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TERMS OF CORRUPTION 
SAMUEL JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY IN ITS CONTEXTS 
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Supervisors: Elizabeth Hedrick and Sara E. Kimball 
 
 
This dissertation revises our understanding of one of the most important and 
controversial works on language in the eighteenth century. It provides the first 
rhetorically situated analysis of the Preface, and offers new ways to read the Dictionary 
that take into account the hermeneutic challenges it poses. I employ replicable 
interpretive strategies for future students of the Dictionary, and offer a novel, substantive 
reconstruction of Johnson’s philological methods and logic.  
By rhetorically situating the Preface, reconstructing the interpretive logic of 
Johnson’s philology, and recovering Johnson’s complex and changing understanding of 
language change, this study makes a significant contribution to Johnson studies and 
revises our understanding of Johnson’s place within the history of modern language 
study. Chapter 1, a rhetorical analysis of the Preface, reveals its importance as an early 
modern masterwork of scholarly self-fashioning in an age when self-promotion was both 
socially and morally awkward. This reading of the Preface moreover explains how and 
 
    vii
why we should limit its role in determining our views about Johnson’s ideas on language. 
Chapter 2 shows how Johnson’s etymologies, definitions, and usage notes—usually 
regarded as discrete acts—are most fruitfully read as complementary interpretive 
activities. By showing how the parts of Johnson’s entries fit together, and by recovering 
the overlooked connections between separate entries, I reconstruct the logic of Johnson’s 
philological reasoning. Chapter 3 shows that, contrary to all accounts, Johnson’s most 
common and most seemingly prescriptive term to describe language change, 
“corruption,” is not just a term of condemnation, but a term of conjecture and inquiry 
operating within a context of early modern scientific discourse whereby all sublunary 
change is viewed as “corruption.” As I demonstrate, Johnson’s use of the term 
“corruption” signals his participation in a paradigm shift regarding thinking about 
language change and shows how he has more in common with nineteenth-century 
historical philologists than we ever imagined. An Epilogue provides a theoretical 
framework for reading the Dictionary. This dissertation not only challenges the ways that 
literary critics, linguists, and historians of the English language read the Dictionary, it 
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 Samuel Johnson has been called many things, but he has rarely been called a 
linguist. In fact, with his many descriptions of language change as “corruption,” Johnson 
is excluded from contemporary histories of linguistics, except as a negative example. If 
Johnson is, for James Boswell, “our great philologist,” he is for modern linguists an 
emblem of bygone prescriptivism.1 Modern treatments of Johnson associate him with the 
“doctrine of correctness,” the “authoritarian principle in linguistic criticism,” and the 
eighteenth-century “puristic movement.”2 The International Encyclopedia of Linguistics 
includes Johnson under its entry on “Prescriptive Grammar,” but excludes him from its 
entry on the history of linguistics.3 Generally, linguists only mention Johnson or 
eighteenth-century language study to demonstrate antiquated, wrongheaded, or even 
morally dubious approaches to linguistics.  
Leonard Bloomfield, pioneer of American structuralist linguistics and one of the 
most influential linguists of the twentieth century, contrasts his own approach with the 
“failures” of “eighteenth-century scholars,” which for him include “the failure to 
distinguish between actual speech and the use of writing” and the conclusion that 
“languages are preserved by the usage of educated and careful people and changed by the 
                                                 
1 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., ed. G. B. Hill, rev. L. F. Powell (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1934-64), I, 187. All references to this text are designated hereafter as Life. When referring to 
multivolume standard editions of Johnson’s works I use Roman numerals. For all other multivolume works 
I use Arabic numerals, in accordance with The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003).  
2 Sterling A. Leonard, The Doctrine of Correctness in English Usage 1700-1800 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, 1929); Harold Byron Allen, “Samuel Johnson and the 
Authoritarian Principle in Linguistic Criticism” (PhD diss., University of Michigan 1940); Jean Aitchison, 
Language Change: Progress or Decay?, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 8. 
3 Lesley Milroy and James Milroy, “Prescriptive Grammar,” in William Bright, ed. International 
Encyclopedia of Linguistics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3:269.  
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corruptions of the vulgar. In the case of modern languages like English,” Bloomfield 
writes, “they believed, accordingly, that the speech-forms of books and upper-class 
conversation represented an older and purer level, from which the ‘vulgarisms’ of the 
common people had branched off as ‘corruptions’ by a process of ‘linguistic decay.’” For 
Bloomfield, the notion of language change as “corruption” or “decay” is a misconception 
that left eighteenth-century “grammarians” free to “prescribe fanciful rules” and 
prevented them from making use of linguistic evidence.4 Accurate linguistic analysis, 
according to this view, can only take place after exorcising morally laden terms like 
“corruption” from the linguist’s interpretive vocabulary. One can only become a linguist 
after casting off both the terms of corruption and the mistaken notions they signify.  
Johnson’s writings on language abound with such terms, of course, which include 
not only “corruption,” but also the closely related words “decay,” “degeneration,” 
“vitiation,” and “depravation.” Such terms, along with opposing terms of purity, like 
“undefiled” and “pure,” lend Johnson’s Preface to the Dictionary a strong moralistic 
tenor and place it in what James and Lesley Milroy call the “complaint tradition” of 
writings on English.5 These terms of corruption suffuse the Preface, the most commonly 
cited source for Johnson’s views on language, and inhabit some of its best known and 
most widely quoted passages. The English language, Johnson writes, has been “exposed 
to the corruptions of ignorance, and caprices of innovation.” Spelling should not be made 
                                                 
4 Leonard Bloomfield, Language (New York: Henry Holt, 1933), 8; also quoted in Scott Elledge, “The 
Naked Science of Language, 1747-1786,” in Studies in Criticism and Aesthetics, 1660-1800: Essays in 
Honor of Samuel Holt Monk, Howard Anderson and John S. Shea, eds. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1967), 293-94.
5 For more on this complaint tradition, see Chapter 2 of James Milroy and Lesley Milroy, Authority in 
Language: Investigating Standard English, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 1999).   
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to “comply with the corruptions of oral utterance.” “Language is only the instrument of 
science, and words are but the signs of ideas: I wish, however, that the instrument might 
be less apt to decay.” When language was “first reduced to an alphabet, every penman 
endeavoured to express, as he could, the sounds which he was accustomed to pronounce 
or to receive, and vitiated in writing such words as were already vitiated in speech.” The 
“diction” of “the labourious and mercantile part of the people” is “always in a state of 
increase or decay,” and “cannot be regarded as any part of the durable materials of a 
language;” it “therefore must be suffered to perish with other things unworthy of 
preservation.” “Commerce. . . depraves the manners” as it “corrupts the language.” It “is 
incident to words, as to their authours, to degenerate from their ancestors.” “[T]ongues, 
like governments, have a natural tendency to degeneration.” 6 Even when Johnson 
suggests that no lexicographer can “put a stop to those alterations” in language “which 
time and chance have hitherto been suffered to make in it”—widely considered to be an 
example of Johnson’s modernity and a gesture of descriptiveness—the “corruption” of 
language change figures as a sign of mutability and mortality. No nation has preserved its 
“words and phrases from mutability,” Johnson writes. The lexicographer can no more 
“embalm his language, and secure it from corruption and decay,” than he can “change 
sublunary nature, and clear the world at once from folly, vanity, and affectation.”7  
                                                 
6 Preface, paragraphs 3, 16, 17, 7, 80, 86, 27, 91. Unless otherwise noted, I use Mona Wilson’s edition of 
the Preface, but cite paragraph numbers rather than page numbers to allow for readers who consult one of 
the various, widely available printings of the Preface. See “Preface to the English Dictionary,” in Johnson: 
Prose and Poetry, ed. Mona Wilson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 301-23. Hereafter cited 
as Preface.  
7 Preface, para. 84.  
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Johnson’s terms of corruption, apart from any other considerations, seem to identify him 
as a pre-linguistic thinker, and to place him squarely outside the realm of linguistics.   
The present study of the Dictionary suggests, however, that Johnson is not a pre-
linguistic thinker, but a linguist in his own right, though constrained by his own times and 
his own terms. Johnson’s understanding of language change as corruption does not 
prevent him from distinguishing “actual speech” from “the use of writing,” and it does 
not lead him to prefer “upper-class conversation.” Linguistic corruption, like moral 
corruption, is for Johnson a consequence of the postlapsarian condition, not the exclusive 
characteristic of any particular station or condition. Writing in the Rambler, Johnson 
notes that the “greater part of mankind are corrupt in every condition, and differ in high 
and in low stations, only as they have more or fewer opportunities of gratifying their 
desires, or as they are more or less restrained by human censures.”8 Linguistic corruption, 
likewise, is common to those in “high and in low stations.” It is a consequence of mortal 
fallibility and the vagaries of human history. Thus in the Plan for the Dictionary, Johnson 
writes, “our language. . . was produced by necessity and enlarged by accident, and is 
therefore composed of dissimilar parts, thrown together by negligence, by affectation, by 
learning, or by ignorance.”9 Johnson’s concession in the Preface to the inevitability of 
language change likens the desire to preserve “words and phrases from mutability” to the 
                                                 
8 Rambler 172 (9 November 1751), in The Rambler, eds. Walter Jackson Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, 
vols. III-V of the Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969), V, 146. All Rambler citations refer to this edition.  
9 “The Plan of a Dictionary of the English Language,” in Johnson: Prose and Poetry, ed. Mona Wilson 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 121-39; para. 31. Hereafter cited as Plan. As is the case with 
the Preface, I cite paragraphs not page numbers.  
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assumption that one could change “sublunary nature.”10 Language change is endemic to 
the human condition—as pervasive as human folly, as incurable as death. Under this 
view, “all things sublunary are subject to change.”11  
“Corruption,” given this context, is not only a key term in our inherited discourse 
of moral lament and indignation, but a fundamental yet now obsolete term of early 
modern scientific discourse. While Johnson draws heavily on the moral tradition in the 
Preface, in the Dictionary itself he frequently draws on the tradition in natural philosophy  
that describes all sublunary change—even the change from wood to fire and the change 
from an egg to a chicken—as “corruption.”12 Because we are so familiar with the still 
active morally laden sense of the term that Johnson uses so conspicuously, we tend to 
read Johnson’s comments on “corruption” in the Dictionary as a harsh term of 
opprobrium, regardless of the context. But throughout the Dictionary, Johnson uses 
“corruption” (in its various forms, “corrupted,” “corrupt,” and so on) not only as a usage 
label with prescriptive force but just as often as a term of linguistic conjecture and 
analysis. So in one entry we may find Johnson writing that the verb to embezzle “seems 
corrupted by an ignorant pronunciation from imbecil.”13  In another entry Johnson refers 
to corruption not so much to prescribe as to offer a conjectural etymology: 
                                                 
10 Preface, para. 84.  
11 This quote, used by Johnson to illustrate the usage of the word “sublunary,” comes from “Dryden’s 
Dufresnoy”: “The celestial bodies above the moon being not subject to chance, remained in perpetual order, 
while all things sublunary are subject to change. 
12 “Wood is said to be corrupted, when we don’t see it remain Wood any longer, but find Fire in its stead. 
And thus the Egg is corrupted, when it ceases to be an Egg, and we find a Chicken in its room.”Ephraim 
Chambers, Cyclopædia: or, an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, 2 vols. (London, 1728), 332, sig. 
Qqqq2v.  
13 Johnson illustrates his two definitions for to embezzle with quotes from historian Sir John Hayward (c. 
1560-1627) and John Dryden. In the entry for to imbecile, which Johnson derives ultimately from the 
French imbecile and the Latin imbecilis, he also notes, “This word is corruptly written embezzle.”  
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DOT. n.s. [This is derived by Skinner from dotter, German, the white of an egg, 
and interpreted by him a grume of pus. It has now no such signification, and 
seems rather corrupted from jot, a point.] A small point or spot made to mark any 
place in a writing.14  
 
Johnson’s comment on dot may be intended to carry prescriptive force, but just as 
importantly it serves as a conjectural etymology, an alternative to Skinner’s analysis. 
While modern etymologists prefer to derive dot from an Old English word meaning the 
“head of a boil,” the point is not whether Johnson was right.  Johnson, to be sure, did not 
have access to the single extant example from the Old English corpus now supporting 
that derivation. Likewise, Johnson lacks the information modern linguists use to say that 
a change from “j” to “d” is not likely.15 The point, rather, is that Johnson uses 
“corrupted” here as a term of analysis rather than complaint.  
An anecdote from Boswell’s Life illustrates the way Johnson employs, as an 
analytic tool, the causes of linguistic corruption that he laments elsewhere. Boswell finds 
Johnson preparing the revision of his Dictionary.” Then they talk “of languages.”  
Johnson observed, that Leibnitz had made some progress in a work, tracing all 
languages up to the Hebrew. ‘Why, Sir, (said he,) you would not imagine that the 
French jour, day, is derived from the Latin dies, and yet nothing is more certain; 
and the intermediate steps are very clear. From dies, comes diurnus. Diu is, by 
inaccurate ears, or inaccurate pronunciation, easily confounded with giu; then the 
                                                 
14 Unless otherwise noted, I use fourth edition (1773) of Johnson’s Dictionary, the edition Johnson revised, 
as my copy-text for entries, but I always consult the first edition (1755) and generally note differences 
between these editions when they occur.  
15 In proposing a change from jot from dot, Johnson proposes a kind of reverse palatalization. The change 
from a “d” sound to a “j” sound, as in “soldier,” is an example of palatalization. The same process can be 
heard as a change from a “t” to a “ch” sound in the way some British speakers of English prounounce the 
word “tune” (“choon”). Palatalization is common in languages across the world and tends to occur to 
certain consonant sounds when they precede what are known to linguists as “front vowels.” The “o” in 
“dot,” however, is likely a “back vowel” and thus would not be expected to trigger palatalization. Johnson 
seems to note a correspondence between “d” and “j” sounds in English pronunciation, but lacks the means 
to judge the likelihood of this particular change.  
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Italians form a substantive of the ablative of an adjective, and thence giurno, or, 
as they make it, giorno; which is readily contracted into giour, or jour.’”16  
 
While Johnson may get some details wrong here, the interesting thing is not whether or 
not he is precisely right, but the fact that he does not lament inaccuracy and confusion—
the mechanisms of corruption, so to speak. Rather, he uses them to help justify a 
derivation that “you would not imagine” but whose “intermediate steps are very clear.” 
Johnson certainly decries “corruptions of ignorance” and the “corruptions of oral 
utterance,” and he urges their avoidance, but when he observes language across time, his 
ideas about what letters might be “easily confounded” by “inaccurate ears” or “inaccurate 
pronunciation” and his assumptions about what might be “readily contracted” transform 
these comments on corruption from topoi of the prescriptive complaint tradition to 
nascent tools of the descriptive linguist’s trade.  
* * * * * * 
 Johnson’s concession in the Preface to the inevitability of language change is 
generally the aperçu we consult to understand Johnson’s attitudes toward language 
change and his place in the history of language study. Almost any summary treatment of 
the Dictionary includes some account—however abbreviated, however qualified—of 
Johnson’s intellectual trajectory from linguistic prescriptivism in the Plan to 
descriptivism.17 The Preface has even been taken to represent “Johnson’s final views on 
                                                 
16 Life, II, 156. This episode occurs in March of 1772, one year before the revised fourth edition appears. 
17 For instance, Victoria Fromkin and Robert Rodman write, “The aim of most early lexicographers, whom 
Dr. Johnson called ‘harmless drudges,’ was to ‘prescribe’ rather than ‘describe’ the words of a language, to 
be, as in the stated aim of one Webster’s dictionaries, the ‘supreme authority’ of the ‘correct’ pronunciation 
and meaning of a word. It is to Johnson’s credit that in his Preface he stated he could not construct the 
language but could only ‘register the language.’ An Introduction to Language, 6th ed. (Fort Worth: 
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), 66. C. M. Millward writes, “When Samuel Johnson announced 
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questions of language.”18 I would like to argue, however, that Boswell’s account of 
Johnson’s derivation of jour is just as important to our understanding of Johnson’s 
developing views on language change and our understanding of his philological work in 
the Dictionary. Yet those who are skeptical about the accuracy of any Johnsonian quote 
in Boswell’s Life may protest. Why should we substitute Boswell’s account of an offhand 
remark for Johnson’s own words in the Preface?   
For several reasons. First, because the comment is an offhand remark, it is not 
compromised by the complex, self-defensive rhetoric of self-fashioning that pervades the 
Preface. Johnson’s representation of language in the Preface, by contrast, is 
hyperbolically charged with terms and tropes that emphasize the difficulties that 
language, by its very nature, pose for him and his task. If Johnson is not able to “fix” the 
language as some had hoped, it is because of the intractable nature of language and the 
numerous, unstoppable causes of language change, which Johnson amplifies with 
rhetorical self-consciousness. Moreover, the observation on jour is offered as a 
remarkable, even surprising, insight or discovery. One “would not imagine” such a 
derivation, yet “nothing is more certain.” Johnson’s confidence in relating the 
presumably counterintuitive circumstances of jour’s derivation comes from years of 
studying, and reflecting on, such details of language change—not only in compiling the 
Dictionary, but in editing an edition of Shakespeare’s works, and in his countless 
                                                                                                                                                 
his plan for a dictionary in 1747, he stated that his purpose was to refine and fix the language. In the course 
of his seven years of compiling A Dictionary of the English Language (two volumes, 1755), he gradually 
recognized the impossibility of achieving this goal, realizing that no living language could ever be fixed 
and that language change was inevitable.” A Biography of the English Language, 2nd ed. (Fort Worth: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1996), 240.  
18 James McLaverty, “From Definition to Explanation: Locke’s Influence on Johnson’s Dictionary,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 47(1986): 378. 
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revisions of the Dictionary’s fourth edition. Such a derivation, enthusiastically related to 
Boswell during a break from those revisions, suggests that the Preface does not, in fact, 
represent Johnson’s final views on language. In its rendering of a “very clear” series of 
“intermediate steps” from dies to jour this derivation is a more orderly depiction of 
language change than any we find in the Preface. In fact, Johnson’s derivation of jour 
captures, as much as anything in the Plan or the Preface, the logic of Johnson’s linguistic 
analysis in the Dictionary. Johnson’s etymological deduction from dies to giorno to jour 
suggests the kinds of sound correspondences Johnson may consider, for instance, when 
positing the connection between dot and jot. It also helps illustrate that, contrary to many 
accounts, Johnson does not ignore oral language in the Dictionary, but uses his 
knowledge of the “corruptions of oral utterance” to inform his philological judgments.  
Boswell’s anecdote also suggests that, in addition to the terms of corruption we 
expect to encounter when Johnson describes language change—the morally laden 
evaluative terms like “decay,” “degeneration,” “vitiation,” and “depravation” in the 
Preface; “bad,” and “barbarous” among his usage notes—we should be prepared to 
recognize another related set of terms of corruption, including but not limited to 
“contraction,” “composition” (compounding), “coalition,” “softening” and various forms 
of the verb “to confound.” “Diu is. . . easily confounded with giu.” Giorno “is readily 
contracted into giour, or jour.”  
Johnson employs these perhaps less conspicuous terms of corruption in the 
Dictionary to describe what he treats as common processes of language change, or types 
of corruption. Johnson often uses one of those terms, “confound,” to describe words 
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whose meanings are confused with one another, as “satire” and “lampoon,” “pot” and 
“kettle,” “thief” and “robber.” But as the derivation of jour indicates, Johnson also uses 
these terms to describe the confounding of “letters.” In his Dictionary entry for the letter 
B, Johnson writes that it  
has a near affinity with the other labial letters, and is confounded by the Germans 
with P, and by the Gascons with V; from which an epigrammatist remarks, that 
bibere and vivere are in Gascony the same. The Spaniards, in most words, use B 
or V indifferently. 
 
Johnson makes similar observations in his etymology for tribe, noting that b and v are 
“labials of promiscuous use in the ancient British words.”  
[tribu, Fr. tribus, Lat. from trev, b and v being labials of promiscuous use in the 
ancient British words; trev from tir ef, his lands, is supposed to be Celtick, and 
used before the Romans had any thing to do with the British government. . . .] 
 
In another context, Johnson might censure phonetic promiscuity or so-called indifferent 
pronunciation, but in these instances they are phenomena of interest to philology.  
The word “contraction” is another important term of corruption in Johnson’s 
descriptive linguistic vocabulary. In some entries, Johnson uses the terms “contraction” 
and “corruption” almost interchangeably. In one entry Johnson describes the word nys as 
an obsolete “corruption of ne is.” Yet in the entry for ne, Johnson describes nis as an 
example of “contraction in compound words.”  
NE. adv. [Saxon. This particle was formerly of very frequent use, both singly  
and by contraction in compound words; as, nill for ne will or will not; nas for ne 
has or has not; nis for ne is or is not.] Neither; and not.  
 
“Contraction” is, then, a kind of corruption. Thus in the entry for the noun remnant 
Johnson writes that it is “corrupted from remanent”; in the entry for remanent, Johnson 
writes, “It is now contracted to remnant.” The term “contraction,” like the term 
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“corruption,” can carry a prescriptive or descriptive emphasis, depending on the context. 
One can certainly find Johnson elsewhere censuring contraction: phiz is a “ridiculous 
contraction” of physiognomy, and the verb to hyp “barbarously contracted from 
hypochondriack.” But in the entry for ne Johnson is describing, not condemning usage. 
“Contraction,” like “corruption,” is also a term of conjectural etymology, as in the entry 
for ant: 
ANT.n.s. [æmett, Sax. which Junius imagines, not without probability, to have 
been first contracted to æmt, and then softened to ant.]  
 
These terms of corruption seem to signify for Johnson universal processes of language 
change that often work in tandem with one another. By using these terms, language 
change is describable within the framework of corruption that is generally used to 
describe processes of material change in early modern Europe. We generally overlook 
this latter lexicon of corruption in the Dictionary because its terms are often employed in 
the etymologies, often ignored because they are deemed ignorant and thus worthless. 
Moreover, we overlook them because we generally do not associate them with Johnson’s 
term “corruption,” which is generally read as moralistic complaint, as in the Preface, or 
as a usage note alongside his comments on “barbarous” words, rather than a descriptive 
term of analysis or a heuristic term of discovery in the Dictionary. 
* * * * * * 
Currently, there is no account of these heuristic terms of corruption in any account 
of Johnson’s ideas about language or his ‘language theory.’ This is largely due to the fact 
that Johnson’s handling of “corruption” in the Preface, rather than the Dictionary itself, is 
what most scholars are really writing about when they write about either Johnson’s use of 
    11
 
“corruption” or his views on language change. James McLaverty writes, for instance, that 
Johnson  
believed language participated in a general movement towards decay, since “it is 
incident to words, as to their authors, to degenerate from their ancestors;” and 
though he recognized that individual languages might follow a pattern from 
rudeness, through perfection, to false refinement and declension, the movement 
from language to language he always regarded as one of degeneration; modern 
words are inferior to their originals.19
 
Taken from its context in the Preface, where Johnson is defending the fact that words he 
portrays as etymologically related “do not always agree in sense,” this statement is made 
to represent, generally, Johnson’s views on language change and his views on “modern 
words.”20  Yet it seems inadequate to describe Johnson’s account of the movement from 
dies to diurnus to giurnus, thence to giurno, giour, and finally to jour, as a “general 
movement towards decay.” It is unclear, likewise, whether Johnson views jour as 
somehow inferior to dies. In fact, such an observation seems beside the point Johnson is 
making to Boswell about jour; so also does it seem beside the point in Johnson’s 
conjectural derivation, in the Dictionary, of harangue: 
HARA'NGUE. n.s. [harangue, French. The original of the French word is much 
questioned: Menage thinks it a corruption of hearing, English; Junius imagines it 
to be discours au rang, to a circle, which the Italian arringo seems to favour. 
Perhaps it may be from orare, or orationare, orationer, oraner, aranger, 
haranguer.] A speech; a popular oration.21  
 
Putting aside the fact that modern etymologists favor Junius’s etymology, what is 
striking, for our purposes, is Johnson’s conjectural etymology, which is not adequately 
described as a postulated negative trajectory “toward decay.” Like the derivation of jour, 
                                                 
19 James McLaverty, “From Definition to Explanation,” 381. 
20 Preface, para. 27.  
21 I have removed the illustrative quotations.  
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this derivation proposes a series of changes which includes losses and additions, rather 
than a simple movement toward decay. Johnson’s postulated corruptions are an 
alternative to those of Menage, and are further supported by Johnson’s assessment of the 
definition: “a speech; a popular oration.” 
However ridiculous they may seem to a modern etymologist, Johnson’s 
conjectures about the etymology of harangue assume the operation of general processes 
of language change Johnson observes elsewhere, such as contraction, as well as another 
kind of “corruption,” the addition of h to the beginning of a word, that Johnson assumes 
in the etymology for hatchment: 
HA'TCHMENT. n.s. [Corrupted from atchievement. See ATCHIEVEMENT.] 
Armorial escutcheon placed over a door at a funeral.22  
 
The proposed changes from atchievement to hatchment, like those from dies to jour, from 
orationare to harangue, involve losses and additions, not a simple movement toward 
decay or a movement from superiour to inferior. Yet without the close examination of 
Johnson’s terms of corruption, and the countless observations on language change in 
which they are employed in the Dictionary, the rhetorically charged Preface will 
dominate discussions of Johnson’s ideas about “corruption” and about language change.   
 A closer examination of Johnson’s terms of corruption is also in order because 
these terms are often deployed by scholars who find in them evidence not only of 
hegemony, xenophobia, and “anxiety,” but also misogyny, and even a delusional retreat 
from the reality of living language into a Platonic world of pure, ideal lexical forms. As is 
                                                 
22 The Dictionary contains no entry for atchievement, but does contain an entry for an achievement whose 
second definition is similar to the one given for hatchment. The entry for hatchment contains an illustration, 
which I exclude here, from Shakespeare’s Hamlet.  
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usually the case, the terms of corruption as found in the Preface dominate the discussion. 
Deidre Lynch, who views Johnson as “the Tory lexicographer” with a “distaste for social 
mobility,” finds in his terms of corruption and purity evidence for her view that “by 
questing after the uncorrupted” Johnson “backs into Platonism.” Johnson’s lexicography, 
Lynch writes, involves a general “retreat from a documentary engagement with the real.” 
Thus Johnson, seeking ideal Platonic forms, retreats from “a recalcitrant material world 
where ordinary language—realism—proves inadequate to the conservationist’s 
mission.”23 Olivia Smith, who studies the linguistic ideas of Johnson “in so far as they 
contributed to the hegemony of language, justifying and perpetuating class divisions,” 
reads Johnson’s comments on “corruption” as an indicator of his “political position.” 
Johnson’s “Preface and his definitions betray his political position, both his anger at 
corruption and his distrust of expanding political power beyond traditional boundaries.”24 
Rajani Sudan reads the Preface as part of a larger effort to “illustrate Johnson’s definition 
of English culture as one produced through xenophobia.” Interested in “issues of 
contamination” that “inform Johnson’s lexicographic task,” Sudan analyzes Johnson’s 
“Johnson’s anxiety about the possibility of linguistic infection” as it seems to appear in 
his comments in the Preface on “jargon which serves the traffickers on the 
Mediterranean and Indian coasts.”25 “Johnson’s anxiety” seems “to be class based as 
well as xenophobic,” thus “Johnson aligns ‘strangers’ with corruption, and particularly 
                                                 
23 Deidre Lynch, “‘Beating the Track of the Alphabet’: Samuel Johnson, Tourism, and the ABCs of 
Modern Authority,” ELH 57 (1990): 381, 377, 389, 378, 373.  
24 Olivia Smith, The Politics of Language 1791-1819 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 4, 16, 14.  
25 Rajani Sudan, Chapter 1, “Institutionalizing Xenophobia: Johnson’s Project,” in Fair Exotics: 
Xenophobic Subjects in English Literature, 1720-1850 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2002), 26-7, 33, 38; Preface, para. 86.  
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strangers from exoticized ports of exchange. . . The “mingled” mongrel dialect such 
traffickers speak” may infect “the proper language” and thus hinder “the lexicographer’s 
search for linguistic ‘purity.’”26 Unfortunately, Sudan, like Lynch and for the most part 
Smith, relies exclusively on the Preface to make her claims about Johnson’s 
lexicographic task.  
For Janet Sorenson, Johnson’s thoughts on corruption are an index of his animus 
toward “contemporary” usage and the “associative, random, creative aspects of 
metaphor,” as well as the “common people,” “outsiders,” and women.27 On the basis of 
Johnson’s comment in the Preface that “words are the daughters of earth, and that things 
are the sons of heaven,” Sorenson argues that Johnson “genders the ‘living’ language he 
confronts female, especially in its tendency towards growth and corruption.”28 This 
“gendering of language change,” Sorenson writes, “corresponds to an Enlightenment 
image of nature as wild and entangled, fluid and unstable, in need of order and 
hierarchy.” After aligning Johnson “with such Enlightenment figures as the encyclopedia 
writer or scientist,” who are “continually asserting an ordering force over a feminized 
                                                 
26 Rajani Sudan, Fair Exotics, 38.  
27 Janet Sorenson, The Grammar of Empire in Eighteeenth-Century British Writing (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), Chapter 2, “‘A grammarian’s regard to the genius of our tongue’: 
Johnson’s Dictionary, Imperial Grammar, and the Customary National Language,” 73, 74, 93, 103, 77-8.  
28 Sorenson, The Grammar of Empire, 77. Johnson’s depiction of words as the “daughters of the earth” 
comes from the Preface, para. 17, and is, according to Steven Lynn, an allusion to Genesis 6.1-2. Johnson’s 
allusion comes on the heels of his appeal for “steadiness and uniformity” in written language. Johnson 
wants to make it clear that this “recommendation. . . does not proceed from an opinion, that particular 
combinations of letters have much influence on human happiness; or that truth may not be successfully 
taught by modes of spelling fanciful and erroneous: I am not yet so lost in lexicography, as to forget that 
words are the daughters of earth, and that things are the sons of heaven.” For Lynn’s observation, see 
“Locke’s Eye, Adam’s Tongue, Johnson’s Word: Language, Marriage, and ‘The Choice of Life,’” The Age 
of Johnson 3 (1990): 58. Citing Lynn’s observation on this allusion, Dennis Dean Kezar, Jr. writes, “This 
enigmatic metaphor, which most critics conclude is Johnson’s own,” also draws from “eighteenth-century 
iconography that traditionally represented language as female.” See “Radical Letters and Male Genealogies 
in Johnson’s Dictionary,” Studies in English Literature 35 (1995): 515 n. 24.    
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space of the unknown and unordered,” Sorenson employs Johnson’s terms of corruption 
in the Preface to display a “revealing characterization of the Dictionary project,” one in 
which Johnson’s rational inquiry is, disturbingly, a kind of sublimated necrophilia:    
Johnson images [sic] the lexicographer’s ultimate dream as being able to 
“embalm his language, and secure it from corruption and decay”; the ideal form 
for the object of examination is life-less but life-like, at best a perfectly preserved 
corpse. In this necrophillic figure is a revealing characterization of the Dictionary 
project. The body of language—gendered female—is open for endless inspection, 
preserved intact so that a total knowledge is possible. Dead, it is no longer capable 
of the entangling threat of unregulated growth. It is perhaps predictable, then, that 
Johnson describes his desire to “pierce deep into every science.”29
 
Sorenson’s “necrophillic figure” is certainly a nightmarish vision of the “Enlightenment 
mind” and its presumed desires.30 But by conjuring a phantom “body of language” out of 
disparate metaphors in the Preface, Sorenson constructs a caricature, rather than a 
“revealing characterization of the Dictionary project.” In contrast to the previous studies 
cited, Sorenson’s study does not rely exclusively on the Preface to characterize the 
Dictionary, but the image she offers as a “revealing characterization of the Dictionary 
project” depends on her reading of the Preface and its terms of corruption.  
 More sympathetic readers of the Preface also depend on it almost exclusively to 
characterize Johnson’s use of “corruption.” For example, Nicholas Hudson, defending 
Johnson against the charge that he “attempted to serve the linguistic demands of the rich 
and powerful, or to exclude the idiom of the poor or vulgar,” argues that Johnson “laid 
most of the blame for the recent corruption of English not on speakers but on ‘penmen’ 
                                                 
29 Sorenson, Grammar of Empire, 77-78. 
30 Citing the work of Ruth Salvaggio, Luce Irigaray, and Helene Cixous, Sorenson writes that the 
“Enlightenment mind” figured the “space” of nature—an “‘other’ space”—as a “fluid realm outside the 
pristine islands and systems of men.” Thus, according to Sorenson, William Warburton’s metaphor of the 
“wide sea of words” and Johnson’s metaphorical descriptions of language as a “maze” in which he might 
be entangled are necessarily gendered figurations of language. See Sorenson, Grammar of Empire, 77-78.  
    16
 
and those he called ‘illiterate writers,’” constituents of a “predominately literate” and 
“mercantile middle-class.” “Linguistic disorder springs not from people at the lower end 
of the social spectrum, but from those who have had some education and leisure to 
think,” including the “idle upper classes” that were “one important source of the cant and 
improper innovation that he sought to correct.”31 Ultimately, Hudson’s claim that 
Johnson blames the leisured classes, not “people at the lower end of the social spectrum,” 
for “linguistic disorder” suffers because it places too much emphasis on the need to find 
an element of society from which “linguistic disorder springs” in Johnson’s view.  
It seems difficult to argue that Johnson singles out any class of people as the 
exclusive cause of “linguistic disorder” when he observes that English is “variable by the 
caprice of every one that speaks it” while “our language is yet living.”32 If “corruptions” 
are the product of “oral utterance—if vowels are “capriciously pronounced” and 
“differently modified, by accident or affectation, not only in every province, but in every 
mouth”—how can any class of speakers be especially to blame for “corruption”?33 If 
Johnson points out that the “fugitive cant” of “the laborious and mercantile part of the 
people” is “always in a state of increase or decay,” he also observes that language change 
necessarily accompanies the “leisure to think,” the “increase of knowledge,” the 
“cultivation of various sciences,” the “tropes of poetry,” and the increase of 
“politeness.”34 If “traffickers on the Mediterranean and Indian coasts” must “in time 
learn a mingled dialect,” so also languages “will always be mixed, where a chief part of 
                                                 
31 Nicholas Hudson, “Johnson’s Dictionary and the Politics of ‘Standard English,’” Yearbook of English 
Studies: Eighteenth-Century Lexis and Lexicography 28 (1998): 86-7.  
32 Preface, para. 45.  
33 Preface, paras. 16, 10.  
34 Preface, paras. 80, 87-89.  
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education, and the most conspicuous accomplishment, is skill in ancient or foreign 
tongues.”35 Language change is attributed to human fallibility generally in the Preface as 
much as anything else. It is the product of “ignorance” and “affectation,” “negligence” 
and “caprice,” qualities not restricted to any particular station in life. Language change is 
a consequence of life, of “the real state of sublunary nature, which partakes of good and 
evil, joy and sorrow, mingled with endless variety of proportion and innumerable modes 
of combination.”36 If Johnson wishes that language “might be less apt to decay,” he does 
not desire Sorenson’s “perfectly preserved corpse” for inspection, but rather tries to 
explain why language change is unavoidable so long as “our language is yet living.”37  
* * * * * * 
 Despite their clear importance to our understanding of Johnson’s views on 
language, his terms of corruption are only part of the story. This study aims to challenge 
not only the ways we typically read Johnson’s terms of corruption, but the ways in which 
we typically arrive at our understanding of Johnson’s views on language change, and 
most generally, the ways we tend to read—or consult—the Dictionary. The generally 
neglected heuristic terms of “corruption” suffuse the Dictionary and disclose essential 
operative assumptions about language change employed by Johnson throughout. But in 
order to recover these neglected terms and the knowledge they bear about Johnson as a 
linguist, we must first understand why we cannot merely rely on the Preface alone to 
understand how Johnson views language change. And if we are to consult the Dictionary 
                                                 
35 Preface, paras. 86, 89.  
36 “Preface to Shakespeare, 1765,” in Johnson on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo, vols. VII-VIII of the 
Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), VII, 66. 
37 Preface, paras. 17, 45.  
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for such understanding, we must also find feasible, manageable ways to read this 
important and controversial text, which is of such importance to eighteenth-century 
studies, as well as the histories of English and English lexicography. Moreover, we need 
to reexamine the interpretive conventions and assumptions we bring to the Dictionary 
when we do consult it. Finally, we must be sensitive to the semantic slippage present in 
Johnson’s evaluative and descriptive terms, which like the term “corruption” are by turns, 
sometimes simultaneously, prescriptive and descriptive.  
To achieve these aims, this study includes chapters examining, in order, the 
Preface, the textual nature and structure of the Dictionary and its implications for our 
readings of the Dictionary, and Johnson’s use of corruption as a term of linguistic 
analysis. Chapter 1, a rhetorical analysis of the Preface, reveals its importance as an early 
modern masterwork of scholarly self-fashioning in an age when self-promotion was both 
socially and morally awkward. This reading of the Preface moreover explains how and 
why we should limit its role in determining our views about Johnson’s ideas on language. 
Chapter 2 shows how Johnson’s etymologies, definitions, and usage notes—usually 
regarded as discrete acts—are most fruitfully read as complementary interpretive 
activities. By showing how the parts of Johnson’s entries fit together, and by recovering 
the overlooked connections between separate entries, I reconstruct the logic of Johnson’s 
philological reasoning. Chapter 3 shows that, contrary to all accounts, Johnson’s most 
common and most seemingly prescriptive term to describe language change, 
“corruption,” is not just a term of condemnation, but a term of conjecture and inquiry 
operating within a context of early modern scientific discourse whereby all sublunary 
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change is viewed as “corruption.” As I demonstrate, Johnson’s use of the term 
“corruption” reveals his changing views on language change and shows how he has more 
in common with nineteenth-century historical philologists than we ever imagined. I close 
with an epilogue placing my own work in the context of Peter Rabinowitz’s idea of 
“authorial reading,” which involves “accepting the author’s invitation to read in a 
particular socially constituted way that is shared by the author and his or her expected 
readers.”38 Such a reading of Johnson’s Dictionary, I argue, provides a useful point of 


























                                                 
38 Peter Rabinowitz, “From Before Reading,” in The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary 
Trends, 2nd ed. David H. Richter, ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 1000.  
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Chapter 1, The Rhetoric of Johnson’s Preface to the Dictionary 
 
 While few modern readers have actually consulted a copy of the Dictionary, 
many have read its widely anthologized Preface. The Preface has always served as a 
crucial mediator between reader and text—so much so that it often substitutes for the text 
it introduces. And while scholars have long praised the Preface for its grand pathos, or 
pointed out the fact that Johnson drew heavily on commonplaces, they have rarely 
considered how awkward and vexing it may have been for Johnson to compose it. But if, 
as scholars suggest, Johnson composed the Preface between the summer and autumn of 
1754, his rhetorical circumstances were unprecedented, despite a long tradition of 
dictionary and scholarly prefaces.39 Monolingual English dictionaries had been offered to 
the public since Robert Cawdrey’s Table Alphabetical in 1604, but they were works of 
humble pretensions compiled “as well for the Entertainment of the Curious as the 
Information of the Ignorant.”40 Johnson’s work, by contrast, was marketed as a work of 
                                                 
39 There is currently no conclusive evidence to indicate exactly when Johnson wrote the Preface. We can 
confidently date it after 3 April 1753, when Johnson writes that he has not yet begun writing it; Diaries, 
Prayers, and Annals, ed. E. L. McAdam, Jr., with Donald and Mary Hyde, Vol. I of the Yale Edition of the 
Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 50. The two most detailed studies of 
the Dictionary’s composition—James H. Sledd and Gwin J. Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary: Essays in the 
Biography of a Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 110; and Allen Reddick, The Making of 
Johnson’s Dictionary, 1746-1773, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 75—
both conjecture that Johnson wrote the Preface and other prefatory materials in 1754 (summer for Sledd 
and Kolb, summer-autumn for Reddick) once he had given his printer, William Strahan, the complete 
manuscript for Vol. II of the Dictionary. For arguments about when Johnson completed the Dictionary 
manuscript, see Sledd and Kolb, 109-10, and Reddick, 73-4. Chesterfield’s first puff for the Dictionary 
appeared in The World for 28 November, 1754, and Johnson both wrote his letter to Chesterfield and 
received his honorary degree in February 1755. David Fleeman conjectures that as late as 21 December 
1754 “Johnson had not yet written his ‘Preface’ and other preliminary essays”; see “Dr. Johnson’s 
Dictionary, 1755,” in Samuel Johnson, 1709-84: A Bicentenary Exhibition (The Arts Council of Great 
Britain: London, 1984), 41. In this section of this chapter I cite the 1747 and 1755 editions of the Plan and 
Preface, respectively, and cite signature marks rather than page numbers. See notes 43 and 46 below.  
40 London Evening Post, (30 April 1745), 3, from an advertisement for the eleventh edition of Nathaniel 
Bailey’s An Universal Etymological English Dictionary, reprinted in facsimile in James Tierney, “Book 
Advertisements in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Newspapers: The Example of Robert Dodsley,” in A Genius for 
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national consequence—a work of great import and significant mental labor—a dictionary 
“in the superior sense of that title.”41 Consequently, in the Preface Johnson was 
introducing a work of great scholarly ambition, an English dictionary to place alongside 
the academic dictionaries of France and Italy.  
 But in the summer and autumn of 1754, Samuel Johnson was still an Oxford 
dropout who lacked even a bachelor’s degree, and the task of introducing his own work 
to the public must have been challenging. Johnson’s task was made more awkward 
because he had publicly dedicated the 1747 Plan of the Dictionary to a patron, Lord 
Chesterfield, who appeared by the autumn of 1754 to have forgotten his charge until late 
November of that year, when the Dictionary was in the final stages of its printing. Thus 
Johnson would have to commit, quite carefully, an act of erasure in the Preface. Writing 
the Preface without the legitimizing cachet of a patron or even a dignified list of 
subscribers, Johnson was in the awkward position of putting himself forward—of 
recommending himself and his own work to the public. To do so was no easy task at a 
time when professional writers, caught between the degrading image of Grub Street 
hacks and the inaccessible ethos of leisured writers untainted by lucre, “did not fit into 
prevailing ideas about how the literary world was constructed.”42 Johnson’s task was 
further complicated by the fact that while his Dictionary was a work of great scholarly 
ambition, it lacked the traditional textual signs of aristocratic support for such work—a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Letters: Booksellers and Bookselling from the 16th to the 20th Century, ed. Robin Myers and Michael 
Harris (Winchester: St Paul’s Bibliographies, 1995), 108. The standard scholarly work on monolingual 
English dictionaries before Johnson is DeWitt T. Starnes and Gertrude E. Noyes, The English Dictionary 
from Cawdrey to Johnson 1604-1755 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946).  
41 The World, No. 100 (28 November 1754), 601. 
42 John Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 144. 
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dedication or a list of noble subscribers—so it was ostensibly “nothing but a bookseller’s 
job,” as one contemporary described it.43  
 Although Johnson’s private letter to Chesterfield has, in hindsight, been seen as a 
symbolic declaration of independence for modern authors, it is the Dictionary’s Preface, 
not the unpublished letter to Chesterfield, in which Johnson first presents himself to the 
public as a man unbeholden to the traditional legitimizers of scholarship—the aristocracy 
and the academy. As Johnson writes, “the English Dictionary was written with little 
assistance of the learned, and without any patronage of the great; not in the soft 
obscurities of retirement, or under the shelter of academick bowers, but amidst 
inconvenience and distraction, in sickness and sorrow.”44 Johnson never disavowed the 
ideal of patronage in principle and later relished the opportunity to don his Oxford gown, 
once he received his honorary M.A., but when he wrote the Preface, he could not claim 
the support of either legitimizing institution.45 He would be including no dedication to an 
authorizing noble, nor was he even able to tender the cultural capital afforded by 
academic degree letters after his name. In effect, by means of his rhetorical performance 
                                                 
43 James L. Clifford, Dictionary Johnson: Samuel Johnson’s Middle Years, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979), 141. This comment appears in a letter from Thomas Edwards to Daniel Wray. Clifford describes 
Edwards as “a stalwart Whig” and claims that “much of his attack was politically based.”  
44 Samuel Johnson, Preface to A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols. (London, 1755), Sig. C2r.  
45 While Johnson, of course, secured his honorary M.A. from Oxford in time to place the designation after  
his name on the title page, he almost certainly wrote the Preface before knowing that the degree was his. 
Johnson was aware in November 1754 that Thomas Warton and Francis Wise were working to obtain the 
degree, but he did not know even as late as 13 February 1755 where the matter of his degree stood. Once 
Johnson learned of receiving the degree on 25 February 1755, only one day elapsed before newspaper 
advertisements appeared, beginning 27 February 1755, announcing the imminent publication of the 
Dictionary. For Johnson’s letters regarding the degree, see The Letters of Samuel Johnson, ed. Bruce 
Redford, 5 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992-94), I, 88-90, 91-92, 94, 97-101. This edition 
will be cited hereafter as Letters. Regarding the first advertisements for the Dictionary, see Sledd and Kolb, 
Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 110. Having received the degree, Johnson, on a visit to Oxford, wrote, “I have 
been in my gown ever since I came here.” One observer reports that Johnson “prided himself in being, 
during his visits to Oxford, accurately in all points; and he wore his [M.A.] gown almost ostentatiously,” 
Letters, I, 186 and 186 n. 2.   
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in the Preface, Johnson would have to establish his ethos independent of those traditional, 
implicit yet powerful means of legitimation. Johnson adopted this approach by necessity, 
not by choice, and his Preface is the reluctant self-promotion of an uncredentialed scholar 
whose public reputation was still in flux. 
 While some scholars have discussed the pathos of the Preface, its ideological 
underpinnings, or even some of its evident strains of self-promotion, most scholarly 
treatments of the Preface pay little attention to the complex material and rhetorical 
circumstances that would have been most significant to Johnson as he, for the first time, 
fashioned his independent and authoritative public ethos, presenting himself apart from 
any other authorizing agent.46 Certain material circumstances, such as the size and price 
of his book, and the realities of the way books were reviewed and received, constituted 
some of the most obvious elements of Johnson’s rhetorical situation, shaping his 
assumptions about audience and his decisions about how to present himself to the public. 
Subsequent scholarship has characterized Johnson’s ethos as a proudly professional 
author, but it is more accurate to say that he was apologetically professional at a time 
when writing for the booksellers carried little or no cachet, especially in a work of such 
scholarly ambition. Johnson made no mention of his “professional status” except 
indirectly, by noting his lack of dependence on patrons or academe.  
 Johnson’s material circumstances, and the material qualities of his book, would 
restrict the rhetoric available to him as he presented himself to the public. He needed to 
                                                 
46 Daniel P. Gunn provides a useful reading of the Preface as “a work of art in its own right” but in reading 
the Preface apart from historical conditions, “for its own sake, as a complex and carefully wrought text,” 
Gunn’s study leaves unexplained contexts which help account for what he describes as “Johnson’s unusual 
emphasis on himself and his efforts throughout  the Preface.” “The Lexicographer’s Task: Language, 
Reason, and Idealism in Johnson’s Dictionary Preface,” The Age of Johnson 11 (2000): 105, 106 and 113.    
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adopt a tone and manner that was appropriately authoritative, given the audacious nature 
of his work, which he fashioned in the Plan as a part of a daunting “contest with united 
academies and long successions of learned compilers.”47 Yet Johnson’s circumstances as 
a writer for hire prevented his adopting the traditional pose of the leisured author whose 
work was the “diversion of some of my Idle and Happy Hours.”48 Still, the ambitious 
nature of Johnson’s Dictionary meant that he would need to differentiate himself from 
those “several authors, who, without any pretensions to genius, or human literature, 
earned a very genteel subsistence, by undertaking work for booksellers, in which 
reputation was not at all concerned.”49 Johnson was presenting serious scholarship, 
presumed to be undertaken for the greater good, but underwritten by booksellers, not 
patrons. As well, Johnson was directly addressing the public in his own voice, and under 
no one’s wing, for the first time—all of this at a time when the future for Johnson was 
quite unclear.50 Constrained and influenced by these material and rhetorical 
circumstances, Johnson set out to defend his work.  
                                                 
47 Samuel Johnson, The Plan of a Dictionary of the English Language; Addressed to the Right Honourable 
Philip Dormer, Earl of CHESTERFIELD; One of His MAJESTY’S Principal Secretaries of State, (London, 
1747), Sig. E r. 
48 John Locke, “Epistle to the Reader,” An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch 
(1975; repr. with corrections, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 [1690]), 6. 
49 Tobias Smollett, The Adventures of Peregrine Pickle, ed. James L. Clifford (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964 [1751]), 637. O M Brack, Jr. and Thomas Kaminski cite this passage to illustrate the character 
of the Medicinal Dictionary, for which Johnson wrote a dedication; “Johnson, James, and the ‘Medicinal 
Dictionary,’” Modern Philology 81 (1983-84): 381.  
50 Johnson’s name had certainly appeared in print alongside his work before—when The Vanity of Human 
Wishes was published, when Irene was published, and on the title page of his Plan—but not often. The 
Rambler and Adventurer essays and his “Life of Savage” were published anonymously, even if certain 
friends and literati knew he wrote them. But before writing the Preface, Johnson had never been in the 
position of having to explain or justify his work in direct address to the reading public. The Plan, of course, 
was addressed to Lord Chesterfield. Despite the Plan’s pragmatic function as a marketing tool, structurally 
and symbolically, members of the reading public are not addressees, but rather witnesses of Johnson’s 
address to Chesterfield. Chesterfield, not the reader, is asked to consider the merits of Johnson’s scheme.  
    25
 
Johnson’s Preface is a careful work of scholarly self-advocacy, a proleptic 
apologia in which he adapts the rhetoric of self-presentation both to the material 
circumstances of the Dictionary’s production and reception, and to the awkward 
necessity of having to promote himself at a time when scholarly self-promotion was 
socially and morally awkward. Among the handful of scholarly treatments of the Preface, 
no study has approached it as a historically situated rhetorical document. While most 
treatments of the Preface recognize its rhetorical power, none has considered why 
Johnson might have chosen to lend this text such moral and philosophical resonance 
beyond his propensity toward the philosophical. A rhetorically situated study will not 
only recover important contexts of the Preface, but also will address some uncertain 
readings of its audience and ethos. No study of the Preface has adequately considered 
these material and rhetorical contexts, though they would have been essential to 
Johnson’s estimation of his rhetorical situation, and to his judgments about audience and 
ethos. As Donald Siebert has suggested about Johnson’s later Preface to Shakespeare, the 
Preface to the Dictionary is in some ways as much about Johnson as it is about the 
Dictionary.51 Understanding these contexts reminds us that the Preface is not simply an 
outline of lexicographic methodology, or an unselfconscious effusion of emotion or 
ironic humility. Rather it is a subtly crafted rhetorical self-construction calibrated to make 
the most of an awkward rhetorical situation. This essay attempts to establish what Gérard 
Genette might term Johnson’s “prefatorial situation of communication,” and argues that 
                                                 
51 Donald T. Siebert, Jr., “The Scholar as Satirist: Johnson’s Edition of Shakespeare,” SEL (1975): 486.  
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an understanding of this complex situation makes common assumptions about the 
audience and ethos of the Preface, and even the aims of the Dictionary, untenable.52  
 
I. Johnson’s Proud Folio: The Material and Rhetorical Contexts of the  
Preface  
 
 In William Thackeray’s Vanity Fair, Becky Sharp tosses Johnson’s “Dixionary” 
out of the coach window as she leaves Miss Pinkerton’s academy. But the dictionary 
Miss Sharp tosses out of the window is not the same one most critics refer to when they 
discuss “Johnson’s Dictionary.” As Clifford points out, Becky’s copy cost “only two-
and-ninepence,” and was probably an octavo edition.53 Most critics, however, refer to 
Johnson’s folio Dictionary, a large and expensive work published in two weighty 
volumes. Becky Sharp would not easily have “flung” a folio edition of Johnson’s 
Dictionary through the coach window—she would have had to heave each ponderous 
volume one by one, providing that the massive folios could fit through the coach window 
at all.54  Of course, what is more to the point for Thackeray and his readers is that Becky 
rejects what Johnson’s Dictionary represents. For Thackeray, Johnson’s Dictionary, 
almost a century after its initial publication, became an efficient, potent icon of 
institutional authoritarianism—a symbol against which Thackeray could characterize 
Becky as an impious and impetuous girl. The fact that Becky’s Dictionary and the 
                                                 
52 Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997 [1987]), Ch. 8, “The Prefatorial Situation of Communication.” I do not depend on Genette’s 
classification scheme, but am indebted throughout to his account of the forms and functions of a work’s 
paratextual elements—all those elements of a book which exist on the threshold of a work and which are 
“at the service of a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it,” 2.  
53 Clifford, Dictionary Johnson, 145.  
54 William Makepeace Thackeray, Vanity Fair: A Novel without a Hero, ed. James Sutherland (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983 [1847-48]), 10.  
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scholar’s Dictionary are often not distinguished suggests that the work’s status as a 
cultural icon has overshadowed significant details of its material circulation. Johnson’s 
Dictionary was published in various editions, and in various formats, over a long period 
of time. So when we talk about Johnson’s Dictionary, we use a single term to refer to 
many, sometimes quite different, texts. As these texts were printed, bound, and 
distributed throughout England and beyond, “Johnson’s Dictionary” became a shorthand 
term for the authoritative, institutional symbol it appears to be in Vanity Fair, regardless 
of size or format.55 And just as “Johnson’s Dictionary” became a shorthand term for the 
authoritative, institutional symbol it appears to be in Vanity Fair, “Dr. Johnson” came to 
stand as a symbol of authority, to be obeyed or flouted.  
But when Johnson compiled his Dictionary and wrote its now famous Preface he 
was not the authoritative Doctor but a man whose public authority rested significantly on 
his powers of self-representation.56 If we look past our inherited authoritarian image of 
“The Doctor” we will be reminded that Johnson compiled his Dictionary and wrote its 
framing, mediating text, the Preface, as a man who still needed to negotiate carefully his 
own authority in a contentious literary marketplace. The Preface was not just a 
                                                 
55 This shorthand term is, of course, necessary and convenient. In this portion of this chapter, my own 
references to the Dictionary and its Preface are, unless otherwise noted, to the 1755 first edition folio.  
56 Boswell records a note by Bennett Langton fils which claims that Johnson “did once receive from Lord 
Chesterfield the sum of ten pounds” but that this was an “inconsiderable” sum; Life, I, 261 n. 3. J. D. 
Fleeman, citing this note in his examination of Johnson’s literary earnings, lists this receipt of £10 as 
occurring in August 1749. This date must be a misprint for 1747, given the item’s place in Fleeman’s 
chronological list, and given the Plan’s publication date, which Fleeman lists as corresponding with the £10 
gift. Fleeman does not provide evidence for this particular dating, but it seems to come from John Croker’s 
note in Boswell’s Life, cited by Fleeman, which claims, “No doubt they [the £10] had been given in 1747 
as an acknowledgment of the compliment paid to Chesterfield in the Plan,” Life, I, 262.  See J. D. Fleeman, 
“The Revenue of a Writer: Samuel Johnson’s Literary Earnings,” in Studies in the Book Trade in Honour of 
Graham Pollard, ed. R. W. Hunt, I. G. Philip, and R. J. Roberts (Oxford: Oxford Bibliographical Society, 
1975), 212.  
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methodological document meant to introduce a dictionary, but an easy-to-circulate 
marketing tool—a self-promotional document that Johnson viewed as both crucial to his 
work’s reception and important to his own literary career. Johnson wrote the Preface, the 
first public document in which he directly addressed the public as himself, aware that it 
would be read by an international audience, and he used that opportunity to fashion a 
public ethos for himself. Though we generally encounter the Preface apart from its 
original material contexts, those contexts significantly shaped the way eighteenth-century 
writers and readers presented and received texts. To an extent that scholars have not duly 
acknowledged, Johnson adapted the rhetoric of his self-presentation not only to the 
material aspects of his book and its production, but also to the conditions of textual 
transmission and reception, and to his own tenuous authority in the literary marketplace. I 
will outline in this section the material factors—the format and size of the Dictionary,  
the circumstances of its production, and book reviewing practices of the mid eighteenth 
century—which constrained and shaped Johnson’s most essential rhetorical choices about 
ethos and audience.  
 The very format and size of Johnson’s Dictionary, as it became apparent to 
Johnson, helped shape his sense of the appropriate ethos and likely audience for his 
Preface. When Johnson first conceived his Dictionary for a congeries of booksellers in 
his 1746 “Scheme,” he was free to imagine what it might contain and what audiences it 
might serve. But by the time he wrote his Preface eight years later, after starts and stops 
and methodological modifications, his Dictionary was no longer an object of his 
imagination, but a physical one of considerable physical bulk. His Dictionary manuscript 
    29
 
was complete or nearly so, and entries through GRATE had long since been printed.57 
The Dictionary Johnson imagined in the Plan as pleasing both “critic” and “learner,” 
“philosopher” and “common workman” (Sig. A3r), grew page by page into a work that 
was “vasta mole superbus,” proud in its prodigious bulk, as Johnson described it just 
weeks before publication.58 A book of such size, consisting of “two unwieldly volumes” 
as Johnson’s friend Thomas Warton described them—announced its pretension and its 
impracticability.59 It was big, presumptuous and costly—no vade mecum for the common 
reader’s coat or dress pocket, but a pretentious and weighty tome for the genteel study.60  
And while bibliographers have long cautioned that terms used to describe a 
book’s format—folio, quarto, octavo—are not reliable indicators of a book’s size, these 
terms signified for eighteenth-century book buyers much more than the relationship 
between the size of a leaf and the sheet of paper on which it was printed.61 A book’s 
format often connoted its level of seriousness or social pretence. The Earl of Chesterfield 
                                                 
57 Sheets containing A to CARRY definition 21 were printed at the end of 1750; CARRY definition 22 to 
DAME 2 in May 1752; DAME 2 to GRATE in October 1753; see Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s 
Dictionary, 39, 59. Thomas Birch wrote to Philip Yorke on 21 September 1754 that the Dictionary was 
completed, except for the Grammar and History of the language, and considered the book’s size notable: “It 
will be 100 sheets larger than Chamber’s Cyclopaedia,” B.L.Add.MS.35,398, f. 214v, cited in Clifford, 
Dictionary Johnson, 126; 331, n. 13. 
58 Letters, I, 100, from a letter to Thomas Warton (20 March 1755). I use Bruce Redford’s translation of the 
Latin tag as “proud in its prodigious bulk.” Redford notes that the phrase may allude to “Aeneid III. 656-
57, ‘vasta se mole moventum / pastorem Polyphemum’: ‘the great shepherd Polyphemus, moving his 
mighty bulk’ (trans. H. R. Fairclough, Loeb ed.)”, Letters, I, 100, n. 6. 
59 (19 April 1755) The Correspondence of Thomas Warton, ed. David Fairer (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1995), 43.  
60 Unless one counts the “very wide brown cloth great-coat” Johnson wore on his journey to Scotland. 
Boswell wrote that its pockets “might have almost held the two volumes of his folio dictionary,” James 
Boswell, The Journal of A Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, LL.D., ed. Frederick A. Pottle and 
Charles H. Bennett (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961[1786]), 8.  
61 Ronald B. McKerrow notes, “These designations are not of much use as indications of size, for in quite 
early times one might measure nearly 50 per cent. more both in height and width than another and yet they 
might both be ‘octavo’,” An Introduction to Bibliography for Literary Students (1928; New Castle, 
Delaware: Oak Knoll Press, 1994), 164. Gérard Genette writes that while the “manner of folding. . . did not 
by itself indicate the flat dimensions of a book,” it “quickly became a shorthand way of estimating” their 
size, seriousness, and claims to prestige (Genette, Paratexts), 17.  
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joked with the Bishop of Waterford that “Solid folios are the people of business, with 
whom I converse in the morning. Quartos (not quarts, pardon the quibble) are the easier 
mixed company, with whom I sit after dinner; and I pass my evenings in the light, and 
often frivolous, chit-chat of small octavos and duodecimos.”62 Joseph Addison suggests 
in Spectator 529 that a book’s format loosely conferred status, or at least the presumption 
of it, on the part of some authors: 
The Author of a Folio, in all Companies and Conversations, sets himself above 
the Author of a Quarto; the Author of an Octavo; and so on, by a gradual Descent 
and Subordination, to an Author in Twenty-Fours. This Distinction is so well 
observed, that in an Assembly of the Learned, I have seen a Folio Writer place 
himself in an Elbow-chair, when the Author of a Duo-decimo has, out of a just 
Deference to his superior Quality, seated himself upon a Squabb. In a Word, 
Authors are usually ranged in Company after the same manner as their Works are 
upon a Shelf.63  
 
Magazine readers who browsed the Gentleman’s Magazine’s monthly list of books 
published, advertisements in The Public Advertiser, or book reviews in The Monthly 
Review could often find a book’s format listed, along with other significant details: the 
price, number of volumes, the bookseller, and the author’s academic credentials, if any.64 
On the front page of The Public Advertiser for 17 March 1755, an advertisement for 
Johnson’s Dictionary lists its material features first, noting that it will be published “In 
Two Large VOLUMES in FOLIO.” Sale catalogues categorized books for sale according 
to format, and even “shelving protocol” in circulating libraries involved placing more 
                                                 
62 (22 November 1757) Letter No. 2031 in The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, 
ed. Bonamy Dobrée, 6 vols. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1932), V, 2265. Emphasis in original.  
63 (6 November 1712) The Spectator, ed. Donald F. Bond, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), IV, 
386. Emphasis in original. 
64 The Gentleman’s Magazine is not consistent in listing a work’s format. This may be because many of the 
“books” listed are sixpence pamphlets and tracts or modest one-shilling works whose price, along with the 
title, author, and publisher, may have helped convey the relative prestige of the work.   
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expensive folios on the high shelves, out of reach of the merely casual browser.65 In his 
proposals for the Harleian Miscellany Johnson wrote of the intellectual respect given to 
folios, simply for their size.  
It has long been lamented, that the Duration of the Monuments of Genius and 
Study, as well as of Wealth and Power, depend in no small Measure on their 
Bulk; and that Volumes, considerable only for their Size, are handed down from 
one Age to another, when compendious Treatises, of far greater Importance, are 
suffered to perish, as the compactest Bodies sink into Water, while those, of 
which the Extension bears a greater Proportion to the Weight, float upon the 
Surface.66  
 
As material objects in an expanding consumer culture, books connoted status, and 
different formats were loosely accorded different levels of intellectual and social status. 
These material features of eighteenth-century books, and their symbolic resonance, were 
basic to the experience of eighteenth-century booksellers and buyers, and contributed 
significantly to how books were marketed and perceived. Unless Johnson knew in 
advance that his expensive folio would later be sold in less expensive installments, and 
even later be heavily abridged for a 10-shilling octavo, these most basic features of his 
book limited the buying audience for his Dictionary, and were fundamental constraints 
on his sense of how to present himself and his work to the public. Johnson’s initial vision 
of a dictionary that would meet the needs of the philosopher and the common workman 
must have been tempered by his awareness, over seven years later, and as his work 
neared publication, that his Dictionary would be a bulky, and thus costly, folio. As a 
                                                 
65 Edward H. Jacobs, “Buying into Classes: The Practice of Book Selection in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 33 (1999-2000): 57.  
66 “An Account of the Undertaking” [Proposals for the Harleian Miscellany (1744)], in Samuel Johnson’s 
Prefaces and Dedications, ed. Allen T. Hazen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 51.  
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result, his primary, purchasing audience would not be made up of common readers but 
the folio-buying set.  
It is certainly not clear when Johnson would have reevaluated his sense of 
audience for the Dictionary and the Preface, but scholars have not addressed the extent to 
which the sheer bulk of his text would have made it clear to Johnson that his Dictionary 
would not likely be thumbed by the common reader, much less the workman. Although 
these book buyers were a staple audience of monolingual English dictionaries since their 
first appearance in 1604, neither they nor another common user of dictionaries, the 
student, constitute a key part of Johnson’s sense of audience by the time he wrote the 
Preface. Robert DeMaria, Jr. has often emphasized that the Dictionary has an 
“educational mission,” that it is “a book designed to be read by learners.”67 Anne 
McDermott, editor of the CD-ROM version of the Dictionary, quotes the 1747 Plan to 
reinforce this point, noting that “Johnson was always more concerned to instruct the 
learner than to delight the critic.”68 Johnson does, in fact, mention one group of students 
explicitly in the Preface—foreign “students of our language” (Sig. Bv). Yet while it is 
reasonable to say that Johnson was concerned about the needs of learners, or to say, as 
DeMaria does, that his audience could have included “young people,” or that that he 
attempted to give the Dictionary “a moral and religious bent that he felt was appropriate 
for the instruction of students,” Johnson’s Dictionary was not primarily aimed at 
students, who had always formed a key audience for the numerous English dictionaries of 
                                                 
67 Robert DeMaria, Jr., “Johnson’s Dictionary,” in The Cambridge Companion to Samuel Johnson, ed. 
Greg Clingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 88. 
68 Booklet accompanying Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language on CD-ROM: The First 
and Fourth Editions, ed. Anne McDermott, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 
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the “hard word” tradition before Johnson.69 Until 1756, when it was made available in the 
much more affordable 10-shilling octavo, the Dictionary was, by and large, inaccessible 
to this traditional audience, unless they had fairly well-to-do parents or instructors. 
 In Johnson’s Preface to the octavo abridgment, he contrasts the pretences and 
prestige of his folio with the works of his predecessors, who courted the more humble 
and less discriminating traditional dictionary audience. Monolingual English dictionaries 
had long attracted readers who were assumed to lack skill. The title page of Robert 
Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabeticall (1604), printed in small octavo, states that its words 
have been “gathered for the benefit & helpe of Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other 
vnskillful persons.”70 Over a century later, the title-page of Nathan Bailey’s octavo An 
Universal Etymological English Dictionary (1721) states that the work was “compil’d 
and Methodically digested, as well as for the Entertainment of the Curious, as the 
Information of the Ignorant, and for the Benefit of young Students, Artificers, Tradesmen 
and Foreigners who are desirous thorowly to understand what they Speak, Read, or 
Write.”71 By contrast, Johnson’s octavo Preface, written after he received an honorary 
Oxford degree, and presumably after the folio had been publicly praised by the likes of 
Marquis Nicolini, president of Italy’s Accademia della Crusca, states that his folio, “a 
dictionary like those compiled by the academies of Italy or France,” was published “for 
the use of such as aspire to exactness of criticism or elegance of style.” But “it has been 
since considered that works of that kind are by no means necessary to the greater number 
                                                 
69 DeMaria, Jr., “Johnson’s Dictionary,” 91.  
70 Facsimile reprint in R. C. Alston, A Bibliography of the English Language from the Invention of Printing 
to the Year 1800 (Leeds: E. J. Arnold & Sons, 1966), V, Plate IA.  
71 Facsimile reprint in Bibliography of the English Language, V, Plate XIIA. 
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of readers, who, seldom intending to write or presuming to judge, turn over books only to 
amuse their leisure, and to gain degrees of knowledge suitable to lower characters, or 
necessary to the common business of life.”72 In this octavo Preface Johnson underscores 
the difference between himself and previous lexicographers, some of whom “wanted 
industry and others literature: some knew not their own defects, and others were too idle 
to supply them.”73 These lexicographers were, presumably, the “humble drudges” with 
whom Johnson contrasted himself, more artfully, in the folio Preface. Johnson’s folio 
Preface, introducing a work so proud in its bulk, was aimed at a more pretentious 
audience—if for no other reason than that it generally contained the literati who would 
ultimately judge its success. The common reader was, at least initially, priced out of the 
ability to judge.  
 The question of how Johnson saw his aims and audience is, of course, complex; 
but while it has been commonplace to say that if Johnson revised his expectations of what 
lexicographers might do for the language between the Plan and Preface, it is almost never 
said that Johnson must have modified his fundamental notion of audience, once the 
Dictionary was no longer an imagined text. In any case, any discussion of Johnson’s aims 
as a lexicographer must probably include comments and sentiments from both the Plan 
and the Preface, since the entries of the Dictionary, compiled over several years, probably 
contain evidence of the more ambitious Johnson of the Plan and the Johnson who, in the 
                                                 
72 Preface to A Dictionary of the English Language....Abstracted from the FOLIO EDITION, 2nd ed., 
corrected, 2 vols. (London, 1760); hereafter referred to as Octavo Preface. Nicolini’s praise of the 
Dictionary was announced in The Public Advertiser (10 October 1755); see Sledd and Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s 
Dictionary, 110-111, 230 n. 22. 
73 Octavo Preface.  
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Preface, presents himself as chastened by experience. Nonetheless, it is important to pay 
keen attention to Johnson’s strikingly different rhetorical circumstances in each case.  
If the size and format helped shape Johnson’s sense of ethos and audience, his 
awareness of circumstances surrounding his text’s production—the highly detailed nature 
of his work, as well as his knowledge of his working habits—helped shape the character 
of the Preface as an apologia. “Every writer of a long work commits errours,” Johnson 
notes in the Preface, and in the Preface Johnson is discussing material which, in some 
cases, he handed over to his printer over three years before (Sig. B2v).74 The Preface 
recounts highly detailed work of over eight years, well over two thousand pages, and over 
forty thousand entries.75 “No work of such multiplicity,” Johnson writes, “was ever free” 
of “a few wild blunders and risible absurdities” (Sig. C2v). Perhaps not having had much 
opportunity to edit the Dictionary closely before publication, Johnson had quite practical 
motives for extenuating faults, knowing more than anyone the extent to which the 
Dictionary was subject to human error. Both the sheer extent of detail in the Dictionary 
and the fact that this detailed work was done over several years with the assistance of 
amanuenses meant that Johnson was in some cases extenuating errors he may have 
suspected, rather than known. The account book of Johnson’s printer, William Strahan, 
shows that at some point in 1753 Johnson began “producing copy faster than it was being 
printed.” Although Strahan did charge the Dictionary’s publishers for “Alterations and 
                                                 
74 In December of 1750 the Dictionary’s printer, William Strahan,, “recorded (and charged the investing 
booksellers) for printing the first 70 sheets…encompassing the text through the twenty-first sense of the 
word CARRY;” Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 59.  Sledd and Kolb point out that some evidence from Strahan’s 
ledgers points to 1749, but they explain why the 1750 dating is preferable; Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 107.  
75 Anne McDermott records the 1755 first edition folio as containing 42,773 entries; booklet accompanying 
A Dictionary of the English Language on CD-ROM, 7.  
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Additions” in the Dictionary, it is not clear how much time Johnson had to review the 
text that he was producing with significantly increased speed from 1753.76 Anne 
McDermott has pointed out that some entries under the letter T are “badly out of 
alphabetical order (thus: TOPSAIL followed by TOPARCH, etc.).”77 There is no way to 
know for sure, but Johnson may have suspected that his massive Dictionary contained 
more errors or infelicities than he could ever catch before handing over the last portions 
of his manuscript to his printer. We do know that Johnson suggests as much in a letter he 
wrote to Charles Burney a week before the Dictionary was published: “If you find faults, 
I shall endeavor to mend them; if you find none, I shall think you blinded by kind 
partiality.”78 Many years later Johnson wrote that “the writer of a Dictionary may silently 
omit what he does not know; and his ignorance, if it happens to be discovered, slips away 
from censure under the name of forgetfulness.”79 Johnson’s sense in the folio Preface of 
his own limitations is figured masterfully as just what sublunary creatures must expect, 
given their condition, but his knowledge of the very concrete material conditions of 
textual production, especially when the text to be produced is so large and intricate, 
would have given him reason to conduct preemptive strikes against his own errors, so he 
could attribute them to mortal fallibility before others might characterize them as due to a 
lack of skill or negligence.  
                                                 
76 See The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 72. Citing “Strahan’s account book BM MS 48803 (A), p. 23,” 
Reddick argues that the £123.11s. charged for the alterations “suggests that Johnson must have gone 
closely over the printed text and not hesitated to change it if he felt it needed alteration”; The Making of 
Johnson’s Dictionary,” 82, 215 n. 86. 
77 Booklet accompanying A Dictionary of the English Language on CD-ROM, 10. 
78 Letters, I, 103.  
79 Preface to Alexander Macbean’s Dictionary of Ancient Geography (London, 1773), quoted in Hazen, 
Prefaces and Dedications, 135.  
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  In addition to the circumstances of his text’s production, Johnson would have 
considered the ways in which his Preface would circulate among book reviews and 
magazines, which tended to excerpt substantial portions of featured or reviewed books. 
Thus while Johnson was aware that the price of his folio put it out of the reach of most 
consumers, he still had every reason to expect that substantial portions of his Preface 
would reach a wide, even international audience—his own Rambler essays, his play 
Irene, and The Vanity of Human Wishes had all been excerpted or abstracted in 
Gentleman’s Magazine. So he must have considered the Preface as crucial to both his 
future literary reputation and the success or failure of the Dictionary. As books increased 
in number, bringing about what Johnson called an “epidemical conspiracy for the 
destruction of paper,” such Prefaces could serve as useful marketing tools, and as 
demonstrations of a writer’s knowledge and qualifications.80 As such, they were equally 
useful to bookseller, author, and the serious book browser who was looking to buy—
especially in the mid eighteenth century, when book reviewing in England began to 
develop as a genre in its own right. In any case, a work without a Preface would make its 
entrance upon the world awkwardly, especially if it were a large pretentious folio like the 
Dictionary, which, as a reference work purporting to differ from previous works, was 
also in Johnson’s case a work whose contents may have undershot the targets he set for it 
in the Plan. These considerations clarify the potential stakes involved for Johnson as he 
wrote the Preface: it is likely that in writing the Preface Johnson expected a large stage on 
                                                 
80 Adventurer 115 (11 December 1753), in The Idler and The Adventurer, ed. W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt 
and L. F. Powell, vol. II of the Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1963), 458. All Adventurer and Idler citations refer to this edition.  
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which to display his knowledge and qualifications, and he wrote with full knowledge of 
the extent to which such a document, circulated widely through magazines and the 
Monthly Review, might thereby distinguish him as an eminent man of learning.  
 As Johnson was working on the Dictionary, the genre of the literary review was 
developing as a mechanism by which these prefaces were disseminated, and through 
which they were often filtered, to the increasingly large and heterogeneous reading 
public. The periodical market, spurred by Edward Cave’s Gentleman’s Magazine as well 
as the energetic efforts of Scottish and Irish print piracy, had helped to develop the 
provincial English book trade and enlarged the size and geographical distribution of the 
British reading public.81 In the mid eighteenth century, booksellers aware of the 
expanding market for books regularly used advertisements and “puffs” to reach large 
magazine and newspaper audiences.82 In May 1749 England’s first successful periodical 
dedicated entirely to reviewing new books for the general reader, the Monthly Review, 
first appeared as Johnson was working on his Dictionary, noting that “the abuse of title-
pages is obviously come to such a pass, that few readers care to take in a book, any more 
than a servant, without a recommendation.”83 Perhaps in response, The Gentleman’s 
Magazine, as early as August 1750, began including occasional commentary in its 
                                                 
81 John Feather, A History of British Publishing (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 77-78. 
82 Feather, A History of British Publishing, 100-101. 
83 “Advertisement” to the first number of the Monthly Review, quoted in Antonia Forster, Introduction to  
Index to Book Reviews in England 1749-1774 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 4. 
Forster notes that the “Advertisement” is “bound following the table of contents at the beginning of volume 
I of the Monthly Review in the Bodleian Library’s copy. . . but is bound at the end of the first number, i.e., 
between pages 80 and 81, in the British Library’s copy and the copy in the State Library of Victoria,” 15 n. 
4. Forster’s Introduction, 3-18, is a useful overview of the development of book reviews during this period 
in England.  
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monthly list of works published.84 Johnson, a longtime writer for the Gentleman’s, which 
he described in 1754, as “one of the most successful and lucrative pamphlets which 
literary history has upon record,” would have been aware of its potential as source of 
publicity, generally through its inclusion of “specimens” of new works; it included the 
“PLAN and SPECIMENS” of his play Irene in February 1749 and it reprinted, whole or 
in part, 25 of his Rambler essays.85   
Johnson also would have been familiar with the method of reviewing employed 
by the Monthly Review, what Antonia Forster has described as the “abstract/extract 
                                                 
84 This observation comes from my own examination of The Gentleman’s Magazine. James G. Basker cites 
March 1751 as the beginning of this practice. See Basker, Tobias Smollett, Critic and Journalist. (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 1988), 170; quoted also in Frank Donoghue, “Colonizing Readers: Review 
Criticism and the Formation of a Reading Public,” The Consumption of Culture 1600-1800, ed. Ann 
Bermingham and John Brewer (London: Routledge, 1995), 58. Antonia Forster claims that the Gentleman’s 
Magazine and London Magazine did not include lengthy reviews as a regular feature until the 1760s: “Even 
before the birth of the Monthly Review the Gentleman’s makes the occasional very brief comment on a new 
publication, and this continues until December 1750 when its booklist, a regular feature since the 
magazines beginning in 1731, is for the first time described in the table of contents as ‘Books and 
pamphlets with remarks.’ Only a few items in the booklist do have ‘remarks,’ and these are rarely more 
than a few words; this area of literary endeavor remains of very minor interest until 1765, with, sometimes, 
a whole year passing without any comments at all. Then in April 1765, when the importance of reviewing 
can no longer be questioned, the Gentleman’s begins an expanded review section. . . . It is in June 1767 that 
the London Magazine. . . makes a formal beginning of larger scale reviewing,” Index to Book Reviews in 
England, 12-13. 
85 Johnson’s description of the Gentleman’s Magazine appears in its own pages, in Johnson’s unsigned 
obituary of its founder, Edward Cave, Gentleman’s Magazine, 24 (February 1754), 57. The “PLAN and 
SPECIMENS” of Irene appear in Gentleman’s Magazine, 19 (February 1749), 76-81. My own examination 
of the Gentleman’s Magazine found that between March 1750 and March 1752, the duration of the 
Rambler’s existence, 19 out of 26 monthly issues of The Gentleman’s Magazine reprinted, or significantly 
excerpted, 25 of the 208 total Ramblers: Rambler 1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 22, 33, 42, 54, 60, 67, 79, 83, 91, 107, 130, 
133, 151, 161, 186, 187, 191, 197, 198, 208. Rambler 186 and 187 were reprinted in the 1751 Supplement. 
The September 1750 issue (406-08) contains “The MOTTOES and other Passages in the RAMBLER” for 
nos. 1 to 29, and the October 1752 issue (468-70) contains “The Subjects, Mottoes, and other Citations in 
the RAMBLER” for Ramblers 30-57.  Edward Cave acquired the copyright for the Ramblers on 1 April 
1751. For a facsimile of the contract see Hugh Amory, “Johnson’s Copies, 1744-1784,” (Cambridge, 
Mass.: For the Johnsonians, 1984). I thank Michael Winship for this reference, and Rachel Howarth of the 
Houghton Library for helping me locate the article. The Gentleman’s Magazine acknowledged its special 
interest in the Ramblers, reprinting praise of the Rambler from “an ingenious and disinterested writer,” 
since “many, who know the Ramblers are sent into the World from St. John’s Gate [the magazine’s office], 
would have paid little Regard to our Encomium and Recommendation,” Gentleman’s Magazine, 20 
(October 1750), 465. 
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method,” a method he would himself later employ in the Literary Magazine.86 The 
abstract/extract method used by reviewers of the time usually entailed much less of the 
reviewer’s critical opinion than is now expected, and relied more on summary and 
quotation.87 If Johnson expected any regard from the Monthly Review or magazines with 
wide circulation, he would have been right to expect that regard to take the form, largely, 
of summary and quotation—both from the body of the Dictionary, and from the Preface 
that would introduce its contents. And in fact, this is what generally did happen when the 
Dictionary was reviewed (or abstracted) upon publication.88 Scholars must be careful 
when consulting these reviews because the lack of explicit quotation marks does not 
                                                 
86 See her Index to Book Reviews in England, 5. For a summary of Johnson’s involvement with the Literary 
Magazine, see Donald D. Eddy, Samuel Johnson, Book Reviewer in the Literary Magazine, or Universal 
Review, 1756-1758 (New York & London: Garland, 1979), ch. 1. For Johnson’s methods as a reviewer, see 
Eddy, ch. 3.  
87 See Eddy, Samuel Johnson as Book Reviewer, 89. Two articles have focused on reviews of Johnson’s 
Dictionary: Stanley Rypins, “Johnson’s Dictionary Reviewed by His Contemporaries,” Philological 
Quarterly 4 (1925): 281-86, and Gertrude E. Noyes, “The Critical Reception of Johnson’s Dictionary in the 
Latter Eighteenth Century,” Modern Philology 52 (1954-55): 175-91. Both scholars cover a period of 
nearly fifty years, yet neither article mentions the nascent state of reviewing at mid-century, which is 
crucial to understanding the reviewing context of which Johnson would have been aware when writing the 
Preface. Despite this caveat, the Noyes article is valuable as a survey of eighteenth-century published 
responses to the Dictionary.  
88 I have examined reviews in the Edinburgh Review, as reprinted in Scots Magazine 17 (November 1755), 
539-44; Gentleman’s Magazine 25 (April 1755), 147-51; London Magazine, 24 (April 1755), 193-200; 
Monthly Review 12 (April 1755), 292-324; and Scots Magazine 17 (April 1755), 177-85. Of these reviews, 
only the Edinburgh Review, written by Adam Smith, and to a lesser extent the account in the Monthly 
Review, give much place to the reviewer’s own commentary. The Scots Magazine review excerpts brief 
material from the Gentleman’s Magazine, but is generally an abbreviated version of the Monthly Review 
account—an abridgment, not simply a reprint, as Sledd and Kolb suggest; Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 145. 
The London Magazine review excerpts the Preface and the entry for ‘To BEAR v.a.’ Sledd and Kolb also 
note that reviews “appeared, at various times in 1755 and 1756,” in the Bibliothèque des savans and the 
Bibliothèque des sciences et des beaux arts, as well as the Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, the 
Journal britannique, the Journal étranger, and the Magazine of Magazines (Limerick), see Sledd and Kolb, 
Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 145. Helen Louise McGuffie lists the Magazine of Magazines review (April 
1755, 289-94) and Gentleman’s and London Magazine (Dublin, April 1755, 263-68) as repeating the 
Gentleman’s Magazine review, and lists June 1755 as the date of the Edinburgh Review’s account of the 
Dictionary in Samuel Johnson in the British Press, 1749-1784: A Chronological Checklist (New York & 
London: Garland, 1976), 15-16. The European Magazine, (Vol. 61, 249-54) also reprinted the Edinburgh 
Review account, according to Gertrude E. Noyes,“The Critical Reception of Johnson’s Dictionary, 178 n. 8. 
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mean that the reviewer is not quoting, or paraphrasing closely, the author being reviewed. 
For instance, Johnson’s Preface reads 
Having therefore no assistance but from general grammar, I applied myself to the 
perusal of our writers; and noting whatever might be of use to ascertain or 
illustrate any word or phrase, accumulated in time the materials of a dictionary, 
which, by degrees, I reduced to method, establishing to myself, in the progress of 
the work, such rules as experience and analogy suggested to me. (Sig. A2v; 
emphasis added) 
 
The Gentleman’s Magazine, in its “account” of the Dictionary, continues to quote 
Johnson profusely, even when the writer of the account stops using quotation marks:  
Having therefore no assistance but from general grammar, he applied himself to 
the perusal of our writers, and noting whatever might be of use to ascertain or 
illustrate any word or phrase, accumulated in time the materials of a dictionary, 
which, by degrees, he reduced to method, by such rules as experience and 
analogy suggested in the progress of the work.89  
 
Given the abstract/extract method, as Forster terms it, writers of significant works at mid 
century might expect that their works, or at least prefaces meant to attract regard, would 
be significantly excerpted. Because such reviewing practices made limited portions of the 
Preface and the Dictionary accessible to more than the purchasing audience, Johnson was 
inclined to expect, weeks before publication, that his vast and expensive tome “must 
stand the censures of the great vulgar and small, of those that understand it and 
                                                 
89 Gentleman’s Magazine 25 (April 1755), 147; emphasis added. Nicholas Hudson quotes another passage 
from this review of the Dictionary as evidence for the opinion of the reviewer, whom he identifies as 
Johnson’s friend John Hawkesworth (as does Allen Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 83), but 
Hudson fails to note that Hawkesworth is actually paraphrasing Johnson; what’s more, Hawkesworth is 
paraphrasing the 1747 Plan, which I argue was written before Johnson had clarified his sense of his who 
would actually be able to buy the Dictionary. See Hudson, “Johnson’s Dictionary and the Politics of 
‘Standard English,’” Yearbook of English Studies 28 (1998): 85; Hudson uses the same quote to make the 
same point in “Discourse of Transition: Johnson, the 1750s, and the Rise of the Middle Class,” Age of 
Johnson 13 (2002): 38. Hawkesworth’s close paraphrasing on the passage cited above moves without 
announcement, and without quotation marks, from the Preface in one paragraph, to the Plan in the next. 
Hawkesworth would have had easy enough access to the 1747 Plan, which was made available gratis in 
late February 1755. For information about the reprinting of the Plan and advertisements for its availability, 
see Sledd and Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 82, 110, 220 nn. 133 and 136, and 230 n. 20.  
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understand it not.”90 Two years later, Johnson complained about the fact that his own 
self-criticisms circulated beyond even those who had read the Preface, writing that “upon 
the publication of my book” there “were only two who . . . did not endeavour to depress 
me with with threats of censure from the publick, or with objections learned from those 
who had learned them from my own preface.”91
* * * * * * 
 In the world of eighteenth-century letters prefatory materials, or preliminaries, are 
crucial to a work’s reception. They are highly conspicuous vehicles for authorial self-
fashioning, and when placed at the head of an especially ambitious work, they also 
function as authorial outlays of symbolic cultural capital.92 The more capital one has to 
display, the more authority one can obtain on credit from readers; and in works seeking 
cultural authority, these outlays are more crucial than they are in other books. In an 
ambitious work like Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopædia, a list of subscribers and a 
dedication can suggest that Chambers’s project is not merely written for profit, but for the 
public good. If the list of subscribers provides a public list of presumedly disinterested 
personal references, the dedication allows one to present the author’s aspirations and 
achievements as an ambition to please or glorify the dedicatee.93 So these prefatory 
materials partly function as means by which authors participating in print capitalism can 
                                                 
90 Letters, I, 101 (25 March 1755); emphasis in original. Bruce Redford notes that Johnson is quoting from 
Abraham Cowley’s imitation of Horace’s “Odi profanum vulgus” ode (III.1): “Hence, ye Profane; I hate ye 
all; / Both the Great, Vulgar, and the Small” (lines 1-2). See Letters, I, 101 n. 6.  
91 Letters, I, 157.  
92 I am indebted throughout to Dustin Griffin’s discussion of the “cultural economics of literary patronage” 
in Literary Patronage in England, 1650-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 2.  
93 Richard Yeo discusses why encyclopedias might be dedicated to kings at a time when “a bookseller no 
longer needed a privilege or licence, granted by the king, in order to protect his book from piracy,” in 
Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 222-45. 
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avoid the taint of having their work viewed as vitiated by vanity or self-interest. Because 
Johnson knew his Dictionary would lack these legitimizing preliminaries, and perhaps 
because he wrote the Preface before obtaining his first academic degree, he could not so 
much outlay symbolic capital as document the evidence and value of his intellectual 
labors. And if Johnson’s awareness of the Dictionary’s possible errors required tactics of 
a proleptic apologia, the need to praise the value of his work also required self-panegyric.  
 Johnson was eminently aware of the realities of textual reception in his day, and 
because of this he would have considered the Preface essential to his work’s successful 
reception. In A Tale of a Tub, Swift’s endlessly digressive narrator complains that a 
work’s front matter, while often ignored, was often read as a substitute for the text that it 
introduced, writing that “it is lamentable to behold, with what a lazy Scorn, many of the 
yawning Readers in our Age, do now a-days twirl over forty or fifty Pages of Preface and 
Dedication, . . . as if it were so much Latin. Tho’ it must be also allowed on the other 
Hand that a very considerable Number is known to proceed Criticks and Wits, by reading 
nothing else. Into which two Factions, I think, all present Readers may justly be 
divided.”94 Notwithstanding Swift’s satiric reduction, a third class of readers, as well as 
the writers and booksellers who courted them, used textual preliminaries as a way to 
situate texts socially, to establish the knowledge and qualifications of the author, and to 
determine the worthiness of a book for purchase. The eighteenth-century book, unarmed 
with the summaries and endorsements found on the covers or dust jackets of modern 
                                                 
94 Jonathan Swift, Section V, “A Digression in the Modern Kind,” A Tale of a Tub. A Tale of a Tub with 
Other Early Works: 1696-1707, ed. Herbert Davis, vol. I of The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1939 [1704]), 82; emphasis in original. 
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books, was often unbound, so the front matter of the text—title page, frontispiece, 
dedication, list of subscribers, preface—served to authorize the text, situate the author 
and work both socially and intellectually, and to attract potential readers.  
Johnson himself suggested years later that a preface was—in ways that we now 
perhaps underestimate—essential to a work’s reception. Writing of a late seventeenth-
century collection of modern Latin poetry, Johnson notes that the collection was 
published by a London man who “concealed his name, but whom his Preface shews to 
have been well qualified for his undertaking.” But when Pope later reissued the collection 
with some additional collections he “injuriously omitted his predecessor’s preface. To 
these books, which had nothing but the mere text, no regard was paid; the authors were 
still neglected, and the editor was neither praised nor censured.”95 The “mere text” itself 
was not sufficient if a work were to receive any regard. Eighteenth-century French 
novelist Pierre Marivaux, protesting against the “burden of writing a preface,” admits 
perhaps playfully that “a preface is necessary: a book printed and bound without a 
preface—is it a book? No, without a doubt, it does not yet deserve that name; it is a sort 
of book, a book without proper authorization . . . an applicant, aspiring to become a book, 
and only when vested with this last formality is it worthy to truly bear that name.”96 The 
eighteenth-century preface functioned in the growing, socially disconnected world of the 
reading public like a petition for favor—it introduced the author’s credentials to a 
potential reader, who then decided to engage or pass by potential suitors to their time, 
                                                 
95 Samuel Johnson, Lives of the English Poets, ed. G. B. Hill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905), III, 183. 
This edition is hereafter cited as Lives.  
96 Preface to La Voiture embourbée, quoted in Genette, Paratexts, 231.  
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attention, and regard. When accompanied by other common preliminaries—the 
dedication, or the list of subscribers, and in the case of dictionaries, a grammar and brief 
history of the language—a preface allowed authors to display the knowledge or 
qualifications already implicitly vouched for by patrons, subscribers, or even the good 
reputation of a bookseller.  
Given the special nature of dictionaries as works to be consulted not read, 
Johnson could easily have suspected that his Preface would carry as much weight with 
readers and reviewers as the text itself.  Because a dictionary is really not expected to be 
read cover to cover, its preface is crucial to shaping how readers understand it. The 
relationship between preface and text in a dictionary thus differs from the relationship 
between a preface and a text meant to be read through. Generally, the body of a text read 
straight through gradually overshadows its preface, as a play eclipses its prologue. But in 
a dictionary, most readers only ever experience a small portion of the bulk of the text. 
Only through repeated and continued use of a dictionary can one’s experience of the text 
overshadow the shaping frame of the preface. The reviewer of Johnson’s Dictionary in 
The Monthly Review apologized to readers for  
the short time we have allowed ourselves for the consideration of so extensive a 
performance. It is not to be supposed that in the few days elapsed since the 
publication of these large volumes, we could peruse the whole, or even so large a 
portion of them, as might serve to justify a critical detail; . . . we . . . have chose 
to let Mr. Johnson speak for himself; contenting ourselves with having 
endeavoured to elucidate his declared intention, by correspondent specimens of 
his performance.97   
 
                                                 
97 The Monthly Review 12 (April 1755), 324. 
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Of course, no one has to read a preface, and modern dictionary users, taking the layout of 
a dictionary and the structure of entries for granted, routinely ignore a dictionary’s 
preface, going instead straight for the definition they seek. But in “this age of 
dictionaries,” when, as Johnson put it in the Plan, the term “dictionary” had “long 
conveyed a very miscellaneous idea,” and in a work meant to be the first authoritative 
dictionary of English, readers would have an incentive to read the Preface, which was not 
merely an operator’s manual, defense of methodological principles, and overview of its 
contents, but also testimony to the compiler’s abilities and authority.98 Contemporary 
reviews of the Dictionary point out the value attributed to the Preface in demonstrating 
the worth of the Dictionary’s contents. The Gentleman’s Magazine proclaims that the 
Preface “will be found an indubitable testimony of [the Dictionary’s] worth.”99 The 
London Magazine notes that “extracts from his preface will best shew the nature of his 
work, and the difficulties of its execution: and will give to the public the truest ideas of its 
merits, and its imperfections.”100 And given Johnson’s condition when writing the 
Preface—lacking a degree, a patron, or any other traditional legitimizing authority—he 
would have to establish the merits of his vast, now completed work, to a large extent, on 
the merits of the Preface, in which Johnson would have to present himself and his work 
to the public. 
Though prefaces were crucial mediators between readers and “the mere text” of a 
dictionary, readers would expect more than a mere Preface—more even than the expected 
                                                 
98 Letters, I, 79; Plan, (Sig. A3r).  
99 Gentleman’s Magazine 25 (April, 1755), 150.  
100 London Magazine 24 (April 1755), 193.  
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grammar and history of the language, in the Dictionary that Johnson was presenting to 
the public—a nationally significant dictionary modeled on continental academic 
dictionaries. Scholarly folios, even when underwritten by booksellers, often began with 
culturally legitimizing preliminaries—that is, dedications or lists of subscribers. The 
Dictionnaire of the French Academy, aside from its authority as a state-sanctioned 
institution, notes on the title page that it is “DEDIÉ AU ROY.”101 Robert Ainsworth’s 
Thesaurus Linguæ Latinæ, one of Johnson’s sources, includes, among other 
preliminaries, a Latin dedication to “Doctissimo Viro RICHARDO MEAD GEORGII II, 
Magnæ Britanniæ Regis,” Richard Mead, physician to the King; a letter to the “learned 
and lovers of pure Latinity” (Eruditis et puræ Latinitatis amatoribus); and a Preface.102 
Dr. Robert James’s folio Medicinal Dictionary (1742) contains a dedication to Dr. Mead 
ghostwritten by Johnson.103 The Cyclopædia, whose author Ephraim Chambers is often 
cited as a model for Johnson’s style, contains two legitimizing paratexts, in addition to its 
Preface: a dedication “TO THE  KING,” and a list of subscribers which includes earls, 
knights, lords, and fellows of the Royal Society.104 Such authorizing preliminaries 
granted these authors and lexicographers the cachet of aristocratic approval and gave 
subscribers and patrons publicity for their contribution to the greater good. Thus the 
burden for Chambers of introducing and legitimizing the Cyclopædia does not rest 
                                                 
101 Le Dictionnaire de L’Académie Françoise, Dedié au Roy, 2 vols. (Paris, 1694). 
102 Robert Ainsworth, Thesaurus Linguæ Latinæ compendarius (London, 1736).  
103 Hazen, Prefaces and Dedications, 73. 
104 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopædia: or, an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, 2 vols. (London, 
1728). The list also includes upwardly mobile printers, chemists, clockmakers, attorneys, and a “Mr. 
Michael Johnson of Litchfield” (Sig. h2v). For the reputed influence of Chambers on Johnson’s style, see 
Sledd and Kolb’s discussion of this persistent tradition, which begins with Boswell’s report of a comment 
Johnson made; Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 19-20.  
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primarily on his Preface, as it does with the Dictionary. But Johnson’s Dictionary, 
despite its ambitions, would lack these elements, and thus rely by necessity on Johnson’s 
ability to recommend the book himself.  
 The fact that Johnson’s ambitious scholarly work would lack a dedication meant 
that in the Preface he would have to vouch for himself, and this was both socially and 
morally awkward for a number of reasons. First, Johnson would be presenting an 
ambitious scholarly work intended to be culturally authoritative but lacking even the 
implicit imprimatur of any culturally legitimizing institution, such as the monarchy, the 
peerage, a university, or a royally sanctioned academy. Moreover, because Johnson had 
dedicated the Plan of the Dictionary to Lord Chesterfield, the lack of a dedication to 
Chesterfield in the published Dictionary might open Johnson to the charge of ingratitude, 
a quality which one fictionalized correspondent to Mr. Rambler identified as a 
“frequently” and “justly censured” “depravity of the mind.”105 When Johnson wrote the 
Preface, the reading public would have little reason to suspect that he no longer regarded 
Chesterfield as his patron, even though Johnson himself had received no contact or 
                                                 
105 Rambler 149 (20 August 1751) in The Rambler, ed. Walter Jackson Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, vols. 
III-V of the Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), V, 
28. In fact, one contemporary reviewer of the Dictionary charged Johnson with neglecting his obligations 
to Chesterfield.  Dr. Matthew Maty, a friend of Lord Chesterfield, expressed surprise that Johnson did not 
place the Plan at the head of the Dictionary, and suggested that its absence was an attempt on Johnson’s 
part to conceal obligations to his patron: “On a lieu d’être surpris que cette pièce ne se trouve point à la tête 
du dictionnaire, dont elle contenoit l’annonce. Elle eût épargné à l’Auteur la composition d’une nouvelle 
preface, qui ne contient qu’en partie les mêmes choses, et qu’on est tenté de regarder comme destineé a 
faire perdre de vue quelques unes des obligations, que M. Johnson avoit contractées, et le Mécène qu’il 
avoit choisi.” Journal Britannique, 17 (juillet et août 1755), quoted in A. De Morgan, “Dr. Johnson and Dr. 
Maty,” Notes and Queries, 2nd series, IV (July-December, 1857): 341. De Morgan suggests that this 
review lay behind Johnson’s reportedly heated response to the suggestion that Maty help him with a literary 
review: “The little black dog! I’d throw him into the Thames.” See Life, I, 284. Boswell alters this quote 
from its form in his source for the anecdote, a letter (15 June 1784) from Dr. William Adams: “Damn 
Maty—little dirty-faced dog I’ll throw him into the Thames.” See The Correspondence and Other Papers 
of James Boswell Relating to the Making of the ‘Life of Johnson’, 2nd ed., corrected and enlarged, ed. 
Marshall Waingrow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 19, 21 nn. 18 and 19.  
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support from Chesterfield since 1747.106 Johnson’s letter to Chesterfield came later and 
was private, even though it may later have made the rounds of some London literati.107 In 
part to explain the absence of a dedication, Johnson thus may have deemed it necessary to 
inform the public, to “gratify curiosity” in his words, that the Dictionary was “written. . . 
without any patronage of the great” (Sig. C2v).  
In addition, at a time when, in Mr. Rambler’s words, to “commence author is to 
claim praise,” to put oneself forward or to recommend one’s own work risked immodesty 
and vanity, and violated classical and contemporary notions of decorum.108 Cicero, in a 
                                                 
106 Events transpiring after Johnson likely wrote the Preface reinforced the impression that Chesterfield was 
still Johnson’s patron: Chesterfield’s puffs of the Dictionary appeared in The World in November and 
December 1754; Johnson’s Plan, dedicated to Chesterfield was made available for free in February or 
March 1755, if not earlier (Sledd and Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 110, 220 n. 133). One correspondent 
to The Scots Magazine in February 1755 still believed that the Dictionary was “patronized by the Earl of 
Chesterfield, that living standard of true British eloquence,” Scots Magazine 17 (February 1755), 91. In 
March 1755 The London Magazine printed a poem reinforcing Chesterfield’s image as a generous patron: 
“On the intended Academy for the Encouragement of Genius, and the Establishment of Painting, Sculpture, 
Architecture, &c. with the Arts depending.” After asking if “genius” in Britain shall “perish in its infant 
state,” the author exclaims, “Ye Chesterfields! ye Lytteltons, arise!” London Magazine 24 (March 1755), 
136. In addition, a correspondent to the April 5 Inspector seems to refer to Johnson as still enjoying 
Chesterfield’s patronage. “I should do injustice to one, who having in repeated instances shewn the force 
and elegance of our language, is at this time employed in the most laborious work, genius ever undertook, 
to establish it, if I should not add, that he early received the same honour [i.e., patronage from Chesterfield] 
with the first mentioned poet [listed simply as Jones], and continues to enjoy as much of the same 
patronage as he chuses to accept,” reprinted in London Magazine 24 (April 1755), 166. This passage may 
be an indirect allusion to Johnson’s letter to Chesterfield, but there is no way to be sure.  
107 Years later Johnson’s friend, the Rev. William Adams, claimed in a letter to Boswell that the 
Chesterfield letter was “the talk of the town,” and Dr. William Warburton apparently heard about the letter, 
but I have found nothing printed in 1755 that refers directly to the letter. For a possible indirect reference, 
see the previous note. It is not clear how much we can trust Adams’s account—we have no way to know 
how widely or how quickly the contents of the letter or its message were circulated before the publication 
of the Preface made the rift between Chesterfield and Johnson clear. John J. Burke, Jr. identifies Isaac 
Reed’s 1774 account of the rift in the Westminster Magazine as the “first account in print of the 1755 
quarrel,” “The Originality of Boswell’s Version of Johnson’s Quarrel with Lord Chesterfield,” in New 
Light on Boswell: Critical and Historical Essays on the Occasion of the Bicentenary of The Life of 
Johnson, ed. Greg Clingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 145. 
108 Rambler 93 (Yale Works, IV, 134). 
    50
 
text Johnson recommended for students of ethics and morality, noted that it “is bad taste . 
. . to talk about oneself.”109 David Hume, in a study of morals wrote,  
That impertinent, and almost universal propensity of men, to over-value 
themselves, has given us such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to 
condemn it, by a general rule, wherever we meet with it; and ‘tis with some 
difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, even in their most secret thoughts. 
At least, it must be own’d, that some disguise in this particular is absolutely 
requisite; and that if we harbour pride in our breasts, we must carry a fair outside, 
and have the appearance of modesty and mutual deference in all our conduct and 
behaviour.110  
 
As Mr. Rambler and as correspondent “T” of The Adventurer, Johnson advised “firmness 
and spirit” to authors, since “softness, diffidence and moderation will often be mistaken 
for imbecility and dejection;” the latter traits “lure cowardice to the attack by the hopes of 
easy victory, and it will be soon be found that he whom every man thinks he can conquer, 
shall never be at peace.” But self-defence, especially when used to “secure” the writer 
from “unexpected encounters,” could easily give way to self-praise, hence to vanity and 
error. Those who indulge their pride in defense of errors may find that “such pride, once 
indulged, too frequently operates upon more important objects, and inclines men not only 
to vindicate their errors, but their vices; to persist in practices which their own hearts 
condemn, only lest they should seem to feel reproaches, or be made wiser by the advice 
of others.” And even though, as Mr. Rambler noted, Erasmus wrote that “It is right...that 
                                                 
109 Cicero, De Officiis, I. 38, trans. Walter Miller (London: William Heinemann, 1938), 141. Johnson 
recommends “Tully’s Offices” in his anonymous Preface to The Preceptor (1748); see Prefaces and 
Dedications, 187.   
110 David Hume,  A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, rev. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978 [1739-40]), 598. Emphasis in original.  
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he, whom no one else will commend, should bestow commendations on himself,” those 
self-praisers are merely the “happiest and greatest” of the “sons of vanity.”111  
 Mid-eighteenth-century professional writers employed a variety of ways to avoid 
putting themselves forward, which could taint the value of their work if they appeared to 
be motivated by monetary gain. As John Brewer puts it, under a long-prevailing view of 
writing as “a ‘liberal’ pursuit, the occupation of persons of enlarged views and unbiased 
vision,” writing for money  
not only reduced authorship to a mechanical trade but subverted the value of the 
work. Literature for profit could not be unsullied and unbiased. . . . In such a view 
all true authors aspired to the status of persons whose independent means freed 
their capacity for true judgment. It was therefore extremely important to deny or 
conceal any mercenary motive, to disavow and devise the temptations of 
mammon. . . . Contemporaries contrasted the genteel camp of ‘liberal’ writers, 
populated by men and women of large vision and good taste, with what they saw 
as the squalid and impecunious quarters inhabited by authors of partial vision, 
venal aspiration and grovelling subordination. In this view there was no 
intermediate niche between the liberal author and the Grub Street hack.112  
 
Some writers of fiction avoided the stigma of vulgar professionalism by publishing 
anonymously, or writing what Genette has called the “disavowing authorial preface,” in 
which the writer denies authorship of the text, often claiming to be simply the editor of a 
text composed by the narrator.113 Samuel Richardson published his Pamela anonymously, 
and composed a “Preface by the Editor,” in which he was confident that the work was 
worthy for two reasons: “Because he can Appeal from his own Passions, (which have 
been uncommonly moved in perusing these engaging Scenes) . . . ; And, in the next 
                                                 
111 Yale Works, V, 166; III, 171; V, 246. Mr. Rambler does not note that Erasmus conveyed this advice on 
self-praise through the voice of Folly. See Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, trans. Clarence H. 
Miller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979 [1509]), 11.  
112 Brewer, Pleasures of the Imagination, 144-46. 
113 Genette, Paratexts, 185-87, 280-84. 
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place, because an Editor may be reasonably supposed to judge with an Impartiality which 
is rarely to be met with in an Author toward his own Works.”114 In addition to this 
disinterested editor’s preface, the prefatory matter includes an anonymous letter first 
published in the Weekly Miscellany, addressed “To my worthy Friend, the Editor of 
PAMELA, &c.” The correspondent closes by insisting that “the Cause of Virtue, calls for 
the Publication of such a Piece as this. Oblige then, Sir, the concurrent Voices of both 
Sexes, and give us Pamela for the Benefit of Mankind” (p. 8). Henry Fielding, in 
presenting Tom Jones to the public, did not publish anonymously, but did dedicate his 
work to “the HONORABLE George Lyttelton, Esq.,” insisting on his “Right to desire your 
Protection of this Work” despite Lyttelton’s “constant Refusal, when I have asked Leave 
to prefix your Name to this Dedication.”115 In discussing the merits of his work with 
Lyttelton, rather than the public, Fielding can vaunt his work without the stigma of 
appealing directly to the buying public.  
What Merit these Labours have is already known to yourself. If, from your 
favourable Judgment, I have conceived some Esteem for them, it cannot be 
imputed to Vanity; since I should have agreed as implicitly to your Opinion, had 
it been given in Favour of any other Man’s Production. Negatively, at least, I may 
be allowed to say, that had I been sensible of any great Demerit in the Work, you 
are the last Person to whose Protection I would have ventured to recommend it 
(7).   
 
Fielding thus figures his high self-regard as praise for the opinion of Lyttelton, and his 
high opinion of the work is portrayed as a gesture of respect for Lyttelton, whose time he 
would not willingly waste with an unworthy work. The public, instead of being addressed 
                                                 
114 Samuel Richardson, Pamela, ed. T. C. Duncan Eaves and Ben D. Kimpel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1971 [1740]), 3. Genette mentions, but does not discuss, Pamela; see Paratexts, 186. 
115 Henry Fielding, Tom Jones, ed. Sheridan Baker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973 [1749]), 5.  
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and courted here by Fielding, is merely witness to a literary transaction that helps them 
situate the author socially, morally, and intellectually. Once Fielding has established a 
relationship with Lyttelton, he can humorously condescend in the introduction to the 
work, to opine that an “Author ought to consider himself, not as a Gentleman who gives a 
private or eleemosynary Treat, but rather as one who keeps a public Ordinary, at which 
all Persons are welcome for their Money” (I.1, 25).  
Chesterfield, puffing Johnson’s Dictionary in The World, thought it necessary to 
inform readers, in a rhetorically conspicuous location—a postscript—that he had not 
accepted money for his efforts. Chesterfield then turns his disavowal of profit motive into 
an occasion to suggest ingratitude, or a lack of decorum, on the part of Johnson and the 
booksellers: 
P. S.  I hope that none of my courteous readers will upon this occasion be so 
uncourteous, as to suspect me of being a hired and interested puff of this work; for 
I most solemnly protest, that neither Mr. Johnson, nor any person employed by 
him, nor any bookseller or booksellers concerned in the success of it, have ever 
offered me the usual compliment of a pair of gloves or a bottle of wine; nor has 
even Mr. Dodsley, though my publisher, and, as I am informed, deeply interested 
in the sale of the dictionary, so much as invited me to take a bit of mutton with 
him.116
 
The mock solemnity of the postscript, rhetorically conspicuous while formally an 
afterthought, allows Chesterfield to establish his superiority to those who are “concerned 
in the success” of the Dictionary or “deeply interested” in its “sale”—who have, by 
implication, failed to observe decorum and their obligation to Chesterfield’s 
                                                 
116 The World, 100 (28 November 1754), 604.  
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condescension (by not offering “the usual compliment”)—while at the same time not 
seeming to take the affair too seriously.117   
In Johnson’s anonymous dedications, ghostwritten for other writers, the 
dedication allows the writer to avoid the imputation of vanity by providing a way to 
claim praise by proxy, by the tacit or desired approval of the dedicatee. While still 
writing the Rambler, Johnson wrote a dedication for Charlotte Lennox’s The Female 
Quixote to the “Right Honourable the Earl of Middlesex” in which he crystallizes many 
of the hazards of authorship that he enumerates over the course of the Ramblers: “The 
Dread which a Writer feels of the public Censure; the still greater Dread of Neglect; and 
the eager Wish for Support and Protection, which is impressed by the Consciousness of 
Imbecillity; are unknown to those who have never adventured into the World; and I am 
afraid Lord, equally unknown to those, who have always found the World ready to 
applaud them.” Worried that “the Effects of my Fear” may be “imputed to my Vanity,” 
the dedicator seeks rhetorical refuge in the dedicatee, whose implicit approval lends 
authority to the dedicator: “Whatever be supposed my Motive, the Praise of Judgment 
cannot be denied me; for, to whom can Timidity so properly fly for Shelter, as to him 
who has been so long distinguished for Candour and Humanity? . . . Or by what other 
means could I so powerfully suppress all Opposition, but that of Envy, as by declaring 
                                                 
117 Dustin Griffin cites Chesterfield as an example of eighteenth-century patrons who “seem to have 
attempted to acquire a reputation for beneficence without actually laying out much money or political 
capital.” Griffin argues that “after about 1750” all parties in the “literary system— authors, readers, critics, 
booksellers, and patrons — advance claims for their own literary authority. Each party in effect resists or 
contests the authority of every other party.” Literary Patronage in England, 1650-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 280-81.  
    55
 
myself, My Lord, Your Lordship’s Obliged and most Obedient Humble Servant.”118 
Unlike the hypothetical writer who was the subject of many Rambler essays, the author, 
at least rhetorically, enters the world under the protection of the patron rather than 
depending on personal authority. In some of the dedications Johnson later wrote, the 
dedicator’s presumption pertains not to a sense of the author’s own merit before the 
public, but the presumption of being worthy to be associated with the patron. In another 
dedication attributed to Johnson, the dedicator notes that “ambition, which often 
overpowers judgment in questions of more importance, has made me forget the 
disproportion between Your Lordship’s name, and a Dramatic Pastoral.”119  
In writing the Preface, however, Johnson could not “fly for Shelter” to his patron, 
even had he been inclined to do so. But the lack of a dedication was now awkward, given 
Johnson’s dedication in the Plan and the ambitions to authority of Johnson’s Dictionary, 
and an ethos as a professional was not desirable. Johnson would have to address the 
public directly, without academic degree, without addressing the patron to whom he had 
dedicated the Plan of his Dictionary, and to a wide audience who might have access to 
his Preface through the magazines or reviews. Johnson’s Preface was not only crucial to 
the reception of the Dictionary, but because of its high-profile nature, the Preface would 
be significant to Johnson’s subsequent literary reputation as well.  
 While the writer of dedications could draw upon the long-established customs of 
decorum in dedications, Johnson had no precise precedent to follow in presenting himself 
                                                 
118 In Hazen, Prefaces and Dedications, 98.  
119 In Hazen, Prefaces and Dedications, 103. I do not have time here to explore the fact that the formal 
presenter of these two dedications is Charlotte Lennox, a fact that raises interesting questions about the how 
these self-presentations may have been calibrated to suit the gender of the nominal presenter.   
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and his labors when writing the Preface to a work that was both nationally significant 
scholarly folio and bookseller’s project—despite the abundance of dictionary prefaces 
written before Johnson. Though there existed a long tradition of prefaces to English 
dictionaries, their value as precedents was diminished by the fact that those who wrote 
them were commonly described as plodding drudges or mean hacks. Johnson’s 
introduction to his Preface—in which he notes that the “writer of dictionaries” has 
generally been considered a “humble drudge . . . doomed only to remove rubbish and 
clear obstructions from the paths through which Learning and Genius press forward to 
conquest and glory”—is not merely an ironic conceit, but recognition of the tradition 
against which he had to portray himself (Sig. A2r). The April 1755 Monthly Review 
noted, for instance, that “Lexicographers we have had, not a few, but such as, for the 
most part, were little better than copyists of each other.”120 One A. Y., eagerly 
anticipating the Dictionary’s impending release, related his view of Johnson’s 
predecessors to the “author of the SCOTS MAGAZINE.” Stating his own version of a 
commonplace view, he writes, “It was merrily said of the German writers, by one of the 
wits of France, that they were generally men of more shoulders than head, and that 
Apollo had condemned them to be the drudges and baggage-horses of Parnassus: an 
observation that admirably suits most of Mr Johnson’s predecessors in dictionary-writing 
and glossography.”121 Pope employed the trope of the drudge in a letter to William 
Broome, thanking Broome for helping to annotate his translation of Homer. While Pope 
“had the flowery walks of the imagination to expatiate in,” Broome had “drudged in only 
                                                 
120 The Monthly Review 12 (April 1755), 292.  
121 The Scots Magazine 17 (February 1755), 91.  
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removing the loads, and clearing rubbish, heaped together by the negligence no less than 
by the industry of past pedants, whose very taste was generally so wrong, that they toiled 
most on what was least worth.”122 Ephraim Chambers himself was drawing on the well-
worn trope of the thankless drudge or pioneer when he wrote, “Your Mines and 
subterranean Matters are mere drudgery, and Pioneers work; difficult to carry on, dubious 
of Success, and overlook’d when done.”123 Johnson himself employed the trope of the 
drudge or laborer of learning in Rambler 145, noting that most of the “authors of 
London” “however laborious, however arrogant, can only be considered as drudges of the 
pen, the manufacturers of literature, who have set up for authors;” and in Rambler 83, 
when he noted that “To mean understandings, it is sufficient honour to be numbered 
amongst the lowest labourers of learning,” though to “hew stone, would have been 
unworthy of Palladio; and to have rambled in search of shells and flowers, had but ill-
suited with the capacity of Newton.”124  
 And if the presumed drudges among English lexicography’s tradition were 
inadequate models for Johnson’s self-presentation, other predecessors were inadequate 
for different reasons: they were members of an elite Academy or died in medias res.125 
                                                 
122 (24 March 1720), in The Correspondence of Alexander Pope, ed. George Sherburn (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1956) 2:40; also quoted in James R. Sutherland, “The Dull Duty of an Editor,” Essential Articles for 
the Study of Alexander Pope, ed. Maynard Mack (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1964), 639. 
123 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopædia (London, 1728), xxii.  
124 Yale Works, V, 10; IV, 76.  
125 Paul J. Korshin, as well as Gwin J. Kolb and Robert DeMaria, Jr., have pointed out that even when 
talking about very personal matters in the Preface Johnson may have consulted what they respectively term 
“the tradition of lacrimae lexicographi” and the “lugubrious tradition of humanistic lexicography.” Korshin 
suggests similarities between Johnson’s Preface and the “Epistola Dedicatoria” written by the son of 
Johannes Buxtorf for his late father’s posthumously published Lexicon Chaldaicum, Talmudicum, et 
Rabbinicum (Basle, 1639); see “Johnson and the Renaissance Dictionary,” Journal of the History of Ideas 
35 (1974): 305-06. Robert DeMaria, Jr. and Gwin J. Kolb argue that Johnson’s “elegiac and traditional 
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Johnson’s Dictionary, always conceived to compete with those of the continental 
academies, was not a project of an academic cultural elite, but a bookseller’s project, and 
was presented, at least, as the work of one man. Even though Johnson could mine 
abundant materials for his Preface from predecessors, he had few precise precursors 
whose scholarly self-representation he could emulate; few, if any, predecessors who 
presented so ambitious a work of scholarship both without a patron and for a congeries of 
booksellers.126 Such a self-presentation, as I have argued, would not have been a simple 
matter for a man who could not deflect the taint of writing for money by feigning literary 
retirement. Johnson’s honorary degree just before the Dictionary’s publication, 
Chesterfield’s two letters in The World puffing the Dictionary months before its release, 
and the booksellers’s re-release, gratis, of the Plan dedicated to Chesterfield all occurred, 
I argue, after Johnson wrote the Preface. When Johnson wrote the Preface, he could only 
count on his own performance to vouch for his labors.  
* * * * * * 
Johnson’s awkward rhetorical circumstances when writing the Preface have been 
obscured not only because of complex and changing circumstances surrounding the 
Dictionary’s publication, but also because Johnson has long stood to represent an 
emerging class of professional writers beholden not to patronage but rather the public. 
                                                                                                                                                 
sentiments in the Preface” have antecedents in prefaces lamenting the death of the lexicographer, 
“Johnson’s ‘Dictionary’ and Dictionary Johnson,” Yearbook of English Studies 28 (1998): 42.  
126 John Considine argues that Johnson learned how to present lexicography as heroic from the preliminary 
matter of Henri Estienne’s Thesaurus Graecae Linguae of 1572, “The Lexicographer as Hero: Samuel 
Johnson and Henri Estienne,” Philological Quarterly 79 (2000): 205-24. Considine suggests that early 
modern scholars such as Estienne began to make “judicious use of preliminary material” to present 
themselves “carefully” to their readers (213), but does not suggest how Johnson would have calibrated his 
own self-presentation, given the circumstances I have outlined.  
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But this traditional view of Johnson obscures one of the most interesting aspects of his 
literary career: he is the most conspicuous example of an English writer in the eighteenth 
century who stands at the crossroads of patronage, the market, and academia. Few other 
writers participated so fully in all modes of the changing world of eighteenth-century 
literature, a period which is, as Dustin Griffin argues, “characterized by overlapping 
‘economies’ of patronage and marketplace.”127 Because of Johnson’s letter to 
Chesterfield and perhaps his reputed utterance about no one but a blockhead writing, 
except for money, Johnson has long stood as the harbinger of a new age of independent 
authors who were beholden to the market and not to patrons for approval. But Griffin 
argues convincingly that Johnson’s letter to Chesterfield is “not so much evidence of the 
end of the era of the patron, as of an injured but proud author’s sense that a patron had 
failed to observe the system’s norms.”128 In his day, Johnson was attacked for accepting 
in 1762 a royal pension of £300 per annum.129 And, as Hazen notes, Johnson wrote 
                                                 
127 Griffin, Literary Patronage in England, 10.  
128 Griffin, Literary Patronage in England, 247. For two views, in addition to Griffin’s, on the nature of the 
misunderstanding between Johnson and Chesterfield, see Paul J. Korshin, “The Johnson-Chesterfield 
Relationship: A New Hypothesis,” PMLA 85 (1970): 247-59; Jacob Leed, “Johnson and Chesterfield: 
1746-47,” Studies in Burke and His Time 12 (1970): 1677-90; as well as Korshin, “Johnson and and 
Literary Patronage: A Comment on Jacob Leed’s article,” Studies in Burke and His Time 12 (1971): 1804-
11; and Leed, “Johnson, Chesterfield, and Patronage: A Response to Paul Korshin,” Studies in Burke and 
His Time 13 (1971): 2011-15. Korshin argues that Chesterfield did follow the norms of patronly giving by 
offering “small-gift patronage” (e.g., £10) of the “kind most frequently available to writers in the 1740s,” 
and the benefit of having Chesterfield’s name associated with the project; “Johnson and Literary 
Patronage,” 1806-1807. Leed, by contrast, writes that many “instances of considerable financial support 
[for writers] can be cited from mid-century,” but asserts that “the main difficulty with Korshin’s suggestion 
is that it does not seem to allow for Johnson’s disappointment,” (“Johnson, Chesterfield, and Patronage,” 
2011). Korshin continues the discussion in “Types of Eighteenth-Century Literary Patronage,” Eighteenth-
Century Studies 7 (1974): 453-73.  
129 For the most thorough analysis of the pension and its circumstances, see James Clifford, Dictionary 
Johnson, Ch. 16, “The Pensioner,” 262-77. 
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twenty dedications over a thirty-year period following the incident with Chesterfield, and 
thus can be considered a “chief propagator” of the patronage system.130  
Yet Johnson’s presumed independence of the patronage system, and his deep 
participation in writings for the market, have perhaps led scholars to generalize too 
hastily that Johnson’s public persona was proudly professional. Alvin Kernan, for 
instance, uses the “blockhead” quote to underscore his claim that Johnson did not just 
accept his status as a professional writer, but that he flaunted it. “He not only accepted 
but boasted that his writing often had little to do with inspiration. . . . He also openly 
acknowledged, even flaunted, his status as a wage-earner: ‘No man but a blockhead ever 
wrote, except for money.’”131 Simon Jarvis, drawing on Kernan’s characterization of 
Johnson, writes that Johnson “was happy (unlike many of his predecessors) to 
acknowledge that he wrote for money,” and argues for “Johnson’s explicit self-
construction as a professional writer.”132 But other scholars have emphasized Johnson’s 
strong identification with Renaissance humanists, many of whom practiced under 
patronage. DeMaria has described Johnson’s life as an unhappy compromise between his 
desire to lead the life of a Renaissance-humanist scholar and both “financial exigencies 
                                                 
130 Hazen, Prefaces and Dedications, xix. Boswell praises Johnson as a master-writer of dedications, “that 
courtly species of writing,” adding, however, that the “loftiness” of Johnson’s “mind prevented him from 
ever dedicating in his own person”; Life, II, 1. 
131 Alvin Kernan, Printing Technology, Letters & Samuel Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1987), 96-97. While Kernan reads the “blockhead” quote as the proud boast of a wage-earner, Paul Fussell 
argues that in this comment Johnson “is doing many things at once, but the one thing he is not doing is 
registering his own convictions on the matter. . . . In talking about money as the motive for writing, he 
intends to startle the genteel and the sentimental, to undermine easy cant on the subject of literary motive 
by making the whole question, as it is discussed in public, appear naïve and stupid,” Samuel Johnson and 
the Life of Writing (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 111. In the end, it is easy to grant too 
much significance to this quote, whose provenance and rhetorical context are unclear. For Boswell’s 
presentation of this quote, see Life, III, 19.  
132 Simon Jarvis, Scholars and Gentlemen: Shakespearian Textual Criticism and Representations of 
Scholarly Labour, 1725-1765 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 129, 139.  
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and the nature of the publishing world in which he lived.”133 Because Johnson’s 
Dictionary was, in fact, presented as a work of high scholarly pretensions, a proudly 
explicit professional persona would have been an awkward choice. Whatever Johnson 
may have later said about his own writing career or motives of writers, when writing the 
Preface, Johnson would have had little reason to declare his professionalism with 
conspicuous pride.  
If Johnson emphasized at times his status as a professional writer and figured his 
booksellers as his patrons, he fashioned himself as a learned scholar at other times, even 
though he generally remained an outsider to the academy. Johnson never allied himself in 
his public writings directly with booksellers. Boswell claimed that Johnson viewed the 
Dictionary booksellers as “patrons of literature,” and Johnson did write playfully that 
bookseller Robert Dodsley, “Doddy,” was his patron. Johnson called bookseller Andrew 
Millar “the Maecenas of the age,” and Boswell records Johnson as saying of him, “I 
respect Millar, Sir; he has raised the price of literature.” Johnson also once told Boswell 
that the booksellers who underwrote his Dictionary were “generous liberal-minded 
men.”134
                                                 
133 The Life of Samuel Johnson: A Critical Biography, 157 and passim. W. Jackson Bate discusses 
Johnson’s “ideal of the Renaissance scholar-Humanist” in Samuel Johnson (New York & London: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, 1977), 447. Nicholas Hudson refers to “Johnson’s vision of himself as 
an independent scholar” in “Johnson’s Dictionary and the Politics of ‘Standard English,’” Yearbook of 
English Studies 28 (1998): 78. Paul J. Korshin has discussed Johnson’s familiarity with early modern 
humanistic authors as evidenced in the Ramblers,  “‘Johnson and . . .’: Conceptions of Literary 
Relationship,” in Greene Centennial Studies: Essays Presented to Donald Greene in the Centennial Year of 
the University of Southern California, ed. Paul J. Korshin and Robert R. Allen (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1984), 298-301. Korshin also suggests Johnson’s familiarity with early modern 
lexicography in “Johnson and the Renaissance Dictionary.”  
134 Life, I, 305; Letters, I, 173; Life, I, 287 n. 3., 288, 304. 
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Yet if Johnson at times saw himself as a professional writer working for a new 
kind of patron, he also identified himself as a scholar, and in Boswell’s view, no “man 
had a higher notion of the dignity of literature than Johnson, or was more determined in 
maintaining the respect which he justly considered due to it.”135 When Johnson, having 
received two honorary doctorates and a royal pension, advises the Master of Oxford’s 
University College on how Clarendon Press might bring a profit, he presents himself to 
the Oxford don as a fellow scholar and as a man whose worldly experience qualifies him 
to inform the don on details of “the circulation of Books which perhaps every man has 
not had opportunity of knowing and which those who know it, do not perhaps always 
distinctly consider.” Johnson allies himself with the academy when addressing the don, 
suggesting that however often one might describe booksellers as patrons, no bookseller 
published anything, except for money: “I suppose,” Johnson writes, “with all our 
scholastick ignorance of mankind we are still too knowing to expect that the Booksellers 
will erect themselves into Patrons and buy and sell under the influence of a disinterested 
zeal for the promotion of Learning.”136 In the letter to Chesterfield, Johnson makes no 
reference to himself as a professional writer, but refers to himself as a “retired and 
uncourtly Scholar.”137 Johnson’s encounter with Thomas Osborne, in which Johnson 
                                                 
135 Life, III, 310. 
136 Letters, II, 308, 306. 
137 Letters, I, 95. Given Chesterfield’s mention in The World of Johnson’s “literary retirement,” Johnson’s 
self-description here as a “retired” scholar may be read as sarcastic. When recommending that Johnson 
include in his Dictionary “that most important verb, TO FUZZ,” a term from the card game whist, he added 
“I am not sure that [the word] has yet made it’s [sic] way into Mr. Johnson’s literary retirement.” The 
World 101 (5 December 1754), 607. Chesterfield’s reference to Johnson’s “literary retirement” may be a 
euphemistic way to call Johnson unworldly while at the same time trying to help publicly fashion for 
Johnson an ethos of the comfortably retired and ‘liberal’ man of letters. The fact that Chesterfield would 
recommend, even if playfully, “a small supplemental dictionary” of words used by the “BEAU MONDE” in 
December, when the Dictionary was in its final stages of printing, and when Johnson was still gently 
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reportedly used a folio to fell the “impertinent” bookseller who hired him to catalogue the 
Harleian Library, has been read as an instance of a scholar maintaining independence 
from the commercial interests of a market-driven bookseller.138 Boswell relates an 
anecdote as a “characteristical instance” of Johnson’s steadfast maintenance of the 
“dignity of literature”:  
He told Sir Joshua Reynolds, that once when he dined in a numerous company of 
booksellers, where the room being small, the head of the table, at which he sat, 
was almost close to the fire, he persevered in suffering a great deal of 
inconvenience from the heat, rather than quit his place, and let one of them sit 
above him.139  
 
Johnson’s maintenance of position above the booksellers suggests Johnson’s own sense 
of his own dignity, and suggests that he thought of himself as more than just a literary 
wage-earner. But as proud as Johnson must have been upon receiving his honorary 
Oxford M.A. just before the Dictionary was published, his letter to the Oxford don in 
1776 indicates his worldliness, in comparsion to the retired scholar.  
                                                                                                                                                 
petitioning the aid of Thomas Warton and Francis Wise in securing an honorary M. A. from Oxford, would 
have underscored for Johnson how out of touch Chesterfield was with the progress of a project he was 
publicly sponsoring. The World 101 (5 December 1754), 610. For another analysis of Johnson’s reasons to 
be annoyed by Chesterfield’s puffs and the “equally demeaning paper” they prompted Richard Owen 
Cambridge to write, see Howard Weinbrot, “Johnson’s Dictionary and The World: The Papers of Lord 
Chesterfield and Richard Owen Cambridge,” Philological Quarterly 50 (1971): 663-69. Weinbrot argues 
that Chesterfield and Cambridge both insult Johnson and his project by suggesting that he would make 
lexicographic decisions to enhance sales or on the basis of “financial self-interest” (668). Such insinuations 
in The World would have only underscored the Dictionary’s status as a bookseller’s project, and partly 
explains why Johnson would want to avoid seeming self-interested in the Preface. It is important to note, in 
addition, that while I suggest a kind of rhetorical interplay between the wording of Chesterfield’s puffs and 
the wording of Johnson’s letter to Chesterfield, the original of Johnson’s letter is untraced. The only extant 
copies of the letter authorized by Johnson are the undated British Library version dictated to Giuseppe 
Baretti and corrected by Johnson, as well as the copy dictated from memory to Boswell in 1781, now held 
at Yale University’s Beinecke Library. In his edition of Johnson’s letters, Bruce Redford uses the British 
Library MS as his copy-text but lists variants found in the Yale MS; see Letters, I, 94-97. 
138 Life, I, 154. For a reading of this episode, see DeMaria, Jr. The Life of Samuel Johnson: A Critical 
Biography, 105-106.  
139 Life, III, 311. 
    64
 
But even though Johnson identified with scholars, he was an outsider to academia 
when he compiled the Dictionary and wrote the Preface. When the Oxford dropout 
visited his old campus in 1754 to complete some final work for the Dictionary, he found 
a cold reception from the master of his old college. Johnson told his friend Thomas 
Warton, the Oxford professor who hosted Johnson, “There lives a man, who lives by the 
revenues of literature, and will not move a finger to support it.” And upon seeing his old 
University College fellow, Mr. Meeke, Johnson said to Warton, “I used to think Meeke 
had excellent parts, when we were boys together at the College: but, alas! ‘Lost in a 
convent’s solitary gloom!’ . . . . About the same time of life, Meeke was left behind at 
Oxford to feed on a Fellowship, and I went to London to get my living: now, Sir, see the 
difference of our literary characters!”140
Given Johnson’s position as a man who participated in all aspects of the 
overlapping economy, no categorical, historically unsensitive description of his literary 
persona is adequate. Johnson seems to have enjoyed being a man of the world among 
dons and a man of learning among booksellers. Johnson’s claim—“No man . . . who ever 
lived by literature, has lived more independently than I have done”—suggests his own 
sense that he occupied an unusual position in the changing literary economies of the 
eighteenth century.141 Johnson’s position at the crossroads of patronage, the market, and 
academia was dynamic, and Johnson took rhetorical advantage of this awkward position 
depending on his situation, modifying his presentation by emphasizing one aspect of his 
persona or another. Martin Wechselblatt has rightly suggested that Johnson is a 
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“characteristically modern, hybrid version of a scholar because of his circumstances,” 
and that Johnson “sometimes construed” his Dictionary “and persona in terms derived 
from the Anglo-Latin tradition of scholarship and sometimes in terms derived from Grub 
Street, the public sphere, and the marketplace.”142 But while Johnson could not deny that 
his Dictionary was a product of the marketplace, he would have little to gain by 
cultivating the persona of a Grub Street laborer in the Preface.  
* * * * * * 
 If Johnson found ways to negotiate his way successfully among these often 
overlapping and intersecting components of the literary economy over the years, his 
position in 1754, when he wrote the Preface, left less room for negotiation. He was 
presenting an ambitious work of learning to the international republic of letters without 
even the implicit sanction of patron or academic degree. Johnson did not receive his      
M. A. from Oxford until February 1755, two months before the publication of the 
Dictionary, and at the end of December 1754 he had not mentioned the possibility of 
receiving the degree to his friends “for fear of being laughed at for my disappointment.” 
And even on 13 February 1755 Johnson still did not “know in what state my little affair 
stands.”143 By remembering these circumstances of Johnson’s literary career we can 
                                                 
142 Martin Wechselblatt, Bad Behavior: Samuel Johnson and Modern Cultural Authority (Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press, 1998), 33. In “The Pathos of Example: Professionalism and Colonization in 
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hireling,” The Yale Journal of Criticism 9 (1996): 382. 
143 Letters, I, 90; Life, I, 97.  
    66
 
avoid anachronistically projecting our own belated sense of the “Dr.” onto the man who 
compiled the Dictionary and who presented it to the public for the first time.144
 In closing the Preface Johnson dismisses his Dictionary “with frigid tranquillity, 
having little to fear or hope from censure or from praise,” but this dismissal comes only 
after he has dramatically documented his intellectual labors and his sacrifices for the 
language and the nation (Sig. C2v). In this peroration delivered before the literary 
marketplace Johnson lays bare for readers his endurance of what were often seen as 
vitiating effects on a writer’s mind and work—“inconvenience and distraction, . . . 
sickness and sorrow” (Sig. C2v). But in underscoring these experiences alongside his 
careful delineations of his achievements, Johnson converts his travails outside the “soft 
obscurities of retirement, or under the shelter of academick bowers” from potentially 
vitiating liabilities to the noble sacrifices of an intellectual hero (Sig. C2v). Johnson’s 
choice to present himself as unbeholden to patron or academy for his work was not 
necessarily a statement, by default, of proud professionalism, but was essentially true, 
especially while he was still unclear about whether he would receive a degree at all. 
Given his tenuous social status, and the burden of having to defend his work without 
much symbolic capital, he had to make the most of the truth. Having read Samuel 
Richardson’s epistolary novel Sir Charles Grandison, Johnson advises Richardson 
against employing the conventional conceits of disavowing prefaces. Johnson wrote that 
he had  
                                                 
144 Johnson himself never used the title of “Dr.,” and even the appearance of “A.M.” no longer appeared on 
the Dictionary title page after the first three editions. The last two editions of the Dictionary appearing in 
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time he could have used “LL.D.”  
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no objection but to the preface in which You first mention the letters as fallen by 
some chance into your hands, and afterwards mention your health as such that you 
almost despaired of going through your plan. If you were to require my opinion 
which part should be changed, I should be inclined to the suppression of that part 
which seems to disclaim the composition. What is modesty if it departs from 
truth? Of what use is the disguise by which nothing is concealed?145  
 
In constructing the rhetoric of the Preface, Johnson did not attempt to conceal his 
circumstances, but made them the basis of his merit, as others had before him. Johnson 
had already pointed out in Rambler 77 that the  
miseries of the learned have been related by themselves; and since they have not 
been found exempt from that partiality with which men look upon their own 
actions and sufferings, we may conclude that they have not forgotten to deck their 
cause with the brightest ornaments, and strongest colours.146
 
An understanding of Johnson’s rhetorical circumstances, shaped as they were by forces 
beyond his control, helps account for the striking vacillations between pride and humility 
in the Preface, often interpreted simply as latent psychological tendencies made manifest. 
Johnson’s humility is not ironic, as some have argued, but rather an honest and 
rhetorically desirable counterpoise to the praise that Johnson’s circumstances required 
him to bestow on himself.  These circumstances remind us that the Preface is not merely 
an account of Johnson’s methodological decisions or his views on language—it is a 







                                                 
145 Letters, I, 74. 
146 Yale Works, IV, 39.  
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II. “Defensive Pride”: The Moral and Rhetorical Foundations of the Preface in 
Johnson’s Rambler and Adventurer 
 
 Johnson’s longtime friend, Dr. William Adams, hearing Johnson claim 
Chesterfield to be “the proudest man this day existing,” responded, “‘No, there is one 
person, at least, as proud; I think, by your own account, you are the prouder man of the 
two.’ ‘But mine (replied Johnson, instantly) was defensive pride.’ This, as Dr. Adams 
well observed, was one of those happy turns for which he was so remarkably ready.”147 
Johnson’s clever qualification of his alleged pride in this anecdote is amusing, in part 
because of the oxymoronic character of the phrase “defensive pride.” The presumed 
virtues of the modifier morally counteract the admitted vice implied by the noun, as in the 
modern phrase, “preemptive strike.” Johnson’s “happy turn” justifies his pride as an act 
of self-defense, a reaction to an outside stimulus, rather than the exuberance of corrupt, 
innate inclinations. At the same time, an act of “defense” itself requires a degree of pride. 
Johnson does not deny his pride, but mitigates it in a phrase that performs, in a very 
compressed way, the kind of casuistry or ethical estimation that Johnson frequently 
practices in his Rambler and Adventurer essays and later employs when writing his 
Preface to the folio Dictionary.  
Thus Johnson’s Preface is the product of a kind of careful rhetorical casuistry by 
which Johnson determined how to acknowledge what he thought were the true merits of 
his work without veering into prideful self-praise. We see Johnson in the Preface seeking 
the kind of middle path of virtue he had recommended in his periodical essays, a “path 
                                                 
147 Life, I, 265. Italics in original.  
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which it is every man’s duty to find, and to keep,” yet one that is “so narrow, that it 
cannot easily be discovered, and so little beaten that there are no certain marks by which 
it can be followed” (Rambler 129, IV, 322). In the Preface, Johnson tries to strike the 
proper balance between various contraries, just as he recommends in the essays—
between “arrogance and submission” (Rambler 1, III, 7), between “false hopes and false 
terrors” (Rambler 25, III, 140), between “confidence and despondency” (Adventurer 81, 
II, 401), between “firmness and spirit” on one hand and the “softness, diffidence, and 
moderation” that “will often be mistaken for imbecility and dejection” on the other 
(Rambler 176, V, 165). Seen within this context, Johnson’s readiness in responding to 
Adams’s playful charge of pride may not just reflect Johnson’s well-documented talent 
for witty retort; it may also reflect Johnson’s long meditations in his essays on “the case 
of the author entering the world” (Rambler 1, III, 5), where he perhaps unwittingly 
rehearses and ethically assesses the rhetorical choices and lines of defense that he later 
uses in writing the Preface. By the time Johnson wrote the Preface and his letter to 
Chesterfield he had long since considered the appropriate, ethical response to 
Chesterfield, justifying his pride, both in the letter and in the Preface, as properly 
defensive. 
Scholars have used various terms to describe the striking co-presence of pride and 
humility in the Preface: “It is at once an apology and an exultation”; it contains “self-
aggrandizement and self-effacement”; it “both celebrates and apologizes for the tenuous 
authority and independent authorship of its creator”; its movement “back and forth 
between aspiration and limitation, desire and sad constraint” represents the 
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“extraordinary tension of the Preface”; “Johnson defines his lexicographic task as the 
work of ‘a harmless drudge,’ but in the final paragraph of his Preface. . . assumes a stance 
of near heroic indifference, maintaining a fragile balance between arrogance and high 
nobility”; Johnson displays an “alternating pattern . . . , balancing great aspirations with 
menial position. . . , vaunted achievement with a sense of the ultimate littleness of 
achievement.”148 But despite this consensus on Johnson’s manner of proceeding, it has 
seldom extended beyond mere observation. Little has been put forward to explain this co-
presence of pride and humility other than Lawrence Lipking’s suggestion that it 
represents the unconscious and alternating profusion of poorly controlled “opposing 
inclinations” rather than a conscious rhetorical strategy.149  
Those, however, who read at least Johnson’s humility in the Preface as conscious 
read it as necessarily ironic: there is “a distinct degree of irony in Johnson’s repeatedly 
                                                 
148 The quotes, in order, appear in Paul Fussell, Samuel Johnson and the Life of Writing, 206; Lawrence 
Lipking, Samuel Johnson: The Life of an Author (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 131; 
Dennis Dean Kezar Jr., “Radical Letters and Male Genealogies in Johnson’s Dictionary,” SEL 35 (Summer 
1995): 511; Daniel P. Gunn, “The Lexicographer’s Task: Language, Reason, and Idealism in Johnson’s 
Dictionary Preface,” The Age of Johnson 11 (2000): 118; Richard B. Schwartz, “Johnson’s ‘Mr. Rambler’ 
and the Periodical Tradition,” Genre 7 (1974): 200; Isobel Grundy, Samuel Johnson and the Scale of 
Greatness (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986), 235.  
149 Lipking, Samuel Johnson: The Life of an Author, 44.  Lipking here is writing about the Rambler, but he 
argues throughout that “preemptive dejection” is Johnson’s characteristic attitude with respect to the 
reception of his work; it serves as a “dose of poison to build up one’s resistance,” 37. Lipking finds 
preemptive dejection reflected in the Preface and elsewhere in his work; see Lipking, ibid., 36-7, 115, 156, 
219, 236, 269. Richard B. Schwartz argues that “pride and humility” are self-consciously chosen 
components of Johnson’s “Mr. Rambler,” since Johnson, he argues, had to create an “advisor” who “must 
exhibit the humility which he recommends throughout the Rambler as an alternative to vanity and vain 
desire, yet maintain a sufficient degree of self-assurance to bring his points home without dissipating them 
in a flood of modesty and timidity,” 198.  Schwartz is right to point out the importance of pride and 
humility as a topos in the essays, but his interpretation seems to conflate Johnson’s ethos with that 
significant topos. 
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humble and derogatory statements about his labors.”150 Paul Korshin finds notes of 
“ironic self-deprecation” in the Preface, and Paul Fussell goes further, arguing that the 
“whole framework of the Preface is ironic, depending as it does on repeated contrasts 
between the pleasant clarities and simplicities of the job when first projected, and the sad 
obscurities, complexities, and frustrations experienced when the job was actually in 
hand.”151 Yet for Johnson to be only ironically humble therein might allow too much 
room for pride in a public document of self-appraisal where a surfeit of pride might court 
the very kind of criticism the Preface is calculated to preempt. To read Johnson’s 
humility as ironic or comic precludes the possibility that Johnson wanted to display 
humility—that his humility was both genuine and part of a self-conscious rhetorical 
strategy of defensive pride. 
In fact, Johnson’s alternating pride and humility in the Preface replicates the kind 
of autodidactic moral self-regulation that Johnson recommends throughout the periodical 
essays written while he prepared the Dictionary. Johnson quite consciously shuttles back 
and forth in the Preface between pride and humility because it is a dignified yet modest 
way for an author, or lexicographer, presenting his work to the public without the 
legitimizing cachet of a dedication, a list of subscribers, or even an academic degree, to 
recommend such an ambitious folio Dictionary to the public. Though there was a long 
tradition of panegyric in dedications, there was no dignified tradition of self-panegyric. 
Moreover, Johnson’s loss of contact with his patron, lack of any academic degree, and his 
                                                 
150 W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., Philosophic Words: A Study of Style and Meaning in the Rambler and Dictionary of 
Samuel Johnson. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 23. Daniel P. Gunn agrees with Wimsatt, 
“The Lexicographer’s Task,” 106. 
151 Korshin, “Johnson and the Renaissance Dictionary,” 304; Fussell, Johnson and the Life of Writing, 206. 
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tenuous social position made such self-recommendation an unattractive proposition in an 
agonistic eighteenth-century world of letters where “he that writes may be considered as 
a kind of general challenger, whom every one has a right to attack” (Rambler 93, IV, 
133-34). On top of that, by recommending himself directly to the public, rather than to 
the patron of the Plan, Johnson would open himself to the charge of ingratitude.  
 The rhetorical circumstances of the Preface recommended the virtues of humility, 
even where self-praise was quite practical. However awkward Johnson’s rhetorical 
circumstances were in writing the Preface, he did not approach them cold when writing 
the Preface. He had, wittingly or not, developed the basis for approaching those 
circumstances in the Rambler and Adventurer essays. In this portion of the chapter, I aim 
to establish a generally overlooked but important connection between these essays and 
Johnson’s rhetorical choices in the Preface.  
Johnson’s self-presentation in the Preface follows the counsel he gives to readers, 
and, crucially, I argue, to himself, throughout the Rambler and Adventurer essays, where 
he traces the middle path by examining the contrary choices an author has. Johnson’s 
meditations on authorial self-presentation explore the same social and moral terrain 
covered in Rambler 166, where Johnson observes that he “who fails to please in his 
salutation and address is at once rejected, and never obtains an opportunity of showing 
his latent excellencies, or essential qualities.” Taking this as a given, Johnson considers 
what “manner of approach” might bring success to “distressed” petitioners “whose 
condition subjects every kind of behaviour equally to miscarriage.” He   
whose confidence of merit incites him to meet without any sense of inferiority the 
eyes of those who flattered themselves with their own dignity, is considered as an 
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insolent leveller, impatient of the just prerogatives of rank and wealth, eager to 
usurp the station to which he has no right, and to confound the subordinations of 
society; and who would contribute to the exaltation of that spirit, which even want 
and calamity are not able to restrain from rudeness and rebellion?  
But no better success will commonly be found to attend servility and 
dejection, which often give pride the confidence to treat them with contempt. A 
request made with diffidence and timidity is easily denied, because the petitioner 
seems to doubt its fitness. (Rambler 166, V, 117-18) 
 
Johnson pursues a “middle path” of virtuous and dignified self-representation that stood 
“between faults on either hand,” knowing that “the place of the middle point may always 
be disputed” (Rambler 76, IV, 36), and conscious of the mind’s capacity for self-
deception, by which “all the artifices of self-deceit” give “us time to form distinctions in 
our own favour, and reason by degrees submits to absurdity, as the eye is in time 
accommodated to darkness” (Rambler 8, III, 43).   
Emboldened by a faith in properly spirited self-presentation, yet careful to avoid 
vitiating “ensnarers of the mind” (Rambler 155, V, 65) such as vanity,  Johnson 
juxtaposes indirect yet grand commendations of himself in the Preface with admissions of 
fault that temper his self-praise, yet whose proximity to praise prevents an undignified 
display of diffidence. Johnson’s presumably just self-estimation prevents excessive 
diffidence, and humility counteracts Johnson’s proleptic defense of faults, preventing 
them from becoming prideful. Such a rhetorical approach is consonant with Johnson’s 
recommendation in his essays that one should attack “disease[s] of the intellect” with 
“proper counteraction” (Rambler 89, IV, 107), and in the Preface he applies “austerity,” 
in the form of humility, as a “proper antidote” to whatever “indulgence” he allows 
himself, since “diseases of mind as well as body are cured by contraries, and to contraries 
we should readily have recourse, if we dreaded guilt as we dread pain” (Rambler 110, IV, 
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225). In the Preface Johnson proceeds consciously by rhetorical counteraction, repeatedly 
juxtaposing contraries to prevent either tendency from overpowering the other, and 
endeavoring to strike a balance close to the elusive middle point that “may always be 
disputed” (Rambler 76, IV, 36).  
* * * * * * 
 Several scholars have identified the late 1740s and the 1750s, when Johnson 
wrote “The Vanity of Human Wishes,” wrote the Rambler and Adventurer essays, and 
completed the Dictionary, as the period during which, in the words of Allen Reddick, 
Johnson’s “critical genius matured brilliantly;” his “weight as a great moral prose writer 
solidifies for the first time;” and his mature character forged.152 Robert DeMaria, Jr. notes 
that in the Rambler Johnson “found a distinctive voice and created a literary persona that 
he enjoyed being.”153 And while various connections between the Ramblers and the 
Dictionary have been suggested, no scholar has discussed the extent to which Johnson 
formed the style, manner, and a rationale for the arrangement of his Preface—its ethos, 
tropes, and figures, as well as its mode of rhetorical and moral counteraction—in his 
Rambler and Adventurer essays. Before Johnson had delivered his folio Preface to the 
public, these periodical essays served as rigorous inventional exercises in which Johnson, 
writing for a wide audience, cultivated the voice and manner of the independent man of 
learning, a voice he would adopt in the Preface and continue to refine thereafter.154  
                                                 
152 Allen Reddick, The Making of Johnson's Dictionary, 68. 
153 DeMaria, Jr. The Life of Samuel Johnson: A Critical Biography, 144. 
154 As Roy M. Wiles has shown, the slow initial sales of the folio Ramblers do not adequately reflect the 
circulation of these essays, since many were published in several provincial newspapers and magazines 
throughout Britain. See “The Contemporary Distribution of Johnson’s Rambler,” Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 2 (1968): 155-71.  
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 Johnson’s Rambler and Adventurer essays were not highly topical, and Johnson’s 
frequent recourse to the Mr. Rambler persona and the voices of his fictional 
correspondents should caution the reader not to view individual essays as windows into 
Johnson’s mind, but recurring topics and themes in the essays suggest some concerns that 
would be relevant to a man in Johnson’s circumstances.155 Among other topics, the 
essays tend to revisit the hopes and fears of writers alternately pursuing fame and 
dreading censure or neglect, the most effective way for authors to present themselves, the 
impediments and spurs for projectors of grand schemes, the scholar’s need to balance 
                                                 
155 Fussell, Johnson and the Life of Writing, 152, argues that it “would not be going far wrong to say that 
the Rambler constitutes a translation into objective moral and psychological terms of much of the personal 
anguish Johnson felt in forcing himself to fulfill the Dictionary contract.” Paul J. Korshin also suggests a 
relationship between topics in the Rambler and Johnson’s difficulties with the Dictionary project. Korshin 
argues more generally that a close examination of the Rambler for 1751 can “enlarge our knowledge of his 
life in that year,” and yield “an understanding of Johnson’s intellectual development;” see “‘Johnson and. . 
. ’: Conceptions of Literary Relationship,” Greene Centennial Studies: Essays Presented to Donald Greene 
in the Centennial Year of the University of Southern California, Paul J. Korshin and Robert R. Allen, eds. 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 301. Referring to Johnson’s frequent reference in the 
essays to “humanistic authors from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth century,” Korshin writes that 
Johnson often “tried to turn his scholarly interests to everyday life as represented in the subjects of the 
essays,” 299. Richard B. Schwartz has gone further, arguing that “Mr. Rambler is a Johnsonian self-portrait 
and should be considered as such;” see Schwartz, “Johnson’s ‘Mr. Rambler,’” 197. Robert DeMaria, Jr, 
citing Schwartz, writes that “Johnson is not exactly equivalent to Mr Rambler, but the mask is in many 
ways a self-portrait. In the Rambler Johnson found a distinctive voice and created a literary persona that he 
enjoyed being. . . . Although he should not be equated with Mr Rambler . . . these 208 essays represent the 
full flowering of his literary identity. . . . [B]y the time he finished the Rambler Johnson’s literary identity 
had an integrity and a centre that would hold together for the rest of his life”; The Life of Johnson: A 
Critical Biography, 144, 159. Lawrence Lipking points out that Johnson “puts on the mask of a much older 
man” in the Rambler. Johnson, forty-one at the time, claims as Mr. Rambler to have known Suspirius the 
screech-owl “fifty-eight years and four months” (Rambler 58, III, 315). As Lipking points out, the 
reference contains a joking self-reference; Mr. Rambler’s comment appears in the fifty-eighth Rambler, just 
after the fourth paragraph; see Lipking, Samuel Johnson: The Life of an Author, 149-50. In general, I argue 
that Johnson’s topics can plausibly be seen to spring from his own exigencies as a lexicographer 
negotiating his way through methodological and financial straits, and from his concerns as someone who 
would soon be presenting an ambitious work to an agonistic marketplace. In his essays, Johnson was able 
to rehearse and fashion a public persona, and he was able to theorize a pragmatic and ethical mode of self-
representation.  
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closeted abstraction with social engagement, and the role of patronage in promoting or 
neglecting literary endeavors.156  
In a cogent study of Johnson’s recurring rhetorical strategies in the Rambler, 
Steven Lynn notes that Johnson begins with an “epigraph, drawn from the classics, which 
functions like a sermon text, encapsulating, stimulating, authorizing what follows.”157 Yet 
while these epigraphs begin the actual text of the Ramblers, their exigence is often 
consistent with, if not shaped by, Johnson’s moral, material, and methodological 
concerns that informed and inspired these texts as he worked on the Dictionary, the 
largest and most labor-intensive project he had ever attempted. According to Allen 
Reddick, Johnson experienced a methodological crisis midway through his work on the 
Dictionary.158 If this is true, the first appearance in 1750 of Johnson’s Rambler essays 
occurred not long after this crisis. Whether or not Johnson experienced a full-blown 
crisis, his work was taking longer than planned, and an angry letter of Johnson’s in 
November 1751 to his friend and printer William Strahan indicates that the booksellers 
                                                 
156 Jacob Leed points out that a fifth (42 of 208) of the Ramblers mention patronage in some sense. See 
“Patronage in the Rambler,” Studies in Burke and His Time 14 (1972): 5. 
157 Steven Lynn, “Johnson’s Rambler and Eighteenth-Century Rhetoric,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 19 
(1986): 466.  
158 On the basis of bibliographical and manuscript evidence, as well as his examination of Johnson’s 
Dictionary and its 4th edition revision, Reddick argues that “Johnson’s model, which he outlines in the 
Plan, for determining a set number and type of definitions for each word, proved to be inflexible and 
inadequate, as did the guidance he was probably receiving from his checking of [Nathaniel] Bailey and 
other dictionaries, whose definitions may have caused Johnson to underestimate what his own dictionary, 
in responding to examples of usage, would require. He was overwhelmed with the number of different 
usages illustrated in the passages that he found he had marked and gathered, a wealth of language that 
could not be accommodated by his system of definition. At some stage, then — probably late 1749 or early 
1750 — Johnson saw that his method of completing the copy, along with the manuscript itself, would have 
to be abandoned;” Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 43. For more detail on how Johnson’s 
system of definition was eluded by the exuberance of language, see Reddick, ibid., ch. 3, as well as 
Elizabeth Hedrick, “Locke’s Theory of Language and Johnson’s Dictionary,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 
20 (1987): 443.  
    77
 
began to put pressure on Johnson, who had signed a contract in 1746, to finish the job.159 
On top of that, Johnson was experiencing financial difficulties, despite the weekly 4 
guineas he received for writing two Ramblers a week, and despite selling the copyright 
for the Ramblers to Edward Cave. Between April and August of 1751, Johnson wrote 
three letters to bookseller John Newberry requesting loans.160 In addition, his loss of 
contact with his patron may have led him to consider how to approach the awkward task 
of writing a Preface to his ambitious folio when his audience might expect a dedication to 
Chesterfield. 
 While the Rambler essays, in particular, have generally and rightly been viewed 
as didactic essays calculated to instruct the public, they can also be viewed as 
autodidactic meditations in which Johnson provides counsel not just to the public but to 
himself at a time when he was experiencing methodological and financial difficulties, at a 
time when he “often had occasion to consider the contrary effects of presumption and 
despondency; of heady confidence, which promises victory without contest, and heartless 
pusillanimity, which shrinks back from the thought of great undertakings, confounds 
difficulty with impossibility, and considers all advancement toward any new attainment 
as irreversibly prohibited” (Rambler 25, III, 137). While Johnson’s Ramblers address 
moral questions in the generalized language of the moral philosopher, and his primary 
purpose is to instruct the public, the very frequency of personally relevant topics, along 
with what we know about Johnson’s activities during this period, suggests that Johnson’s 
muse frequently prompted him to explore topics that related in some way to his work on 
                                                 
159 Letters, I, 50-51.  
160 See Johnson’s letters in 1751 for 15 April, 29 July, and 24 August in Letters, vol. I. 
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the Dictionary. Responding to critics who offered him suggestions, Mr. Rambler wrote 
that “an author has a rule of choice peculiar to himself; and selects those subjects which 
he is best qualified to treat, by the course of his studies, or the accidents of his life” 
(Rambler 23, III, 129).  
 Both the freedom of the essay form, and the formal anonymity of the essays, 
published without Johnson’s name attached to them, provided Johnson a relatively 
unthreatening context within which to develop his public voice and explore various sides 
of personal concerns. To the extent that Johnson regarded an essay, as “a loose sally of 
the mind; an irregular indigested piece,” his Ramblers and Adventurers were free to range 
across topics without having to meet the demands of intertextual coherence expected in a 
long work (Dictionary, ESSAY n.s. 2). In the Plan for his Dictionary, dedicated to Lord 
Chesterfield and thus shaped by the conventions of dedications, the dedicator’s ethos was 
constrained by the real social action and norms enacted in the document. In the essays, 
however, minor offences against decorum, or changes of opinion from one essay to 
another, might be excused as indulgences of the genre, as exercises of fancy rather than 
firm professions of firm principle. Even though, as has been noted, Johnson’s 
acquaintances soon foiled his desire to keep his authorship secret, Johnson concluded his 
Rambler essays by noting in Rambler 208 that “‘A mask,’ says Castiglione, ‘confers a 
right of acting and speaking with less restraint, even when the wearer happens to be 
known.’ He that is discovered without his own consent, may claim some indulgence, and 
cannot be rigorously called to justify those sallies or frolicks which his disguise must 
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prove him desirous to conceal.”161 The anonymity of the essays allows Johnson to 
practice public self-fashioning while writing behind the mask of the Rambler or 
Adventurer’s persona. Moreover, in essays Johnson occasionally wrote under 
pseudonyms and addressed “TO THE RAMBLER,” he could enlarge upon topics without 
being personally identified with the viewpoints expressed by his fictional correspondents. 
Though Johnson “always thought it the duty of an anonymous author to write, as if he 
expected to be hereafter known,” their official anonymity insulates Johnson from being 
“rigorously called to justify those sallies or frolicks” that he there indulged.162   
* * * * * * 
 One of Johnson’s recurring rhetorical techniques in the essays is to model a 
process of ethical ratiocination for his readers, to approach ethical questions by taking 
moral commonplaces and then examining their validity by using contrary vices or errors 
as tools of discrimination.163 Johnson’s practice has classical precedent, notably in 
Aristotle’s discussion in his Nicomachean Ethics of arriving at the “mean” of moral 
virtue that lies somewhere between “excess and deficiency.” Thus, in “feelings of fear 
                                                 
161 “Introduction,” Yale Works, III, xxv; Rambler 208 (14 March 1752), Yale Works, V, 317-18. Of the 208 
Ramblers, only four (30, 44, 97, 100), and parts of three others (15b, 107b, and the billets in 10), were not 
written by Johnson. See “Introduction”, Yale Works, III, xxi, n. 1.  
162 Rambler 208, V, 318.  
163 Johnson’s examination of moral commonplaces is discussed as a “dismantling of commonplaces” by 
Leopold Damrosch, Jr., in “Johnson’s Manner of Proceeding in the Rambler,” ELH 40 (1973): 71-2; and as 
“deconstructive” by Lynn, 470. Both Damrosch and Lynn view Johnson’s sometimes abrubt turns in the 
Ramblers as a conscious part of Johnson’s didactic purposes in the essays, whereas Paul Fussell reads these 
turns as the result of Johnson’s hasty method of composing the essays; Lynn challenges the traditional view 
of Johnson writing many Ramblers with a printer’s boy waiting at the door. Alan T. McKenzie argues that 
Johnson’s use of opposites, “too numerous and obvious to require elaboration,” was encouraged by a 
longstanding “system” of discriminating among passions that was familiar to “Augustan humanists and 
their readers.” The “system,” McKenzie writes, “that established the differences between these passions 
encouraged opposition, both psychological and syntactic, as a tool of this discrimination.” See “The 
Systematic Scrutiny of Passion in Johnson’s Rambler,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 20 (1986-1987): 134-
35. 
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and confidence courage is the mean.” A “man who exceeds in confidence is reckless, and 
a man who exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is cowardly.”164   Likewise in 
Horace, “There is a measure in all things. There are, in short, fixed bounds, beyond and 
short of which right can find no place.”165 Yet Aristotle admits that “there appears to be a 
certain similarity between some extremes and their median, e.g., recklessness resembles 
courage and extravagance generosity.”166 Cicero, in his De Inventione, notes that 
“diffidence is the opposite of confidence, and is therefore a vice; temerity is not opposite 
to courage, but borders on it and is akin to it, and yet is a vice. In a similar way each 
virtue will be found to have a vice bordering upon it. . . . All of these as well as the 
opposites of good qualities will be classed among things to be avoided.”167  
In two of his most significant moral writings before the Rambler essays, The 
Vision of Theodore (1748) and The Vanity of Human Wishes (1749), Johnson figures 
ethical choice as a struggle to maintain a path between problematic opposites and avoid 
being beset by various “snares.” In "Vanity,” Johnson portrays “the clouded maze of 
fate” as “o’erspread with snares” by “hope and fear, desire and hate.” “Wavering man, 
betrayed by venturous pride,” treads “the dreary paths” of life “without a guide,” 
shunning “fancied ills” and chasing “airy good” (lines 5-8, 10).  In the Vision of 
Theodore, an allegory written for publication in The Preceptor, Johnson’s narrator 
                                                 
164 Book II, Chs. 6 and 7 of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald (New York: Macmillan, 
1962), 42, 45.  
165 Horace, Satires, I.1.106-07: “[E]st modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines, / quos ultra citraque nequit 
consistere rectum.”  
166 Aristotle, Ethics, trans. Ostwald, 49. 
167 Cicero, De Inventione, II. 54. 165: “[F]identiae contrarium est diffidentia et ea re vitium est; audacia non 
contrarium, sed appositum est ac propinquam et tamen vitium est. Sic uni cuique virtuti finitimum vitium 
reperietur. . . . Quae omnia item uti contraria rerum bonarum in rebus vitandis reponentur.” Trans. H. M. 
Hubbell (London & Cambridge, Mass.: William Heinemann, 1949), 333. 
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observes a traveller on “the road of Happiness,” who, “when the Passions or Appetites 
which had before seduced him, made their approach,” and when “Habit” pushed “him 
toward them,” the “wretch thus impelled on one side, and allured on the other, too 
frequently quitted the road of Happiness, to which, after his second deviation from it, he 
rarely returned.”168 “All those who determined to follow either Reason or Religion were 
continually importuned to forsake the road, sometimes by Passions, and sometimes by 
Appetites, of whom both had reason to boast the success of their artifices; for so many 
were drawn into bypaths, that any way was more populous than the right.”169  Lawrence 
Lipking argues that the moral lessons Johnson imparts in the Vision crucially “inform his 
later work.”170 In the context of my own argument, the Vision employs, in a cohesive 
account, the terms of Johnson’s didactic writing that he employs, or modifies, again and 
again to trace the path to virtue, obstacles to that path, and the consequences of losing 
sight of the path: Passions, Appetites, Habits, Reason, Innocence, experience (not 
personified), Education, Religion and her emissary Conscience, the regions of Desire, the 
caverns of Despair, the bowers of Content, the maze of Indolence. 
In Rambler 25, Johnson notes that it “ought to be the constant endeavour of every 
reasonable being” to “walk with circumspection and steadiness in the right path, at an 
                                                 
168 “The Vision of Theodore, the Hermit of Teneriffe, Found in His Cell,” in Rasselas and Other Tales, ed. 
Gwin J. Kolb, vol. XVI of the Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 195.  
169 “Vision of Theodore,” in Yale Works, XVI, 205.   
170 Lipking argues that Johnson modeled the Vision’s “organization of human life as a journey through 
successive temptations to a promised, if almost inaccessible, end” on The Table of Cebes, an ancient 
allegorical fable traditionally attributed to a “friend of Socrates.” See Lipking, “Learning to Read Johnson: 
The Vision of Theodore and The Vanity of Human Wishes,” ELH 43 (1976): 521, 527. 
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equal distance between the extremes of error” (Rambler 25, III, 137). As well, Johnson 
observes that there  
are some vices and errors, which, though often fatal to those in whom they are 
found, have yet, by the universal consent of mankind, been considered as entitled 
to some degreee of respect, or have, at least, been exempted from contemptuous 
infamy, and condemned by the severest moralists with pity rather than detestation. 
A constant and invariable example of this general partiality will be found in the 
different regard which always been shown to rashness and cowardice, two vices, 
of which, though they may be conceived equally distant from the middle point, 
where true fortitude is placed, and may equally injure any publick or private 
interest, yet the one is never mentioned without some kind of veneration, and the 
other always considered as a topick of unlimited and licentious censure, on which 
all the virulence of reproach may be lawfully exerted. (Rambler 25 III, 136)  
 
By walking through the process of ethical reasoning, and by establishing tools of ethical 
discrimination, Johnson models the process, and identifies the hazards, of moral 
reasoning. Opposing vices provide points of excess and deficiency by which to judge 
one’s own behavior in individual cases, and “reason” and “experience” stand as 
touchstones used to test the rational and practical advisability of a particular action. These 
tools and tests help one trace the path of virtue, even when it is clouded by the inordinate 
emphasis placed by moralists or public opinion on one side of the mean. As didactic 
literature, Johnson’s essays model for the autodidact replicable methods of ethical 
deliberation. Johnson reminds readers of what tools are at their disposal for self-
regulation, and for Mr. Rambler, even a “vicious moralist” by “whose writings the heart 
is rectified, the appetites counter-acted, and the passions repressed, may be considered as 
not unprofitable to the great republick of humanity, even though his behaviour should not 
always exemplify his rules” (Rambler 77, IV, 41). “He . . . that would govern his actions 
by the laws of virtue, must regulate his thoughts by those of reason” (Rambler 8, III, 46). 
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Johnson portrays such regulation as the inevitable aspect of the postlapsarian “condition 
upon which we are to pass our time.” Mr. Rambler urges readers to make use of those  
superior principles by which the force of external agents may be counteracted, 
and the temporary prevalance of passions restrained. Nature will indeed always 
operate, human desires will always be ranging; but these motions, though very 
powerful, are not resistless; nature may be regulated, and desires governed; and to 
contend with the predominance of successive passions, and to be endangered by 
one affection, and then another, is the condition upon which we are to pass our 
time, the time of our preparation for that state which shall put an end to 
experiment, to disappointment, to change. (Rambler 151, V, 42) 
 
By means of self-regulation, one may counteract the “force of external agents,” restrain 
passions, resist powerful desires.  
 But while Johnson models ethical ratiocination in the essays, he often exhibits 
skepticism about the mind’s abilities, possessing perhaps “a mind taught by experience to 
distrust itself.”171 The very process of self-estimation, especially when it involves self-
defense or self-vindication, is potentially compromised by one’s capacity for self-
delusion, since followers of the “Passions” march “at first in a path nearly in the same 
direction with that of Reason and Religion; . . . deviated by slow degrees,” they 
ultimately change course.172 On one hand, “every man” must estimate his capacity for 
taking on particular tasks, “since a genius” is “only to be produced by collision with a 
proper subject, it is the business of every man to try whether his faculties may not happily 
co-operate with his desires” (Rambler 25, III, 139). On the other hand, “no estimate is 
more in danger of erroneous calculations than those by which a man computes the force 
of his own genius” (Rambler 54, V, 55). Once a task is completed, “we are blinded in 
                                                 
171 “Vision of Theodore,” in Yale Works, XVI, 196. 
172 “Vision of Theodore,” in Yale Works, XVI, 205.  
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examining our own labours by innumerable prejudices” (Rambler 21, III, 120). Even if 
one uses “reason and reflection” and determines “to exert the latent force that nature may 
have reposited in him,” (Rambler 129, IV, 324), those who regulate their thoughts by 
reason must “remember that the pleasures of fancy, and the emotions of desire are more 
dangerous as they are more hidden, since they escape the awe of observation, and operate 
equally in every situation, without the concurrence of external opportunities” (Rambler 8, 
III, 46). Once one begins through pride to vindicate one’s errors, “such pride, once 
indulged, too frequently operates upon more important objects, and inclines men not only 
to vindicate their errors, but their vices” (Rambler 31, III, 171). Johnson uses rhetorical, 
lexical, and syntactic oppositions within the essays, both to determine ethical and pious 
action on his own part, and to model autodidactic self-regulation for his readers. The 
argument of the essay proceeds by demonstrating the value of opposition and 
counteraction as a tool for determining action.173
* * * * * * 
 Just as a kind of dialectic is seen within individual essays—in which Johnson 
employs antitheses that he often formally resolves at the end of the essay in what Steven 
Lynn terms a call to action— another, less fully resolved dialectic of counteraction plays 
out across the body of the essays. Freed by the periodical format to “indulge the sallies” 
of his “own imagination” (Rambler 23, III, 129), and not as obliged, as in the individual 
essays, to resolve contradictions for rhetorical purposes, Johnson’s essays are recurring, 
autodidactic meditations on the exigencies of the writer, the projector, and those who 
                                                 
173 McKenzie, “The Systematic Scrutiny of Passion,” 134.  
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viewed themselves, vainly or not, as laborers of learning, doing work seen as benefiting 
the greater good. Perhaps influenced by his growing sense that he would have to present 
his Dictionary, if he should complete it, without the protection of a patron, Johnson at 
some level seems to consider in these essays the proper response to his own exigencies: 
his methodological setbacks, his slow progress, his lack of public social status or 
academic degree, his lack of support from a patron despite his endeavors.  
 Insulated by the mask of Mr. Rambler and often by voice of his fictional 
correspondents, Johnson examines exigencies on different sides, and in effect, if not by 
design, the messages of some essays counteract each other—or at least modify each 
other. Scholars have various ways of addressing the inconsistencies one can find both 
within individual Ramblers and across the body of these essays. Paul Fussell finds in 
them signs of hasty writing and existential drift. Paul Fussell has emphasized 
inconsistency in Johnson’s Ramblers, noting that “for all his pretences to know where he 
is, Johnson is adrift.”174 The essays, for Fussell, are “dynamic enterprises in which real 
doubts and uncertainties are constantly at war with the mere appearance of order and 
faith.”175  Leopold Damrosch, Jr., finds inconsistencies only natural given the nature of 
the essays as a loose collection. He argues against viewing the essays as a “uniform 
repository of Johnsonian wisdom” and against imposing coherence on a body of what he 
views as “a very loosely organized collection.” Yet Damrosch finds seeming 
inconsistencies within essays as part of Johnson’s didactic purpose as a moral writer: 
“Johnson often leads deliberately toward a platitude and then turns on us without 
                                                 
174 Fussell, Johnson and the Life of Writing, 178.  
175 Ibid., 160-61.  
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warning, in order to show us how uncritical our thinking usually is. . . . The heart of 
Johnson’s mission as a moralist is to make us stop parroting the precepts of moralists and 
start thinking for ourselves.”176  
Inconsistencies have long been a concern of Johnson scholars. Over fifty years 
ago, James Clifford wrote that “much of our difficulty in understanding and appreciating 
Johnson stems from his own lack of consistency.”177 Bertrand Bronson famously traced 
the “root of most of his inconsistencies” to “two forces, the conservatism of intellectual 
attitude and the ebullient temperament.”178 Yet Donald Greene asks, “Does ...an internal 
contradiction really exist in Johnson, or does the hypothesis spring from a failure fully to 
understand one or the other of the two allegedly conflicting elements in Johnson’s 
thought?”179 Steven Lynn, arguing against a long tradition of describing Johnson’s 
methods in the Ramblers as exploratory grasping for truth, has argued for a view of the 
essays as more coherent than searching, that “in his writing Johnson ultimately wants to 
convey the truth to readers, not discover it for himself.”180  
But we should examine Johnson’s inconsistencies, when they exist, with a 
consideration of the rhetorical situation, the constraints and freedoms allowed to the 
genre, and their occurrence within the span of Johnson’s career. In the case of the 
Ramblers, Johnson’s professed didactic aims led him to close many individual essays 
                                                 
176 Damrosch, Jr., “Johnson’s Manner of Proceeding,” 71, 81.  
177 James L. Clifford, “A Survey of Johnsonian Studies, 1887-1950,” abridged, and with a new postscript, 
in Samuel Johnson: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Donald J. Greene (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1965), 46-61; originally printed, without abridgement, in Clifford’s Johnsonian Studies, 
1887-1950 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1951), 1-16. 
178 Bertrand H. Bronson, “Johnson Agonistes,” in Johnson Agonistes and Other Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1946), 1-52. Bronson’s essay can also be found in Greene’s collection of 
essays, Samuel Johnson: A Collection of Critical Essays, 30-45 
179 “Introduction,” in Greene, Samuel Johnson: A Collection of Critical Essays, 8.  
180 Lynn, “Johnson’s Rambler and Eighteenth-Century Rhetoric,” 465. 
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with a “call” to action, as Lynn has described it, but the fact that the essay form allowed 
for “sallies of the imagination” as Johnson described them, and the fact that he often 
spoke through the voice of fictional correspondents, means that Johnson may not have 
required rigorous consistency of himself across the body of the essays, even if he tried to 
ensure that at least those essays that were “professedly serious” could be “found exactly 
conformable to the precepts of Christianity, without any accommodation to the 
licentiousness and levity of the present age” (Rambler 208, V, 320).  
 If Johnson employs counteraction within individual essays to model ethical 
reasoning for his readers, he employs counteraction across the body of the essays as a 
way to seek practical wisdom that he can apply to his own exigencies. So Johnson’s 
comments on patronage in the essays, for instance, do not simply represent Johnson’s 
unitary views on that institution. Yet they are not, on the other hand, randomly 
inconsistent manifestations of contrary impulses either. These comments, like all of 
Johnson’s comments on authorial exigencies in these essays, are part of a dialectic of 
practical wisdom that is synthesized and temporarily arrested in the Preface, where 
Johnson finds himself in a position to apply the wisdom he tries to inculcate to others in 
the essays. Across the body of these essays, Johnson calibrates his own responses to his 
awkward position in the changing 18th-century literary economy as a man engaged in 
“the labours of learning” (Rambler 180, V, 183). Johnson then reflects on his own status 
as an independent man of learning, merit and ability, who was bereft of a patron and 
producing a highly ambitious work or learning that was also bookseller’s project for the 
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market.181 Johnson’s experience in preparing the Dictionary underscored his awkward 
position amid the worlds of patronage, market, and academia.The periodical format, the 
mask, the ability to assume the voice of various fictional correspondents were all aspects 
of the essay form that allowed Johnson to employ the heuristic of moral self-
counteraction in the pursuit of authorial choices that were practical, wise, and morally 
defensible.  
Thus we see Johnson criticize patrons in one essay and mitigate their faults in 
another. In Rambler 91, the allegorized “Sciences, after a thousand indignities, retired 
from the palace of Patronage, and having long wandered over the world in grief and 
distress, were led at last to the cottage of Independence,” where “they were taught by 
Prudence and Parsimony to support themselves in dignity and quiet” (Rambler 91, IV, 
120). During the previous month, however, Mr. Rambler had noted that “many have 
dared to boast of neglected merit, and to challenge their age for cruelty and folly, of 
whom it cannot be alledged that they have endeavoured to increase the wisdom or virtue 
of their readers” (Rambler 77, IV, 42). Rambler 163 returns to a critique of patronage, 
noting that “none of the cruelties exercised by wealth and power upon indigence and 
dependance, is more mischievous in its consequences, or more frequently practised with 
wanton negligence, than the encouragement of expectations which are never to be 
gratified, and the elation and depression of the heart by needless vicissitudes of hope and 
                                                 
181 Here I depart from Raman Selden’s observation that in the essays Johnson  allows “the principles and 
conceptual oppositions of his thought…emerge in a less repressed form” than in his other writings. Selden 
refers to oppositions within single essays. I include oppositions across the essays, and I argue that many of 
Johnson’s oppositions, in Freudian terms, reflect not the emergence of an id, but an ongoing encounter 
between id and superego as Johnson develops his authorial ego. See Raman Selden, “Deconstructing the 
Ramblers,” Fresh Reflections on Samuel Johnson: Essays in Criticism, ed. Prem Nath (Troy, NY: 
Whitston, 1987), 281. 
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disappointment” (Rambler 163, V, 100). Mr. Rambler illustrates this critique with an 
image of the “punishment of Tantalus in the infernal regions,” (Rambler 163, V, 101) 
suggesting that this “image of misery was perhaps originally suggested to some poet by 
the conduct of his patron, by the daily contemplation of splendor which he never must 
partake, by fruitless attempts to catch at interdicted happiness, and by the sudden 
evanescence of his reward, when he thought his labours almost at an end” (Rambler 163, 
V, 102). If Johnson critiques those who “have dared to boast of neglected merit” 
(Rambler 77, IV, 42) in one essay, in another he excoriates the “wanton negligence” and 
the “cruelties exercised by wealth and power upon indigence and dependence” (Rambler 
163, V, 100).  
In Rambler 149, presented as a letter from the fictional correspondent Hyperdulus 
to Mr. Rambler, examines what might constitute the proper response to a benefactor 
whose actions do not inspire gratitude. Hyperdulus, having spent much of his time in a 
“dependant state,” has consequently “received many favours in the opinion of those at 
whose expense I have been maintained; yet I do not feel in my heart any burning 
gratitude or tumultuous affection” (Rambler 149, V, 28). In this essay, Johnson, through 
the story of a youth’s shabby treatment from the uncle who takes him and his orphaned 
sister in, can explore the general principles of virtuous action that presumably govern 
behavior in the patron-client relationship: beneficence on the part of the patron, and 
gratitude on the part of the client. Moreover, the letter raises the question of how much 
gratitude is owed to a benefactor, when the quality of beneficence is in question. 
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Hyperdulus begins his letter by acknowledging his awareness that ingratitude is looked at 
severely by society.  
No depravity of the mind has been more frequently or justly censured than 
ingratitude. There is indeed sufficient reason for looking on those that can return 
evil for good, and repay kindness and assistance with hatred or neglect, as 
corrupted beyond the common degrees of wickedness; nor will he who has once 
been clearly detected in acts of injury to his benefactor, deserve to be numbered 
among social beings; he has endeavoured to destroy confidence, to intercept 
sympathy, and to turn every man’s attention wholly on himself. (Rambler 149, V, 
28).  
 
But after asking what behavior is appropriate on the part of the client, Hyperdulus, 
perhaps speaking for Johnson, examines the behavior of patrons, whose behavior satisfies 
vanity under the guise of altruism: “[P]erhaps if these patrons and protectors were 
confronted with any whom they boast of having befriended, it would often appear that 
they consulted only their pleasure or vanity, and repaid themselves their petty donatives 
by gratifications of insolence and indulgence of contempt” (Rambler 149, V, 28). Then 
after enumerating the indignities he and his sister, treated with “licentious brutality” by 
the host family’s heir, Hyperdulus poses a question that seems to answer itself—that 
contains both his charge against the host and his own defense and against the charge of 
ingratitude: 
I beg to be informed, Mr. Rambler, how much we can be supposed to owe 
beneficence which pollutes its gifts with contumely, and may be truly said to 
pander to pride? I would willingly be told, whether insolence does not reward its 
own liberalities, and whether he that exacts servility, can with justice at the same 
time expect affection (Rambler 149, V, 32).  
 
Hyperdulus’s language at the end suggests that his question is merely rhetorical, that he 
already has vindicated himself in his own mind.  
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But if Hyperdulus’s account of his own situation, along with his own disapproval 
of ingratitude, seems to vindicate him from the charge of ingratitude, the epigraph 
appended to the text’s beginning and his very name in the closing salutation together 
serve as a kind of outer frame to the text, and they serve to counteract, or at least 
complicate each other. The motto, which often comments on or frames the text of the 
Rambler essays, is in this case a text from Martial, and concludes with what may 
constitute Mr. Rambler’s advice to benefactors, “Love—if you wou’d be lov’d again” 
(Rambler 149, V, 27).182  
While the motto admonishes neglectful benefactors, the correspondent’s 
pseudonym, read against that motto, suggests that he should redirect his mind. As with 
many names of the Johnson’s fictional Rambler correspondents, the name Hyperdulus 
has chosen (via Johnson) serves as an unintentionally ironic self-critique.183 Throughout 
the essays, the irony of a correspondent’s presumably self-chosen pseudonym, placed at 
the end of the essay, often functions like a punch line, characterizing or reversing what 
comes before; and the irony of the name contributes to the moral of the story. The 
etymology of Hyperdulus’s name not only conveys his own sense of abject servitude, but 
also suggests that Hyperdulus has little sense of gratitude for his divine benefactor. The 
Greek doulos, slave, is used by Christian apostles to describe their relationship to Jesus, 
and in the context of describing a slave as having only one true master, wherein God is 
                                                 
182 Here I use the 18th-century English translation for ut ameris, ama, included in Yale Works, V, 27.  
183 For examples other than Hyperdulus, see  Edward A. Bloom, “Symbolic Names in Johnson’s Periodical 
Essays,” MLQ 13 (1952): 333-52.  
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master (kyrios).184  Furthermore, in Thomas Aquinas’s formulation of proper veneration, 
hyperdulia refers to veneration for the Virgin Mary.185 For the Anglican Johnson and for 
Protestant readers, such a connection may suggest that Hyperdulus’s energies are 
misplaced. If Hyperdulus explains away his own ingratitude quite easily in his own 
account of things, the epigraph and name, which frame the text, serve as subtle moral 
counterpoints to Hyperdulus’s complaints. 
Read against these contexts, his name, if it imparts any moral at all, suggests that 
the question of gratitude as a social obligation should be subsumed under the larger 
question of gratitude toward one’s divine benefactor. The name Hyperdulus suggests that 
Mr. Rambler’s correspondent has overestimated the degree of his own bondage. Thus the 
name Johnson chooses for his correspondent suggests the way Hyperdulus might 
examine his condition from a broader perspective. Hyperdulus’s choice of a pseudonym 
is, in itself, as hyperbolic as his claims of injustice in the essay, which can be read 
throughout as magnified through the lens of Hyperdulus’s consciousness that he is 
superior to those in his adopted family who are socially superior to him. Thus, for 
Hyperdulus, incivilities become grave injustices. Hyperdulus’s self-description as a 
doulos, or slave, is hyperbolic; his condition is, perhaps, less severe than he imagines, 
and in the process of overemphasizing his slavery he forgets where gratitude ultimately 
should be directed. Hyperdulus also seems to ignore the possibility that he has not 
learned any lessons from the example of his mother, a woman who “had no pleasure but 
                                                 
184 The term “servants of Christ Jesus” in the salutation to Philippians 1:1 (NRSV) is an example of this 
figuration. Among other places, see also James 1:1; 2 Peter 1: 1; Jude 1: 1; Revelations 1:1.   
185 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2nd Part of 2nd Part, Question 103, Article 4.  
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in dress, equipage, assemblies, and compliments” who, “finding” after the death of her 
husband “that she could live no longer in her accustomed rank, sunk into dejection, and 
in two years wore out her life with envy and discontent” (Rambler 149, V, 29). Having 
only ‘one true master,’ as the Biblical figuration goes, Hyperdulus should direct his 
gratitude toward is divine benefactor, for the sake of piety and peace of mind.  
Whether or not Johnson was thinking this early about the Preface he would have 
to write for the Dictionary, he would at some point have to decide whether or not his 
Preface, and the Dictionary’s lack of a dedication, would be seen as, or count as, 
ingratitude. This counterbalancing effect within Rambler 149, a perhaps indirect critique 
of patrons through the voice of one of Mr. Rambler’s correspondents, who himself is 
ironized, allows Johnson, insulated from the essay’s statements by the masks of 
Hyperdulus and Mr. Rambler, to critique benefactors (who themselves should love if they 
would be loved again) in quite bald terms. If Johnson critiques patronage in some essays, 
he examines his own complaints, or qualifies them, just he does those of Hyperdulus. 
And this self-examination often takes the form of counteraction or a turning over of his 
declarations to examine them from different perspectives.  
 Johnson’s criticism of benefactors or patronage in some essays is counterbalanced 
both within the essay, as in Rambler 149, or across the body of the essays. So for all of 
Johnson’s complaints against patrons and patronage, he recognized that “the miseries of 
the learned have been related by themselves; and since they have not been found exempt 
from that partiality with which men look upon their own actions and sufferings, we may 
conclude that they have not forgotten to deck their cause with the brightest ornaments, 
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and strongest colours” (Rambler 77, IV, 39). Johnson will observe, writing as 
correspondent T in The Adventurer 138, the somewhat arbitrary processes and forces by 
which books are assessed, noting that “whoever has remarked the fate of books, must 
have found it governed by other causes, than general consent arising from general 
conviction. If a new performance happens not to fall into the hands of some, who have 
courage to tell, and authority to propagate their opinion, it often remains long in 
obscurity, and perhaps perishes unknown and unexamined.” Yet unlike Hyperdulus 
Johnson offers a larger view, offering palliation in the fact that such is the human 
condition, which consists of “miseries of life,” as well as its “lenitives and abatements.” 
Johnson ends Adventurer 138, the last one he wrote, by writing, “Upon the whole, as the 
author seems to share all the common miseries of life, he appears to partake likewise of 
its lenitives and abatements” (Adventurer 138, II, 496-97).  
Johnson, then, counteracts moments of pride, or peevish complaint, with moments 
of resignation, with gestures of faith. Thus on the subject of desiring reputation, Mr. 
Rambler concludes, in No. 159, that the “utmost which we can reasonably hope or fear is 
to fill a vacant hour with prattle, and be forgotten” (Rambler 159, V, 84). Yet in Rambler 
203, five months later, Mr. Rambler makes the same arguments he has already made 
elsewhere in the essays about the improbability and evanescence of reputation, but 
concludes with a different tone and message:  
It is not therefore from this world, that any ray of comfort can proceed, to cheer 
the gloom of the last hour. But futurity still has its prospects; there is yet 
happiness in reserve, which, if we transfer our attention to it, will support us in the 
pains of disease, and the languor of decay. This happiness we may expect with 
confidence, because it is out of the power of chance, and may be attained by all 
that sincerely desire and earnestly pursue it. On this therefore every mind ought 
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finally to rest. Hope is the chief blessing of man, and that hope only is rational, of 
which we are certain that it cannot deceive us. (Rambler 203, V, 295)  
 
It is impossible to make any confident claim about how conscious this process of 
counterbalancing across the essays was, but Johnson’s (or Mr. Rambler’s) explicit advice 
on self-regulation, suggest that the recurrence of counterbalancing claims, within 
individual essays, and across the body of essays, was no accident. We can even observe 
this habit of moral self-regulation in a letter Johnson wrote to his friend Thomas Warton 
less than a month before the Dictionary’s publication. Johnson, anticipating the 
impending reception of his work, begins to complain and pulls back, regulating himself. 
“[W]hat will be its fate I know not nor much think because thinking is to no purpose. It 
must stand the censures of the great vulgar and the small, of those that understand it and 
that understand it not. But in all this I suffer not alone, every writer has the same 
difficulties, and perhaps every writer talks of them more than he thinks.”186  
 Johnson’s habit of self-regulation through the examination of opposites and 
through self-counteraction both within essays and across the body of the essays allows 
him to approach the issue of gratitude both in his Preface and in his letter to Chesterfield 
with well-considered notions of how to act. Even if individual essays are structured, as 
Lynn argues, ultimately to “convey truth to readers, not discover it for himself,” 
Johnson’s examination of the various sides of his own literary exigencies allows him to 
practice the practical wisdom he tries to articulate in those essays when he must apply 
                                                 
186 Letters (25 March 1755) I, 101, italics in the original, referring to Cowley’s version of Horace’s ode 
III.1. See ibid., n. 6.  
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that wisdom to his own rhetorical choices.187 Johnson’s rhetorical choices were adopted 
with the full knowledge that they were social choices with real-world consequences, and 
at some level, moral choices, with consequences for his state of mind and his position, 
ultimately, as a divine subject. Johnson writes the Ramblers and Adventurers, then, in the 
tradition of phronesis, and he applies his deliberations of practical wisdom and moral 
philosophy therein to the Preface.  
* * * * * * 
 Days after the Dictionary was published, Johnson’s friend Thomas Warton wrote 
his brother Joseph that the Preface was “noble,” yet he also feared it would “disgust, by 
the expressions of his consciousness of superiority, and of his contempt of patronage.”188 
While Johnson’s infamous letter to Chesterfield has long symbolized the author’s 
independence from patronage, most of Johnson’s contemporaries would have read the 
Preface with little knowledge of the conflict, apart from Johnson’s assertion that “the 
English Dictionary was written with little assistance of the learned, and without any 
patronage of the great.”189 In pursuing a mean between dignity and modesty, Johnson’s 
                                                 
187 Lynn, 466.  
188 (19 April 1755) The Correspondence of Thomas Warton, ed. David Fairer (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1995), 43.  
189 John J. Burke, Jr. points out that that the story of the conflict “remained part of the oral tradition for 
many years before versions of it began to appear in print. . . .The first account in print of the 1755 quarrel 
can be found in a piece by Isaac Reed that appeared in the Westminster Magazine in 1774, almost twenty 
years later.” See “The Originality of Boswell’s Version of Johnson’s Quarrel with Lord Chesterfield,” New 
Light on Boswell: Critical and Historical Essays on the Occasion of the Bicentenary of The Life of 
Johnson, ed. Greg Clingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 145-46. Lawrence Lipking 
suggests that by showing the letter to friends and acquaintances Johnson and Chesterfield both helped “set 
off a public buzz that would sell many books,” Samuel Johnson: The Life of an Author, 14. It’s difficult to 
know, of course, how much such activities would reverberate among the national reading public. I argue 
that any such buzz around the time of the Dictionary’s publication would have been more due to the 
Preface. The declaration of independence in the Preface was a public affront to Chesterfield, whose 
association with the Dictionary was publicly reiterated when Chesterfield puffed the Dictionary in the 
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“defensive pride” perhaps strays beyond the mean in ways that contributed enduringly to 
his public persona. Johnson’s seeming ingratitude to Chesterfield and apparent “contempt 
of patronage” was partly responsible for the notion, later discredited by Boswell, that 
Johnson was the unnamed man whom Chesterfield labels a “respectable Hottentot.” A 
number of early biographies of Johnson excerpt the Chesterfield letter, which describes 
an uncouth man of “moral character” and “deep learning”:  
There is a man, whose moral character, deep learning, and superior parts, I 
acknowledge, admire, and respect; but whom it is so impossible for me to love, 
that I am almost in a fever whenever I am in his company. . . . Inattentive to all 
the regards of social life, he mis-times or mis-places every thing. He disputes with 
heat, and indiscriminately. Mindless of the rank, character, and situation of those 
with whom he disputes, absolutely ignorant of the several gradations of 
familiarity or respect, he is exactly the same to his superiors, his equals, and his 
inferiors; and therefore, by a necessary consequence, absurd to two of the three. Is 
it possible to love such a man? No. The utmost I can do for him, is to consider 
him a respectable Hottentot.190
 
Even though Boswell later discredits the attribution of this portrait to Johnson, the image 
of Johnson as a “respectable Hottentot” circulated for years among readers of such early 
biographies.  
Johnson’s independence, often admired by modern readers, constituted a social 
and perhaps ethical breach for eighteenth-century readers. The first early biography of 
Johnson to include the “respectable Hottentot” letter offers it as evidence for “singular 
manners of the Doctor,” who “has ever affected a singularity in his manners, and to 
                                                                                                                                                 
World in late 1754, and when the consortium of booksellers financing the Dictionary made free copies of 
the Plan of the Dictionary (dedicated to Chesterfield) available at their bookshops.  
190 I cite the letter as quoted in Isaac Reed, “An Impartial Account of the Life, Character, Genius, and 
Writings, of Dr. Samuel Johnson” (1774). The biography originally appears in Westminster Magazine 2 
(September 1774), 443-46; quoted here from The Early Biographies of Samuel Johnson, ed. O M Brack, Jr. 
and Robert E. Kelley (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1974), 17.   
    98
 
contemn the social rules which are established in the intercourse of civil life.”191 But if 
Johnson “contemned” social rules, he only did so after calibrating the social and ethical 
consequences of his self-presentation in his periodical essays. He had already considered 
in Rambler 166, for example, the consequences for a person “whose confidence of merit 
incites him to meet without any sense of inferiority the eyes of those who flattered 
themselves with their own dignity” (Rambler 166, V, 117). Such a person might be 
considered as “an insolent leveller, impatient of the just prerogatives of rank and wealth, 
eager to usurp the station to which he has no right, and to confound the subordinations of 
society” (Ibid.). Through such calibrations, worked out through the moral and rhetorical 
counteractions of the essays, Johnson developed ethical yet practical grounds for self-
representation. It was through such exercises of ethical deliberation that Johnson 
rehearsed the public ethos he would use in the Preface, his first effort to fashion himself 
as an independent man of letters.    
III. Johnson Enkrates: The Ethos of the Folio Preface  
In writing the Preface, the first document in which he addressed the public 
directly as Samuel Johnson, and which was, up to that point in his career, the most 
important single piece of writing consequential to his career, Johnson follows the moral, 
ethical, and rhetorical advice he gives writers in his periodical essays—he tries to achieve 
a virtuous mean between presumption and timidity. The moral self-counteraction he 
urges and practices in these essays become both principles of rhetorical arrangement and 
the basis of his ethos in the Preface. As a result, Johnson counterbalances humble 
                                                 
191 Ibid., 17.  
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admissions of fault with indirect yet grand, even aggressive, self-praise, thereby effecting 
a presumptively justifiable “defensive pride.” Here Johnson aims at a kind of rhetorical 
golden mean, trying to find the middle path of courage between temerity and timorous 
prudence, as he had advises in so many of his periodical essays. Partly to substitute for 
the lack of protection a patron might have granted to his Dictionary, Johnson adopts a 
rhetorical strategy wherein he counterbalances preemptive self-defense with indirect but 
grand self-praise. Johnson avoids the appearance of an immodest, self-interested hack by 
crafting his Preface into a kind of text act—an act of pietas, self-sacrifice, and self-
control in which Johnson justifies his ways to God and country by enumerating his 
discouragements, his temptations, the difficulty of his tasks, as well as his labor, his 
application, his “anxious diligence,” his “persevering activity” (para. 74). Thus Johnson 
tries to demonstrate the social usefulness of a work—even if it fails to meet its originally 
stated goals, while at the same time demanding that immediate and obvious utility, in 
terms of the marketplace, not be the standard by which his work is measured.  
In his classic essay, “Johnson Agonistes,” Bertrand H. Bronson writes that the 
“pattern of Johnson’s temperament, far from being cut to fit the classical Golden Mean, 
tended everywhere to the volcanic.”192 Bronson posits an analogue between Johnson’s 
“aggressive physical courage,” his “athletic” “style of expression,” as well as his 
“forcible and violent” “character and manners.”193 Johnson is a “born fighter” who “will 
swim instinctively against the current, whose forces are naturally called into play by 
opposition and difficulty”; who, “with instinctive satisfaction of imperious inner 
                                                 
192 “Johnson Agonistes,” 3.  
193 “Johnson Agonistes,” 2, 43, and 4; these last terms are Boswell’s; see Life, IV, 72.   
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compulsions . . . grappled with a world in which joy was three parts pain, grimly but 
somehow exultantly fighting the good fight, determined never to capitulate.”194 
Bronson’s account is consistent with Johnson’s descriptions of himself in the Preface as a 
kind of Herculean scholarly laborer grappling with the language, dispatched on 
“fortuitous and unguided excursions into books” and “the boundless chaos of a living 
speech” (Preface, para. 28). Bronson’s portrait of Johnson as agonistes foregrounds “the 
ferment and tumult of Johnson’s nature” but obscures the Johnson who sought to control 
that ferment and tumult, the Johnson whose temperament perhaps may not have been “cut 
to fit the classical Golden Mean,” but who so frequently sought in the essays to tread the 
“middle path” with the aid of moral self-regulation, and who wrote that “to subdue 
passion and regulate desire, is the great task of man as a moral agent.”195  However 
“forcible and violent” the “character and manners” of Johnson may have sometimes 
seemed to some, in his writing Johnson’s character and manners were more susceptible to 
control—both moral and rhetorical. And in the Preface, a crucial document of self-
fashioning for Johnson, self-control constitutes the basis for Johnson’s ethos of moral 
virtue.  Johnson’s Preface shows him striving, but ultimately coming to terms with his 
limits; pursuing grand desires, but contracting his designs. In both its rhetorical manner 
of disposition and its predominant ethos, the Preface embodies not merely the exuberance 
and energy of the agonistes, but the courageous self-restraint of the enkrates, who in 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics is the figure of moral strength who controls passions, 
                                                 
194 “Johnson Agonistes,” 42, 6, 52.  
195 “Johnson Agonistes,” 6, 3; Samuel Johnson, “Sermon 18,” Sermons. The Yale Edition of the Works of 
Samuel Johnson. Vol. XIV. Jean Hagstrum and James Gray, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1978), 193.   
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but not without struggle. In contrast to the agonistes, the struggles of the enkrates are 
with the self. In the Preface, Johnson conspicuously displays these struggles for the 
reader. An ethos of moral struggle and self-control was both practical and pious, since it 
avoids a professional ethos of unseemly self-advocacy, and allows Johnson to let his 
struggles for virtue, rather than the merits of his Dictionary, stand as the final test of his 
labors. After examining in this section Johnson’s rhetorical strategies in the Preface, I 
show how Johnson’s famous dismissal of the Dictionary with “frigid tranquillity” is an 
emphatic, final display of Johnson’s moral struggle and self-control. Finally, I conclude 
by arguing that our awareness of the rhetoric of the Preface should lead us to temper our 
reliance on the Preface for Johnson’s views on language.  
* * * * * * 
Unlike the dedicator who might enumerate the “encouragements” offered by the 
patron, Johnson takes his reader through his discouragements, his challenges, and his 
impediments, thereby making the demands of his task and the intellectual rigor it required 
explicit for the reader.196 By displaying these intellectual challenges so dramatically he 
demonstrates why he is no mere drudge. At the same time, by rhetorically amplifying his 
intellectual challenges, Johnson provides the basis for judging his performance in the 
Dictionary as virtuous, if imperfect. Thus Johnson “attempted a dictionary of the English 
                                                 
196 Howard Weinbrot notes that in emphasizing his own attempts to create order from the disorder of 
language Johnson “comments obliquely on his former patron;” “Samuel Johnson’s Plan and Preface to The 
Dictionary: The Growth of a Lexicographer’s Mind,” in New Aspects of Lexicography: Literary Criticism, 
Intellectual History, and Social Change, ed. Howard D. Weinbrot (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1972), 86-7. Dustin Griffin discusses what he calls the “cultural economics of literary 
patronage” and the customary eighteenth-century terms, including “encouragement”—a term Johnson uses 
three times, in one form or another, in Johnson’s letter to Chesterfield—used to describe the “symbolic 
capital” exchanged between patrons and writers. See Griffin, Literary Patronage in England., Ch. 2. 
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language,” despite the “discouragement” traditionally afforded the lexicographer, “who 
can only hope to escape reproach, and even this negative recompense has been yet 
granted to very few.” Johnson approaches a language that “has itself been hitherto 
neglected; suffered to spread, under the direction of chance, into wild exuberance; 
resigned to the tyranny of time and fashion; and exposed to the corruptions of ignorance, 
and caprices of innovation.” From the beginning, Johnson highly dramatizes his labors, in 
which he undertakes a task previously left to the mercy of chance, time, fashion, 
ignorance, and caprice.197  
Through rhetorical amplification, Johnson dramatizes his lexicography as an 
encounter with wild nature, finding “our speech copious without order, and energetick 
without rules; wherever I turned my view, there was perplexity to be disentangled, and 
confusion to be regulated; choice was to be made out of boundless variety, without any 
established principle of selection.” In Johnson’s dramatic rendering, he is utterly alone in 
the face of wild nature. But despite this daunting state of affairs, Johnson “applied myself 
to the perusal of our writers,” having “no assistance but from general grammar.” Having 
accumulated “in time the materials of a dictionary,” Johnson “reduced” them “to method” 
"by degrees,” and established to himself, “in the progress of the work, such rules as 
experience and analogy suggested to me.” Johnson thus struggles, practically unaided but 
by “practice” and “observation.”198
 Here Johnson figures himself as one of those “heroes of literature” in Rambler 
137, whose “proper ambition” is “to enlarge the boundaries of knowledge by discovering 
                                                 
197 Preface, paras. 3, 2.  
198 Preface, paras. 4, 5.  
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and conquering new regions of the intellectual world” and who “ventures into the 
unexplored abysses of truth, and attempts to find his way through the fluctuations of 
uncertainty, and the conflicts of contradiction” (Rambler 137, IV, 362); or as one of those 
wishing “to be counted among the benefactors of posterity,” who adds “by his own toil to 
the acquisitions of his ancestors, … looking out upon the wastes of the intellectual world, 
and extending the power of learning over regions yet undisciplined and barbarous” 
(Rambler 154, V, 58).  
Throughout the Preface, Johnson reminds readers of the immensity of his task and 
his diligent endeavours to perform it. Thus Johnson has to find information “by fortuitous 
and unguided excursions into books,” to “glean” information “as industry should find, or 
chance should offer it, in the boundless chaos of a living speech.” Johnson’s description 
of his labor, in which he faces “perplexity to be disentangled” and the “boundless chaos 
of a living speech,” and in which he takes the “materials of the dictionary, which, by 
degrees, I reduced to a method,”is reminiscent of language Johnson uses to describe 
Herman Boerhaave’s celebrated public lectures on chemistry:  
This he undertook . . . to the great improvement of the art itself, which had been 
hitherto treated only in a confused irregular manner, and was little more than a 
history of particular experiments, not reduced to certain principles, nor connected 
with another; this vast chaos he reduced to order, and made clear and easy, which 
was before to the last degree perplexed and obscure.199  
 
Johnson’s labours are not mere drudgery but intellectually serious endeavors. He reminds 
us that “to interpret a language by itself is very difficult”; that by a certain “class of 
verbs” his “labour has . . . been much increased,” and that “it is hard to trace them 
                                                 
199 Preface, paras. 28, 5; Samuel Johnson, “Life of Dr. Herman Boerhaave,” Samuel Johnson. Oxford 
Authors. Ed. Donald Greene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 61.  
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through the maze of variation, to catch them on the brink of utter inanity, to circumscribe 
them by any limitations.” If Johnson has failed in detailing the “whole power of these 
verbs,” “it must be remembered, that while our language is yet living, and variable by the 
caprice of every one that speaks it, these words are hourly shifting their relations, and can 
no more be ascertained in a dictionary, than a grove, in the agitation of a storm, can be 
accurately delineated from its picture in the water.” Johnson’s own limitations become 
personified so that “Discernment,” not Johnson, “is wearied.” “Distinction” itself is 
“puzzled, and perseverance hurries itself to an end, by crouding together what she cannot 
separate.” If it seems that Johnson’s “complaints of difficulty” regarding the “uncertainty 
of terms, and commixture of ideas” be “thought only the jargon of a man willing to 
magnify his labours, and procure veneration to his studies by involution and obscurity,” it 
“must be remembered that I am speaking of that which words are insufficient to explain.” 
Many “seeming faults are to be imputed to the nature of the undertaking, than the 
negligence of the performer.” And Johnson notes that “[i]f our language is not here fully 
displayed, I have only failed in an attempt which no human powers have hitherto 
completed.” Johnson’s “first experiments” did not indicate that “what I had not of my 
own was easily to be obtained.” “[O]ne enquiry only gave occasion to another, . . . book 
referred to book,” “to search was not always to find, and to find was not always to be 
informed; and . . . thus to persue perfection, was, like the first inhabitants of Arcadia, to 
chace the sun, which, when they had reached the hill where he seemed to rest, was still 
beheld at the same distance from them.” Johnson’s syntactic chains, from searching to 
not finding, from finding to coming away uninformed, replicate the endless chase for the 
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horizon’s end, and lay out each step of his efforts for the reader: his “experiments,” his 
successive enquiries, his movement from book to book, and his searches, both those that 
were and were not productive. Johnson documents his labor, demonstrating the time and 
effort spent without producing tangible results, as if he were justifying to a customer the 
cost for “labor.”200   
By using the figure of the Arcadians, Johnson demonstrates the fact that he 
labored very hard on this book, but that he exercised judgment, too. Johnson, unlike the 
Arcadians, recognizes a futile task as such and ends the chase. Johnson is then valiant for 
his efforts, and wise for his wisdom in choosing when to stop. The figure suggests that 
his faults lay in a doomed but brave attempt to “persue perfection.” Johnson, the realist 
who recognizes his limits and “then contracted my design,” goes on to present himself as 
having to limit time spent on individual sections of the Dictionary so that he could 
complete the whole. In one gesture Johnson admits imperfections and dramatizes his 
labor as a magnificent feat:  
A large work is difficult because it is large, even though all its parts might singly 
be performed with facility; where there are many things to be done, each must be 
allowed its share of time and labour, in the proportion only which it bears to the 
whole, nor can it be expected, that the stones which form the dome of a temple 
should be squared and polished like the diamond of a ring.  
 
In making a gesture of preemptive defense, Johnson rhetorically erects the “dome of a 
temple,” and presumably leaves others to the task of squaring and polishing the stones 
                                                 
200 Preface, paras. 43, 45, 50, 51, 55, 94, 72.  
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which form the dome. If Johnson’s subsequent admirers compared his large folio 
Dictionary to a noble edifice or a monument, Johnson had given them the hint.201  
Johnson does not, of course, praise himself directly, but his indirect yet grand 
self-presentation perhaps comes from a conviction that “to dig the quarry or to search the 
field, requires not much of any quality, beyond stubborn perseverance; and though genius 
must often lye inactive without this humble assistance, yet this can claim little praise 
because every man can afford it” (Rambler 83, IV, 75). Mr. Rambler suggests that to 
trumpet one’s “labors” was not, in itself, enough except perhaps “To mean 
understandings” for whom “it is sufficient honour to be numbered amongst the lowest 
labourers of learning” (Rambler 83, IV, 76).  This view reflects Johnson’s 
complementary view that one “may be sometimes culpable for confining himself to 
business below his genius, and losing in petty speculations, those hours by which if he 
had spent them in nobler studies, he might have given new light to the intellectual world” 
(Rambler 83, IV, 74-5).  
 By illustrating and dramatizing exactly what he means when referring to his 
“labours” Johnson shows that, unlike his predecessors, who were deemed “generally men 
of more shoulders than head,”202 he had performed countless acts of immense intellectual 
labor. These grand rhetorical depictions of his labor are the concrete manifestations of the 
labor Johnson mentions with a kind of anaphoric repetition throughout the Preface. Thus 
                                                 
201 Preface, paras. 73, 83. Allen Reddick claims that the commonplace “conception of the Dictionary as 
monumental architecture was introduced” in 1756 by Christopher Smart in the January 1756 Universal 
Visitor, where Smart praised it as “a work I look upon with equal pleasure and amazement, as I do upon St. 
Paul’s cathedral.” Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 177. Perhaps Smart just revised 
Johnson’s metaphor.  
202 The Scots Magazine 17 (February 1755), 91.  
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Johnson reminds us that he has “laboured [the Dictionary with so much application,” that 
he is presenting to his readers a work that is the “labour of years,” that he has performed 
a “task, which Scaliger compares to the labours of the anvil and the mine.” By 
demonstrating the difficult nature of his labors, Johnson preemptively defends himself 
against criticisms, demonstrates his virtues of diligence and application, and distinguishes 
himself from undue association with any of his less intellectually endowed 
predecessors.203
* * * * * * 
 Johnson not only palliates admitted faults with “complaints of difficulty” 
(Preface, para. 51), but he counterbalances his admissions of fault by praising himself just 
as often. Following the advice he gave writers throughout his periodical essays, Johnson 
took a middle path between temerity and diffidence, between arrogance and submission. 
By counterbalancing pride and humility in a document that that required such direct self-
promotion, Johnson might be able to secure a fair hearing for his labor of years and avoid 
straying into folly by acknowledging what he considered to be likely flaws. Conversely, 
Johnson’s admissions of flaws would not unduly open him up to captious criticism since 
those admissions would be rhetorically outweighed by indirect yet grand gestures of self-
praise. Time and time again, Johnson follows an admission of fault with a claim of merit, 
and vice versa.  
This continual, repeating pattern of confession and indirect self-praise overlays 
the more general structure of the Preface, which is loosely organized according to 
                                                 
203 Preface, paras. 84, 92, 93. 
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methodological questions. “The work, whatever proofs of diligence and attention it may 
exhibit, is yet capable of many improvements.” After candidly admitting some areas 
capable of improvements, Johnson writes that “some faults will at last appear to be the 
effects of anxious diligence and persevering activity.” As well, the “nice and subtile 
ramifications of meaning were not easily avoided by a mind intent on accuracy, and 
convinced of the necessity of disentangling combinations, and separating similitudes.” If 
Johnson is oversubtle, it is because of the ebullience of his admirable qualities—his 
“diligence,” his “persevering activity,” his commitment to “accuracy,” his conviction that 
it is right to disentangle what has heretofore been left to chance. In another passage, 
Johnson laments “[t]he imperfect sense of some examples” that he “could not remedy,” 
thus showing that their imperfection remains in spite of effort, rather than because of 
negligence. Besides, Johnson hopes that the imperfect sense of some examples will be 
compensated for by “innumerable passages selected with propriety, and preserved with 
exactness.” “Care,” Johnson continues, will sometimes betray to [sic] the appearance of 
negligence.” Elsewhere, Johnson notes that “authorities will sometimes seem to have 
been accumulated without necessity or use. . . . But a work of this kind is not hastily to be 
charged with superfluities.” “[A] more accurate examiner” will notice that the extra 
quotations display “different shades of meaning,” whereas “to careless or unskilful 
perusers” they “appear only to repeat the same sense. . . . [E]very quotation contributes 
something to the stability or enlargement of the language.” When Johnson—figured in 
the universal third person as “he”—“is catching opportunities which seldom occur,” he 
“will suffer those to pass by unregarded, which he expects hourly to return; he that is 
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searching for rare and remote things, will neglect those that are obvious and familiar.” “In 
this work, when it shall be found that much is omitted, let it not be forgotten that much is 
likewise performed.” In one triplet, Johnson presents errors as excusable and momentary 
lapses from his usual state of vigilance and attention, with each clause ending with 
rhetorical emphasis on Johnson’s virtues: “[S]udden fits of inadvertency will surprise 
vigilance, slight avocations will seduce attention, and casual eclipses of the mind will 
darken learning.”204  
 In addition to these more straightforward examples of rhetorical counterbalancing, 
Johnson repeatedly balances a humble self-presentation with indirect yet grand self-
praise. In several rhetorically conspicuous, grand passages, the literal point is one of 
humility, but the rhetorical effect is self-praise. Johnson establishes this pattern in the 
Preface from the beginning, noting that “Every other authour may aspire to praise; the 
lexicographer can only hope to escape reproach, and even this negative recompense has 
been yet granted yet to very few” (Preface, para. 2). Johnson figures the lexicographer as 
a typically undervalued intellectual laborer, as one “whom mankind have considered, not 
as the pupil, but the slave of science, the pionier of literature, doomed only to remove 
rubbish and clear obstructions from the paths through which Learning and Genius press 
forward to conquest and glory, without bestowing a smile on the humble drudge that 
facilitates their progress” (Preface, para. 2). Johnson, by implication, is merely a 
“pionier”, in its less flattering 18th-century sense. Johnson defines a “pionier” in his 1773 
folio as “One whose business is to level the road, throw up works, or sink mines in 
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military operations” (1773 Dictionary). The pioneer is merely “the slave of science,” a 
“humble drudge,” but one whose work has grand consequences: he “facilitates” the 
“progress” of “Learning and Genius.”  
Once Johnson implicitly figures himself as an unappreciated, undervalued 
“pionier of literature” who “can only escape reproach,” he fills the “Preface” with 
reminders of just why he merits praise. And in trying to establish his own scholarly 
credibility, Johnson maneuvers between “arrogance and submission” (Rambler 1, III, 7). 
Acknowledging his debt to Junius and Skinner for “the Teutonick etymologies,” Johnson 
humbly genuflects before “these, whom I ought not to mention but with the reverence 
due to instructors and benefactors,” and after praising their respective merits, Johnson 
concludes the paragraph by asserting his own critical sagacity and his habit of 
counteracting praise and censure. Thus “Skinner is often ignorant, but never ridiculous; 
Junius is always full of knowledge; but his variety distracts his judgment, and his 
learning is very frequently disgraced by his absurdities.” Johnson is aware that the  
votaries of the northern muses will not perhaps easily restrain their indignation, 
when they find the name of Junius thus degraded by a disadvantageous 
comparison; but whatever reverence is due to his diligence, or his attainments, it 
can be no criminal degree of censoriousness to charge that etymologist with want 
of judgment, who can seriously derive dream from drama, because life is a 
drama, and a drama is a dream; and who declares with a tone of defiance, that no 
man can fail to derive moan from µóνος, monos, single or solitary, who considers 
that grief naturally loves to be alone.205  
 
                                                 
205 Preface, para. 24. Johnson’s self-defense here (“no criminal degree of censoriousness”) is reminiscent of 
Johnson’s self-vindication against the potential charge of ingratitude when relinquishing any claim of 
obligation to Chesterfield: “I hope it is no very cinical asperity not to confess obligation where no benefit 
has been recieved, or to be unwilling that the Public should consider me as owing that to a Patron, which 
Providence has enabled me to do for myself.” Letters, I, 96.  
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After noting the ignorance of Skinner and the absurdities of Junius, Johnson places 
himself in the company of Aristotle and Cicero, while in the process of reminding us that 
he is a mere “pionier of literature.” Johnson admits, “Some words there are which I 
cannot explain, because I do not understand them; these might have been omitted very 
often with little inconvenience, but I would not so far indulge my vanity as to decline this 
confession.” After underscoring here his aversion to vain self-indulgence, Johnson 
elaborates by placing himself in grand company: “For when Tully owns himself ignorant 
whether lessus, in the twelve tables, means a funeral song or mourning garment; and 
Aristotle doubts whether oυρευς in the Iliad, signifies a mule, or muleteer, I may freely, 
without shame, leave some obscurities to happier industry, of future information.”206  
 Later, Johnson follows a pathos-laden sketch of his exigencies and faults with 
indirect yet grand self-praise. “[M]uch of my life has been lost under the pressures of 
disease; much has been trifled away; and much has always been spent in provision for the 
day that was passing over me; but I shall not think my employment useless or ignoble, if 
by my assistance foreign nations, and distant ages, gain access to the propagators of 
knowledge, and understand the teachers of truth; if my labours afford light to the 
repositories of science, and add celebrity to Bacon, to Hooker, to Milton, and to Boyle 
(Preface, para. 92). Johnson couches his desire to add celebrity to others in a sentence 
whose cumulative effect provides grounds for his own celebrity. Johnson may have 
suspected that few would think such labors, performing such tasks, were “useless or 
                                                 
206 Preface, para. 47. In a letter (8 March 1758) apologizing to Charles Burney for delays in Johnson’s 
Shakespeare edition, to which Burney had subscribed, Johnson notes, “I have printed many of the plays and 
have hitherto left very few passages unexplained; where I am quite at a loss, I confess my ignorance, which 
is seldom done by commentators.” Letters, I, 159. The Greek word oυρευς is marked above the first 
upsilon to indicate accent and breathing in the original text. 
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ignoble”—and here Johnson, known for periodic sentences, employs a loose sentence to 
underscore the point. Johnson follows the litotes of the rather understated main clause, “I 
shall not think my employment useless or ignoble,” with the bold hopes of a compound 
conditional clause, juxtaposing humility with indirect self-praise, if one reads Johnson’s 
conditional clauses as implicitly foregone conclusions. Johnson’s moments of self-praise, 
stated more directly and without their accompanying moments of humility, would be 
excessively prideful. Perhaps they still are, but when stated alongside and following 
candid admissions of fault and professions of inadequacy, their net effect aims toward the 
mean. If Johnson is prideful, his pride is defensive, and the object of his pride is desired 
“assistance” to those who seek “knowledge,” “truth,” and “science.” Moreover, 
Johnson’s pride is rhetorically counteracted, and palliated by his several gestures of 
humility, inadequacy, and personal suffering. Johnson’s defensive pride was, perhaps, 
required by the awkward rhetorical circumstances under which he wrote. In any case, 
“there is always room to deviate on either side of rectitude without rushing against 
apparent absurdity” (Rambler 129, IV, 322).  
* * * * * * 
 Not only does Johnson use self-counteraction as a virtuous and pragmatic 
principle of rhetorical arrangement; he also makes it a crucial aspect of his ethos in the 
Preface, where he dramatizes his own moral strength of will, emphasizing both his self-
restraint and perseverance. Johnson lends moral resonance to his intellectual labors, 
which he portrays as an attempt to tread the middle path of virtue between presumption 
and idle despondency. In doing so, Johnson draws on the values and virtues developed in 
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his periodical essays, and he does so in ways that are consistent with classical and 
Christian concepts of virtue. Johnson’s self portrayal as a man whose material, 
intellectual, and ultimately moral struggles for self-control has a classical analogue, in 
Aristotelian ethical terms, but it is not the sophron, the self-controlled man who always 
guides his actions by the dictates of reason; it is, rather, the enkrates, the morally strong 
man in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics who controls his passions, but not without 
struggle.207 Martin Ostwald, who translates sophron and enkrates, respectively, as “self-
controlled” and “morally strong,” writes that these terms “refer not only to different 
virtues but to essentially different types of personality.” The sophron “gives the 
impression of ‘self-control’ without effort or strain. The enkrates, on the other hand, has 
an intense and passionate nature which he is, indeed, strong enough to control, but not 
without a struggle. His ‘moral strength’ resides in his victory; the sophron’s ‘self-control’ 
makes a struggle unnecessary” While there is no direct evidence that Johnson consciously 
used the concept of the enkrates in shaping his self-presentation in the Preface, he would 
have been familiar enough both with Aristotle’s ethical framework and his terms for 
virtue to be able to do so. He once considered producing a translation, “with notes,” of 
“Aristotle’s Ethicks,” and both the term enkrates and enkrateia are used in New 
Testament lists of virtues for “restraint of one’s emotions, impulses, or desires, self-
control.”208  
                                                 
207 For the differences between the sophron and the enkrates I am indebted to Martin Ostwald’s discussions 
of them in his edition of Aristotle’s Ethics, 178 n. 12, 313-14. 
208 A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed., revised, 
Frederick William Danker, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) lists forms of enkrateia in 
Galatians 5:23, Acts 24:25, and 2 Peter 1:6; and a form of enkrates in Titus 1:8. The King James Bible 
translates forms of enkrateia as “temperance,” and enkrates as “temperate,” whereas these terms are 
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In addition, Johnson’s essays suggest that he was familiar enough with the term 
sophron to use it twice as the name for models of undesirable or generally unrealistic 
self-regulation: a fictional correspondent to Mr. Rambler in Rambler 57, and a character 
sketched nearly nine years later in Idler 57. Writing to Mr. Rambler on frugality, 
Johnson’s fictional Sophron imagines that his own ease in following simple maxims is 
universally replicable. He is “sometimes inclined to imagine, that, casual calamities 
excepted, there might, by universal prudence, be procured an universal exemption from 
want” (Rambler 57, III, 307). The sophron described in the Idler as “[o]ne of the most 
prudent of all that have fallen within my observation” is equally perplexed by ills of the 
world.” He “has passed through the world in quiet, by perpetual adherence to a few plain 
maxims, and wonders how contention and distress can so often happen” (Idler 57, II, 
178). Rather than being a laudable model, the sophron comes across as a man whose 
prudence has helped him avoid calamity, but whose aversion to risk of any kind has 
rendered him a rather timid, colorless creature. “Thus Sophron creeps along, neither 
loved nor hated, neither favoured nor opposed; he has never attempted to grow rich for 
fear of growing poor, and he has raised no friends for fear of making enemies” (Idler 57, 
II, 180). Prudence, for the Idler, “rather prevents loss than procures advantages; and often 
escapes miscarriages, but seldom reaches either power or honour. It quenches that ardour 
of enterprize, by which every thing is done that can claim praise or admiration”; it “keeps 
life safe, but does not often make it happy” (Idler 57, II, 177-8).  
                                                                                                                                                 
translated, respectively, as “self-control” and “self-controlled” in the New Revised Standard Version. See 
also Aristotle, Ethics, trans. Ostwald, 178 n. 12. For Johnson’s proposed translation of the Ethics, see Life, 
IV, 381 n. 1.  
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 The enkrates is subject to strong passions in a way that the sophron is not. Thus it 
is more realistic, and hence more useful, as a moral model. For Aristotle, a “morally 
strong man (enkrates) is the kind of person who does nothing contrary to the dictates of 
reason under the influence of bodily pleasures, and the same is true of a self-controlled 
man (sophron). But while a morally strong man has base appetites, a self-controlled man 
does not and is, moreover, a person who finds no pleasure in anything that violates the 
dictates of reason. A morally strong man, on the other hand, does find pleasure in such 
things, but is not driven by them.”209 Yet Aristotle presents these types with an awareness 
that “in relation to the characteristics possessed by most people, moral weakness 
(akrasia) and moral strength (enkrateia) lie at the extremes.”210 Johnson, as he presents 
himself in the Preface, is a kind of modified or revised enkrates figure who resists not 
“base appetites” but noble, intellectual appetites. 
 Johnson self-consciously portrays himself as regulating his desires and hopes, 
with various results—thereby checking his own vanity or making his work more useful. 
Johnson has, for example, been “cautious lest my zeal for antiquity might drive me into 
times too remote, and croud my book with words no longer understood” (Preface, para. 
62). Johnson enumerates his grand desires, dramatizes his labors, and indicates his 
aversion to the intellectually dull aspects of his labor, which are vexatious, to which he is 
“condemned”: 
When I first collected these authorities, I was desirous that every quotation should 
be useful to some other end than the illustration of a word; I therefore extracted 
from philosophers principles of science; from historians remarkable facts; from 
                                                 
209 Ethics, trans. Ostwald, VII. 9, 200-01; 1151b-1152a. 
210 Ethics, trans. Ostwald, VII. 10, 202, 1152a.   
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chymists complete processes; from divines striking exhortations; and from poets 
beautiful descriptions. Such is design, while it is yet at a distance from execution. 
When the time called upon me to range this accumulation of elegance and 
wisdom into an alphabetical series, I soon discovered that the bulk of my volumes 
would fright away the student, and was forced to depart from my scheme of 
including all that was pleasing or useful in English literature, and reduce my 
transcripts very often to clusters of words, in which scarcely any meaning is 
retained; thus to the weariness of copying, I was condemned to add the vexation 
of expunging. Some passages I have yet spared, which may relieve the labour of 
verbal searches, and intersperse with verdure and flowers the dusty desarts of 
barren philology. (Preface, para. 57) 
 
In a rational act of self-regulation, Johnson contracts his design to make it more useful, 
and even when he is engaged in the dull duties of a lexicographer the judgment of the 
“poet” intersperses his work “with verdure and flowers.” Johnson is a man of reason and 
practical judgment, and he presents himself as bringing the taste of a poet to the 
intellectually mundane aspects of lexicography.  
 Here and throughout the text, Johnson portrays himself as regulating his own 
perhaps absurdly high expectations by employing, as he had recommended throughout 
the Ramblers, reason to check his own passions. Johnson recounts the hopeful resolutions 
he made upon starting the work:  
When I first engaged in this work, I resolved to leave neither words nor things 
unexamined, and pleased myself with a prospect of the hours which I should revel 
away in feasts of literature, the obscure recesses of northern learning, which I 
should enter and ransack, the treasures with which I expected every search into 
those neglected mines to reward my labour, and the triumph with which I should 
display my acquisitions to mankind. When I had thus enquired into the original of 
words, I resolved to show likewise my attention to things; to pierce deep into 
every science, to enquire the nature of every substance of which I inserted the 
name, to limit every idea by a definition strictly logical, and exhibit every 
production of art or nature in an accurate description, that my book might be in 
place of all other dictionaries whether apellative or technical. But these were the 
dreams of a poet doomed at last to wake a lexicographer. (Preface, para. 72) 
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Johnson’s grandly described resolutions seem perhaps absurdly grand, and after 
describing with careful amplification the exuberance of his noble designs, Johnson uses 
one clean sentence to dramatize the end of his dreams and the beginning of his practical 
attention to completing his duty.  Johnson defends the limitations of his work as the 
necessary result of a wise act. This message is reinforced as the passage continues into 
the juxtaposition of Johnson’s endless labors with the “first inhabitants of Arcadia” who 
chased the sun. So while Johnson rhetorically enlarges the scale of his labors with this 
juxtaposition, he also uses the figure to demonstrate his own lack of folly. Johnson 
recognizes the folly of pursuing perfection—“I then contracted my design”. Johnson both 
demonstrates his rational recognition of his limits and provides another proleptic defense 
against criticisms. Johnson recognizes his own limits, and hopes that the audience will 
agree that it is wiser to “set limits to my work, which would in time be ended though not 
completed,” rather than to “persue perfection” (Preface, paras. 72-3). Contracting his 
design becomes a moral virtue that ends the task even as it opens it up to the 
imperfections of an incomplete work. Here Johnson demonstrates the practical wisdom 
urged by Mr. Rambler, who observes, “The known shortness of life, as it ought to 
moderate our passions, may likewise, with equal propriety, contract our designs” 
(Rambler 17, III, 96). 
 In Johnson’s most famous account of self-restraint, he is a man who “flattered 
himself for a while” with the notion that his Dictionary might be able to “fix our 
language,” but who now begins “to fear that I have indulged expectation which neither 
reason nor experience can justify. When we see men grow old and die at a certain time 
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one after another, from century to century, we laught at the elixir that promises to prolong 
life to a thousand years; with equal justice may the lexicographer be derided, who . . . 
shall imagine that his dictionary can embalm his language, and secure it from corruption 
and decay, that it is in his power to change sublunary nature, and clear the world at once 
from folly, vanity, and affectation.”211  
 Johnson’s self-restraint is a model of self-regulation—he does not simply fail to 
meet his design, but curbs his noble desires with reasonable self-regulation, even when 
that reasonable self-regulation involves merely an acknowledgment of his own limits of 
knowledge to avoid vanity. Hence the “vigilance and activity” of academies intending to 
“guard the avenues of their languages, to retain fugitives, and repulse intruders” has 
“hitherto been vain.” Johnson recognizes, perhaps implicitly by contrast, that “sounds are 
too volatile and subtile for legal restraints; to enchain syllables, and to lash the wind, are 
equally the undertakings of pride, unwilling to measure its desires by its strength.” 
Johnson, by implicit contrast, has curbed his pride and measured his desires by his 
strength.212  
* * * * * * 
 If Johnson has restrained presumptuous hopes, he has also resisted 
discouragements, not only the intellectual challenges inherent to his task but the moral 
challenges concomitant to that task, including the vitiating effects of despondency. 
Johnson displays the ways he has, “with so much application” (Preface, para. 84), 
through “persevering activity” (Preface, para. 74), through “anxious” and “useful 
                                                 
211 Preface, para. 84.  
212 Preface, paras. 84, 85.  
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diligence” (Preface, paras. 74, 93), managed to ensure that “[d]espondency has never so 
far prevailed as to depress me to negligence” (Preface, para. 74). Johnson’s phrasing 
suggests that he has experienced despondency, though it has not prevailed. Johnson’s 
rhetorical gesture of triumph over despondency suggests his own struggles to overcome a 
morally hazardous state of mind. Thus Johnson’s dramatization of the material and 
intellectual hazards posed by a “work of such multiplicity” (Preface, para. 93) accompany 
reference to Johnson’s perhaps numerous minor victories over despondency, which is 
comparable to the Christian and western moral philosophical concept of acedia, and 
which Johnson defines in the Dictionary as “Despair; hopelesness; desperation.” “To 
DESPOND [In Theology.]” is defined as “To lose hope of the divine mercy,” and for 
Johnson, “despair is criminal.”213   
Throughout Johnson’s periodical essays he advises writers, including himself, 
against the danger of falling prey to despondency, which is both a hazard to one’s social 
usefulness and one’s mental and moral health. In Rambler 25, the Rambler notes that he 
has “often had occasion to consider the contrary effects of presumption and 
despondency,” which he refers to as “opposite qualities of mind, which may become 
dangerous” (Rambler 25, III, 137) In Rambler 29, Mr. Rambler warns against 
despondency, which he distinguishes from general observations on the vicissitudes of 
life: 
The concern about things to come, that is so justly censured, is not the result of 
those general reflections on the variableness of fortune, the uncertainty of life, and 
the universal insecurity of all human acquisitions, which must always be 
suggested by the view of the world; but such a desponding anticipation of 
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misfortune, as fixes the mind upon scenes of gloom and melancholy, and makes 
fear predominate in every imagination [emphasis added]. (Rambler 29, III, 160).  
 
Those among whom “despondence” is “some danger lest he that too scrupulously 
balances probabilities, and too perspicaciously foresees obstacles, should remain always 
in a state of inaction, without venturing upon attempts on which he may perhaps spend 
his labour without advantage” (Rambler 43, III, 236). “It is the fate of industry to be 
equally endangered by miscarriage and success, by confidence and despondency” 
(Rambler 127, IV, 313). In Adventurer 81 Johnson counsels against “torpid 
despondency,” calling it “the frost of the soul which binds up all its powers, and congeals 
life in perpetual sterility” (Adventurer 81, II, 401). Despondency makes one socially and 
intellectually inert, not to mention spiritually lost; Johnson’s battle against it, then, is 
framed as a moral victory.   
 Just as Johnson dramatizes his intellectual efforts by making explicit for the 
reader the intellectual depth of his labors, so he makes explicit the many impediments to 
the virtue of “persevering activity” (Preface, para. 74). After explaining why his “[c]are 
will sometimes betray to the appearance of negligence” (Preface, para. 81), Johnson 
makes his own lapses a general reminder of the limits of “the mind”, a reminder whose 
length and detail suggest that it is not just a disquisition on “the mind”, but a frank 
acknowledgement of Johnson’s own challenges as he wavered between overconfidence 
and diffidence, as he overcame ignorance, confidence, fear, pride, sloth, security, anxiety, 
idleness, distraction, and dissipation.  
[I]n things difficult there is danger from ignorance, and in things easy from 
confidence; the mind, afraid of greatness, and disdainful of littleness, hastily 
withdraws herself from painful searches, and passes with scornful rapidity over 
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tasks not adequate to her powers, sometimes too secure for caution, and again too 
anxious for vigorous effort; sometimes idle in a plain path, and sometimes 
distracted in labyrinths, and dissipated by different intentions [emphasis added]. 
(Preface, para. 82).  
  
In this meditation on the dangers inherent in “things difficult” Johnson suggests that 
merely completing the Dictionary required a series of moral struggles. The material and 
mental challenges of his labors become moral challenges—the kind of moral challenges 
Johnson describes in many of his periodical essays, where he often portrays the mind 
between the “equal follies” of “security and despair”, between the contrary excesses of 
“presumption and arrogance” on one hand, and “weakness and cowardice” on the other 
(Rambler 43, III, 236). Johnson reiterates throughout the Preface the difficulty of his 
“fortuitous and unguided excursions” into the “boundless chaos of a living speech.” 
Johnson reminds readers that he has persevered despite being “distracted in labyrinths” 
and engaged in several “painful searches”; that he has faced “perplexity to be 
disentangled,” and in which “discernment is wearied, and distinction puzzled”; he has 
traced words “through the maze of variation, to catch them on the brink of inanity,” only 
to find that often “perplexity cannot be disentangled.” Johnson’s moral perseverance, 
then, perhaps follows the model of the apostle Paul, whom Johnson quotes in the 
Dictionary entry for DESPAIR: “We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we 
are perplexed, but not in despair.”214
 Johnson portrays himself in the Preface as overcoming what he describes in 
Rambler 103 as an undesirable “middle state” achieved by those entrapped by that 
“snare” so “dangerous to busy and excursive minds, . . . the cobwebs of petty 
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inquisitiveness,” who are entangled “in trivial employments and minute studies” —a state 
“between the tediousness of total inactivity, and the fatigue of laborious efforts. . . . The 
necessity of doing something, and the fear of undertaking much, sinks the historian to a 
genealogist, the philosopher to a journalist of the weather, and the mathematician to a 
constructer of dials” (Rambler 103, IV, 187). Johnson’s disquisition here on the 
challenges to “the mind” serves as a kind of confession couched in the generalized moral 
language of the third person. It also allows Johnson to demonstrate for his readers and for 
his maker, not just the material, but also the mental and moral, challenges he faced and 
overcame through application, diligence, and perseverance, even though much time “has 
been spent in provision for the day that was passing over me;” even though he much of 
“my life has been lost under the pressures of disease.” While writers “sometimes faint 
with weariness under a task, which Scaliger compares to the labours of the anvil and the 
mine,” Johnson worked “amid inconvenience and distraction, in sickness and in sorrow.” 
Johnson looks “with pleasure on my book, however defective, and delivers it to the world 
with the spirit of a man that has endeavoured well.”215  
Johnson’s defense against charges of negligence in the Preface are not only 
proleptic defenses against captious criticism but accounts of his moral struggles for 
virtuous action. In prayers Johnson wrote while at work on the Dictionary, he asks for 
help in shunning “sloth and negligence” (Yale Works, I, 48); in another he asks for help 
in repenting “of my negligence, that I may obtain mercy from Thee, and pass the time 
which Thou shalt yet allow me, in diligent performance of thy commands” (Ibid., I, 49). 
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Johnson’s presentation in the Preface of his struggles shows him accounting for how he 
has employed his talents and his time over the previous several years. Johnson began 
work on the second volume of the Dictionary with a future accounting of his own actions 
in mind, with a sense of moral purpose and duty: “O God who hast hitherto supported me 
enable me to proceed in this labour & in the Whole task of my present state that when I 
shall render up at the last day an account of the talent committed to me I may receive 
pardon for the sake of Jesus Christ” (Yale Works, I, 50).  
 Johnson, however, is not a perfect model of self-regulation. Sometimes 
methodological requirements or noble desires win in the struggle for self-control. But 
even this exuberance is chosen, rather than an unconscious sign of “negligence.” For 
instance, sometimes “the scheme of my work did not allow me to repress” instances of 
“grammatical exuberance.” He departs from his resolution to include among his examples 
of usage “no testimony of living authors” when “some performance of uncommon 
excellence excited my veneration, when my memory supplied me, from late books, with 
an example that was wanting, or when my heart, in the tenderness of friendship, solicited 
admission for a favourite name.” So in including a modern example Johnson is not 
“misled by partiality” but “excited” by “uncommon excellence” into “veneration.” He is 
simply meeting necessity, supplying “an example that was wanting,” or obliging the 
solicitations of “my heart, in the tenderness of friendship.” As well, Johnson “sometimes, 
though rarely, yielded to the temptation of exhibiting a genealogy of sentiments, by 
shewing how one authour copied the thoughts and diction of another.” This practice, 
Johnson notes, entails “repetitions, which might justly be censured, did they not gratify 
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the mind, by affording a kind of intellectual history.” So when Johnson fails to regulate 
himself, it is because of methodological restraints beyond his control, or countervailing 
virtues, which extenuate his rare excesses. Johnson takes pains throughout to demonstrate 
that his work is “not imperfect for want of care.”216  
 If one set of opposites, pride and humility, helped Johnson present himself in the 
Preface in an appropriately dignified yet modest rhetorical manner, another set of 
opposites, presumption and despondency, provided him with the moral framework for the 
public self-evaluation of his own accomplishments and actions in preparing the 
Dictionary. Just as Johnson follows the advice in writing the Preface that he had given to 
writers in his periodicals essays, so Johnson’s self-vindication before the public, and 
before his maker, in the Preface proceed along ethical lines established in the periodical 
essays. Johnson portrays his own attempts to regulate his actions by consulting reason, 
his attempts to achieve a mean between the impious excesses of presumption and 
despondency, which both involve losing sight of one’s relation to the divine.  
 Having dramatized, through copious amplification, both the difficult nature of his 
solitary task and his careful application, which was animated by noble if vain desires, 
Johnson then moves from discussing his impediments, to his responses to those 
impediments. So if some faults are due to the nature of the task, others are due to the 
necessity of “contracting” one’s “design.” In the drama of pietas that unfolds in the 
Preface, Johnson now moves from his courageous, diligent, and solitary stand against 
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immense nature in the name of honor to his experience-driven restraints on a perhaps 
foolish adventure.  
 Part of Johnson’s heroism comes from his self-conscious representation of 
himself as overcoming despondency and obstacles, as recognizing the limits of human 
capacity without giving up, from restraining his zeal and his passion by reason and 
experience, by applying the gifts of reason to the maze of life, and by conquering his 
personal inclinations to make the project useful to his country, and a benefit to mankind. 
Thus Johnson proleptically defends himself against the charge of vanity by showing that 
he has endeavored, he has employed his faculties to the best of his abilities. He has been 
diligent, “the contrary to idleness” (Dict.; adj. 1), a word he illustrates in the Dictionary 
with the passage from Proverbs 22.29: “A man diligent in his business shall stand before 
kings” (Dict.; “DILIGENT” adj. 1). “Whoever steadily perseveres in the exertion of all 
his faculties, does what is great with respect to himself; and what will not be despised by 
Him, who has given to all created beings their different abilities: he faithfully performs 
the task of life, within whatever limits his labours may be confined, or how soon soever 
they may be forgotten” (Adventurer 128, II, 480).  
* * * * * * 
  
 Johnson’s conclusion to the Preface has always invited the attention of those who 
study the Preface, including Boswell, who thought it strange “that the conclusion of his 
Preface should be expressed in terms so desponding, when it is considered that the 
    126
 
authour was then only in his forty-sixth year.”217 Moreover, if Johnson was so at pains to 
ensure the success of his own work in the body of the Preface, his conclusion, in which 
he, writing in the “gloom of solitude,” dismisses his Dictionary “with frigid tranquillity, 
having little to fear or hope from censure or from praise” (Preface, para. 94), seems either 
contradictory or disingenuous. Johnson’s conclusion has been described as 
“exaggerated,” duplicitous, and as evidence of his constitutional melancholy; or merely 
as a traditional continuation of the “lugubrious tradition of humanistic lexicography.”218 
Yet Johnson’s conclusion is entirely in keeping with his performance in the Preface of 
moral self-regulation through counteraction, and it proceeds just as the “masters of 
rhetorick direct,” by ensuring that “the most forcible arguments be produced in the latter 
part of an oration” (Rambler 207, V, 313-14).  If Johnson wrote the Preface before 
receiving his honorary M. A. from Oxford, and before Chesterfield’s momentous puffs of 
the Dictionary in The World, he was writing as an Oxford dropout, the reception of 
whose tome could greatly influence the rest of his career.  
Having spent most of the Preface preemptively defending his work, his 
resignation of his work’s fate to the public shows him following a vigorous self-defense, 
                                                 
217 Life, I, 298.   
218 For Boswell’s comment on Johnson’s constitutional melancholy, see Life, I, 298. “Johnson surely 
exaggerated his ‘gloom of solitude’ and indifference to censure or praise,” Lipking, Samuel Johnson: The 
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as well as an account of personal hardships, with the kind of “philosophical mind” he had 
earlier recommended to the public in his “Life of Savage.”219 Thus the conclusion 
continues Johnson’s display of his attempts to tread the kind of dignified, virtuous middle 
path he so often  recommends to writers in the essays—between hope and fear, between 
presumption and despondency. Johnson is writing a book for the marketplace, but refuses 
to appear too crassly concerned with the reception of his work. Johnson’s “frigid 
tranquillity” bespeaks a man who is not presenting himself with the warmth of self-
interested passion, but who is struggling to control that passion. Johnson here applies the 
“lenitives of passion” as Mr. Rambler does when “lightly touched with the symptoms of 
the writer’s malady,” an “anticipation of happiness” (Rambler 2, III, 12). There Mr. 
Rambler endeavored “to fortify myself against the infection, not without some weak 
hope, that my preservatives may extend their virtue to others, whose employment exposes 
them to the same danger” (Rambler 2, III, 12). Johnson’s memorable phrase, “frigid 
tranquillity,” combined with his description of his condition in the “gloom of solitude,” 
dramatizes his self-control in spite of strong, countervailing passions. Johnson is not only 
counteracting false hope, but preventing the numbing effects of fear and despondency. A 
closer look at Johnson’s use of the terms of this striking phrase, both as defined in the 
Dictionary, and as used in his other writings, will help show that the semantic tension 
between the elements of this phrase, too, plays a crucial role in the Preface’s grand drama 
of moral struggle and self-control that serves as the basis for Johnson’s virtuous ethos.  
* * * * * * 
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 W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. includes "frigid," and the related words “frigidity” and 
“frigorifick,” among what he terms Johnson’s “philosophic” or “scientific” words in the 
Rambler, that is, Johnson’s often “Latinate, abstract, and sesquipedalean diction”  that 
suggest a “physico-philosophical core” of Johnson’s “moral and psychological 
discourse.”220 Johnson outlines four senses of FRIGID in his Dictionary: “1. Cold; 
without warmth. In this sense it is seldom used but in science. 2. Without warmth of 
affection. 3. Impotent; without warmth of body. 4. Dull; without fire of fancy.” And 
Johnson describes “FRIGORIFICK, adj. Causing cold,” as “A word used in science.” 
Johnson warns, throughout his essays, against various mental states producing a 
“frigorifick” effect on mental and physical activity and, hence, both social efficacy and 
piety. To the author who wearies near the end of a production, Johnson argues, “Against 
the instillations of this frigid opiate, the heart should be surely secured by all the 
considerations which once concurred to kindle the ardour of enterprise” (Rambler 207, V, 
313). Thus Johnson, or at least Mr. Rambler, warns against the “fatal influence of 
frigorifick wisdom,” whereby “timorous prudence” is “inculcated, till courage and 
enterprize are wholly repressed, and the mind congealed in perpetual inactivity” 
(Rambler 129, IV, 322). The essays also contain several warnings against “frigorifick” 
influences, which, like “indolence,” in which “curiosity may be . . . congealed” (Rambler 
118, IV, 268). A “frigorifick torpor encroaches upon” the veins of the dying Nouradin in 
Rambler 120 (IV, 277), and Mr. Rambler notes that “we every day see the progress of life 
retarded by the vis inertiae, the mere repugnance to motion” that is found among “those 
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that suffer themselves to freeze in idleness” (Rambler 134, IV, 347). “It may indeed 
happen that knowledge and virtue remain too long congealed” by the “frigorifick power” 
of “diffidence,” as “the principles of vegetation are sometimes obstructed by lingering 
frosts” (Rambler 159, V, 82). “Torpid despondency” is an “error” to be avoided—it is the 
“frost of the soul which binds up all its powers, and congeals life in perpetual sterility” 
(Adventurer 81, II, 401). Mr. Rambler recommends that when one who has “learned the 
art of regaling his mind with ...airy gratifications” finds the “frigid and narcotick 
infection beginning to seize him, should turn his whole attention against it, and check it at 
the first discovery by proper counteraction” (Rambler 89, IV, 107).  
 Johnson also contemplated in his essays how one might achieve tranquility, and 
often prayed for it in his recorded prayers. In Rambler 6 Mr. Rambler writes,  
[W]e may very properly enquire, . . . how far we can exempt ourselves from 
outward influences, and secure to our minds a state of tranquillity: For, though the 
boast of absolute independence is ridiculous and vain, yet a mean flexibility to 
every impulse, and a patient submission to the tyranny of casual troubles, is below 
the dignity of that mind, which, however depraved or weakened, boasts its 
derivation from a celestial original, and hopes for a union with infinite goodness, 
and unvariable felicity. (Rambler 6, III, 31) 
  
In Rambler 41, readers are told, “If fear breaks in on one side, and alarms us with dangers 
and disappointments, we can call in hope on the other, to solace us with rewards, and 
escapes, and victories; so that we are seldom without means of palliating remote evils, 
and can generally sooth ourselves to tranquillity, whenever any troublesome presage 
happens to attack us” (Rambler 41, III, 224). In Rambler 47, Mr. Rambler examines 
various reputed paths to tranquility. Some suggest that we “keep our minds always 
suspended in such indifference, that we may change the objects about us without 
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emotion. An exact compliance with this rule might, perhaps, contribute to tranquillity, but 
surely it would never produce happiness” (Rambler 47, III, 256). Others “recommend 
rather to sooth it into tranquillity, by making it acquainted with miseries more dreadful 
and afflictive” (Rambler 47, III, 257). In giving advice against “inordinate desires,” 
Johnson writes as the Adventurer that an “ardent wish, whatever be its object, will always 
be able to interrupt tranquillity” (Adventurer 119, II, 465). “[T]o sooth the mind to 
tranquillity by hope, even when that hope is likely to deceive us, may be sometimes 
useful; but to lull our faculties in a lethargy, is poor and despicable” (Adventurer 69, II, 
394). In Rambler 184, Johnson writes, “In this state of universal uncertainty, where a 
thousand dangers hover about us, . . . nothing can afford any rational tranquillity, but the 
conviction that, however we amuse ourselves with unideal sounds, nothing in reality is 
governed by chance” (Rambler 184, V, 205).  
In his recorded prayers Johnson often seeks divine aid for “tranquillity of 
thought.” He prays for help in discharging the “duties of my calling with tranquillity and 
constancy.” He asks God to “permit me when the last year of my life shall come, to leave 
the world in holiness and tranquility.” On his birthday in 1769, Johnson hopes to “survey 
my life with tranquility.” Two birthdays later he hopes that his remaining days “may pass 
in reasonable confidence, and holy tranquility.” He asks God to “preserve me from the 
dangers of sinful presumption. Give me, if it be best for me, stability of purposes, and 
tranquillity of mind.”221  
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Johnson’s definition of tranquillity (“Quiet; peace of mind; peace of condition; 
freedom from perturbation”) suggests that tranquillity was a significant topos of 
Johnson’s moral reflections, even when he uses other language. Johnson asks for help in 
calming his “inquietude”; prays for God to “restore ease to my body, and quiet to my 
thoughts.” On Easter Day, 1771, Johnson writes, “O God, invigorate my understanding, 
compose my perturbations, recal my wanderings, and calm my thoughts.” Johnson prays 
that God will “appease the tumults of my Mind.” Likewise, Johnson’s Easter prayer of 
1775 asks for relief from “the infirmities of my body, and the perturbations of my mind.” 
The following Easter he writes that “in part of my life [I] have been almost compelled by 
morbid melancholy and disturbance of mind.” In asking God to “look with mercy upon 
my studies and endeavours,” Johnson asks to be afforded “calmness of mind, and 
steadiness of purpose, that I may so do thy will in this short life, as to obtain happiness in 
the world to come.”222 Johnson’s pursuit of tranquillity is not only part of his own quest 
for mental and spiritual repose, but necessary to help him achieve his own sense of 
Christian duty. That pursuit of tranquillity, or “freedom from perturbation,” was also part 
of the discourse of classical moral philosophy. Cicero, in his De Officiis, recommends 
that “we must keep ourselves free from every disturbing emotion (animi perturbatione), 
not only from desire and fear, but also from excessive pain and pleasure, and from anger, 
so that we may enjoy that calm of soul (tranquillitas animi) and freedom from care which 
bring both moral stability and dignity of character.”223 
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 Against this background of Johnson’s use of the terms, we can read Johnson’s 
“frigid tranquillity” as a phrase that dramatizes his attempts to achieve a golden mean, as 
does the phrase “defensive pride.” Johnson’s dismissal of his work with “frigid 
tranquility” is a final display of moral struggle that exhibits Johnson’s efforts to shake off 
despondency. Johnson the enkrates closes the Preface in a state of philosophical calm, 
however tenuous. The phrase performs, in the tension between modifier and modified, 
the moral struggle that Johnson so closely connects with his intellectual struggles. If 
Johnson’s tranquillity here is, as his Dictionary definition suggests, a kind of “peace of 
condition” into which he has soothed himself, the modifier he chooses qualifies that 
tranquility, helping to distinguish his self-satisfaction from vanity. But if that tranquility 
is a “freedom from perturbation,” its frigidity not only suggests that Johnson is 
counteracting the warmth of self-interested passion, but that his tranquility is the result of 
Johnson’s resisting of the “fatal influence of frigorifick wisdom,” which, if unchecked, 
leaves the mind “congealed in perpetual inactivity” (Rambler 129, IV, 322).  
It is arguable that Johnson chose the noun “tranquillity” to palliate his gloom as 
he prepared for the publication of a work so consequential to his literary reputation and 
legacy. Johnson’s “gloom of solitude” in the Preface is in keeping with the tone of a letter 
Johnson wrote to Thomas Warton, who was working to secure Johnson’s honorary M. A. 
from Oxford. The letter is postmarked weeks after the second of Chesterfield’s public 
puffs of the Dictionary, which as Sledd and Kolb have pointed out, “placed [Johnson] in 
an intolerably false position,” since he “was soon to declare in a Preface perhaps already 
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composed, that his great work had been written without the ‘patronage of the great.’”224 
Johnson still was unsure about the status of his potential M. A. “I have mentioned it to 
none of my friends for fear of being laughed at for my disappointment.” And reflecting, 
just days before Christmas, upon his wife’s death over two years earlier, Johnson wrote, 
“I have ever since seemed to myself broken off from mankind a kind of solitary wanderer 
in the wild of life, without any certain direction, or fixed point of view. A gloomy gazer 
on a World to which I have little relation. Yet I would endeavour by the help of you and 
your brother to supply the want of closer union by friendship.”225
Whatever the state of Johnson’s mind when he wrote the Preface, its conclusion is 
consistent with Johnson’s ethos of moral self-regulation, and projects the kind of 
tranquilitas animi and dignitas recommended by Cicero; and the tension in the phrase 
“frigid tranquillity” itself performs for the reader an act of moral self-regulation. In this 
phrase Johnson again displays not the strenuous efforts of the agonistes but the moral 
struggles of the enkrates and the temperament of a philosophical mind. Though “frigid,” 
grammatically speaking, modifies “tranquillity,” each word rhetorically counterbalances 
the other, and together the words portray Johnson’s effort to calm the perturbations of his 
mind, to achieve a philosophical quietude amid professedly gloomy solitude. It is this 
balancing act that prevents Johnson’s self-vindication from veering into pride or 
indecorous self-love, and his frigidity from becoming torpid despondency. Johnson’s 
practice here and throughout the text of such rhetorical and moral counterbalancing helps 
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translate a potentially vain and morally awkward self-panegyric, the Preface, into an 
exemplum of virtue and nobility.  
 The Ramblers suggest the ways Johnson might turn his personal labors into an 
exemplum, and in the Preface, as in the Ramblers, “Johnson becomes a representative of 
mankind (rather than a flawless norm) whose individual struggle can easily be 
generalized, whose personal identity is transmuted into parable,” as Richard B. Schwartz 
has put it.226 Johnson thus takes awkward rhetorical circumstances, the practical need to 
defend his work and avoid the charge of transparently vain self-interest. Johnson takes 
the awkward need to serve as his own panegyrist and makes the best of it, making a 
virtue of a necessity. In his “Life of Savage” Johnson wrote that “It were doubtless to be 
wished. . . that men would secure themselves from being disappointed in their endeavours 
after happiness, by placing it only in virtue, which is always to be obtained.”227 In the 
Preface, Johnson reposes his happiness in his attempts to maintain a virtuous path. 
Johnson humbly resigns himself to the power and judgment of Providence, as he had 
recommended throughout the Ramblers. Taken together, Johnson’s heroic depictions of 
his encounters with his own convey the picture of a man whose reason and experience 
lead him to pious humility, but not before he has tested the limits of his abilities and 
industry.  
Johnson’s “performance” in the Preface, to use the 18th-century term, is a self-
vindication for his contemporaries and posterity, and at the same time, it is a kind of text-
act, an act of pietas in which Johnson justifies his ways to God. While Johnson’s 
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continual gestures of self-defense and self-praise make it clear that he did care about the 
reception of his work, he makes his struggle to maintain a virtuous path, rather than any 
particular accomplishments, the ultimate criterion for judging his work on the Dictionary. 
Thus in the Preface Johnson models what he described in Rambler 146 as the “utmost 
excellence at which humanity can arrive”—a “constant and determinate pursuit of virtue, 
without regard to present dangers or advantage; a continual reference of every action to 
the divine will; an habitual appeal to everlasting justice; and an unvaried elevation of the 
intellectual eye to the reward which perseverance only can obtain” (Rambler 185, V, 
209). Johnson, like others engaged in “the labours of learning” may be “disappointed in 
[his] labours,” yet “their example contributed to inspire emulation, and their miscarriages 
taught others the way to success” (Rambler 180, V, 183-84). Crafting his ethos in 
awkward rhetorical circumstances, Johnson models virtuous intellectual labor in the 
Preface just as he models ethical ratiocination in the Ramblers. And though Johnson’s 
encomiums to himself in the Preface, and his preoccupation with literary fame in the 
Ramblers suggest his wish that the Dictionary would be well received, he had written in 
Rambler 49 that fame is  
to be accepted as the only recompence which mortals can bestow on virtue; to be 
accepted with complacence, but not sought with eagerness. Simply to be 
remembered is no advantage; it is a privilege which satire as well as panegyric 
can confer. . . . The true satisfaction which is to be drawn from the consciousness 
that we shall share the attention of future times, must arise from the hope, that, 
with our name, our virtues will be propagated; and that those whom we cannot 
benefit in our lives, may receive instruction from our examples, and incitement 
from our renown (Rambler 49, III, 267-68).  
 
 Johnson closes his Preface by declaring “success and miscarriage” to be “empty 
sounds,” and himself “having little to fear or hope from censure or praise” (Preface, para. 
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94), but only after he has eloquently defended his work. Johnson thus closes an at least 
pragmatically motivated and functioning paratext with a contemptus mundi gesture. 
Johnson’s Preface performs a double duty; it presents a spirited, proleptic self-defense, 
and it serves itself as an act of virtue—of pride tempered by humility, of self-control 
sometimes relaxed for laudable reasons, and it contains a philosophical disregard for, or 
lack of dependance on, the views of others for happiness.  
Johnson’s dismissal of praise and censure also is in keeping with advice he had 
given in the essays. As Mr. Rambler, Johnson frequently advised against having too 
much concern with praise or censure, despite their powerful influence. In Rambler 193, 
Mr. Rambler observes the powerful influence of the desire for praise, writing that it “is so 
pleasing to the mind of man, that it is the original motive of almost all our actions. . . . 
[N]one, however mean, ever sinks below the hope of being distinguished by his fellow-
beings, and very few have, by magnanimity or piety, been so raised above it, as to act 
wholly without regard to censure or opinion” (Rambler 193, V, 244). Yet Mr. Rambler, 
in various ways, seems eager to convince his readers, and perhaps himself, that 
“[a]pplause and admiration are by no means to be counted among the necessaries of life” 
(Rambler 20, III, 114).  In Rambler 23, Mr. Rambler notes “one of the first precepts of 
moral prudence”—that “every man should regulate his actions by his own conscience, 
without any regard to the opinions of the rest of the world. . . .[I]f we make the praise or 
blame of others the rule of our conduct, we shall be distracted by a boundless variety of 
irreconcileable judgments, be held in perpetual suspense between contrary impulses, and 
consult forever without determination” (Rambler 23, III, 126). Mr. Rambler concludes 
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Rambler 106 by noting, “he that extends his hope to higher rewards” will not “be so 
much anxious to obtain praise, as to discharge the duty which Providence assigns him” 
(Rambler 106, IV, 204). In order that “we may not languish in our endeavours after 
excellence, it is necessary that . . . ‘we raise our eyes to higher prospects, and 
contemplate our future and eternal state, without giving up our hearts to the praise of 
crouds, or fixing our hopes on such rewards as human power can bestow’” (Rambler 118, 
IV, 269). Likewise, in Rambler 127:  
He that never extends his view beyond the praises or rewards of men, will be 
dejected by neglect and envy, or infatuated by honours and applause. But the 
consideration that life is only deposited in his hands to be employed in obedience 
to a Master who will regard his endeavours, not his success, would have 
preserved him from trivial elations and discouragements, and enabled him to 
proceed with constancy and chearfulness, neither enervated by commendation, 
nor intimidated by censure” (Rambler 127, IV, 315).  
 
Mr. Rambler writes in Rambler 196 that experience teaches one that “what he does, 
whether good or bad, soon gives way to new objects of regard. He then easily sets 
himself free from the anxieties of reputation, and considers praise or censure as a 
transient breath, which, while he hears it, is passing away, without any lasting mischief or 
advantage” (Rambler 196, V, 261). In Rambler 203, Mr. Rambler writes, “Whether to be 
remembered in remote times be worthy of a wise man’s wish, has not yet been 
satisfactorily decided, and indeed, to be long remembered, can happen to so small a 
number, that the bulk of mankind has very little interest in the question” (Rambler 203, 
V, 295). And in the final Rambler, Johnson concluded that the “essays professedly 
serious, if I have been able to execute my own intentions, will be found exactly 
conformable to the precepts of Christianity, without any accommodation to the 
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licentiousness and levity of the present age. I therefore look back on this part of my work 
with pleasure, which no blame or praise of man shall diminish or augment” (Rambler 
208, V, 320). Johnson’s persistent preoccupation in the Ramblers with the desire for, and 
elusiveness of, literary fame suggests rather unsurprisingly that he did hope for a good 
reception, but at the end of the Preface, Johnson dramatizes his struggle to maintain the 
kind of “philosophical mind” that he modeled in the Ramblers, and that he described in 
his “Life of Savage”—a mind with which one might “alleviate the loss or want of fortune 
or reputation, or any other disadvantage which it is not in man’s power to bestow upon 
himself”—a frame of mind “very properly proposed to the imitation of multitudes  
who. . . languish under afflictions which might be easily removed.”228 Having dramatized 
his intellectual labors as moral struggles, Johnson displays to the public “the spirit of a 
man that has endeavoured well” (Preface, para. 93), and is willing to disregard the 
opinion of the public in favor of “a Master who will regard his endeavours, not his 
success” (Rambler 127, IV, 315).  
* * * * * * 
 Boswell praised Johnson’s Dictionary as a work “of much greater mental labour 
than mere Lexicons,” a view Johnson helped create as much with his performance in the 
Preface as he did in the body of his large work.229 In the process of developing lines of 
defense for himself, Johnson developed arguments that would help dignify the work of 
detailed intellectual labor, even when it was generally misunderstood by the wider public. 
Johnson, in perhaps unwitting attempts at self-defense in the essays, defended and 
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encouraged scholarly endeavour, industry, and perseverance, and he discourages undue 
censure on those whose activities have been ridiculed popularly via longstanding 
stereotypes of the virtuoso and the pedant. As he later does in his Preface to Shakespeare 
(“Let us now be told no more of the dull duty of an editor.”), Johnson in the Dictionary 
Preface characterizes his labor as a duty and not dull.230 For Johnson, it is the frigid 
man—lost in the maze of indolence, and whose inactivity renders him socially useless 
and a careless steward of divine gifts—who serves as the most consistent object of 
disapproval rather than the dull man, whose zeal for trifles consumes him. Johnson 
romanticizes intellectual labor and his essays, in contradistinction to Locke’s Essay and 
Bacon’s Novum Organum, does not lay out a rigorous epistemology or outline a method 
for scientific discovery, but among other things, explores at the level of human passions 
and appetites, impediments to the advancement of learning—the personal challenges 
facing one who attempts to carry out the New Science “advancement of learning” 
program. The essays offer a personal and social Christian ethic of virtuous endeavor, 
which Johnson then tries to model in the Preface. In the process of preemptively 
defending his own labors Johnson developed a new ethos to replace the dull scholar and 
virtuoso.  
For Johnson, the drudgery of labor was a necessary complement to a 
comprehensive view. Such labor would provide data often disregarded by “those arrogant 
philosophers who are too easily disgusted with the slow methods of obtaining true 
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notions by frequent experiments; and who, possessed with too high an opinion of their 
own abilities, rather choose to consult their own imaginations, than inquire into nature, 
and are better pleased with the delightful amusement of forming hypotheses, than the 
toilsome drudgery of amassing observations.”231 Johnson condones a system of 
intellectual labor in which there is an appropriate and valued place for systematizers and 
for drudges, and in which critical discussions were engaged in a tone not of malevolence, 
but of moderation. “[S]omething may be properly attempted by criticism, keeping the 
middle way between presumption and timidity.”232 For Johnson, all have their place in 
the ‘general system of life.’ Johnson rewrites the poring antiquarian as a man whose 
faults are his own and whose potential benefits are all of ours. Johnson’s rewriting is a 
palimpsest, not an erasure, of the previous type. Johnson’s satire of these virtuosos is not 
failed, but a conscious part of Johnson’s ethic in the essays.  
IV. The Rhetoric of the Preface and Johnson’s Views on Language 
 One consequence of this study is that it confirms what others have claimed: 
Johnson’s practice in the Dictionary at times belies his pronouncements in the Preface. 
Even further, and more importantly, it suggests that we should not read Johnson’s Preface 
to the Dictionary for evidence of Johnson’s linguistic views without comparing his 
comments in the Preface to his actual practices in the Dictionary and recognizing the 
rhetorical nature of the Preface as a document of public self-fashioning written at a 
crucial moment in Johnson’s career. Johnson’s dramatic portrayal of his own labors is 
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partly made possible by his dramatic portrait of language as an evanescent and imposing 
force of nature whose “causes of change” are “perhaps as much superiour to human 
resistance, as the revolutions of the sky, or the intumescence of the tide.” Johnson 
portrays language in the Preface as a “boundless chaos of a living speech” where “words 
are hourly shifting their relations”; “fugitive cant . . . is always in a state of increase or 
decay”; “sounds are too volatile and subtile for legal restraints”; “time and chance,” 
“mutability,”and “a natural tendency to degeneration” have “hitherto been suffered to” 
change the language “without opposition.” It should not be forgotten that the depiction of 
language we get in the Preface is in the context of a vigorous self-defense, offered to the 
“republic of letters” in a self-promotional paratext. In Johnson’s drama of virtuous moral 
struggle, his efforts are more likely to be lauded, his shortcomings more likely to be 
forgiven, and his labor more likely to be appreciated, by an audience who understands the 
difficulties of fixing the language.233  
In this preemptive self-defense against carping critics, Johnson serves as his own 
advocate, and by portraying language as an intractable force of nature he engages in what 
Rome’s most famous advocate calls remotio criminis, a “removal of the charge” or 
shifting of blame from himself whereby the advocate diverts the accusation or 
responsibility for an act to another person or thing.234 Johnson’s dramatic depiction of 
language is part of his self-defense against critics eager to charge him with failing at his 
task. By depicting language variety as a “maze of variation” through which he had to 
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travel even to “the brink of utter inanity”as he tried to “trace” meaning, Johnson makes it 
more difficult to blame him for not conquering one of the “insurmountable distresses of 
humanity” (para. 91), or fault him for failing to “change sublunary nature” and thereby 
“embalm his language,” securing it “from corruption and decay” (para. 84). Such 
dramatic language draws attention in almost any discussion of the Preface or the 
Dictionary, but this hyperbolically charged language gets its charge in part from 
Johnson’s self-defensive posture, and is part of his rhetorical strategy of self-fashioning.  
 Even Johnson’s famous rallying cry, “we have long preserved our constitution, let 
us make some struggles for our language,” along with other signs that his project is 
zealously nationalistic, can be read as a crucial element in his strategy of self-defense. 
Johnson’s exhortation comes on the heels of his complaint that “the license of 
translatours, . . . if it be suffered to proceed will reduce us to babble a dialect of France,” 
and precedes his dedication of the Dictionary to “the honour of my country, that we may 
no longer yield the palm of philology, without a contest, to the nations of the continent.” 
Taken together, these passages display most nakedly the kind of anxious nationalistic 
ambition that helped underwrite, along with a coterie of booksellers, Johnson’s 
undertaking. It is just such passages that urge readers to conflate Johnson’s views on 
language with his presumed views on politics.235  
Yet these passages, too, derive part of their strident tone from Johnson’s defensive 
posture. The complaint against the “licence of translatours” concludes Johnson’s fifth of 
five paragraphs on the “causes of change” in language. The “licence of translatours,” 
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whose translations are figured as the “great pest of speech,” is only one of many things 
with which “speech” (and thus, by extension Johnson) has to contend. As Johnson 
ratchets up the patriotism, it is easy to forget the fact that he is, at the very same time, 
moving from a section describing obstacles to his mission (i.e., the many causes of 
“alteration” in language) to a passage in which he effectively absolves himself from the 
responsibility for fixing the language. After describing all of the reasons he could not 
fulfill his charge, he moves from what he could not do to what others should do, and to 
what “we” (not just I) should do. Johnson hopes that “the spirit of English liberty will 
hinder or destroy” an “academy for the cultivation of our stile,” should it be established. 
At the same time, however, he abdicates responsibility for doing anything to stop the 
“great pest of speech,” exhorting his readers to “let them” (the members of the 
hypothetical academy) “endeavour, with all their influence, to stop the license of 
translatours.”  This exhortation not only serves as a kind of challenge—“let them” with 
“all their influence” try to succeed where I have failed, where the “vigilance and activity” 
of previous academies “have been in vain” (para. 85). But it also serves as a kind of 
release from responsibility: “let them,” not me, stop the abuses of translators. Johnson’s 
personal failure to fix the language here becomes the success of “the spirit of English 
liberty,” and becomes the fault of, among many other things, the “licence,” “idleness,” 
and “ignorance” of translators (para. 90). In closing a section on causes of change about 
which he could do little, Johnson emerges as the champion of “English liberty” in 
contrast to translators who corrupt the spirit of the language.  
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 Having expressed his hope that “the spirit of English liberty” would “hinder or 
destroy” an English-language academy, Johnson takes one step further toward absolving 
himself from the responsibility of fixing the language, this time not urging “them” (an 
English academy) to take up the responsibility, but rather transferring the responsibility 
to his English readers (para. 90). At this point, he effectively ends his term of service to 
the country. The text, so suffused with the first person singular, so replete with reminders 
of what “I” have done for “the honour of my country,” shifts to what “we” should do. In 
this rare moment of rhetorical solidarity of purpose with his readers, Johnson implicitly 
converts his presumed responsibility for preserving and protecting the language from a 
matter of personal to collective responsibility: “[W]e have long preserved our 
constitution, let us make some struggles for our language” (para. 91). The patriotic fervor 
of this passage, taken along side his Francophobic language and his devotion to the 
“honour of my country”—the very language that helped establish the Dictionary as an 
icon of Englishness—now comes across, in the most unsympathetic analysis, as crude, 
John Bull jingoism, and urges readers to conflate Johnson’s views on language with his 
presumed views on politics.   
Yet Johnson’s high-flown exhortation here, again, shifts the responsibility from 
him to “us”: “let us make some struggles for our language” (it is not simply my 
responsibility, nor, given the circumstances of language change I have outlined, could 
anyone expect to burden one individual with such a responsibility). The causes of 
language change, described abundantly with rhetorical copia, are likened to “other 
insurmountable distresses of humanity,” and require the kind of collective action, and 
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collective sense of responsibility, needed to maintain “tongues,” “governments,” or any 
other entity supposedly constituted for the common good. As Johnson rallies the crowd 
with patriotism, every cheering patriot, wittingly or not, accepts responsibility for the 
state of the language, consenting by acclamation to relieve Johnson of the “duty of the 
lexicographer” (para. 6). At this point, Johnson’s official term of service and duty ends 
with acknowledgment of his limitations and obstacles, but the thunder of patriotic 
applause obscures this fact.  
By pointing out the reasons for Johnson’s high-flown rhetoric, I do not suggest 
that his patriotism or his depictions of language are somehow disingenuous or that they 
seriously distort his attitudes toward, or views on, language. But Johnson’s patriotism in 
the Preface is generally taken to reflect his work in the Dictionary rather than to 
represent it. This tendency makes sense; Johnson wrote the Preface; who would know 
better the contents of the Dictionary or the goals of the lexicographer? Yet our 
understanding of Johnson’s approach to language study or his ‘theories’ on language is 
strongly shaped by the rhetorically charged Preface, which is consulted more frequently 
than the Dictionary itself, and generally with little notice of the possibility that his 
depiction of language, of his aims or goals, might function as an element of the striking 
self-fashioning that pervades the Preface.  
The many causes of linguistic change, the intractability and exuberance of the 
language, the lexicographer’s service to the country, Johnson’s “labor of years” in a 
“task, which Scaliger compares to the labours of the anvil and the mine” (paras. 92, 
93)—all of these elements of the Preface contribute to the brilliance and the high drama 
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of what amounts to a scholar’s highly consequential public oration before the republic of 
letters and posterity. Donald Siebert’s study of “low, bad” words in the Dictionary and 
Thomas Gilmore’s study of how Johnson treats Gallicisms indicate that Johnson’s 
prescriptive rhetoric is misleading, given evidence from the Dictionary.236 Gwin and 
Ruth Kolb have shown that Johnson was, by contrast, remarkably accurate in describing 
his tendencies when truncating quotations for inclusion as illustrative quotations.237 On 
matters pertaining more directly to the presumed “duty of the lexicographer,” however, 
Johnson seems to employ more attention to presenting his lexicographic choices in a 
favorable light. This chapter study offers the first argument attempting to outline the 
various reasons why the rhetoric of the Preface might differ from Johnson’s actual 
practices in the Dictionary. More empirically based studies of the Dictionary’s contents, 
and more awareness of the Preface’s rhetorical nature will help balance out the 
understandable yet inordinate weight given to the Preface when considering Johnson’s 












                                                 
236 Donald T. Siebert, “Bubbled, Bamboozled, and Bit: “Low Bad” Words in Johnson’s Dictionary,” SEL 26 
(1986): 485-96; Thomas B. Gilmore, Jr., “Johnson’s Attitudes toward French Influence on the English 
Language,” Modern Philology 78 (1981): 243-60.  
237 Gwin J. and Ruth A. Kolb, “The Selection and Use of the Illustrative Quotations in Dr. Johnson’s 
Dictionary,” in New Aspects of Lexicography, ed. Howard D. Weinbrot, 61-72.  
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Chapter 2, Recovering the “Rigour of Interpretative Lexicography”: or, How to  
       Read Johnson’s Dictionary  
 
I. Introduction 
Mr. Elphinston talked of a new book that was much admired, and asked Dr. Johnson if he had read it. 
JOHNSON. ‘I have looked into it.’ ‘What, (said Elphinston,) have you not read it through?’ Johnson, 
offended at being thus pressed, and so obliged to own his cursory mode of reading, answered tartly, ‘No, 
Sir, do you read books through?’    —Boswell’s Life of Johnson.238  
 
Even those of us who read books through can only say that we have looked into 
Johnson’s Dictionary, if we can even say that. Johnson’s Dictionary, next to no one reads 
a dictionary through. Robert Browning, according to an early account, “qualified” 
himself for a literary profession by “reading and digesting the whole of Johnson’s 
Dictionary.”239 Eighteenth-century Scottish historian William Robertson, according to 
Johnson’s friend John Hawkins, told Johnson that “he had fairly perused his Dictionary 
twice over.”240 But more often than not, the Dictionary is known by means of its preface 
rather than the text itself. This is not only because of the wide availability of the Preface 
and our limited access to the Dictionary; it also stems from the nature of the text. Yet we 
certainly perform readings of the Dictionary, though necessarily on the basis of quite 
limited evidence. Three scholars who have studied the Dictionary as closely as anyone—
Allen Reddick, Anne McDermott, and Robert DeMaria, Jr.—handle the hermeneutical 
challenge of interpreting the Dictionary in different ways, but they all insist on treating 
the Dictionary as a “literary text.” DeMaria’s Dictionary is a New-Critical kind of unified 
text with moral “themes;” McDermott, writing with Marcus Walsh, posits an atomistic 
                                                 
238 Life, II, 226. 
239 Mrs. Sutherland Orr, Life and Letters of Robert Browning, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 
1891), I, 75.   
240 Sir John Hawkins, Knt. The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. ed. Bertram H. Davis (New York: 
Macmillan, 1961), 142.  
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view of the text in which entries are “discrete elements with no cohesive ties between 
them.”241 Allen Reddick acknowledges that the discontinuous nature of a dictionary 
places constraints on one’s ability to sustain any polemic by means of disconnected 
quotations across hundreds of pages, but he remains committed to reading the Dictionary 
as rhetorical or literary discourse, suggesting that Johnson “could, however, develop a 
persistent rhetoric” at the level of the entry.242 The main drawback to analyzing the 
Dictionary as a literary text in these ways, however, is that doing so obscures the 
qualities that make it distinctive as a dictionary. If DeMaria and Reddick, by finding 
themes or a unified polemic in the Dictionary, go too far in the direction of finding 
unities, McDermott and Walsh go too far in the other direction by isolating entries that 
are by necessity and by Johnson’s design often interconnected.  
If we view the Dictionary as a text of linguistic inquiry, rather than a literary one, 
we need not posit an organically unified Dictionary nor consider entries as isolated 
islands of text. In fact, the Dictionary can be read as a richly interconnected hypertext, 
with many entries in the Dictionary being related by loose networks of explicit and 
implicit cross-references. In teasing out these connections among entries, we pursue paths 
that Johnson invites readers to follow. Johnson’s own comments in the Plan and Preface 
on how to read his own work suggest that he built such connections into the Dictionary, 
                                                 
241 Robert DeMaria, Jr., “Johnson’s Dictionary,” The Cambridge Companion to Samuel Johnson, ed. Greg 
Clingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 85-101; Anne McDermott and Marcus Walsh, 
“Editing Johnson’s Dictionary: Some Editorial and Textual Considerations,” in The Theory and Practice of 
Text-Editing: Essays in Honour of James T. Boulton, Ian Small and Marcus Walsh, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49. DeMaria, Jr. explains the rationale for, and approach to, reading 
themes in the Dictionary in his “Preface” to Johnson’s Dictionary and the Language of Learning (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). 
242 Allen Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary 1746-1773 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 164. See also Allen Reddick, “Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language and its Texts: 
Quotation, Context, Anti-Thematics,” Yearbook of English Studies 28 (1998): 66-76. 
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expecting readers to use them to make judgments of their own about meaning and usage 
where he could not be conclusive. In addition to noting these links among entries, we 
should perform parallel readings of Johnson’s comments on words (e.g., “a corruption,” 
“retained in Scotland”). Thus Johnson’s controversial comments on Scots words, for 
instance, should be read against one another in order determine their nature and intent, 
which is in dispute. Such parallel readings, unlike hypertextual readings, are only 
possible after careful scholarly research, but the existence of a searchable CD-ROM 
version of the Dictionary facilitates such research. These readings, taken together, reveal 
the logic of Johnson’s philological reasoning. When we read across the entries as I 
suggest, we begin to see how Johnson uses data from one entry to inform his judgments 
in another. Thus we find Johnson teasing out patterns that are not so much morally 
didactic or polemical, as one might expect from Reddick or DeMaria’s accounts of the 
Dictionary, but philological or even proto-linguistic, having to do with textual analysis, 
sound change, and patterns of word-formation and derivation.  
If these connections across the body of the Dictionary illuminate the logic of 
Johnson’s philology, so do the connections among elements within individual entries. A 
summary of the standard assessment of Johnson’s Dictionary might say that the usage 
notes are prescriptive and capricious, the definitions are brilliant if at times absurdly 
Latinate, and the etymologies are often, to use Macaulay’s term, “wretched.” Many 
assessors of Johnson’s achievements in the Dictionary have compartmentalized the 
various elements of his entries in this way to assess them. For Boswell, the “etymologies, 
though they exhibit learning and judgment, are not, I think, entitled to the first praise 
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amongst the various parts of this immense work. The definitions,” by contrast, “have 
always appeared to me such astonishing proofs of acuteness of intellect and precision of 
language, as indicate a genius of the highest rank.”243 John Walker, late eighteenth-
century elocutionist (orthoepist) and lexicographer, also compartmentalizes Johnson’s 
entries in the Preface to his own dictionary, writing, 
This great man troubled himself little about pronunciation, he seems to have cared 
little for etymologies; and even grammatical disquisitions seem not to have been 
his favourite study; but when words were to be precisely defined, when the 
boundaries of their significations were to be fixed, and their most delicate shades 
of meaning to be distinguished and exemplified; this task, so difficult to the 
strongest mind, seemed to present him with an operation worthy of his powers: in 
this Labour he was, indeed, a literary Hercules.244   
 
It certainly makes sense to see Johnson’s writing of definitions, etymologies, and usage 
notes as discrete acts—they do represent different activities and skills. But by 
compartmentalizing elements of the Dictionary in this way, scholars confine themselves 
by borders Johnson routinely ignores. As a result, they facilitate significant misreadings 
of the Dictionary and obscure the particular character of Johnson’s philology in the 
Dictionary.  
If we are to understand Johnson’s philology on his own terms, these components 
of entries in the Dictionary can more fruitfully be viewed as complementary interpretive 
activities, elements of what I call Johnson’s lexicographic-hermeneutic triangle: 
etymology, meaning, and usage. To clarify the connections among elements of the entry, 
and thereby understand the character and logic of Johnson’s philology in the Dictionary, I 
propose that we remap its entries, viewing them as consisting of textual and metatextual 
                                                 
243 Life, I, 292-93.  
244 In Allen, “Samuel Johnson and the Authoritarian Principle,” 382.  
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elements. The text consists of the default elements of the entry (head word, part of 
speech, definition), and the metatext consists of Johnson’s editorial comments on words, 
moments in the Dictionary where Johnson exerts his voice by commenting on the text.  
By doing so, we can see the extent to which an interplay exists for Johnson among these 
various components of an entry—these closely linked interpretive activities—in 
Johnson’s Dictionary. This kind of interplay is part of what makes Johnson’s Dictionary 
distinctive and what characterizes the nature of his philology. Since Johnson drew most 
of his illustrative quotations from authors who wrote in the “golden age” of English 
literature, between Sidney and Dryden, his skill as an explicator of Shakespearean 
English was crucial to his defining practices. And when interpreting Shakespeare’s 
English, Johnson employed his knowledge (or the knowledge of his six amanuenses, five 
of whom were Scottish) of Germanic cognates, country dialects, and contemporary 
spoken Scots to do the interpretive work crucial to his analysis.245  
* * * * * * 
The tradition of compartmentalizing Johnson’s entries, along with competing 
perspectives on Johnson’s aims in the Dictionary, enables quite contrary readings of both 
his usage notes and the nature of his lexicography. James G. Basker, adducing such notes 
as the one for auld (“A word now obsolete; but still used in the Scotch dialect.”), has 
suggested that “one of several ‘low’ or ‘improper’ categories of words” Johnson 
“systematically attempted to proscribe was Scotticisms. Frequently, he seems to have 
included a Scottish word or usage in his Dictionary not because he thought it valid but 
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simply to single it out and stigmatise it as a Scotticism.”246  But in an earlier article, 
Donald T. Siebert argues that Johnson “did not often practice in the Dictionary what he 
preached in the preface regarding familiar diction,” that he was quite willing to include 
examples of familiar diction in the Dictionary, that the “very presence of these words in 
the Dictionary, whether labeled or unlabeled, . . . confirm[s] that Johnson had no 
intention of expunging these words from the language.”247 From this standpoint, “for 
Johnson to recognize Scotticisms at all is a surprising testimony to his lexicographic 
open-mindedness.”248 Basker applies his sense of Johnson’s aims to the evidence, and 
Siebert infers Johnson’s aims from a reading of Johnson’s practices, but if Johnson’s 
inclusion of Scotticisms is to be viewed as testimony of any kind, it should be done with 
an awareness of the role of this entry component vis-à-vis other elements of the entry, 
and in relation to Johnson’s recurring practices in the Dictionary, which illuminate our 
readings of his practices at any particular point in the text.   
How might recontextualizing Johnson’s editorial comments alter our readings of 
his aims and actions as a lexicographer? One of Basker’s examples shows, for instance, 
how he includes the noun drotchel among the list of Scotticisms he regards as stigmatized 
by Johnson, and lists the entry thus: 
Drotchel. n.s. . . . An idle wretch, a sluggard. In Scottish it is still used.249  
                                                 
246 James G. Basker. “Scotticisms and the Problem of Cultural Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain,” in 
Eighteenth-Century Life 15 (1991): 82. 
247 Donald T. Siebert, “Bubbled, Bamboozled, and Bit “Low Bad” Words in Johnson’s Dictionary,” in SEL 
26 (1986): 487, 489. In the category of “familiar diction” Siebert means to “include those words and 
expressions variously classified as cant, slang, vulgar, as well as the language of current fashion, the 
language Swift had decried as ‘modern Terms of Art,’” 487. 
248 Siebert, “Bubbled, Bamboozled, and Bit,” 496, n. 14. 
249 Basker, “Scotticisms and the Problem of Cultural Identity,” 82.  
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In the context of Basker’s discussion of Scotticisms, it seems reasonable for Basker not to 
distract the reader with an etymology that is perhaps inaccurate, and seemingly irrelevant 
to his point; but by removing the etymology Basker removes a context that significantly 
alters our reading of the comment on Scottish usage. When we view the entry as it 
appears in the Dictionary, Johnson’s comment on Scottish usage takes on a very different 
character:  
            DRO'TCHEL.n.s. [corrupted perhaps from dretchel.   To dretch, 
                   in Chaucer, is to idle, to delay.   Droch, in Frisick, is delay.] 
                   An idle wench; a sluggard. In Scottish it is still used.250
 
As it stands, this entry, unauthorized by any illustrative quotation, could demonstrate 
Siebert’s claim that Johnson was quite willing, notwithstanding his comments in the 
Preface, to include in the Dictionary examples of familiar diction. Yet it could also be 
included because it exercised Johnson’s philological and linguistic curiosity. Having 
noted the property of idleness or sluggishness, Johnson conjectures an unattested earlier 
form of the word, dretchel, and relates it to what appear to be semantically related words 
from Middle English and from Frisian, a language he expressed interest in, years later, to 
Boswell.251 Here the comment on “Scottish” usage can actually be read as the only real 
evidence Johnson provides for the word’s existence, assuming it is not an 
unacknowledged borrowing from previous English dictionaries.252 Moreover, Johnson’s 
                                                 
250 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent quotes from the Dictionary come from the 1773 fourth edition 
folio, the edition Johnson revised himself. Mere additions to the text, when they occur in the fourth edition, 
will be distinguished by being underlined; other alterations to the text will be noted when they occur.  
251 Writing to Boswell, then living in Utrecht, Johnson wrote, “It will be a favour if you can get me any 
books in the Frisick language.” Life, I, 475.  
252 In the Preface, Johnson suggests that unattested words he includes are either “useful,” or known to him 
“to be proper.” Words “which I considered as useful, or know to be proper, though I could not at present 
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philological curiosity, as seen in this entry editorial comments, may have been sparked by 
his conjecture in an earlier entry:  
DREDGE.n.s. [To dretch, in Chaucer, is to delay; perhaps a net so often stopped 
may be called from this.] A kind of net. 
For oysters they have a peculiar dredge; a thick, strong net, fastened to three spills of 
iron, and drawn at the boat’s stern, gathering whatsoever it meeteth lying in the bottom.  
Carew.253  
 
This entry includes the same word from Chaucer, and the etymology includes Johnson’s 
speculation about how this word has changed in sound, spelling, and meaning. His 
conjecture is based on a presumed sound correspondence between “dge” and “tch,” and 
Johnson’s link of the semantic notion of delay or impeded progression that he finds in 
both dretch and dredge.254 When we view Johnson’s comments on words, placed in 
context with the rest of the entry and alongside related entries, we get a fuller sense of 
what Johnson is doing in the Dictionary than we do from the standpoint of Siebert or 
Basker on Johnson’s Scotticisms.  
While this chapter aims to influence our reading of the Dictionary, it should be 
obvious that it is extremely rare for someone to read Johnson’s Dictionary in the most 
accepted sense of the term. It is more realistic to say that we perform readings of the 
Dictionary, or any dictionary, on the basis of quite limited evidence. While generally 
judged and assessed as a coherent text, the Dictionary’s size and relative inaccessibility 
mean, practically speaking, that it is usually interpreted on the basis of the widely 
                                                                                                                                                 
support them by authorities, I have suffered to stand upon my own attestation, claiming the same privilege 
with my predecessors of being sometimes credited without proof” (Preface, para. 41).  
253 Johnson has tightened the text of the quotation for the 1773 fourth edition.   
254 Modern linguists would, of course, convert conventional spellings (tch and dge) to phonetic symbols (č 
and  ĵ ) to indicate sound correspondences. In modern linguistic terms the sound correspondence here 
would be between the voiceless and voiced palatal affricates.  
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anthologized Preface or on a highly circumscribed set of data culled from the imposing 
two-volume folio. Readings of the Dictionary are usually done in piecemeal fashion. 
Those few who now consult it do so as with most dictionaries, for some practical 
purpose, and we usually only encounter very small portions of the whole at any given 
time. So most readings or interpretive understandings of the Dictionary rely on Johnson’s 
Preface, which is as concerned with scholarly self-fashioning as it is with laying out 
methodology. Yet Johnson’s Dictionary—long a symbol of power and authority, long 
seen as indicative of a widespread eighteenth-century approach to language, and one of 
the most significant philological projects of the eighteenth century—is an irresistible 
subject for grand arguments. It has been read as a historically useful reference work; as 
an index of 18th-century approaches to language study; as a work of cultural, classist, and 
linguistic hegemony; as a proud nationalistic achievement; as a thematically integral 
work of didactic or polemic intent; as the reflection of one man’s intellectual 
development; as a redaction of the best accumulated practices up to his day; as a literary 
text; as a thematic encyclopedia; as the metaphor for a political project. Most treatments 
of the Dictionary argue from assumptions about Johnson’s intentions and his practices, 
but it is important to ground these larger claims on the fullest view possible of Johnson’s 
practices in the Dictionary lest our circumscribed views of the Dictionary encourage 
seriously infelicitous readings of Johnson’s lexicography and philology.  
This chapter, like all studies of the Dictionary, must rely on a limited sample of 
the entire text to make generalizations about the whole, but that sample has been chosen 
with an understanding that, as Allen Reddick has shown, Johnson’s Dictionary is “a text 
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in flux, growing and changing, in response to its author’s struggles with the language and 
with the rhetoric of the text itself, from the earliest days of its composition until” its 
revision in “1773 and beyond.”255 Specifically, I have collated Johnson’s comments on 
usage in four letters (B, G, M, S) of the first edition (1755) and the fourth edition (1773), 
the only one revised by Johnson himself. I have also compared Johnson’s comments on 
words even when they fall within the etymological brackets, since Johnson’s 
etymological commentary and his usage notes often overlap in content and in location. 
These comments, taken together, as I argue they should be, constitute what I call 
Johnson’s editorial comments. My sample represents various stages of the Dictionary’s 
preparation, and more than one quarter of the total pages in the Dictionary. 
By reintegrating Johnson’s editorial comments—his usage notes and his 
etymologies—with one another, and by showing how they, in turn, are often integral to 
Johnson’s defining practices, we will view elements of Johnson’s philology that are often 
decontextualized from one another, and see how they are often better understood when 
seen as working together. As a result, we gain a fuller understanding of the nature and 
character of Johnson’s philology, insofar as it can be seen in the Dictionary. These 
comments are crucial to our understanding of the Dictionary because they are so 
conspicuous and have so strongly influenced modern assumptions about Johnson and his 
lexicography. These comments, thus recontextualized, contain some of the best evidence 
we have for understanding Johnson’s philological mind at work. Like nothing else, they 
show Johnson grappling with the complexity of human language, and they give us a 
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sense of what Johnson may have meant in the Preface by the “rigour” of his 
“interpretative lexicography.”256 The heroic drama of Johnson’s strenuous lexicographic 
labors as portrayed in the Preface is enacted, though less dramatically, scene by scene in 
these entries. We will best understand Johnson’s philology, as far as it can be perceived 
in the Dictionary, by following the tracks of the lexicographer through his “fortuitous and 
unguided excursions into books” and “the boundless chaos of a living speech.”257  
II. Johnson’s Editorial Commentary in the Dictionary: Literature Review  
Numerous close studies of Johnson’s Dictionary have deepened our knowledge of 
its contents. Because of the Dictionary’s size and detailed nature, studies of its contents 
by necessity focus on particular elements of the dictionary entries, on Johnson’s 
treatment of particular words, or on Johnson’s treatment of particular authors. Sledd and 
Kolb outlined Johnson’s extensive debts to his predecessors; Robert DeMaria, Jr. has 
produced the most comprehensive study of recurring sentiments and themes in Johnson’s 
illustrative quotations; Allen Reddick’s authoritative account of the Dictionary’s 
composition and revision devotes significant attention to Johnson’s illustrative quotations 
and their significance; Daisuke Nagashima has produced the most detailed studies to date 
of Johnson’s etymologies; Elizabeth Hedrick has shown how Johnson incorporated 
Locke’s theories on language into his lexicographic principles and practices; Thomas B. 
Gilmore, Jr. has studied Johnson’s treatment of gallicisms and of the poet James 
Thomson; Harold B. Allen has studied Johnson’s usage notes; and Donald T. Siebert, Jr. 
has studied Johnson’s “low bad” words. Yet despite these detailed studies, we only have 
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a partial view of one of Johnson’s most conspicuous practices in the Dictionary, and one 
of the most striking contributors to his modern reputation as a lexicographer—his 
editorial comments on words.  
In the most detailed treatment of Johnson’s editorial comments to date, Harold B. 
Allen analyzes what he calls Johnson’s “linguistic judgments” in the Dictionary (2), but 
Allen only includes in this category “the epithets and terms of approval and disapproval 
with which Johnson indicated his attitude toward words” (164). Because Allen is 
interested primarily in Johnson’s “personal attitude toward language” (166) he excludes 
any commentary by Johnson that does not reflect this “personal attitude”:  
Not all expressions of judgment about words by Johnson are significant . . . for 
the immediate purpose of particularizing his attitude toward language. These, 
accordingly, have been ignored in making this study. They fall principally into 
four classes: labels indicating technical words, labels or statements indicating 
obsolescence, guesses about the etymology, and neutral observations of usage.  
(Allen, 1164-65).  
 
By confining Johnson’s “linguistic judgments” (2) to his “attitude toward words” (164) 
Allen presents a partial, skewed view of Johnson’s “linguistic” activity in the Dictionary. 
Johnson’s comments on obsolescence and his “neutral observations of usage” are just as 
relevant to our understanding of his linguistic determinations as his more censorious 
comments. Allen’s study not only presents a limited view of Johnson’s handling of 
language in the Dictionary, but it also relies on dated assumptions about Johnson’s 
“mental make-up” and “emotional disposition” (146, 147):   
[I]t is most important to realize, from the unanimous biographical evidence 
supplied by his contemporaries—notably by Boswell, [sic] how completely 
Johnson’s mental make-up was that of the dictator. Regardless of subject-matter, 
his conversation and his writing was not so much a discussion as it was a series of 
pronouncements, often made with an arbitrariness that brooked no dissenting 
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opinion. . . . There can be no doubt that Johnson’s vigorous intellect was directed 
by his emotional disposition to the maintaining of what essentially were personal 
likes and dislikes, and to maintaining them with almost violent dogmatism at the 
slightest hint of opposition. And in Johnson’s published criticism this assertive 
arbitrariness is consistently found with respect to language matters. . .” (146-47).    
 
In Allen’s presentation, Johnson’s “linguistic judgments” in the Dictionary are the almost 
inevitable manifestations of his “assertive arbitrariness” or his “mental make-up” rather 
responses to language in context or judgments influenced by Johnson’s self-imposed 
methodological restraints.  
The other category of editorial commentary, Johnson’s handling of etymology, 
has been studied closely by Daisuke Nagashima. Nagashima argues that Sledd and Kolb, 
in their classic study of the Dictionary, underestimate the extent to which those 
etymologies demonstrate independent judgment and careful consideration on Johnson’s 
part.258 Nagashima concludes that Johnson “was far from being a mere copyist or 
condenser; on the contrary he always exercised his own judgment whenever he was not 
fully convinced by the opinions advanced in his sources.”259 After considering Johnson’s 
                                                 
258 Nagashima primarily considers Johnson’s etymologies under entries for the letters A, B, C, W, Y, and Z 
(Johnson includes no entries for X except a description of the letter itself) in Chapter 4 of Johnson the 
Philologist (Osaka, Japan: Kansai University of Foreign Studies, 1988). Here Nagashima is particularly 
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examinations of how Johnson used the work of Stephen Skinner, Francis Junius, Nathan Bailey, George 
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found in “Johnson’s Use of Skinner and Junius,” in Prem Nath, ed. Fresh Reflections on Samuel Johnson: 
Essays in Criticism (Troy, New York: Whitston Publishing Company, 1987), 283-98. In “Johnson’s 
Revisions of his Etymologies,” Yearbook of English Studies: Eighteenth-Century Lexis and Lexicography 
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other etymologists, rarely offering his own etymological explanations. See “Johnson’s Dictionary and 
Dictionary Johnson,” Yearbook of English Studies 28 (1998): 19-43, esp. pp. 26-31. Nagashima also studies 
the Dictionary’s rarely studied prefatory essays, “The History of the English Language” and “A Grammar 
of the English Tongue” in Chapters 2 and 3 of Johnson the Philologist.  
259 Nagashima, Johnson the Philologist, 201.  
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revisions of his etymologies, Nagashima concludes that in these revisions “it is possible 
to see various facets of Johnson’s philological mind at work.”260  
Nagashima’s findings make it clear that if we look to the etymologies for traces of 
Johnson’s philological mind at work, we cannot restrict our searches to what is written 
between the etymological brackets, the “territory of etymology proper,” to use 
Nagashima’s phrase (101). In a study of Johnson’s revision of his etymologies, 
Nagashima finds non-etymological comments within the etymological brackets, and 
etymological comments outside those brackets. Nagashima finds that between the 
etymological brackets Johnson often includes comments that are not etymological by 
modern standards. Johnson includes comments on word-formation (96), “grammatical 
peculiarities and irregularities” (100), as well as pronunciation and accentuation (101-
02).261  Nagashima tries to account for the variety of comments between the etymological 
brackets by noting that the eighteenth-century notion of etymology was broader than our 
own: “In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century linguistics, ‘morphology’ of today is 
usually called ‘etymology’. . . . [I]n Johnson as well as in linguistics in general, 
etymology is closely associated with phonology, morphology, and even syntax” (100). 
Yet Nagashima also observes Johnson placing these sorts of comments outside the 
brackets (102). In the process of noting several instances of Johnson moving material in 
and out of these brackets, Nagashima finds that Johnson’s practices are “sometimes 
                                                 
260 Nagashima, “Johnson’s Revisions of his Etymologies,” 105.  
261 “Derivation” was sometimes called “etymology” in early grammars. See, for instance, Johnson’s brief 
description of etymology in the Dictionary’s prefatory “GRAMMAR”: Etymology teaches the deduction of 
one word from another, and the various modifications by which the sense of the same word is diversified; 
as horse, horses; I love, I loved.”  Some modern lexicographic practice conflates the two as well while 
some sources apply the term “derivation” in a more technical sense, as Merriam-Webster does, “the 
formation of a word from another word or base (as by the addition of a usually noninflectional affix).”  
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contradictory” (104) and reveal “inconsistency” (104-5); in one case, Nagashima 
concludes that “Johnson’s idea of etymology. . . is too broad to be accepted by any 
standards of today” (102).  
 But if Johnson is inconsistent about what he does or does not include between the 
etymological brackets, it is not just because his idea of etymology is broader than our 
own, but for two other reasons. First, Johnson’s modes of commentary, which include 
glossing, etymologizing, and usage notes, often overlap both in their content and in their 
placement within the structure of Johnson’s entries.  So in the entry for banter, we find a 
comment on usage located in the space typically reserved for etymology: 
To BA'NTER.v.a. [a barbarous word, without etymology, unless it be derived 
from badiner, Fr.] To play upon; to rally; to turn to ridicule; to ridicule. 
L’Estrange.; L’Estrange.; Tate’s Juvenal.262
 
Second, Johnson’s idea of dictionary-entry structure is more flexible than our own. Our 
readings of the Dictionary will be confused if we anachronistically try to retrofit 
Johnson’s entries with modern templates for dictionary-entry structure, templates which 
were in Johnson’s time still in the process of becoming standardized. While certain ideas 
about how to arrange a monolingual dictionary entry had long been standardized by 
Johnson’s time (place the headword first, followed by the part of speech, followed by the 
definition), Johnson exercised more flexibility of structure from entry to entry than is 
seen in modern dictionaries, which are standardized and regularized by teams of editors 
and strict editorial policy. In this chapter I identify the locations and categories of 
                                                 
262 For brevity’s sake, I here only list the authors whose quotations illustrate the definition, rather than 
including the text of the quotations. At a later point in this chapter, I will look at entire individual entries to 
discuss the ways in which these contexts matter to our readings of the Dictionary. Strikethroughs indicate 
material included in the 1755 1st edition but removed in the 1773 4th edition.  
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Johnson’s editorial commentary and demonstrate how one might read them alongside one 
another for a more comprehensive view of Johnson’s philology than has been seen. It is 
in these very comments, thus recontextualized, that we can find the nature of Johnson’s 
lexicography and philology.  
III. Text and Metatext: The Structure of Entries in the Dictionary and the 
Locations of Johnson’s Commentary 
 
 Part of the reason we are inclined to compartmentalize Johnson’s entries this way 
has to do with our own familiarity with the now loosely codified norms of lexicography. 
As literate adults, we come to a dictionary knowing how to use it. Because its structure 
and organization, both at the level of the entry and of the text at large have long been 
loosely fixed, a dictionary is easy to skim and use quickly. Once you learn how to use 
one dictionary, you have learned how to use any dictionary. A monolingual dictionary 
entry now contains certain generally predictable elements, and once those elements are 
assigned a typographic place within a given dictionary’s entry, they appear in the same 
place, over and over. Allowing for small yet significant differences, monolingual 
dictionaries for the average user are organized alphabetically by word, and include the 
part of speech, pronunciation guides, definitions, the etymology, and a note on usage 
when relevant. These elements of the entry represent discrete activities and are visually 
distinguished from one another on the page. Etymologies, for instance, always appear in 
the same place within a particular dictionary’s entries, and are often identified by 
appearing within brackets or being distinguished from usage notes somehow. Once their 
location within an entry is fixed they always occur there, and no other activity occurs 
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there. In fact, their predictable occurrence in the same spot allows readers to ignore them 
if their interests lie elsewhere. 
 But modern readers who approach Johnson’s Dictionary expecting such regularity 
will not always find it, and this is a crucial point in understanding how to read Johnson’s 
entries. Unlike modern lexicographers, whose large staffs, computers, and publication 
house editors can more readily ensure standardized entry formats, Johnson, who, as Allen 
Reddick has already shown, slightly revised and reconceived his methods as he worked 
on the Dictionary, did not always observe the rigid compartmentalization of entry 
space.263 Influenced by unconscious habits and expectations as dictionary users, modern 
readers may expect that within the “etymological brackets” of an entry we will always 
and only find etymology. But Johnson intermittently places what might be deemed usage 
notes between the brackets as well, as in the entries for benign, medicinal, or shabby: 
BENI'GN n.s. [benignus, Lat. It is pronounced without the g, as if written benine; 
but the g is preserved in benignity.] . . .  
 
MEDICI'NAL adj. [medicinalis, Latin: this word is now commonly pronounced 
medícinal, with the accent on the second syllable; but more properly, and more 
agreeably to the best authorities, medicínal.]  . . .  
 
SHA´BBY.adj. [A word that has crept into conversation and low writing; but 
ought not to be admitted into the language.] Mean; paltry. Swift. 
 
                                                 
263 Anne McDermott notes that this fact complicated the process of applying SGML coding to entries in the 
CD-ROM version of the Dictionary for the purpose of making it searchable:  “coherence in coding was not 
always possible to maintain where the presentation of information in the text is idiosyncratic and 
discursive.” For instance, there are “notes on spelling, pronunciation, usage, and grammar, which are 
frequently embedded within an etymology or a definition, or even tacked on to the end of an entry.” 
“Editor’s Introduction,” A Dictionary of the English Language on CD-ROM: The First and Fourth 
Editions, ed. Anne McDermott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8. McDermott does not 
discuss this aspect of the Dictionary beyond its implications for SGML coding of the CD-ROM.  
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Johnson will also occasionally insert what amounts to a textual gloss on grammar within 
these brackets, as in the second signification for the adverb “minutely”: 
MI'NUTELY.adv.  
2.[In the following passage it seems rather to be an adjective, as hourly is both the 
adverb and adjective.]264 Happening every minute.  
Now minutely revolts upbraid his faith-breach, 
Those he commands, move only in command, 
Nothing in love. Shakepeare’s Macbeth.    
 
At times Johnson will use the bracketed area to indicate that the head-word is actually a 
variant of a more common form:  
BLO'NKET.n.s. [I suppose for blanket.]  
Our blonket livery’s been all too sad 
For thilke same season, when all is yclad 
With pleasance.  Spenser’s Pastorals. 
 
SHOUGH.n.s. [for shock.]  A species of shaggy dog; a shock.  
In the catalogue ye be for men, 
As hound and greyhounds, mungrels, spaniels, curs, 
Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves are ’cleped 
All by the name of dogs.         Shakespeare’s Macbeth. 
 
Johnson occasionally uses the space within the brackets to clarify usage with a point of 
grammar, such as the “reciprocal sense” of to mistake:  
To be MISTA'KEN.  To err.  [To mistake has a kind of reciprocal sense; I 
mistake, je me trompe. I am mistaken, means, I misconceive, I am in an error; 
more frequently than I am ill understood; but, my opinion is mistaken, means my 
opinion is not rightly understood.] Sidney; Shakesp. Henry V; Waller. 
 
Johnson will also use brackets to enclose details about derivation (word-formation) and 
field labels, as under belly-fretting:  
BE'LLY-FRETTING.n.s. [from belly and fret.]  
1. [With farriers.]  The chafing of a horse’s belly with the foregirt. . . .  
 
                                                 
264 These brackets are added in 1773.  
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So while Johnson does seem to regard the space between the brackets as the default 
location of etymologies, he also uses the brackets as a space for demarcating commentary 
from the text of the definition proper.  
 The most significant other space Johnson reserves for commentary comes after 
the definition proper, usually following a period or colon (and often an em space), and 
less frequently at the end of the definition following a comma, and comments on usage 
are usually found here, as in the following entries.   
To SLU'BBER. v.a. 3. To cover coarsely or carelessly. This is now not in use, 
otherwise than as a low colloquial word. Wotton. 
 
To GLAVER <sic>.v.n. [glave, Welsh, flattery; gliwan, Saxon, to flatter. It is still 
retained in Scotland.] To flatter; to wheedle. A low word. L’Estrange’s Fables.  
 
To BAWL. v.n. [balo, Lat.] 1. To hoot; to cry with great vehemence, whether for 
joy or pain. A word always used in contempt. . . . .  
 
BE'RGMASTER.n.s. [from berg, Sax. and master.] The bailiff, or chief officer, 
among the Derbyshire miners.  
 
But Johnson will also use this space following the definition as a space for the same 
categories of commentary found within brackets. One may find etymological and other 
kinds of commentary in this space, as in the definition for box, to gospel, and spitchcock: 
BOX. n.s. [box, Sax. buste, Germ.] 1. A case made of wood, or other matter, to 
hold any thing. It is distinguished from chest, as the less from the greater. It is 
supposed to have its name from the box wood.     
 
To GO´SPEL v.n. [from the noun.] To fill with sentiments of religion. This word 
in Shakespeare, in whom alone I have found it, is used, though so venerable in 
itself, with some degree of irony: I suppose from the gospellers, who had long 
been held in contempt. Shakesp. 
 
To SPI´TCHCOCK. v.a. To cut an eel in pieces and roast him. Of this word I find 
no good etymology. King. 
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At least one category of comment that we find after the definition proper that differs from 
the text that we would like to label “commentary” is the invented illustrative phrase or 
illustrative example Johnson occasionally uses to elucidate the definition.  
To GORGE.v.n. [gorger, French.] . . . 2. To swallow: as, the fish has gorged the 
hook. 
 
GOA'TISH.adj. [from goat.] Resembling a goat in any quality: as, rankness; lust. 
Shakesp.King Lear; More against Atheism. 
 
In each case, Johnson uses the colon to exit the definition proper and enter a new kind of 
comment.  
While we can usually find Johnson’s commentary on words in one of these two 
places (between the brackets or immediately following the definition proper) sometimes 
an entire signification will sometimes be devoted to such commentary, as in the entry for 
the verb to fadge. Here the comments after the number 4 serve as a comment applicable 
to all significations listed for the headword, listed 1 through 3 and illustrated respectively 
by Shakespeare, Samuel Butler’s Hudibras, and Richard L’Estrange’s Fables:  
To FADGE. v.n. . . . 4. This is a mean word not now used, unless perhaps in 
ludicrous and low compositions.  
 
Similarly, for headwords listing only one signification the entire text of the signification 
may be constituted by editorial commentary, as in the entry for beemol: 
BE'EMOL.n.s. This word I have found only in the example, and know nothing of 
the etymology, unless it be a corruption of bymodule, from by and modulus, a 
note; that is, a note out of the regular order.  
There be intervenient in the rise of eight, in tones, two beemols, or half 
notes; so as, if you divide the tones equally, the eight is but seven whole 
and equal notes.  Bacon.  
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With the definition of beemol seemingly transparent in Bacon’s quotation, Johnson’s 
entry is made up entirely of his commentary. 
In these areas where we will find Johnson’s commentary, Johnson may combine 
categories of commentary in one comment, and he seems to reserve the right to use these 
spaces for any type of commentary:   
BI'ZANTINE. n.s. [more properly spelt byzantine; from Byzantium.] . . .  
To GLEEN v.n. To shine with heat or polish. I know not the original notion of 
this word: It may be of the same race with glow or with gleam. I have not 
remarked it in any other place. Prior 
 
While these examples display variety in Johnson’s placement of commentary, Johnson 
usually places commentary within the entry in such a way that it can be distinguished 
from the definition proper: within the brackets; after a period or colon or sometimes a 
comma, signifying the end of the definition proper; or within single significations (either 
constituting the entire text of the head-word’s entry, as in beemol n.s., or constituting the 
final signification in a series, as in to fadge v.n.).  
Just as there exists an overlap in these spaces for commentary within the space of 
a single entry, there exists an overlap in Johnson’s own interpretive strategies between 
tracing derivation, accounting for semantic and phonological shifts, and explicating or 
glossing the works of writers whose texts were difficult to read. Any examination of 
Johnson’s editorial commentary, whether it considers etymologies or usage notes, or 
another form, must be open to finding this commentary in any of these spaces rather than 
expecting etymologies, for instance, only to be found within the brackets.  
* * * * * * 
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The overlap that occurs between Johnson’s areas of commentary suggests that to 
get a comprehensive sense of Johnson’s commentary, and to get a sense of how the 
different types of commentary interact with, complement, and influence one another, it 
would be fruitful to view Johnson’s entries as consisting of text and metatext, with text 
corresponding to those elements of the Dictionary where Johnson’s personal voice 
recedes or seems absent (head word, part of speech, definition, illustrative quotations), 
and with metatext corresponding to those places in the text where Johnson’s voice is 
foregrounded or seems present, whether they occur within or without the brackets, 
whether they occur before or after the definition. These categories come from observing 
Johnson’s text and the way Johnson exploits the structure of the dictionary entry rather 
than from preconceived ideas about how the entry should be structured or demarcated. 
They also recognize the frequent overlap, both in location and in content, among the 
varied types of commentary Johnson employs. A comment on etymology, for instance, 
can merge with a comment on usage. Using one name, metatext, for the varied types of 
commentary encourages modern readers of the Dictionary to consider how those kinds of 
commentary may be related or complement one another. Generally speaking, the 
metatextual elements of the Dictionary include comments on the status, usage, or history 
of a word, as well as comments on unusual features of grammar, spelling, or 
pronunciation.  While the text refers to recurring elements of the default paradigmatic 
entry (head word, part of speech, definition), the metatext refers to elements of the entry 
that only occur when Johnson deems it necessary to comment on some element of the 
text. The metatextual elements generally depend for their existence upon elements of the 
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text, and occur if at least the minimal textual elements are present. As already described, 
the metatextual spaces, or spaces in which Johnson typically places commentary, occur in 
predictable locations.  
The distinction between text and metatext, or between definition proper and 
commentary, reflects the common practice in dictionaries of using typographic elements 
of the text (punctuation, empty space, numbers, brackets, fonts) to distinguish and 
demarcate the various functions of the entry. Such conventions make the structure of 
entries more transparent and make dictionaries easier to scan, and thus more user-
friendly. In Johnson’s Dictionary, for instance, the head word is composed entirely of 
capital letters, and the part of speech is printed in italics. A minor revision to punctuation 
in the 1773 fourth edition serves to help distinguish between the definition proper and 
other elements of the entry, including the lexicographer’s commentary. For instance, in 
the definition for the transitive verb to bid, senses 2 and 3 read as follows, minus 
quotations, in the first edition:  
2. To command; to order; before things or persons.  
3. To offer; to propose; as, to bid a price.  
 
In the fourth edition they are revised to distinguish visually the definition from the rest of 
the line (which contains a collocation in sense 2; and an invented illustrative phrase in 3):  
2. To command; to order: before things or persons.  
3. To offer; to propose: as, to bid a price.  
 
This type of correction, however minor, is found in a number of entries of the revised 
fourth edition (bigotry n.s.; bloody adj. 2; body n.s. 4; boldface n.s.; bone n.s. 4; bottomed 
adj. bounce n.s.; bruteness n.s.; to bundle, v.a.; burnisher n.s. 2, and elsewhere) and is a 
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minor example of how typographic features help declare function within the structure of 
a dictionary entry.  
But even though the structure and typography within Johnson’s entries demarcate 
the text and metatext, there is a closer relationship between text and metatext in 
Johnson’s Dictionary than in other works which include significant quantities of 
metatext. This relationship between text and metatext in Johnson’s Dictionary can better 
be seen when contrasted with those kinds of works, such as Johnson’s copiously 
footnoted editions of Shakespeare, whose notes have often been compared to his work in 
the Dictionary. Dictionaries, like texts with footnotes, use typographic conventions to 
hierarchize text on the page, but they do so differently. In Johnson’s edition of 
Shakespeare, the use of footnotes visually and functionally subordinates the commentary 
in relation to the text of the play. Even when a given page of the play might actually 
include more metatext than text, as often happens in Johnson’s Shakespeare, that 
metatext is hierarchically subordinate to the text because it serves the text and its readers. 
Moreover, the visual subordination of the footnote on the page, or the relegation of the 
endnote to the back of the book, allows the metatext to be disregarded more easily by 
readers, whose text is only interrupted by whatever symbol is chosen to indicate a note. 
Besides, in cases where metatexts are not chosen or written by the author, they may 
perform a completely different function from the text—in plays, for instance, the 
commentary may serve to instruct when the play seeks to delight.  In the Preface to his 
edition of Shakespeare, Johnson even recommended that “him, that is yet unacquainted 
with the powers of Shakespeare, and who desires to feel the highest pleasure that the 
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drama can give, read every play from the first scene to the last, with utter negligence of 
all his commentators. When his fancy is once on the wing, let it not stoop at correction or 
explanation.”265  
But readers of dictionaries, who generally read or scan them entry by entry, 
encounter the metatext alongside the text in such a way that makes the metatext more 
integral to the text, relatively speaking. While footnotes or endnotes are segregated from 
the text on which they comment, the metatext within Johnson’s Dictionary is generally 
integral or intrusive to one’s experience of reading the entry. This is often especially the 
case in Johnson’s Dictionary. In the Dictionary, if readers want foremost to consult the 
definition, they must pass through, or leap across, the etymological (loosely defined) 
brackets to do so.266 While both the inclusion of predictably located brackets and the 
brevity of many etymologies often make this leap no great task, the length and 
discursiveness of many other etymologies discourage readers from leaping without first 
looking:  
BA'NDOG.n.s. [from ban or band, and dog. The original of this word is very 
doubtful. Caius, De Canibus Britannicis,267 derives it from band, that is, a dog 
chained up. Skinner inclines to deduce it from bana, a murderer. May it not come 
from ban a curse, as we say a curst cur; or rather from baund, swelled or large, a 
Danish word; from whence, in some counties they call a great nut a ban-nut.] A 
kind of large dog.  
   The time of night when Troy was set on fire, 
The time when screech-owls cry, and bandogs howl. 
      Shakespeare’s Henry VI. p. ii.
                                                 
265 “Preface to Shakespeare, 1765,” in Yale Works, VII, 111.   
266 Sidney I. Landau writes that the placement of etymologies in square brackets, early in the entry, “is 
seen” by some producers of synchronic dictionaries “as a kind of moat that the reader must leap across to 
reach his quest,” since “of all the elements included in modern dictionaries etymology has the least to do 
with the essential purpose of a synchronic dictionary.” Dictionaries: The Art and Craft of Lexicography. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 104, 98.  
267 1755: de canibus Britannicis 
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   Or privy, or pert, if any bin, 
We have great bandogs will tear their skin.         Spenser Pastorals.
 
Not only does the commentary here dwarf the definition in terms of text space used, but it 
also lends support to Johnson’s interpretation of the most salient semantic quality of the 
word bandog. The physical and interpretive proximity of text and the commentary within 
the brackets here encourages readers not to disregard the commentary. And commentary 
placed immediately following the definition, thus is distinguished, but not segregated, 
from the text and is thus even less easy to disregard. Commentary that qualifies the 
definition or describes usage is generally more likely to be heeded by readers. Readers 
are unlikely to ignore the usage notes appended to the beginning or ending of 
definitions—these usage notes have, indeed, been one of the most noticed features of the 
Dictionary. Unlike Johnson’s hypothetical first-time reader of Shakespeare, a reader of 
the Dictionary who ignored the usage notes would seem sloppy or careless.  
The fact that Johnson will place all sorts of commentary both within and without 
the brackets accustoms readers to be prepared for commentary whether it appears within 
or outside brackets, before or after the definition. For this reason, even when the 
predictable location of metatextual space within the structure of the entry distinguishes it 
from the text and helps readers who are not interested ignore it, the varied nature of 
commentary placed within textual slots devoted to metatext means that readers will get 
used to reading the commentary as well, a practice that is encouraged by the recurring 
interconnections between metatext and text in the Dictionary.  
Johnson not only uses etymological conjectures to support his definitions, as in 
the entry for bandog. He also uses known etymons to favor spellings. Whereas in a 
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modern dictionary etymology is less relevant for the purposes of a synchronic dictionary, 
Johnson uses etymology as a deciding factor when determining a certain spelling variant 
as “proper” or “improper.” He “always considered” that “true orthography” of words “as 
depending on their derivation.”268 Johnson demonstrates this under the definitions for 
crawfish and sapphire: 
CRA'WFISH.n.s. [sometimes written crayfish, properly crevice; in French 
ecrevisse.] . . .  
 
SA'PPHIRE.n.s. [sapphirus, Latin: so that it is improperly written saphyre.] . . .  
Johnson’s etymological note becomes the basis for his comment on spelling.  
Occasionally, text and metatext will shade into one another in an entry, as in the 
following entry, shown as it appears in the Dictionary: 
BATE seems to have been once the preterite of bite, as Shakespeare uses biting 
faulchion; unless, in the following lines, it may be rather deduced from beat. 
 
   Yet there the steel staid not, but inly bate  
Deep in his flesh, and open’d wide a red flood gate. Spenser.269  
 
Here we see Johnson using parallel textual examples and conjectural deduction to work 
out the definition of bate as it appears in Spenser’s usage. Johnson’s definition becomes 
inseparable from his commentary as he displays his philogical reasoning, and 
complementary philological strategies (derivation, parallel readings, and parsing) overlap 
freely.  
The interconnectedness of Johnson’s interpretive strategies, the interplay between 
text and metatext, can also be seen under the definition for scroyle, where Johnson  
                                                 
268 Preface, para. 11.  
269 1755: F. Queen. 
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interprets a word he “remember[s] only in Shakespeare” by proposing a derivational link 
to a French word, and by adducing similar examples of Shakespearean insult-formation:  
SCROYLE. n.s. [This word I remember only in Shakespeare: it seems derived 
from escrouelle, French, a scrofulous swelling; as he calls a mean fellow a scab 
from his itch, or a patch from his raggedness.270] A mean fellow; a rascal; a 
wretch.  
   The scroyles of Angiers flout you kings, 
And stand securely on their battlements, 
As in a theatre.     Shakespeare’s King John.  
The illustrative quotation, as printed, does not really provide enough evidence for the 
definition, which presumably is aided by the larger context of the passage, in which the 
moral character attributed to the “scroyles of Angiers” is more clear. Here the proposed 
etymology, along with evidence from analogous words used by Shakespeare, serves as 
crucial evidence for Johnson’s interpretation of the word. The O.E.D. maintains that the 
“assumed development of sense” from OF. escroele to scroyle, “though plausible, has no 
evidence.” Johnson’s commentary in effect makes visible the posited process of semantic 
change he assumes in making sense of the word as he does. As a result the proposed 
definition is even more plausible. Here we see Johnson as etymologist, as scholiast, and 
as philologer, and we see how those roles interact. We see a connection between 
Johnson’s observation of language change as observed in usage, and the kinds of 
assumptions about language change that Johnson draws on when engaged in 
etymological reasoning, where he often posits what he views to be plausible shifts in 
meaning from etymon to head-word.  
                                                 
270 For citations of Shakespeare’s use in this way of scab and patch, see C. T. Onions, A Shakespeare 
Glossary. Enlarged and revised throughout by Robert D. Eagleson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986).  
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The distinction between text and metatext in the Dictionary has its limitations and 
exceptions, and there are many places where Johnson’s metatext overlaps the text 
unannounced by any typographic distinctions or demarcations, as, for instance, when his 
head words are italicized to indicate that they are not ‘naturalized’ or when Johnson 
indicates his spelling preference for a particular spelling form by listing it, and not its 
variants, as the head word. Some other well known examples attest to the ways in which 
text and metatext can overlap: 
LEXICO'GRAPHER.n.s. . . . . A writer of dictionaries; a harmless drudge, that 
busies himself in tracing the original, and detailing the signification of words. 
 
I'RONY.n.s. . . . . A mode of speech in which the meaning is contrary to the 
words: as, Bolingbroke was a holy man.  
 
Nonetheless, the distinction between text and metatext is useful because it operates as a 
fairly predictable norm in most entries, and departures from this norm are still easy to 
spot when readers keep this distinction in mind. Reading the entries in terms of text and 
metatext does not require us to ignore the fact that all of Johnson’s decisions about what 
to include in the Dictionary involve interpretive decisions at some level. It only allows us 
to see how some of those interpretive decisions are crucially linked.  
IV. “The Structures and Relations of Words”: Reading the Dictionary and its 
Philology across the Entries  
 
 All studies of the Dictionary imply a way of reading through the text, and most 
studies of the Dictionary imply or argue for an understanding of Johnson’s intentions. 
Some of the scholars who have studied the Dictionary’s contents most closely—Allen 
Reddick, Anne McDermott, and Robert DeMaria, Jr.—have all offered different ways to 
interpret the text, based on the nature of their data sample and their view of Johnson’s 
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aims. Reddick and DeMaria, Jr., in their studies of the Dictionary, give most attention to 
the illustrative quotations, which for Reddick represent the “most significant” area of 
Johnson’s changes to the text when revising it for the fourth edition (1773); in 
“incorporating extensive new illustrative quotations,” Reddick argues, Johnson “appears 
to have been motivated by a desire to fill out and make more complete the entries as 
representatives of English usage and, as a part of this process, to infuse many of the 
entries with a more conscious religious and/or political presence and purpose.”271  
DeMaria, Jr.’s attention to the illustrative quotations and their contents has led 
him to suggest, first in Johnson’s Dictionary and the Language of Learning and later in 
several articles, that the Dictionary has an “overall theme,” that the contents of the 
quotations, taken together, reveal both “Johnson’s wish to make the Dictionary an 
encyclopedia with moral and religious overtones,” and “Johnson’s overall shaping of his 
book into a pious encyclopedia with a religious message for learners.”272 While DeMaria 
has at various times examined different elements of the Dictionary entries, his emphasis 
on the illustrative quotations lends itself to an interpretation that seeks “themes.” But as 
others have pointed out, Johnson may have approved of the sentiment expressed in many 
individual quotes, but DeMaria finds thematic connections quotations that are scattered 
across the body of the Dictionary, and connects quotes that were not necessarily intended 
                                                 
271 Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 94.  
272 Robert DeMaria, Jr., “Johnson’s Dictionary,” The Cambridge Companion to Samuel Johnson, Greg 
Clingham, ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 94, 89, 95. DeMaria, Jr. explains 
his rationale for “reading the dictionary as a disguised encyclopedia” and his method for identifying in the 
quotations “what seemed to me to be the most important topics” in his “Preface” to Johnson’s Dictionary 
and the Language of Learning (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), ix, x.  
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to be connected, since the primary purpose of the quotations is to illustrate the usage of a 
word.  
Positing themes in the Dictionary presumes that Johnson intended links among 
quotes in the large folio, that readers who consult the Dictionary would make those 
connections, and that Johnson hoped or expected that readers of the Dictionary would 
make those connections. The kind of reader who might make those connections is 
extremely rare—the kind of assiduous, methodical reader DeMaria shows himself to be 
in Johnson’s Dictionary and the Language of Learning. To make the thematic 
connections, DeMaria must read the Dictionary in ways that are atypical and 
counterintuitive. After reading the Dictionary as a “disguised encyclopedia,” he indexes 
its contents to “overcome the obscuring tendency of the alphabetical order,” a tendency 
that must certainly stand in the way of the reader’s ability to grasp those themes.273    
While many quotations may certainly, as Johnson says he first intended, “be 
useful to some other end than the illustration of a word,” in the end he had to “reduce my 
transcripts very often to clusters of words, in which scarcely any meaning is retained.”274 
Many individual quotations, in fact, convey no message at all, but are truncated passages 
meant first to illustrate usage, as can be seen in the definition for to moralize: 
To MO'RALIZE.v.a. [moraliser, French.]  
1. To apply to moral purposes; to explain in a moral sense.  
   He ’as left me here behind to expound the meaning or moral of his signs 
and tokens. 
 —— I pray thee moralize them.    Shak. Taming of the Shrew. 
   Did he not moralize this spectacle? 
 —— O yes, into a thousand similies.     Shakespeare.  
                                                 
273 DeMaria, Jr. Johnson’s Dictionary and the Language of Learning, ix-x.  
274 Preface, para. 57.  
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   This fable is moralized in a common proverb.    L’Estrange.  
2. In Spenser it seems to mean, to furnish with manners or examples.  
   Fierce warres and faithful loves shall moralize my song. Fairy Queen.275
3. In Prior, who imitates the foregoing line, it has a sense not easily discovered, if 
indeed it has any sense.  
   High as their trumpets tune his lyre he strung, 
And with his prince’s arms he moraliz’d his song.               Prior. 
 
The quotes in any given passage, much less quotes across the body of the Dictionary, 
may contradict or have little relation to one another beyond lexical semantic content as 
much as they contribute to a moral theme, presuming those quotes contain a didactic or 
educational message at all. Anne McDermott has argued that Johnson’s  
standards of morality were not so rigid as to exclude entertaining and humorous 
texts which might have slightly vulgar contents, and he was not above quoting 
indecent passages from those texts. . . . [I]t seems that he excluded quotations 
from texts which were doctrinally suspect or which contained moral theories 
which were dubious or misleading in his view. Texts which one might regard as 
indecent rather than immoral seem not to have troubled him overmuch.276  
 
DeMaria’s approach turns a secondary concern of Johnson’s—presenting useful, 
pleasing, and socially responsible quotations—into the lexicographer’s primary aim.     
 In The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 1746-1773, Allen Reddick also focuses 
largely on the illustrative quotations but his recognition of the way these quotations are 
scattered across the text and his examination of Johnson’s revisions to his quotations lead 
him to argue, in contrast to DeMaria, that the rhetoric of the text is ultimately found not 
so much in themes connected among quotations scattered throughout the Dictionary, but 
rather within the individual entry. On the basis of several illustrative quotations added to 
the revised Dictionary of 1773, Reddick argues that in the revised edition Johnson 
                                                 
275 1755: Fairy Queen, b. i.  
276 Anne McDermott, “Textual Transformations: The Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus in Johnson’s 
Dictionary,” Studies in Bibliography 48 (1995): 147. 
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pursued a “sacred program,” adding to the text several Biblical and Miltonic quotations, 
as well as quotations from the writings of “orthodox Anglican controversialists.” 
Reddick, like DeMaria, finds in Johnson’s quotations that the lexicographer “supplies ‘a 
stream of reminders,’ in Robert DeMaria’s phrase, of particular issues and arguments, 
pushed repeatedly before the eyes of the reader.” But because “the Dictionary can only 
fitfully sustain the author’s polemic, the arguments become diffused. Therefore, the 
empowerment of the Dictionary as a tool for general education on and apology for the 
Church in danger remains largely unrealized.” While Reddick acknowledges that the 
nature of a dictionary places constraints on one’s ability to sustain any polemic by means 
of disconnected quotations across hundreds of pages, he suggests that Johnson “could, 
however, develop a persistent rhetoric” at the level of the entry. In Johnson’s revisions 
Reddick sees Johnson’s the additions of quotes from the Bible, from Milton, and from 
theological sources as providing “many entries with overt theological reference.”277  
Reddick returns to his argument about the “rhetoric” of the Dictionary in a later 
article, wherein he argues that the “rhetorical nature of the unit of the entry, or sub-entry, 
determines the voice, significance, the nature of the text on the page.” Reddick argues 
that any polemical content that quotations might contain is limited by their lexicographic 
function as examples of usage to illustrate a definition. So a quotation’s “original 
declamatory meaning, one could argue in most cases of quotation in the Dictionary, is 
virtually held in abeyance, estranged from context and clear reference and signification.” 
                                                 
277 Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 128, 121, 144, 164, 165. 
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Because of these limitations, Reddick finally argues that the Dictionary is “didactic 
primarily in terms of style (linguistic competence) rather than content.”278   
 Anne McDermott and Marcus Walsh have provided the only theorized account to 
date of how to read the Dictionary in “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary: Some Editorial and 
Textual Considerations.” In this account, McDermott and Walsh are concerned to 
describe a theoretically sound approach to producing a critical edition of the Dictionary.  
Adopting E. D. Hirsch’s definition of literature—“Literature comprises any linguistic 
work, written or oral, which has significant aesthetic qualities when described in aesthetic 
categories”—McDermott and Walsh argue that Johnson’s Dictionary “has features which 
make it possible, when it is viewed from an aesthetic perspective, to treat it as a literary 
work.” Thus they address the issues of determining authorial intention, choosing the 
copy-text, and they are also concerned with clarifying the nature of the Dictionary as a 
text type, since the “Dictionary is unlike almost any other text that literary scholars 
edit.”279  
 McDermott and Walsh adopt Michael Hoey’s concept of the “discourse colony” 
to argue that the difference between the Dictionary and other literary texts (poems, plays, 
novels, etc.) is “not simply one of genre but of discourse type.”280 The specificity of 
Hoey’s concept, as described by McDermott and Walsh, is best related in an extended 
quote:  
                                                 
278 Reddick, “Johnson’s Dictionary and its Texts,” 67, 71, 75. 
279 McDermott and Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 42-43, 50. 
280 McDermott and Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 48. They draw Michael Hoey’s concept of the 
“discourse colony” from “The Discourse Colony: A Preliminary Study of a Neglected Discourse Type,” in 
Talking about Text: Studies Presented to David Brazil on His Retirement, ed. Malcolm Coulthard 
(Birmingham, England: English Language Research, 1986), 1-26.  
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Hoey suggests that certain texts differ from ‘mainstream’ discourses in being 
made up of a collection of discrete elements with no cohesive ties between them. 
The elements ‘do not derive their meaning from the sequence in which they are 
placed.’ He graphically compares these discourses to the colonies of a beehive or 
an ant-hill, in which the individual creatures serve a superior end, do not survive 
easily outside the colony, and enter the colony in arbitrary order. It is important to 
note that each individual element in a discourse colony is itself, like a bee, an 
independent organism. The order of the elements in a discourse colony can 
normally be altered with very little damage to its semantic unity, but an individual 
organism within the colony can be no more safely scrambled than a ‘mainstream’ 
discourse as a whole. The characteristics of a discourse colony are shared, to a 
greater or lesser degree, by texts as various as a hymn-book and a shopping list, 
an encyclopedia and a telephone directory, a dictionary and a newspaper. Some of 
the common features are identified by Hoey:  
 
1. Meaning not derived from sequence;  
2. Adjacent units do not form continuous prose; 
3. There is a framing context; 
4. No single author and/or anon; 
5. One component may be used without referring to the others; 
6. Components can be reprinted or reused in subsequent works; 
7. Components can be added, removed, or altered; 
8. Many of the components serve the same function;  
9. Alphabetic, numeric, or temporal sequencing. 
 
Not all discourse colonies share all these features, but all have features 1 and 2 in 
common. Hoey suggests that the only discourse types which display all nine 
features are dictionaries and encyclopedias.281  
 
Hoey’s concept of the discourse colony is useful for McDermott and Walsh because it 
helps them explain their decision to use both the first and fourth editions of the 
Dictionary as copy-texts for a critical edition. McDermott and Walsh’s assessment of the 
Dictionary as a discourse colony leads them to complicate common notions of a work’s 
“version” and authorial intention.  They argue that unlike many literary texts whose 
individual versions represent an ideal, coherent form of the text, a “discourse colony is 
                                                 
281 McDermott and Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 49. 
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generated by a very much more diffuse creative act than a ‘mainstream’ discourse.”282 
Thus for McDermott and Walsh,  
Editions 1 and 4 are not versions, but realizations at particular moments of what 
was in fact a continuous process of alteration, addition, and omission; there was 
never a moment of which it is possible to say that Johnson’s concept of the 
Dictionary was unified and complete. . . . If it is problematic to speak of versions 
in relation to the Dictionary, then, equally, it is problematic to speak of the 
author’s ‘final’ intention regarding the whole work. What we have is a series of 
realized intentions of particular entries in the Dictionary, but no overall intention, 
whether final or otherwise, in respect of the whole work.283
 
By considering individual entries as discrete, independent “organisms” within the colony, 
McDermott and Walsh are free to look at each single entry in editions 1 and 4 as a 
potential copy-text for their proposed critical edition. In addition, their view of the 
Dictionary’s composition as a “continuous process of alteration, addition, and omission” 
allows them, as well, to maintain a reasonably complicated notion of authorial 
intention—one that does not restrict them to choosing edition 1 or 4. McDermott and 
Walsh are making the case for a modern critical edition of the Dictionary, a work 
regarded, they write, as a literary classic now more than a contemporarily relevant work 
of reference.284 Because their prospected critical edition would likely be used primarily 
by literary scholars, the concept of the discourse colony is useful in allowing them to 
maintain traditional categories of literary textual editing while acknowledging the 
significant ways in which the Dictionary differs from most texts regarded as literary.   
* * * * * * 
                                                 
282 McDermott and Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 55.  
283 McDermott and Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 55-56. 
284 McDermott and Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 43.  
    183
 
 But if one is not reading the Dictionary as a literary text, but rather as the kind of 
instrumental text that McDermott and Walsh say Johnson intended it to be, the concept of 
the discourse colony is problematic, particularly in its insistence on the discreteness, the 
independence, of dictionary entries. Monolingual dictionaries, in fact, are remarkably 
cohesive, since the meaning and utility of individual definitions may need to rely on 
words from other entries. Sidney I. Landau has described this fact in discussing two 
principles of defining which, if violated, “defeat the whole purpose of the dictionary”: 
avoid circularity, and define every word in the definition.285 For instance, someone faced 
with the following circular definitions would remain uninstructed: 
 beauty- the state of being beautiful 
 beautiful- full of beauty  
To avoid circular definitions, Landau writes, lexicographers must not, for instance, define 
a word “by itself, and no word can be defined from its own family of words unless the 
related word is separately defined independently of it.”286 The second principle, define 
every word in the definition, links the definition of a word X to entries for every word 
used to define X. Thus Johnson’s first signification for the noun propinquity is connected 
to the definitions for nearness, proximity, and neighborhood:  
PROPI'NQUITY.n.s. [propinquitas, Lat.] 1. Nearness; proximity; neighbourhood. 
And the definitions for nearness, proximity, and neighbourhood are linked in turn to the 
entries for every word used to define them. Individual instances of failure to follow this 
                                                 
285 Landau, Dictionaries: The Art and Craft of Lexicography, 124-25.  
286 Landau, Dictionaries: The Art and Craft of Lexicography, 125. The above examples of beauty and 
beautiful are Landau’s; see 124. Johnson writes in the Preface that “some explanations are unavoidably 
reciprocal or circular, as hind, the female of the stag; stag, the female of the hind.” Preface, para. 55.  
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principle of defining are difficult to prevent entirely, but each failure diminishes the 
maximal utility of a dictionary.  
In addition to these connections among entries, Johnson includes explicit cross-
references from one entry to another.287 The entry for the noun greeze contains three 
cross-referents, including one dead-end referent, grieze, and the entry for grise, not 
mentioned as a cross-referent under the entry for greeze, refers the reader back again to 
greeze:   
GREEZE.n.s. [Otherwise written greece. See GREECE, or GRIEZE, or 
GRICE;288 from degrees.] A flight of steps; a step.289  
 
GRISE.n.s. [See GREEZE, as it should be written.] A step, or scale of steps. . . . 
 
Two other entries are similarly linked to these, even though they are not explicitly 
marked as cross-referents with the “See X” formula:  
GREECE.n.s. [corrupted from degrees. It is written likewise greeze or grice.] A 
flight of steps. Obsolete.  . . .  
 
GRICE.n.s. 2. A step or greeze. . . .  
 
The commentary added to greece in the fourth edition links it to the entries for greeze and 
grice. Rather than employ the common practice of listing lexical variants alongside each 
other as he often does, Johnson accords each attested form an entry of its own. Yet 
clearly these entries are closely linked to one another—Johnson’s preference for the 
spelling greeze is not mentioned explicitly except under the entry for grise, and the 
presumed source for all these variants is only mentioned under greece and greeze.   
                                                 
287 Sometimes, however, Johnson neglects to follow through on the reference. For example, sense 13 of the 
noun assurance (1755: sense 11) reads, “the same with insurance. See INSURANCE,” but the Dictionary 
contains no entry for insurance.  
288 1755: GRICE,  
289 The first edition illustrates this definition with a quote from Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens. 
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 Johnson’s cues to cross-references in the Dictionary—both  explicit (“See X”) 
and implicit (the italicized variants listed under greece and grice)—support the kind of 
cross-entry reading that he encourages in the Preface, a type of reading that is both more 
intuitive than reading for theme or reading without recognition of the links among entries, 
and furthermore such cross-entry reading is consonant with Johnson’s representations of 
his most important duty as a lexicographer: linguistic education, or the “elucidation of 
our language.”290 Both in the Plan and the Preface Johnson suggests that part of his task 
was to help clarify how the parts of the language fit together—to clarify the structure and 
relations of words and their constituent parts. Reading across entries would help readers 
grasp the “structures and relations” of English words, which in previous dictionaries, 
according to Johnson, seemed a “confused heap. . . without dependence, and without 
relation.”291  To consider individual entries as independent organisms would discourage 
the observation of connections that might elucidate the language.  
In justifying the need and rationale for his Dictionary, Johnson suggests that his 
methods, unlike those of dictionaries wherein words are only a “confused heap,” will by 
contrast “facilitate the attainment of our language” when the parts of the language are 
viewed as they relate to the whole language. Employing the language of natural 
philosophy, Johnson declares a hope that his Dictionary will contain the “fundamental 
atoms of our speech,” that in the Dictionary “our language will be laid down, distinct in 
its minutest subdivisions, and resolved into its elemental principles.” And in discussing 
phrasal verbs, Johnson writes that words “having been hitherto considered as separate 
                                                 
290 Preface, para. 42.  
291 Preface, para. 59; Plan, para. 25.  
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and unconnected, are now to be likewise examined as they are ranged in their various 
relations to others by the rules of SYNTAX or construction, to which I do not know that 
any regard has been yet shewn in English dictionaries, and in which the grammarians can 
give little assistance.”292
In the Preface Johnson defends his practices by suggesting that they contribute to 
understanding the “frame” or “general fabrick” of the language. Johnson defends his 
frequent practice of referring derivatives (remoteness) to their primitives (remote) with an 
“accuracy sometimes needless” by protesting that it “is of great importance in examining 
the general fabrick of a language, to trace one word from another, by noting the usual 
modes of derivation and inflection.” And Johnson expresses satisfaction that the number 
of compounded words he includes “might be multiplied, but that use and curiosity are 
here satisfied, and the frame of our language and modes of our combination amply 
discovered.” Johnson also writes that he chooses quotations “which are to teach” the 
“structures and relations” of words.293 Johnson encouraged users of the Dictionary to 
compare related entries, to pursue connections among entries, which sometimes had to be 
read in relation to one another to clarify or rectify deficiencies of a single entry:  
Such is the exuberance of signification which many words have obtained, that it 
was scarcely possible to collect all their senses; sometimes the meaning of 
derivatives must be sought in the mother term, and sometimes deficient 
explanations of the primitive may be supplied in the train of derivation. In any 
case of doubt or difficulty, it will be always proper to examine all the words of the 
same race; for some words are slightly passed over to avoid repetition, some will 
be admitted easier and clearer explanation than others, and all will be better 
understood, as they are considered in greater variety of structure and relations.294  
                                                 
292 Plan, paras. 25, 34, 36.  
293 Preface, paras. 38, 20, 59.  
294 Preface, para. 53.  
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So even though each entry in the Dictionary is structurally and typographically separate 
from one another on the page, and is consulted often as a self-sufficient unit, entries in 
many ways are linked to one another, and as the above paragraph suggests, some 
entries—for instance the entries related to greeze—may illuminate one another. Under 
bashful Johnson precedes a list of etymological conjectures by declaring, “This word, 
with all those of the same race, are of uncertain etymology.” Presumably, Johnson refers 
to bashful and bashfulness, as well as to abash, which refers the reader to bashful. In the 
commentary for the word mirksome, Johnson writes a note on spelling that applies to all 
“derivatives of this set”:  “[morck, dark, Danish. In the derivatives of this set, no regular 
orthography is observed: it is common to write murky, to which the rest ought to 
conform.].” The “derivatives of this set” may include entries for murk, murky, and moky, 
which for Johnson “seems a corruption of murky.”295  
 Johnson attempts to elucidate the “frame of our language and modes of our 
combination” by “inserting great numbers of compounded words,” since the process of 
compounding, or “composition,” is “one of the chief characteristics of a language.”296  
Thus Johnson includes a separate entry for by, which reads thus:  
BY, in composition, implies something out of the direct way; and, consequently, 
some obscurity, as a by-road; something irregular, as a by-end; or something 
collateral, as a by-concernment; or private, as a by-law. This composition is used 
at pleasure, and will be understood by the examples following.   
 
                                                 
295 See also See also To BASTE.v.a., which defines as meaning, among other things, “To beat with a stick.” 
After noting the French cognate bastonner, Johnson writes that “Bazata, in the Armorick dialect, signifies 
to strike with a stick; from which perhaps baston a stick, and all its derivatives, or collaterals, may be 
deduced.”  
296 Preface, para. 38.  
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So aside from their status as discrete entries, the several entries beginning with by- (by-
coffeehouse through by-word) may also function as examples of a process of linguistic 
“composition.”  While etymologists now have a different and more complex story to tell 
about these examples of by, this entry shows how Johnson relates entries by comparing 
their structures and relations to one another. For Johnson, it is only by relating the various 
entries that this composition “will be understood.” A similar connection exists between 
several entries (to foreadvise, to foreappoint, to forebode, etc.) and the entry for the 
adverb fore, “a word much used in composition to mark priority of time, of which some 
examples shall be given.”297
 Some entries are connected through a loose network of explicit cross-references 
and implicit derivational and spelling similarities. In the following related entries, one 
who starts with one related set of entries and follow cross-references, variants, and 
etymons from one entry to another, to discover one set of “words of the same race” 
(Preface, para. 53). There is berg, its variant burrow, and its derivatives298: 
BERG. See BURROW.  
BE'RGMASTER.n.s. [from berg, Sax. and master.] The bailiff, or chief officer, 
among the Derbyshire miners.  
BE'RGMOTE. n.s. [of berg, a mountain, and mote, a meeting, Saxon.] A court 
held upon a hill for deciding controversies among the Derbyshire miners. Blount.  
 
 There is burgh, another variant of burrow, and its derivatives:  
BURGH. n.s. [See BURROW.] A corporate town or borrow299. . . .   
BU'RGHER.n.s. [from burgh.] One who has a right to certain privileges in this or 
that place. Locke. . . .  
                                                 
297 In 1773 Johnson adds, “A vitious orthography has confounded for and fore in composition.” 
298 It is not clear that Johnson considers bergmaster and bergmote as derivatives of the berg that he lists as 
a variant of burrow, since he lists them as deriving from Saxon berg, and he presents the berg listed as a 
variant of burrow as a derivative of “the Saxon burg, byrg.”   
299 1755: burrow 
    189
 
BU'RGHERSHIP.n.s. [from burgher.] . . . . 
BU'RGHMASTER.See BURGOMASTER.  
 
There is burg, its variant burrow, and their derivatives:  
 
BURG. n.s. See BURROW.  
BU'RGAGE.n.s.[from burg or burrow.] A tenure proper to cities and towns, 
whereby men of cities or burrows hold their lands or tenements of the king, or 
other lord, for a certain yearly rent. Cowel. . . . .   
BU'RGLARY.n.s. [from burg, a house, and larron, a thief.] . . . .  
BU'RGOMASTER.n.s. [from burg and master.] One employed in the government 
of a city. . . .  
 
As well, we find a variant of burgomaster: 
 
BU'RGHMASTER.See BURGOMASTER.  
 
And we find burrow, berg, burg, and burgh listed as variants, all derived from “the 
Saxon burg, byrg”:  
BU'RROW, BERG, BURG, BURGH. n.s.  [derived from the Saxon burg, byrg, a 
city, tower, or castle. Gibson’s Camden.] 1. A corporate town, that is not a city, 
but such as sends burgesses to the parliament. All places that, in former days, 
were called borough, were such as were fenced or fortified. Cowel. . . . .  
 
The use of borough in this illustration links this group of entries to that entry, and the 
etymology, linking these forms to the Saxon term for a “city, tower, or castle,” links the 
group as well to the entry for burh, whose illustrative examples, cwenburh and cuthbur, 
seem to be implicit examples of “composition” in Old English, or in Johnson’s terms, 
“Saxon”: 
BURH, is a tower; and from that, a defence or protection; so Cwenburh is a 
woman ready to assist; Cuthbur eminent for assistance. Gibson’s Camden.  
 
Johnson frequently includes entries for Old English words and morphemes that are often 
found in compounds, for instance those found in place names (caster, or chester; comb; 
stead; thorp), thus providing further examples of the structure and relations in the 
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presumed parent language of English. The example of cuthbur may be further elucidated 
by the entry for cuth, also taken from Edmund Gibson’s edition of early modern 
antiquary William Camden’s Britannia: 
 CUTH, signifies knowledge or skill. So Cuthwin is a knowing conqueror; 
Cuthred a knowing counsellor; Cuthbert, famous for skill. Much of the same 
nature are Sophocles and Sophianus. Gib. Camden. 
 
Users of the Dictionary can find other examples of Old English compounding by looking 
up the compounded elements of cuthwin, cuthred, and cuthbert—the entries for win, bert, 
and rad, which, according to “Gibson’s Camden,” differs only from red and rod “only in 
dialect.”  
The pursuit of these cross-entry connections is both encouraged by Johnson and 
facilitated by the nature of the Dictionary, in which Johnson either notes cross-references 
explicitly, or the cross-references suggest themselves to readers who investigate a 
headword’s related terms, whether they be variants, derivatives of a common etymon, or 
elements of a compound word.  By contrast, the thematic approach to reading the 
Dictionary, as DeMaria admits, requires finding ways to circumvent its structure—to 
“overcome the obscuring tendency of the alphabetical order.”300 And viewing the 
Dictionary as a discourse colony obscures the extent to which its entries are interrelated 
in ways that Johnson intended, and in ways that illuminate Johnson’s philological 
methods.    
* * * * * * 
                                                 
300 DeMaria, Jr. Johnson’s Dictionary and the Language of Learning, x.  
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By following connections among entries readers begin to see what appear to be 
Johnson’s own connections between different entries, his own observations of the 
“structure and relations” of the language, and how those observations inform his 
philological judgments. For example, Johnson’s conjectural etymology of bumpkin 
(defined as an “awkward or heavy rustick; a country lout”) seems to employ etymological 
reasoning based on his various observations of English “composition” and his sense that 
all words “will be better understood, as they are considered in greater variety of structure 
and relations”301:  
BU'MPKIN.n.s. [This word is of uncertain etymology; Henshaw derives it from 
pumkin, a kind of worthless gourd, or melon.302 This seems harsh; yet we use the  
word cabbage-head in the same sense. Bump is used amongst us for a knob, or 
lump; may not bumpkin be much the same with clodpate, loggerhead, block, and 
blockhead.] 
 
Johnson prefers to analyze bumpkin as a compound presumably analogous to others in 
the language rather than accept Henshaw’s less complicated derivation, which only 
requires a sound change from p to b and metaphorical extension. Johnson’s etymology 
for loggerhead proposes that the compound element logger derives from “logge, Dutch, 
stupid, and head; or rather from log, a heavy motionless mass, as blockhead.” Johnson’s 
derivation in bumpkin seems to prefer that logger be derived from log, “a heavy 
motionless mass,” which would make the element logger more analogous to clod, block, 
and bump. Other entries suggest Johnson’s understanding of the kin in bumpkin:  
Johnson’s fifth sense of kin, “A diminutive termination from kind, a child, Dutch: as, 
                                                 
301 Preface, para. 53.  
302 Lewis Freed identifies Henshaw as Thomas Henshaw (1618-1700), the editor of Stephen Skinner’s 
Etymologicon Linguae Anglicanae. See “The Sources of Johnson’s Dictionary,” (PhD diss. Cornell 
University, 1939), 38, 63.  
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manikin, manikin, thomkin, wilkin;”303 his interpretation of kin to mean “little” under the 
definition for diminutive: “manniken, in English, a little man;” and his etymology of 
malkin, in which the etymology supports the gloss on Shakespeare that Johnson includes 
from Thomas Hanmer’s edition of Shakespeare.  
MA'LKIN.n.s. [from mal, of Mary, and kin, the diminutive termination.] A kind 
of mop made of clouts for sweeping ovens; thence a frightful figure of clouts 
dressed up; thence a dirty wench.     Hanmer.  
                         The kitchen Malkin pins 
     Her richest lockram ’bout her reechy neck, 
     Clamb’ring the walls to eye him.     Shakesp. Coriolanus 
 
So if we consider individual entries as discrete units, unconnected to the rest of the 
Dictionary, we will overlook the kinds of cross-entry connections that Johnson often 
relies on to make his philological judgments. Moreover, we will overlook a way of 
reading the Dictionary that Johnson encouraged his readers to attempt.  
 While the reasoning of some philological judgments in the Dictionary may be 
clarified by contextualizing them via fairly obvious cross-entry connections, the 
reasoning of other philological judgments is only made clear by comparing them with 
related judgments found in the body of the Dictionary. This kind of comparison requires 
more familiarity with the Dictionary and more systematic scrutiny than the average user 
might bring to the text, yet it suggests that even when connections between the 
commentary in different entries are not made explicit for the reader, they were fully 
available to Johnson, whose philological judgment or etymology in one entry may be 
                                                 
303 The Dictionary does not include entries for thomkin and wilkin, examples added to this note in the fourth 
edition, but does include an entry for lambkin, “a little lamb.”  
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influenced by, among other things, his observations in another entry or several other 
entries.  
For instance, in attempting the etymology of the adjective slope, Johnson adduces 
a presumed Dutch cognate, loopen, in which the etymon, the “original,” may “be latent”: 
SLOPE. adj. [This word is not derived from any satisfactory original. Junius 
omits it: Skinner derives it from slap, lax, Dutch; and derives it from the curve of 
a loose rope. Perhaps its original may be latent in loopen, Dutch, to run, slope 
being easy to the runner.] Oblique; not perpendicular. It is generally used of 
acclivity or declivity; forming an angle greater or less with the plane of the 
horizon. Bacon; Milton.  
 
Johnson’s suggestion that English slope and Dutch loopen derive from a common 
“original” seems questionable on semantic grounds, which seem to provide the major 
rationale for Johnson’s positing the connection. But several other entries under the letter 
S reveal other data upon which Johnson may be connecting slope and loopen by means of 
sound change, not just tenuous semantic connections. Johnson’s commentary in other 
entries suggest assumes the existence of a sound change whereby s is added to the 
beginning of words beginning with c, k, l, m, n, p, q, and t, so that the consonant clusters 
sc, sk, sl, sm, sn, sp, sq, and st are created. Johnson assumes such a sound change, or 
“corruption,” in his derivation of scragged, scraggy, and spruceleather, and he considers 
this sound change as a possibility in the etymology for the verb smilt: 
SCRA´GGED. adj. [This seems corrupted from cragged.] . . . .  
 
SCRA´GGY. n.s. 2. [Corrupted from craggy.] . . . .  
 
SPRU´CELEATHER. n.s. [Corrupted for Prussian leather.] <no definition> 
Arbuthnot <no quote>; Dryden's Fables.  
 
To SMILT. v.n. [corrupted from smelt, or melt.] <The quote functions as the 
definition.>       
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   Having too much water, many corns will smilt, or have their pulp turned into a 
substance like thick cream. Mortimer.  
 
Johnson also assumes such a change produced the verb smirch, one sense of the noun 
squash, and the adjective squeamish: 
 To SMIRCH. v.a. [from murk or murky.] . . .  Shakespeare <2 times> 
 
SQUASH. n.s. . . . [from quash.] 3. Any thing unripe; any thing soft. In contempt. 
Shakespeare’s Winter’s Tale. ... 
 
SQUEA´MISH. adj. [for quawmish or qualmish, from qualm.] Nice; fastidious; 
easily disgusted; having the stomach easily turned; being apt to take offence 
without much reason. it is used always in dislike real or ironical. Sidney; 
Hudibras; Southern; South; Locke.  
 
In deriving to slop from lap, Johnson seems to demonstrate his idea of how it changed, 
again presuming a sound change, the addition of initial s, in order to buttress the 
connection he sees at the semantic level: 
To SLOP. v.n. [from lap, lop, slop.] To drink grossly and greedily. <No quote.> 
 
In the etymologies for spruce and to stumble, Johnson’s disagreements with other 
etymologists rely in part on his faith in the plausibility of this type of sound change: 
SPRUCE. adj. [Skinner derives this word from preux, French; but he proposes it 
with hesitation: Junius thinks it comes from sprout; Casaubon trifles yet more 
contemptibly. I know not whence to deduce it, except from pruce. In ancient 
books we find furniture of pruce a thing costly and elegant, and thence probably 
came spruce.]  Nice; trim; neat without elegance. It was anciently used of things 
with a serious meaning: it is now used only of persons, and with levity. Donne <2 
times>; Milton; Boyle; Hudibras; Tatler; Arbuthnot.  
 
To STUMBLE. v.n. [This word Junius derives from stump, and says the original 
meaning is to strike, or trip against a stump. I rather think it comes from tumble.]  
1. To trip in walking. . . .  
2. To slip; to err; to slide into crimes or blunders. . . .  
3. To strike against by chance; to light on by chance: with upon. . . . . 
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In addition to the assumption of this sound change in these entries, Johnson records 
etymons, cognates, or variants that presume or suggest such a change in the entries for to 
scrabble v.n., screen n.s., to slam v.a., to slash v.a. 2., sleeveless adj. 2., slippery adj. 7., 
to slubber v.a., to sneeze v.n., to splash v.n., to splice v.a., spurge, n.s., to squabble v.n., 
square adj., square n.s. 5, and to squeeze v.a.304  
 These less explicit cross-entry connections provide an important context for 
Johnson’s judgments in individual entries, such as Johnson’s conjecture that the adjective 
slope and Dutch loopen are etymologically related—a conjecture that might be less 
understandable without the context of similar commentary throughout the Dictionary. 
This larger context of entry connections is necessary for any scholar who wants to read it 
with an eye toward claiming what Johnson was doing, philologically speaking, in the 
Dictionary. This is not to say that Johnson expected readers to make these connections, or 
that he was always fully conscious of applying these connections himself. But when we 
note such patterns in Johnson’s practices that shed light on otherwise puzzling or 
inexplicable judgments, those patterns may reveal Johnson applying what Anne 
McDermott, in another context, has termed “an unstated, unacknowledged principle.”305 
In the above examples, it seems that Johnson was applying, or relying on, his ideas about 
                                                 
304 I exclude the  following examples from this list because they may imply not that Johnson presumes the 
addition of an initial s, but rather a change from k to s:  to snap v.a. [The same with knap.]. . . , snapsack 
n.s. [snappsack, Swedish.] A soldier’s bag: more usually knapsack , and snub n.s. [from snebbe, Dutch, a 
nose, or knubel, a joint of the finger.]. Johnson could have understood the appearance of s in these 
examples to have occurred after the k was lost, in which case the presumed sound change would be like the 
others in the list; or the k could have changed into an s. I do not attempt here to determine whether or not 
the s-initial examples are instances of the phenomenon Indo-Europeanists know as s-mobilé.  
305 McDermott, “Textual Transformations,” : 134. McDermott uses the phrase in the following context: 
“While it is broadly true that the majority of source texts in the Dictionary fulfill his criteria of being 
‘pleasing and useful’, some appear to be neither and so raise the possibility of an unstated, unacknowledged 
principle of selection in operation.”  
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what kinds of derivation is plausible, given the other data that he had accumulated and 
examined over the course of his work on the Dictionary. By recontextualizing Johnson’s 
comments with his comments in other entries, we may begin to see why Johnson thought 
certain derivations were more plausible than others—why he derived stumble from 
tumble, rather than stump, which has problems of its own. Whether or not Johnson was 
often correct, or often original, in his etymologies is not the issue here. Johnson was often 
wrong, in hindsight, and, like all other lexicographers, he borrowed from his 
predecessors. But even Johnson’s errors reveal something about Johnson’s views on 
language change and his linguistic reasoning in action. And Johnson presumably only 
borrowed the comments or judgments of others when he deemed them plausible, 
possible, worth repeating, or worth refuting.   
* * * * * * 
 Our understanding of Johnson’s philological practices and principles benefits 
from contextualizing his individual comments with respect to the metatext both inside the 
entry and across related entries. When seen in these contexts, Johnson’s inclusion of 
Scottish words and other dialectal forms in the Dictionary reveals one aspect of his 
philological methods: he uses contemporary dialect, or the testimony of oral language to 
buttress or amplify his conjectural interpretations, whether they are tentative definitions, 
etymologies, or glosses on older usage.   
GI'GLET.n.s. [geagl, Saxon; geyl, Dutch; gillet, Scottish, is still retained.]  
A wanton; a lascivious girl. Now out of use.  
   Young Talbot was not born 
To be the pillage of a giglet wench.  Shakesp. Henry VI. 
    The fam’d Cassibelan was once at point, 
Oh giglet fortune! to master Cæsar’s sword.  Shak. Cymbel. 
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    Away with those giglets too, and with the other confederate companion.  
Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. 
 
The inclusion of gillet among the relevant cognates provides support for the definition of 
a word out of use in England, and it provides a living link to a presumed etymon, Saxon 
geagl. Dutch geyl then forms a link between geagl and gillet, demonstrating the kind of 
sound change—loss of g—which, combined with the addition of a diminutive suffix et (a 
suffix Johnson refers to as a “diminutive termination” in the etymology for baronet), 
would lead to gillet. When read together with the headword, the etymons listed seem to 
demonstrate how one might deduce both gillet and giglet from geagl. These connections 
between giglet and gillet appear later as data Johnson uses to offer alternative etymons 
for the noun jilt: 
JILT.n.s. [gilia, Islandick, to intrap in an amour, Mr. Lye. Perhaps from giglot, by 
contraction; or gillet, or gillot, the diminutive of gill, the ludicrous name for a 
woman. 'Tis also called jillet  in Scotland.] 
1. A woman who gives her lover hopes, and deceives him. Otway's 
Orphan. 
2. A name of contempt for a woman. Pope.  
 
Johnson uses the Scots form jillet, which for him opens up the possibility of derivation 
from either giglot or the diminutive of gill.  
 Johnson does not only draw on Scots but on the language of his native 
Staffordshire to provide data where it is philologically instructive or useful. Under the 
entry for the noun lich, presented as it appears in the Dictionary, Johnson draws on Scots 
usage and the name of his home town, Lichfield, to help illustrate the structure and 
relations of words containing lich, as he does with the entries for burh and cuth, 
discussed above. 
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LICH.n.s. [lice, Saxon.] A dead carcase; whence lichwake, the time or act of 
watching by the dead; lichgate, the gate through which the dead are carried to the 
grave; Lichfield, the field of the dead, a city in Staffordshire, so named from 
martyred christians. Salve magna parens. Lichwake is still retained in Scotland in 
the same sense.  
 
Johnson likewise draws on evidence from Staffordshire under the entries for eame, 
gnarled, goldfinch, kecksy, moreland, and tup; and from Lichfield under the entry for 
minster:306
EAME.n.s. [eam, Saxon; eom, Dutch.] Uncle: a word still used in the wilder parts 
of Staffordshire.  
Daughter, says she, fly, fly; behold thy dame 
Foreshows the treason of thy wretched eame! Fairfax.  
 
GNA'RLED.adj. [gnar, nar, or nurr, is in Staffordshire a hard knot of wood 
which boys drive with sticks.] Knotty.  
Merciful heav’n! 
Thou rather with thy sharp and sulph’rous bolt 
Split’st the unwedgeable and gnarled oak, 
Than the soft myrtle. Shakesp. Measure for Measure. 
 
KE'CKSY.n.s. [commonly kex, cigue, French; cicuta, Latin. Skinner.] Skinner 
seems to think kecksy or kex the same as hemlock. It is used in Staffordshire both 
for hemlock, and any other hollow jointed plant.  
Nothing teems 
But hateful docks, rough thistles, kecksies, burs, 
Losing both beauty and utility. Shakesp. Henry V. 
 
TUP.n.s.[I know not of what original.] A ram. This word is yet used in 
Staffordshire, and in other provinces. <No quote.> 
 
The entry for gnarled also suggests that Johnson was paying attention to oral language. 
His variant spellings (gnar, nar, or nurr) may indicate that he is trying to spell a word he 
was accustomed to hearing among the boys of Staffordshire, rather than relating variant 
spellings he has come across in print.  Johnson’s oral evidence provides support for 
                                                 
306 Johnson also refers to Staffordshire usage under entries for goldfinch and moreland, and notes under the 
entry for the noun minster, “The word is yet retained at York and Lichfield.”  
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Johnson’s definition, and functions as an etymon that supports the definition Johnson 
provides, which is partially taken from the Shakespeare passage. As he suggests in his 
Preface to The Plays of Shakespeare, “He that will understand Shakespeare, must not be 
content to study him in the closet, he must look for his meaning sometimes among the 
sports of the field, and sometimes among the manufactures of the shop.”307 While in most 
of the examples Johnson seems to apply dialectal usage to interpretive problems—
glossing, defining, or deducing etymologies—the example of tup, whose verb form 
(defined by Johnson as “To but like a ram”) is also included by Johnson, shows that 
Johnson, as Donald T. Siebert argues, was willing to include colloquial language more 
readily than the Preface might indicate, even when he was not doing so to elucidate 
interpretive problems posed by etymology or by the process of abstracting definitions 
from usage.308  
The entry for micher further shows how Johnson draws on dialect and oral 
language to address his interpretive tasks in the Dictionary. Johnson first employs as his 
definition a gloss from Thomas Hanmer’s edition of Shakespeare, and notes that the term 
is retained “in the cant language,” adding in the revised fourth edition how it is “used in 
the Western counties”:  
MI'CHER.n.s. [from miche.309] A lazy loiterer, who skulks about in corners and 
by-places, and keeps out of sight; a hedge-creeper.  Hanmer.  
                                                 
307 “Preface to Shakespeare (1765),” in Yale Works, VII, 86.  
308 Johnson may or may not have recalled that the verb to tup also refers to the act of copulation between 
ram and ewe—a sense applied to persons in Shakespeare’s Othello, I. i. 89-90: “an old black ram / Is 
tupping your white ewe.”  
309 The definition of the verb miche reads thus, “To MICHE. v.n. To be secret or covered; to lie hid. 
Hanmer. Marry this is miching malicho; it means mischief. Shakesp” Hanmer is Sir Thomas Hanmer 
(1677-1746) who produced an edition of Shakespeare’s plays in 1744.  
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   Mich or mick310 is still retained in the cant language for an indolent, lazy fellow. 
It is used in the western counties for a truant boy.  
     How tenderly her tender hands between 
In ivory cage she did the micher bind.   Sidney.  
     Shall the blessed son of heav’n prove a micher, and eat blackberries? a 
question not to be asked. Shall the son of England prove a thief, and take purses? 
a question to be asked.    Shakespeare’s Henry IV. p. i.  
 
Here the different senses of the entry are not listed separately and enumerated down the 
column, as they could have been. The comments on cant and provincial usage are tacked 
on after the definition proper, as is common with usage notes.311 But while these 
comments do seem to relegate the forms and senses in question to nonstandard spheres—
thus lending the comments a prescriptive function—they seem to be included in the first 
place not for any prescriptive purpose but rather for their value to philology. If the cant 
and provincial senses are distinct from one another the senses are not enumerated as 
separate significations not just because they are usage notes but because they amplify the 
definition Johnson first lays down—Hanmer’s gloss. They comment on the definition 
while forming part of it. The cant survivals, though changed in form, retain some sense of 
the word as Hanmer defines it, serving as informal illustrations of the word—alongside 
the more formal examples of Sidney and Shakespeare. Moreover, they serve as examples 
of language change. And the comment on Western provincial usage, added to the 
revision, may not be a usage note or an interesting aside for the philologically curious, 
but rather a partial reconsideration of Johnson’s initial definition, an additional piece of 
semantic data which may be relevant to how the word is actually used in the Shakespeare 
                                                 
310 1755: Mick 
311 The comments begin on a new line, rather than following the definition immediately, as is the usual 
pattern.  
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and Sidney passages, a semantic nuance latent in the passages that Johnson had missed or 
not considered when compiling the first edition of the Dictionary. The O.E.D., in fact, 
employs the same passage from the first part of Henry IV to illustrate its third definition 
of micher, “A truant; one who improperly absents himself.” Dialect in the Dictionary, 
alongside the presentation of parallel textual readings, is another form of evidence for 
Johnson’s definitions when they depend on older texts; and these examples show how 
Johnson’s philology found him moving from the evidence of the page to the evidence of 
living language, from the language of the past to the language of dialect. As a man who 
had to negotiate his own way from West Midlands English to the prestige variety spoken 
in southeastern England, Johnson’s philological negotiations between language as he 























    202
 
Chapter 3,  Johnson’s Use of Corruption as a Linguistic Heuristic 
 
I. Introduction 
Anyone who reads Johnson’s Plan or his Preface to the Dictionary can see that 
“corruption” is a concept crucial to Johnson’s understanding of language change. In 
summarizing Johnson’s “theories of language,” Sledd and Kolb note in their classic study 
of the Dictionary that for Johnson, language change “is often ‘corruption.’”312 Lawrence 
Lipking suggests that Johnson, in this respect, is typical of his age, noting that when 
“eighteenth-century writers discuss the causes of linguistic change, the word they use 
most often is ‘corruption.’ Other favorites include ‘barbarous’ and ‘cant’. . . . 
‘Refinement’ and ‘polite’ describe more positive developments.”313 Among modern 
linguists, Johnson’s understanding of linguistic change as corruption contributes as much 
as anything else to his enduring image as a linguistic purist in an age of purism, as 
someone whose approach to language study is antithetical to modern, more scientific 
methods. Johnson is viewed as a pre-linguistic student of the English language whose 
Dictionary, with its “wretched” etymologies and its judgments of “low, bad” words, 
exemplifies an outdated, prescriptive approach to language study typical of “that pre-
Copernican age before philology was born.”314  
                                                 
312 James H. Sledd and Gwin J. Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 27. 
313 Lawrence Lipking, Samuel Johnson: The Life of an Author, 134. Citing two senses of Johnson’s 
definition of refinement, Lipking adds that refinement is “often used with a hint of irony,” since it may refer 
to “Improvement in elegance or purity” or “Affectation of elegant improvement.”  
314 “Everyone remembers Macaulay’s snap verdict: ‘Johnson was a wretched etymologist.’ He does not tell 
us who knew any better. Who should etymologize, beyond the limits of the obvious, in that pre-Copernican 
age before philology was born?” R. W. Chapman, Johnsonian and Other Essays and Reviews (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1953), 132. By “philology” Chapman here means historical and comparative linguistics.  
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Modern linguists who write on language change use Johnson and eighteenth-
century purism, as well as the enduring popular notion that for Johnson linguistic change 
is corruption or decay, as foils against which they can describe modern understandings of 
language change and modern approaches to language study.  In her account of language 
change, Jean Aitchison places Johnson in the contexts of a “puristic movement at its 
height” in the eighteenth century, noting Johnson’s statement in the Dictionary’s Preface 
that “Tongues, like governments, have a natural tendency to degeneration,” and his 
“urging that ‘we retard what we cannot repel, that we palliate what we cannot cure.’”315  
April McMahon cites Johnson’s comment on degenerating tongues as part of a “long and 
continuing tradition which sees linguistic change as an essentially retrograde process 
which should, if possible, be stopped. . . . This view is part and parcel of human 
nostalgia, the belief in a Golden Age which is always just beyond human memory, and 
manifests itself in a view that current languages and states of languages are profoundly 
degenerate compared with what went before.”316 Johnson’s attitudes here are offered in 
order to represent nostalgic, naïve views on language change.   
By using foils such as Johnson or the beliefs about language change he represents, 
the historical linguist can disabuse entrants to the field of “the popular attitude towards 
language change,” whereby “changes are often seen as corruption, decay, degeneration, 
deterioration, as due to laziness or slovenliness, as a threat to education, morality, and 
even to national security.”317  For modern practitioners of historical linguistics, one can 
                                                 
315 Jean Aitchison, Language Change: Progress or Decay?, 8.  
316 April M. S. McMahon, Understanding Language Change. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 323.  
317 Lyle Cambell, Historical Linguistics: An Introduction. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), 7. 
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truly begin linguistic study only after realizing that “language change is not a completely 
random, unprincipled deviation from a state of pristine perfection, but proceeds in large 
measure in a remarkably regular and systematic fashion, without any profound effects on 
our ability to communicate.”318 Thus Johnson’s use of corruption to understand language 
change seems to situate Johnson as a pre-linguistic thinker.  
Given these contexts within which Johnson’s use of corruption is discussed, it is 
not surprising that important studies of the Dictionary portray Johnson’s use of the term 
“corruption” within the Dictionary as a clear case of eighteenth-century prescriptivism. 
Harold B. Allen, in his dissertation on Johnson’s “linguistic judgments” in the 
Dictionary, includes “corrupt, v.,” “corrupt, a.,” “corruptly,” and “corruption” among a 
list of “the epithets and terms of approval or disapproval with which Johnson indicated 
his attitude toward words,” including “low,” “barbarous,” “cant,” among others.319 
Daisuke Nagashima, in Johnson the Philologist, reproduces and accepts Allen’s list as “a 
table of Johnson’s discriminatory labels.”320  “What Johnson meant by these terms,” 
Allen argues, “can perhaps best be seen by recourse to his own definitions of them, with 
the aid of the corresponding definitions from the Oxford English Dictionary.”321 Allen 
applies this same principle in a much later summary of the findings and conclusions of 
his dissertation, noting, “Ninety-four words are ‘corrupt’, ‘corrupted’, ‘corruptions’, or 
‘corruptly used.’ Extremest is ‘corrupted’ by the redundant expression of the superlative 
with –est. Draft is ‘corrupt’ for ‘draught’. To Johnson corrupt meant ‘Vitious; tainted 
                                                 
318 Hans Henrich Hock, Principles of Historical Linguistics, 2nd revised and updated edition. (Berlin and 
New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 2.  
319 Harold Byron Allen, “Samuel Johnson and the Authoritarian Principle,” 164; 172-73.   
320 Daisuke Nagashima, Johnson the Philologist, 128-29.  
321 Allen, “Samuel Johnson and the Authoritarian Principle,” 173.  
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with wickedness; without integrity’.”322 But Allen’s account of Johnson’s use of 
“corruption” contains two serious flaws. First, it significantly undercounts occurrences of 
“corruption” and its related forms in the Dictionary. Computer technology unavailable to 
Allen, in the form of a searchable CD-ROM edition of the Dictionary, now allows us to 
locate via keyword searches every occurrence of “corruption” as it appears in the 
Dictionary in its various forms.323  If one discounts uses of the term in the wording of 
definitions or occurrences in illustrative quotations, the1773 Dictionary contains 395 
occurrences of “corruption” in its various forms, including 20 occurrences new to that 
edition. Second, Allen assumes that all occurrences of “corruption” and its related forms 
are equal in terms of meaning and function. By choosing one of many significations to 
stand in for every use of every form of “corrupt,” “corruption,” “corruptly,” Allen 
performs an artificial act of semantic narrowing, restricting their possible range of 
meanings, and in doing so he disregards the contexts in which Johnson used these terms. 
In effect, every instance of “corruption” as Allen presents it provides more evidence for 
his view that Johnson was a man whose “mental make-up was that of the dictator.”324  
                                                 
322 Harold B. Allen, “Samuel Johnson: Originator of Usage Labels,” Linguistic and Literary Studies In 
Honor of Archibald A. Hill, Jazayery, Mohammad Ali, Edgar C. Polomé, Werner Winter, eds. (The Hague: 
Mouton, 1978), 199.  
323 I searched the CD-ROM Dictionary, which contains the text of both the first (1755) and fourth (1773) 
editions, by asking it to find all instances of “corrupt*”, which yields every instance of a word beginning 
with the string “corrupt” (corrupts, corrupted, corrupting, corruptly, and so on),  including “corrupt” itself. 
Performing this search yields matches that occur anywhere in the Dictionary—not just among etymologies 
or usage notes, but among definitions and illustrative quotations as well. For my particular purpose of 
finding forms of “corruption” among Johnson’s metatextual comments, this search overgenerated results, 
but those results yield important uses of “corruption” which contribute to our understanding of the rich and 
varied contexts informing Johnson’s understanding of, and uses of, the term. Anne McDermott, editor of 
the CD-ROM, describes ways to search the CD-ROM in the handbook accompanying the disc. See Samuel 
Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language on CD-ROM: The First and Fourth Editions, Anne 
McDermott, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 31-32.  
324 Allen, “Samuel Johnson and the Authoritarian Principle,” 146.  
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In fact, Johnson’s use of “corruption” in the Dictionary is more nuanced and 
polysemous than any study, or even Johnson’s writing in the Preface, suggests. Given 
Johnson’s various comments in the Preface on “corruption” and “depravation” in both 
oral and written language, it is valuable to discover that his use of the term “corruption” 
in the Dictionary reveals him employing that term not simply as a prescriptive note to 
bemoan, guide, or condemn usage as is generally believed, but also as an analytic term to 
describe language change. Johnson describes all sublunary change within a larger 
postlapsarian framework that entails corruption, but this does not preclude him from, at 
the same time, describing change in a scientific way—or in Johnson’s case, a linguistic 
way. So even as Johnson uses “corruption” in its still well-known, morally laden sense, 
he also employs the term in a more neutral, descriptive, now obsolete sense, once used by 
natural philosophers but generally overlooked by modern students of the Dictionary. We 
will not discover the nuance in Johnson’s use of “corruption” merely by consulting his 
definition of the term or corresponding definitions in the O.E.D., as Allen suggests. 
Rather, the subtle distinctions in Johnson’s use of “corruption” will best be seen in 
context, in observing his actual use of the term as he applies it along with several other 
evaluative and descriptive terms within what I call the metatextual elements of the 
Dictionary.  
 As I have explained in my general introduction, “corruption,” for Johnson, is a 
term of conjecture and linguistic analysis as much as it is a moral term.  In fact, many of 
Johnson’s comments on “corruption” are not dogmatic pronouncements but tentative 
conjectures in which proposed corruptions are hypothesized assessments of the linguistic 
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and textual evidence available. This use of “corruption” as a heuristic term is not new or 
especially distinctive to Johnson, but draws on the traditions of textual criticism, 
etymology, and antiquarian research that informed the eighteenth-century practice of 
philology. In positing corruptions, Johnson not only draws on these traditions, but also 
draws on his own observations and developing assumptions about what kinds of 
“corruptions” are plausible or likely. These include not only his several observations on 
changes in meaning, which have been widely discussed, but observations on the kinds of 
phonetic changes Johnson notes when deriving the French jour from the Latin dies. In 
positing plausible corruptions, Johnson begins to synthesize the thousands of examples of 
language changes he observes from etymon to headword, from cognate to cognate, from 
entry to entry, from writer to writer, from the west midlands of Lichfield to urban center 
of London. In positing corruptions Johnson also may be particularly inspired by his 
reading of the phonetic work of William Holder, whose Elements of Speech (1614) is 
quoted throughout the Dictionary.  
Ironically, Johnson’s very attention to corruptions for the sake of censoring them 
provides him an informal corpus of data from which to form notions about how language 
actually changes. In paying attention to “corruptions,” seen in the long view of history 
across time and from language to language, Johnson employs his assumptions about what 
kinds of censurable linguistic tendencies occur frequently in order to hypothesize 
plausible language changes.  Johnson the censor becomes Johnson the philologist. Yet 
this is not to repeat the simple trajectory from dedicated prescriptivist to qualified 
descriptivist that we find in many accounts and thumbnail sketches of the Dictionary. 
    208
 
Both Johnson’s belief in the value of what he regarded as carefully cultivated English and 
his deep interest in philological questions and pursuits precede and follow his work on 
the Dictionary.  
The copresence of prescription and description in Johnson’s uses of “corruption” 
parallels the ambivalence Johnson expressed about language change in the Preface. In 
Johnson’s varied uses of “corruption” in the Dictionary we find a kind of semantic 
aporia, a tension in his uses of the term that captures both his prescriptive and descriptive 
tendencies. While his Preface portrays living language as a chaos impossible to describe, 
Johnson’s descriptions of individual language changes in the Dictionary, when seen in 
context with one another, show him using the concept of corruption to describe language 
change as a process that involves clear, describable, intermediate steps. The usual reading 
of “corruption” in Johnson’s writings on language finds only lament and condemnation, 
the voice of the prescriptivist, yet Johnson’s use of “corruption” also reveals his efforts to 
describe language as it exists, even when he is not happy about it.   
II. Johnson’s Uses of the Term “Corruption” 
Johnson’s first definition of corruption, “The principle by which bodies tend to 
the separation of their parts,” suggests a general sense of corruption not as a moral or 
behavioral state of being, but as an inevitable natural law governing change in everything 
under the sun—from changes in speech to the rotting of apples. We find this sense of 
“corruption” throughout the Dictionary. Under the entry for reciprocal, Francis Bacon 
writes, “Corruption is reciprocal to generation; and they two are as nature’s two 
boundaries, and guides to life and death.” Under the entry for dissolubility, Matthew Hale 
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writes, “Bodies seem to have an intrinsick principle of alteration, or corruption, from the 
dissolubility of their parts, and the coalition of several particles endued with contrary and 
destructive qualities each to other.”325 Things corruptible, as defined by the Dictionary, 
include those things which are “[s]usceptible of destruction by natural decay, or without 
violence” (such as bread, flesh, bone) as well as those things that are “susceptible of 
external depravation; possible to be tainted or vitiated” (blood, air).326 Other reference 
works from the period reflect this now obsolete “philosophical” sense of corruption. The 
definition of corruption in the modest Dyche-Pardon dictionary of 1740 displays the 
popular, philosophical, and legal senses of corruption as follows:  
CORRUPTION (S.) a spoiling, abusing, perverting. In Philosophy, it is the 
mutation, destruction, or change of its form or proper mode of existence, that any 
natural body undergoes by time and other accidents. In Law, it is the disgrace, &c. 
that a man brings upon his family by treason or felony.327
 
And corruptibility is “an aptness, suitableness, fitness, or capacity of being debased, 
spoiled, bribed, or putrified.”328 Eighteenth-century encyclopedist Ephraim Chambers, in 
his Cyclopædia’s division of knowledge, places corruption under the heading of 
knowledge “NATURAL & SCIENTIFICAL,” and the further subheading of “PHYSICS, 
                                                 
325 1755 has coadlition for coalition. 
326 The quotes here come from Johnson’s definition of the adjective corruptible; the examples in 
parentheses don’t come from this definition, but represent things described by author’s of illustrative 
quotations as undergoing corruption at some time or other; see, for example, the definition of pestilent, adj. 
2, for an instance of bread; ruddiness, n.s., for an example of flesh; putrefactive, adj., for bone; purity, n.s. 
1, for blood; and permittance, n.s., for air. The wording of the definitions constitutes senses 1 and 2, 
respectively, from the entry for corruptible in the revised 4th edition of 1773. Johnson’s definition of sense 
2 in the 1st edition reads, “Susceptible of corruption; possible to be tainted or vitiated,” which Johnson 
seems to have revised to avoid circularity in his definition. All subsequent quotations from the Dictionary 
come from the revised folio 4th edition of 1773 unless otherwise noted and are checked against the 1755 
first edition.  
327 Thomas Dyche and William Pardon, A New General English Dictionary (Hildesham & New York: 
Georg Olms Verlag 1972 [1740]), sig. Zv. 
328 Dyche and Pardon, A New General English Dictionary, sig. Zv. 
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or the Doctrine of CAUSES; as…Modifications or Changes, as Alteration, Corruption, 
Putrefaction, Generation, Degeneration, Transmutation, &c.”329 Chambers both 
demonstrates the breadth of circumstances for which one might use the term corruption 
and distinguishes corruption from both generation and alteration. Under the entry for 
corruption, Chambers writes: 
CORRUPTION, the Extinction of any Thing; or the Action whereby it ceases to 
be what it was.  
 Thus, Wood is said to be corrupted, when we don’t see it remain Wood 
any longer, but find Fire in its stead. And thus the Egg is corrupted, when it 
ceases to be an Egg, and we find a Chicken in its room. 
 Hence that Axiom in Philosophy, The Corruption of one thing is the 
Generation of another. 
 Corruption, in effect, differs from Generation, as two Contraries differ 
from each other. See GENERATION.  
 It differs from Alteration as the Less from a Greater, or a Part from the 
Whole; a Thing being said to be alter’d, when it is not so far chang’d but may be 
known, and still keeps its old Name; both which it loses by Corruption. See 
ALTERATION.   
But, as in Generation, nothing of Matter is produced that did not before 
exist; so in Corruption, nothing more is lost, than that particular Modification 
which was its Form, and made it to be of such a Species. See FORM.330  
 
While the processes of semantic narrowing have, for the most part, made these senses of 
corruption obsolete, they were pervasive in the eighteenth-century, and both their 
prevalence and breadth of application suggest that by using what seems to be such a 
morally laden term of disapproval in a descriptive, analytical context, Johnson is 
participating in a tradition of discourse on corruption that can be scientific in local 
application, or descriptive in focus, even when its assumptions and vocabulary are 
grounded in Christian cosmology.  
                                                 
329 Ephraim Chambers, “Preface,” Cyclopædia: or, an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, 2 vols. 
(London, 1728), iii, sig. a2r. 
330 Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopædia, 332, sig. Qqqq2v.  
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Boswell’s account of Johnson’s derivation of jour, as I suggest in the 
introduction, gives us a good idea of the way Johnson employs assumptions about how 
language is corrupted to describe language changes as a series of clear, intermediate 
steps. Analogues to Johnson’s derivation of jour are scattered throughout the Dictionary, 
and they show how Johnson uses corruption as an analytic term to describe sound 
changes. In Johnson’s revision to the entry for owler, for instance, he supplements his 
original etymological conjecture, based on semantic change, with a derivation which, like 
the derivation of jour, proposes a series of “intermediate steps” by which sound changes 
proceed. The underlined material was added to Johnson’s 1773 revision.331  
O'WLER. n.s. One who carries contraband goods: in the legal sense, one that 
carries out wool illicitely. Perhaps from the necessity of carrying on an illicit trade 
by night: but rather, I believe, a corruption of wooller, by a colloquial neglect of 
the w, such as is often observed in woman, and by which goodwife is changed to 
goody. Wooler, ooller, owler.  
   By running goods, these graceless owlers gain.  Swift.  
   We understand by some owlers, old people die in France. Tatler, No. 56. 
 
As is the case with the derivation of jour, Johnson employs assumptions both about how 
language changes (“colloquial neglect”) and what particular changes are likely (“neglect 
of the w”), based on what “is often observed” in the language. While Johnson never 
approves of “colloquial neglect,” his point here is not to be prescribing usage, but to 
justify his derivation with arguments based on what he claims to be a common sound and 
spelling change. In addition to his observations on woman and goody (which he describes 
under goody, n.s. as “corrupted from good wife”), Johnson notes similar instances of  ‘w-
                                                 
331 In my presentation of entries from the Dictionary, which come from the revised 4th edition of 1773, I 
indicate revisions to the first edition by underlining material added to the text, and use strikethroughs to 
indicate deletions. Whenever revisions are too complex to present in this way, I present them in my 
footnotes or detail them in the body of the paper.  
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neglect’ under boson (“corrupted from boatswain”), cockswain (“Corruptly COXON”), 
gunnel (“corrupted for gunwale”), and hussy (“corrupted from housewife”). To simply 
read Johnson’s comment here on “corruption” as another prescriptive usage note is to 
ignore an important aspect of Johnson’s use of the term. There is no indication that 
Johnson is suggesting a preference here for the form wooler, nor does there exist an entry 
for wooler in the Dictionary (or the OED).  In Johnson’s revised analysis, corruption is 
both a proposed fact of the word’s history and a reoccurring observable process in 
language change.    
Similarly, Johnson uses “corruption” as an analytical tool when revising his 
derivation of bumbailiff. In the first edition the derivation between the brackets simply 
reads, “From bum and bailiff,” interpreting the word as a compound of bailiff and bum, 
which itself is defined thus,  
BUM.n.s. [bomme, Dutch.]  
1. The buttocks; the part on which we sit.332  
2. It is used, in composition, for any thing mean or low, as bumbailiff.  
 
But in the fourth edition, Johnson replaces his derivation with a new one and removes the 
second sense of bum. The new derivation proposes a process of “gradual” corruption.  
BUMBAILIFF. n.s. [This is a corruption of bound bailiff, pronounced by gradual 
corruption, boun, bun, bum, bailiff.] A bailiff of the meanest kind; one that is 
employed in arrests.  
Go, Sir Andrew, scout me for him at the corner of the orchard, like a 
bumbailiff. Shakespeare. Twelfth Night.  
 
The new derivation may be influenced by legal commentator William Blackstone, who in 
his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69) wrote that because “special bailiffs” 
                                                 
332 For brevity’s sake, I’ve removed the quotations used to illustrate sense 1. Johnson includes no quotes to 
illustrate sense 2.  
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were employed by the sheriff, who was “answerable” for any misdemeanors on their part, 
these bailiffs “are therefore usually bound in a bond for the due execution of their office, 
and thence are called bound-bailiffs; which the common people have corrupted into a 
much more homely appellation.”333 If Blackstone explains the meaning of “bound bailiff” 
where Johnson does not, Johnson presents the gradual, intermediate steps that led 
Blackstone’s “common people” to their “much more homely appellation.” After second-
guessing his original etymology, which may have made sense given the Shakespeare 
illustration and Johnson’s familiarity with bum “in composition,” Johnson turns to 
corruption, or more precisely “gradual corruption,” in order to explain Blackstone’s 
corruption. Johnson does not rely here on a Lockean association of ideas to explain the 
change but proposes sound changes: -nd to -n, -ou- to -u-, -n to -m. In the cases of 
bumbailiff and owler, the OED disagrees with Johnson. And in both cases, Johnson’s 
etymology requires more steps than his previous etymology. But what is significant for 
our purposes is his attempt to deduce a chain of sound changes and his analytical use of 
corruption to explain the change. 
Johnson employs the concept of “gradual corruption” elsewhere in the Dictionary, 
especially when the etymology of a word is unclear or in Johnson’s view unsatisfactory, 
sometimes and sometimes not identifying “intermediate steps” by which he views a word 
to change in form. For example, Johnson supplements his etymology for gun in the 
revised edition with a conjectural etymology grounded in the notion of “gradual 
corruption”:  
                                                 
333 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. 4 vols. A Facsimile of the First Edition of 
1765-1769 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), I, 334.  
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GUN. n.s. [Of this word there is no satisfactory etymology. Mr. Lye observes that 
gun in Iceland signifies battle; but when guns came into use we had no commerce 
with Iceland. May not gun come by gradual corruption from canne, ganne, 
gunne? Canne is the original of cannon.] . . . .  
 
Here again Johnson uses “corruption” as an analytic tool rather than a prescriptive usage 
label. Lacking any notion of regular vowel change, Johnson proposes a “gradual 
corruption” that relies partly on the semantic similarities between gun, cannon, and canne 
(or canna, as Johnson lists this etymon under the entry for cannon):  
CA'NNON.n.s. [cannon, Fr. from canna, Lat. a pipe, meaning a large tube.]  
1. A great gun for battery.  
2. A gun larger than can be managed by the hand. They are of so many sizes, that 
they decrease in the bore from a ball of forty-eight pounds to a ball of five 
ounces.334  
 
But as is the case with bumbailiff and owler, Johnson considers not only semantic 
similarities but also well known observations about sound correspondences and recurring 
sound changes in English, such as the similarities between sounds represented by the 
letters c and g and the common observation that final e becomes silent or disappears in 
English. Under the entry for the letter e Johnson posits the reasons for the loss of final e 
under the entry for the letter e. In Johnson’s account of final e-loss, the e first becomes 
“soft,” then “mute or vocal,” depending on the circumstances, and then “universally 
silent.” Johnson writes, “Anciently almost every word ended with e; as for can, canne; 
for  year, yeare; for great, greate; for need, neede; for flock, flocke. It is probable that this 
e final had at first a soft sound, like the female e of the French; and that afterwards it was 
in poetry either mute or vocal, as the verse required, ’till at last it became universally 
silent.”  
                                                 
334 I have removed quotes from Shakespeare, Clarendon, and Wilkins.  
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In entries other than the one for gun Johnson relies on a presumed correspondence 
between c (or ck) and g (or gg).  For instance, the verb haggle is “corrupted from hackle 
or hack.” The etymology of Muggy and its variant muggish is changed from “a cant 
word” in the first edition to “corrupted from mucky for damp” in the revised fourth 
edition. Under the entry for moky Johnson writes, “It seems a corruption of murky. In 
some places they call it muggy.”335 And in presenting evidence for the etymology of 
huggermugger Johnson presumes correspondences among g, gg, ck, and k:  
HU'GGERMUGGER. n.s. [corrupted perhaps from hug er morcker, or hug in the 
dark. Morcker in Danish is darkness, whence our murky. It is written by Sir 
Thomas More, hoker moker. Hoker, in Chaucer, is peevish, crossgrained, of 
which moker may be only a ludicrous reduplication. Hooke is likewise in German 
a corner, and  moky is in English dark. I know not how to determine.] Secrecy; 
bye-place. Hubberd’s Tale, Hudibras. p. i., L’Estrange’s Fables.
 
In all of these entries Johnson is drawing on the notion of corruption as one of the 
analytical tools at his disposal when deriving a word’s etymology, as he does in the 
etymology for huggermugger, where Johnson mentions corruption not to recommend or 
admonish against usage but rather to offer a conjecture about huggermugger’s derivation.   
 Johnson’s derivation of jour does not mention corruption, but his seeming 
confidence in relating the “intermediate steps” from dies to jour must be related to his 
numerous observations on corruptions in English, and his increasingly confident 
intuitions about them. Even when Johnson does not use the word “corruption” to describe 
change, he offers similar conjectures elsewhere in the Dictionary. In the etymology for 
                                                 
335 1755: “It seems a corruption of murky: and in some places they call it muggy, dusky.” No italics in 
1755.  
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the verb to dribble, for instance, Johnson proposes a derivation like the ones he gives for 
gun, bumbailiff, and wooler.   
To DRI'BBLE.v.n. [This word seems to have come from drop by successive 
alterations, such as are usual in living languages. Drop, drip, dripple, dribble, 
from thence drivel and driveler. Drip may indeed be the original word, from the 
Danish drypp.] 
 
While Johnson uses the term “successive alterations,” a term less provocative to modern 
readers than “gradual corruptions,” the case of dribble is not strikingly different from that 
of words he derives elsewhere as corruptions. Johnson’s conjecture about the 
etymological relationship among drip, dribble, and drivel relies not only on the semantic 
connections between these words but also on both the implied affinity between b and 
other “labials” as well as observations about how b, p, and v are “confounded” with one 
another or used “indifferently.” In his entry for the letter B Johnson notes that it has “a 
near affinity with the other labial letters, and is confounded by the Germans with P, and 
by the Gascons with V; from which an epigrammatist remarks, that bibere and vivere are 
in Gascony the same. The Spaniards, in most words, use B or V indifferently.” Johnson 
relies on such affinities even when he does not label them as alterations or corruptions, as 
in the case of his etymology for the verb to drivel.  
To DRI'VEL. v.n. [from drip, dripple, dribble, drivel.] 
 
The etymology Johnson provides for to drivel seems to represent what he explicitly labels 
elsewhere a corruption, and like the other examples we have seen, the “original” of the 
corrupted form is not necessarily recommended in favor of the corrupted form; the 
comment on corruption serves not so much to condemn current usage as to clarify the 
history of the word.    
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  Johnson’s comments on corruption, like those of other etymologists before him, 
are often conjectures rather than strictures. Under the entry for behalf, Johnson proposes 
an alternative to Skinner’s etymology, drawing on his assumptions and observations 
about how words are corrupted: 
BEHALF.n.s.[ This word Skinner derives from half, and interprets it, for my half; 
as, for my part. It seems to me rather corrupted from behoof, profit; the 
pronunciation degenerating easily to behafe; which, in imitation of other words so 
sounded, was written, by those who knew not the etymology, behalf.] . . .  
 
Just as Johnson’s derivation of of jour depends on his assumptions about what letters 
might be “easily confounded,” his alternative to Skinner’s etymology depends as well on 
assumptions about what forms might “degenerat[e] easily” into others, as well as 
assumptions about how both ignorance of etymology and the inclination to spelling 
“imitation” or analogy alters language.  
Under the entry for stocking we see Johnson similarly using the concept of 
corruption not so much to prescribe against usage but to offer a plausibly reasoned 
conjecture on etymology: 
STO'CKING. n.s. [The original word seems to be stock, whence stocks, a prison 
for the legs. Stock, in the old language, made the plural stocken, which was used 
for a pair of stocks or covers for the legs.  Stocken was in time taken for a 
singular, and pronounced stocking. The like corruption has happened to chick, 
chicken, chickens.] The covering of the leg.336  
 
Even if Johnson regrets such “like corruption[s]” as those presumably operating on stock 
and chick, Johnson is not recommending a return to the ‘uncorrupted’ form of stock; nor 
is he prescribing against the use of stockings or chickens. Johnson’s derivation of 
stocking shows him again using “corruption” as an analytic term. Johnson implicitly 
                                                 
336 Many quotes follow.  
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draws on the concept of corruption in his revisions of the entries for chick/chicken and 
mittens, even though he does not use the term “corruption.” In the revised entry for 
chick/chicken, Johnson adds, “Chicken is, I believe, the old plural of chick, though now 
used as a singular noun.” And in the entry for mittens, Johnson adds, “It is said that mit is 
the original word; whence mitten, the plural, and afterwards mittens, as in chicken.” In 
both the case of chick/chicken and mitten, Johnson’s comments supplement his original 
etymologies, [cicen, Sax. kiecken, Dutch.] and [mitaine, French.]. In the entries for 
chicken, mitten, and stocking, we see Johnson observing recurring processes of language 
change, and we see Johnson using observations made in one entry to analyze or reanalyze 
data in another entry. The “corruptions” responsible for the word chickens (chick, 
chicken, chickens), like the “successive alterations” by means of which drop becomes 
dribble, are “usual in living languages.” As such, they become facts for Johnson to 
reckon with, and Johnson often uses “corruption” both as a term to describe those facts, 
and as a concept to analyze the data he encounters in his entries.    
* * * * * * 
 In addition to the discourses of natural and moral philosophy, Johnson’s 
vocabulary of “corruption” and his practice of using corruption as an analytic tool draws 
on three traditions of philological discourse—textual criticism, etymology, and 
antiquarian research. Before working on the Dictionary, Johnson used “corruption” as an 
analytic tool in his 1745 Miscellaneous Observations on the Tragedy of Macbeth, a 
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sample of Johnson’s critical abilities intended to initiate a new edition of Shakespeare. 
Johnson proposes an alteration to the following text,337  
MACBETH. The service, and the loyalty I owe,  
In doing it, pays itself. Your Highness’ part  
Is to receive our duties, and our duties 
Are to your throne and state, children and servants,  
Which do but what they should, in doing every thing 
Safe tow’rds your love and honour. 
 
Having noted that this last line is “unintelligible” Johnson is not satisfied with the 
“emendation…which Mr. Warburton, and Mr. Theobald have admitted as the true 
reading”: 
Which do but what they should, in doing every thing  
Fiefs to your love and honour.  
 
Johnson proposes “a bolder change, perhaps with no better success”:  
---Our duties  
Are to your throne and state, children and servants, 
Which do but what they should, in doing nothing 
Save tow’rds your love and honour.  
 
Substituting the adverbial form of save, meaning “except,” for safe, Johnson takes the 
passage to mean that we “do but perform our duty when we contract all our views to your 
service, when we act with ‘no other’ principle than regard to ‘your love and honour.’” 
Johnson’s emendation here depends on the assumption that the text was probably  
first corrupted by writing “safe” for “save,” and the lines then stood thus, 
         ---Doing nothing  
Safe tow’rd your love and honour. 
Which the next transcriber observing to be wrong, and yet not being able to 
discover the real fault, altered to the present reading.  
                                                 
337 All passages from the Miscellaneous Observations are quoted from Johnson on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur 
Sherbo, vol. VII of the Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968), 3-45.  
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For Johnson the various intermediaries who came between Shakespeare’s presumptive 
ideal, authorized text and the eighteenth-century reader often corrupted the texts of 
Shakespeare. Johnson later declared, “The business of him that republishes an ancient 
book is, to correct what is corrupt, and to explain what is obscure.”338 The texts of 
Shakespeare were, in Johnson’s view, particularly subject to alteration, as they were  
copied for the actors, and multiplied by transcript after transcript, vitiated by the 
blunders of the penman, or changed by the affectation of the player; …printed at 
last without the concurrence of the authour, without the consent of the proprietor, 
from compilations made by chance or stealth out of the separate parts written for 
the theatre: and thus thrust into the world surreptitiously and hastily, they suffered 
another depravation from the ignorance and negligence of the printers, as every 
man who knows the state of the press in that age will readily conceive.339  
 
The “task of critical sagacity” requires that the editor of an old text be “versed in the 
writings of that age, and particularly studious of his authour’s diction.” “There is danger,” 
Johnson writes, “lest peculiarities should be mistaken for corruptions, and passages 
rejected as unintelligible, which a narrow mind happens not to understand.” Corruption 
was one of the causal explanations available to the textual critic in cases where “all the 
books are evidently vitiated, and collation can give no assistance.”340 In glossing an 
unintelligible or anomalous word or passage Johnson, like textual editors before him, 
attributes certain changes in Shakespeare’s texts to corruption, but corruption was one of 
several ways to account for an anomaly or problematic passage in a text.  
                                                 
338 Proposals for Printing, by Subscription, The Dramatic Works of William Shakespeare, 1756, in Johnson 
on Shakespeare, ed. Arthur Sherbo, vol. VII of the Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 51. All subsequent citations from the Proposals refer to this edition.  
339 Proposals for Printing Shakespeare, 52.  
340 Proposals for Printing Shakespeare, 56, 55.  
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In identifying and rectifying corruptions in the text, the textual editor would 
contribute to the history and accurate use of the language, because “the history of our 
language, and the true force of our words, can only be preserved by keeping the text of 
authors free from adulteration.”341 The close relationship between Johnson’s work as a 
lexicographer and his work as a textual critic has long been acknowledged, and is clear in 
his use of “corruption” in the entry for to begirt: 
To BEGI'RT. v.a. [This is, I think, only a corruption of begird; perhaps by the 
printer.] To begird. See BEGIRD.  
And, Lentulus, begirt you Pompey’s house, 
To seize his sons alive; for they are they 
Must make our peace with him. Ben. Johnson’s Catiline.342
 
While Johnson includes the entry for to begirt, the well attested form of begird in the 
imperative mood leads Johnson to expect that this instance of begirt may only be another 
instance of “the ignorance and negligence of the printers.” In the context of a critical 
edition of Ben Johnson’s work, this note on “corruption” serves primarily as an 
“emendatory” note, the kind “by which depravations [of the text] are corrected.”343 In the 
context of a dictionary meant to standardize the language, this conjectural tone of the 
note, signaled by the phrase “I think,” does not overpower the note’s implicit normative 
message: the reader should, at the very least, be wary of using begirt in this way. 
Johnson’s note here tries to keep the text of Johnson’s Catiline, and by implication the 
                                                 
341 “Preface to Shakespeare (1765),” in Yale Works, VII, 105. In the context of Biblical textual criticsim, 
the correction of corruptions could serve the pious purpose of rectifying seeming absurdities. An April 
1753 summary in The Gentleman’s Magazine of Benjamin Kennicott’s Hebrew Old Testament writes that 
the “author of this book is of the opinion, that the printed Hebrew Text is in many places corrupted; and 
that many sentences, which at present appear unintelligible, absurd or contradictory, owe these blemishes to 
the mistakes of the Jewish transcribers, and to the bad MSS made choice of for printing the Hebrew 
Bibles.” The Gentleman’s Magazine 23 (April 1753), 155. Emphasis in original.  
342 Ben Jonson is spelled Ben Johnson in the Dictionary. 
343 “Preface to Shakespeare, 1765,” in Yale Works, VII, 102.  
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language, “free from adulteration.” Yet the presence of the phrase “I think” suggests that 
the reader is left to judge.  
Johnson’s frequent use of “corruption” as a conjectural term also participates in 
the etymological tradition. Like textual critics, etymologists examining language change 
employed corruption as one of several causal explanations available to them, as is evident 
in cases where Johnson presents conflicting beliefs about a word’s derivation and where 
Johnson disagrees with or questions an etymology, as we have seen in the cases of gun 
and behalf, and in the case of to prowl.  
To PROWL. v.a. [Of this word the etymology is doubtful: the old dictionaries 
write prole, which the dreamer Casaubon derives from προαλης344, ready, quick. 
Skinner, a far more judicious etymologist, deduces it from proieler, a diminutive 
formed by himself from proier, to prey, Fr. perhaps it may be formed, by 
accidental corruption, from patrol.] 
 
In other cases, Johnson offers corruption as an alternative explanation of a word’s 
derivation when he can find no etymon or cognate, as in the entries for to cherup, to fillip, 
hist, callipers, trinket, oakum, and to pore: 
To CHE'RUP. v.n. [from cheer; perhaps from cheer up; corrupted to cherip.] To 
chirp; to use a cheerful voice.  
The birds 
Frame to thy song their cheerful cheriping; 
Or hold their peace for shame of thy sweet lays.  Spenser. Past.  
 
To FI'LLIP. v.a. [A word, says Skinner, formed from the sound. This resemblance 
I am not able to discover, and therefore am inclined to imagine it corrupted from 
fill up, by some combination of ideas which cannot be recovered.] To strike with 
the nail of the finger by a sudden spring or motion. Shak. Hen. IV.; Shakes. 
Coriol.; Bacon’s Natural History, No. 183. 
 
HIST. interj.[Of this word I know not the original: probably it may be a 
corruption of hush, hush it, husht, hist.] An exclamation commanding silence. 
                                                 
344 The eta (η) in the Dictionary is marked with a grave accent.  
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CA'LLIPERS. n.s. [Of this word I know not the etymology, nor does any thing 
more probable occur, than that, perhaps, the word is corrupted from clippers, 
instruments with which any thing is clipped, inclosed or embraced.] Compasses 
with bowed shanks. Moxon’s Mechanical Exercises.  
 
TRI'NKET.n.s. [This Skinner derives somewhat harshly from trinquet, Fr. 
trinchetto, Ital. a topsail. I rather imagine it corrupted from tricket, some petty 
finery or decoration.] 1. Toys; ornaments of dress; superfluities of decoration. 
<several quotes> 2. Things of no great value; tackle; tools. Tuss.; L’Estr.345
 
OAKUM. n.s. [A word probably formed by some corruption.] Cords untwisted 
and reduced to hemp, with which, mingled with pitch, leaks are stopped. Raleigh.; 
Dryden.  
 
To PORE. v.n. [. . . I imagine pore to come by corruption from some English 
word.] To look with great intenseness and care; to examine with great attention. 
<many quotes> . . . 
 
Long before Johnson, etymologists turned to corruption as an explanation for a word’s 
origin or history, especially where textual evidence was inconclusive or unavailable. In 
the case of the interjection halloo, whose “original…is controverted,” all of the 
derivations are presented as some sort of corruption: “some imagine it corrupted from a 
lui, to him! others from allons, let us go! and Skinner from haller, to draw.].” Sometimes 
Johnson disagrees with earlier proposed corruptions, as in the etymologies for booby, to 
cater, chime, pentice, scroll, and sillabub.  
BO'OBY. n.s. [A word of no certain etymology; Henshaw thinks it a corruption of 
bull-beef ridiculously; Skinner imagines it to be derived from bobo, foolish, Span. 
Junius finds bowbard to be an old Scottish word for a coward, a contemptible 
fellow; from which he naturally deduces booby; but the original of bowbard is not 
known.] A dull, heavy, stupid fellow; a lubber.  
Prior.; King.  
 
CATES. n.s. [of uncertain etymology; Skinner imagines it may be corrupted from 
delicate; which is not likely, because Junius observes, that the Dutch have kater 
                                                 
345 Johnson includes no entry for tricket. 
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in the same sense with our cater.346 It has no singular.] Viands; food; dish of 
meat; generally employed to signify nice and luxurious food. Ben. Johnson.; 
Raleigh.; Par. Lost, b. ii.; Philips.; Arbuthnot.   
 
CHIME. n.s. [The original of this word is doubtful. Junius and Minshew suppose 
it corrupted from cimbal; Skinner from gamme, or gamut; Henshaw from 
chiamare, to call, because the chime calls to church. Perhaps it is only softened 
from chirme, or churme, an old word for the sound of many voices, or instruments 
making a noise together.] . . . .  
 
PE'NTICE. n.s. [appentir, French; pendice, Italian. It is commonly supposed a 
corruption of penthouse; but perhaps pentice is the true word.] A sloping roof.  
   Climes that fear the falling and lying of much snow, ought to provide 
more inclining pentices. Wotton.  
 
SCROLL. n.s. [Supposed by Minshew to be corrupted from roll; by Skinner 
derived from an escrouelle given by the heralds: whence parchment, wrapped up 
into a resembling form, has the same name. It may be observed, that a gaoler’s list 
of prisoners is escrou.]  A writing wrapped up. <several quotes> 
 
SI'LLABUB. n.s. [This word has exercised the etymologists. Minshew thinks it 
corrupted from swillingbubbles. Junius omits it. Henshaw, whom Skinner follows, 
deduces it from the Dutch sulle, a pipe, and  buyck, a paunch; because sillabubs 
are commonly drunk through a spout, out of a jug with a large belly. It seems 
more probably derived from esil, in old English vinegar, esil a bouc, vinegar for 
the mouth, vinegar made pleasant.] Curds made by milking upon vinegar. 
Wotton.; King.   
 
Unlike the note on “corruption” in the entry for to begirt, which implicitly serves to 
prescribe the entry word, these notes on “corruption” do not prescribe against the entry 
words to which they refer. These notes are primarily conjectural, not condemnatory, in 
nature, and in this kind of context, the term “corruption” is part of the etymologist’s 
conjectural vocabulary.  
 Johnson’s use of “corruption” in the Dictionary also draws on the discourse of 
antiquarian fieldwork, as seen in the work of William Camden, quoted copiously 
                                                 
346 See Johnson’s definition for to cater: To CA'TER.v.n. [from cates.] To provide food; to buy in victuals.  
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throughout the Dictionary, as well as in The Gentleman’s Magazine, which printed old 
manuscripts and inscriptions as found by correspondents and encouraged readers to offer 
ideas about their meaning. Johnson frequently cites the work of early modern antiquary 
William Camden, both his Remains and his Britannia, a massive tome that comprised 
Camden’s personal search for the physical remnants of the antiquity of “Britain.”347 
Johnson’s entries for “Saxon” particles and their variants, such as the entry for 
al/attle/adle, come from Camden’s Britannia, as revised by Edmund Gibson: 
AL,ATTLE, ADLE348 do all seem to be corruptions of the Saxon Æthel,  noble, 
famous; as also, Alling and Adling, are corruptions of Ætheling, noble, splendid, 
famous.349  
Al, Ald, being initials, are derived from the Saxon Eald, ancient; and so, 
oftentimes, the initial all, being melted by the Normans, from the Saxon eald. 
Gibson’s Camden.350  
 
In the entry for bedlam, Johnson notes a corruption similar to the æthel to adle corruption 
(“corrupted from Bethlehem, the name of a religious house in London, converted 
afterwards into an hospital for the mad and lunatick). And the entries for ey/ea/ee, as well 
as the entry for ley, both constitute Camden’s observations on the presumably corruptive 
process of “melting” in language change: 
EY.EA. EE.351 May either come from ig, an island, by melting the Saxon gh into 
y, which is usually done; or from the Saxon ea, which signifies a water, river, &c. 
or, lastly, from leag, a field, by the same kind of melting. Gibson.  
                                                 
347 Johnson uses Edmund Gibson’s revision of Britannia, so the work of Camden is cited variously: 
Gibson’s Camden (bert); Gib. Camden (cuth); Gibson (rad); and Gib. (ord). It is not clear to me yet 
whether the many references to Camden in the text also refer to Gibson’s Britannia, whether they refer to 
Camden’s Remains, or both.  
348 Generally Johnson’s entries from Camden do not designate a part of speech.  
349 In general I transliterate the font for “Saxon” words. Thus I print a “thorn” as “th,” a “yogh” as “gh,” a 
“winn” as “w.”  
350 1755: Gibson’s Camden followed splendid, famous; Idem, ibid., rather than Gibson’s Camden, followed 
eald. The CD-ROM transcription of this entry incorrectly lists Æwel and Æweling for Æthel and Ætheling, 
mistaking a thorn for a winn.  
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LEY.n.s. Ley, lee, lay, are all from the Saxon leagh, a field or pasture, by the 
usual melting of the letter gh or g. Gibson’s Cam.352  
 
The term “melting” here seems to refer to a recurring process of language change; the     
“corruption” of  æthel to attle and the “melting” of eald to all are similar processes 
described with the vocabulary Johnson uses for language change. Johnson himself refers 
to “melting” in the Dictionary’s entry for the letter G, where he notes that before “n, at 
the end of a word, g is commonly melted away; as in the French, from which these words 
are commonly derived: thus, for benign, malign, i, we pronounce benine, maline, 
condine.”  
Johnson’s metatextual commentary on “corruption” in the Dictionary is 
comparable to the kind of philological discourse Johnson may have read in The 
Gentleman’s Magazine as he worked on the Dictionary.  From mid-century and on into 
the latter 1700s The Gentleman’s Magazine included engravings of inscriptions and old 
texts found by readers who wanted them deciphered. In order to respond to these and 
other questions, the magazine frequently relied on its philological correspondent, “Paul 
Gemsege,” the anagrammatic pseudonym for Samuel Pegge, who sometimes responded 
to questions, and who sometimes discussed philological points on his own initiative.353 
The philogical correspondence in the Gentleman’s, like the metatextual commentary in 
the Dictionary, applies the related interpretive techniques of the textual critic, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
351 Unlike the entry for AL, ATTLE, ADDLE, the entry for EY and its variants lists EY, EA, and EE 
vertically and to the left of a right bracket: }. 
352 In these entries I substitute “gh” for a “yogh.”  
353 John Hawkins, in his eighteenth-century biography of Johnson, identifies Gemsege as Pegge. See Sir 
John Hawkins, Knt., The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D., ed. Bertram H. Davis (New York: Macmillan, 
1961), 283 n.2.  
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etymologist, and the antiquarian researcher in order to interpret data from the past or data 
from the present whose origin is obscured by lack of historical data.  
In the Gentleman’s Magazine for February 1754, Gemsege tries to account for the 
idiom “to turn cat i’ th’ pan.” Its “sense is generally well enough understood,” but the 
“reason and foundation of it is. . . greatly obscur’d by a corrupt pronunciation.” Gemsege 
determines that cat “no doubt is cate,” an “old word for a cake or other aumalette,” and 
proceeds to lay out his evidence: “I will now produce some authorities for this word; 
offer a conjecture concerning its etymon; and then shew by a similar instance the facility 
and probability of the corruption.”354 In April of 1754, a correspondent to “Mr. Urban,” 
the editorial persona of the Gentleman’s, derives the phrase from the word catipani, 
referring to book from 1689 containing the derivation of English words. Another 
correspondent on the same page derives it from Greek.355 After consulting “Mr Urry’s 
edition” of Chaucer and the “first of the Harleyan MSS” Gemsege modifies his 
etymology of cate in the next month’s issue.356 In the Dictionary, Johnson refers both to 
the catipani etymology—which he later adjusts to Catapania in his fourth edition 
revision—and notes that an “unknown correspondent imagines, very naturally, that it is 
corrupted from Cate in the pan.”  
CAT in the pan. [imagined by some to be rightly written  Catipan, as coming 
from Catipania357. An unknown correspondent imagines, very naturally, that it is 
corrupted from Cate in the pan.] There is a cunning which we, in England, call 
                                                 
354 The Gentleman’s Magazine 24 (February 1754), 66. 
355 The Gentleman’s Magazine 24 (April 1754), 172. The first correspondent’s etymology reads as follows: 
“CATIPAN, turn Catipan, from a people called Catipani, in Calabria and Apulia, who got an ill name by 
reason of their perfidy; very falsly by us called Cat in pan.” 
356 The Gentleman’s Magazine 24 (May 1754), 212.  
357 1755: Catipani, revolted governours.  
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the turning of the cat in the pan; which is, when that which a man says to another, 
he lays it as if another had said it to him. Bacon.  
 
It is not certain that Paul Gemsege is Johnson’s “unknown correspondent,” or that 
Johnson’s etymology of “CAT in the pan” necessarily derives from these conjectures in 
The Gentleman’s Magazine; the definitions from carry to dame had already been printed 
for two years, according to Allen Reddick.358  
In any case, whether or not a particular line of correspondence in the Gentleman’s 
Magazine influenced a particular etymology in the Dictionary is not really what is 
interesting here. Rather, two things are notable. First, Johnson’s use of “corruption” in 
the Dictionary participates in the related, often avowedly conjectural discourses of textual 
criticism, etymology and antiquarian research. These discourses were closely related and 
were considered important and interesting enough to be printed in England’s most 
popular magazine of the mid eighteenth century.  These interrelated discourses were 
popular enough and common enough that Johnson could have participated in them 
without announcing that he was doing so. Second, Johnson’s comments on corruption, 
because they often participate in this tradition of learned correspondence, are often 
conjectural and dialogic. The kind of give and take in this etymological correspondence is 
crucial to our understanding of Johnson’s metatextual commentary in the Dictionary. 
Johnson’s commentary is usually considered to be aggressively, even arbitrarily, 
authoritative and hegemonic in manner, ethos, and function. But closer inspection of 
                                                 
358 Reddick also notes that Johnson had an opportunity to review proofs and make corrections. See The 
Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 40, 59, 81-2. One other entry in the Dictionary, curmudgeon, refers to “an 
unknown correspondent,” and two others, lazy and queer, attribute etymological information to a 
“correspondent.” A search of the CD-ROM turned up only these examples of such references to a 
“correspondent.”  
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Johnson’s commentary on “corruption”—given the contexts of textual criticism, 
etymology, and antiquarian research—shows his metatextual commentaries on 
“corruption” to be dialogic as often as they are hegemonic.  
* * * * * * 
Because Johnson’s comments on “corruption” often participate in the closely 
related contexts of the editorial, etymological, and antiquarian traditions, they implicitly 
invite correction, emendation, elaboration. They are dialogic traditions in which 
arguments and hypotheses are offered with the expectation, and in Johnson’s case 
sometimes even the hope, that readers, correspondents, or future authors will offer their 
own confirmations of or challenges to those hypotheses. Johnson indicates the conjectural 
and tentative nature of his etymologies both in the Plan and in the Preface, where he 
writes that “the etymology which I adopt is uncertain, and perhaps frequently 
erroneous.”359 Johnson’s frequent use in his metatextual commentary of qualifiers—
“may,” “perhaps,” “I think,” “seems”—further signals the often tentative nature of his 
commentary.  
In the etymology for to peep, Johnson explicitly points out the provisional nature 
of his commentary, offering it “till something better may be found”:  
To PEEP.v.n. [This word has no etymology, except that of Skinner, who derives it 
from ophessen, Dutch, to lift up; and of Casaubon, who derives it from 
οπιπευτης,360 a spy; perhaps it may come from pip, pipio, Latin, to cry as young 
birds: when the chickens first broke the shell and cried, they were said to begin to 
pip or peep; and the word that expressed the act of crying, was by mistake applied 
                                                 
359 Preface, para. 69. In the Plan, para. 26, Johnson writes that the search for “how are primitives are to be 
deduced from foreign languages” will “give occasion to many curious disquisitions, and sometimes perhaps 
to conjectures, which, to readers unacquainted with this kind of study, cannot but appear improbable and 
capricious.”  
360 I do not mark breathings or accents here.  
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to the act of appearing that was at the same time: this is offered till something 
better may be found.] 1. To make the first appearance. <several quotes> 2. To 
look slily, closely or curiously; to look through any crevice. <several quotes> 
 
Johnson’s derivation here is offered as tentative and subject to revision, implying that 
“something better” indeed might be found.  
SLEEVELESS adj. 2. . . . “to this <Skinner’s judgment> I cannot heartily agree, 
though I know not what better to suggest. Can it come from . . . ?” 
SQUIB. n.s. [schieben, German, to push forward. This etymology, though the best 
that I have found, is not very probable.]  
 
Johnson’s practice of admitting ignorance extends to his definitions and the notes to his 
edition of Shakespeare. “Some words there are,” he writes in the Preface, “which I cannot 
explain, because I do not understand them.”361 With regard to his notes on Shakespeare, 
Johnson wrote to a friend, “[W]here I am quite at a loss, I confess my ignorance, which is 
seldom done by commentators.”362  
Johnson’s etymologies, like the notes to his edition of Shakespeare, often 
broadcast their hypothetical nature, and they often present readers with reasoned 
alternative interpretations and the data upon which those interpretations are based. 
Johnson’s etymologies for pother and its presumed variant pudder differ even though 
Johnson considers them as variants of each other, hence a “word…of double 
orthography.” Johnson notes that the etymology is “uncertain” under pother and offers 
readers alternatives, including his own preference.  
PO'THER.n.s.[This word is of double orthography and uncertain etymology: it is 
sometimes written podder, sometimes pudder, and is derived by Junius from 
foudre, thunder, Fr. by Skinner from peuteren or peteren, Dutch, to shake or dig; 
and more probably by a second thought from  poudre, Fr. dust.] 1. Bustle; tumult; 
                                                 
361 Preface, para. 47.  
362 Letters, I, 159.  
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flutter. A low word. <several quotes> 2. Suffocating cloud. This justifies the 
derivation from  poudre. Drayton.  
  
The “second thought” here is presumably Johnson’s. After indicating his uncertainty, he 
displays alternatives followed by his own preference, in an etymology that remains 
tentative and subject to amendment. The presence of the etymologist is underscored by 
the phrase “by a second thought,” and by including this phrase the etymology reads more 
like a record of etymological ratiocination ending on the last thought than a positive 
declaration. When revising the etymology in the fourth edition, Johnson tries to clarify 
his reasoning further by adding that the second signification “justifies the derivation from 
poudre.” Johnson includes no related entry for podder, but under the entry for pudder he 
includes yet another etymology—suggesting that Johnson had a third thought about the 
derivation of this word of “double orthography”:   
PU'DDER.n.s. [This is commonly written pother. See POTHER.This is most 
probably derived by Mr. Lye from fudur Islandick, a rapid motion.] A tumult; a 
turbulent and irregular bustle. Shakesp. King Lear.; Locke.  
 
Here Johnson displays more confidence in the derivation from fudur, but his preference 
for Lye’s derivation does not foreclose a derivation that is more plausibly reasoned and 
supported by more evidence. Lye’s derivation is just the most probable in Johnson’s 
estimation, given the evidence. Johnson draws not only on the material in the entries for 
the nouns pother and pudder, but also the usage of the related verbs to pother and to 
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pudder, each of which Johnson derives “from the noun.”363 Johnson leaves readers to 
settle the question of which etymology to prefer, and which orthography to follow.  
Just as the notes to Johnson’s edition of Shakespeare present Johnson’s views 
alongside those of Warburton, Hanmer, and Theobald, Johnson’s etymologies offer his 
own views alongside those of etymologists such as Skinner, Minshew, and Junius. 
Likewise, the philological correspondence in The Gentleman’s Magazine gives space to 
various commentators who present their reasons and evidence for readers, who must 
adjudicate among them.  All parties to the dialogue expect contention over their 
assertions, and at least in Johnson’s case, it is believed that “there is no danger in 
conjecture, if it be proposed as conjecture.”364  In all of these fields of inquiry, in which 
conjecture is unavoidable, Johnson offers what he views to be the best extant evidence, 
even when that evidence is inconclusive. Johnson’s willingness to confess ignorance 
where unavoidable is consistent with his expectation, expressed both publicly and 
privately, that knowledge is the product of cumulative work by many hands, and that 
large works such as the Dictionary provide only a foundation upon which others will 
build. Johnson writes in the Rambler, for instance, “Every science was thus far advanced 
towards perfection, by the emulous diligence of contemporary students, and the gradual 
                                                 
363 Johnson’s preference for Lye’s “Islandick” derivation may also reflect Johnson’s seeming preference for 
“Teutonick” etymons when given the choice between a “Teutonick” original and a “Roman” one. Johnson 
makes this sort of preference clear in the etymology for cost: 
COST.n.s. [kost, Dutch.  As this word is found in the remotest Teutonick dialects, even in the 
Islandick, it is not probably derived to us from the Latin consto; though it is not unlikely that the 
French couster comes from the Latin.]. 
See also Johnson’s etymologies for to falter v.n., girl n.s. In the Preface to the Dictionary writes, “The two 
languages from which our primitives have been derived are the Roman and Teutonick: under the Roman I 
comprehend the French and provincial tongues; and under the Teutonick range the Saxon, German, and all 
their kindred dialects.” See Preface, para. 22.  
364 “Preface to Shakespeare, 1765,” in Yale Works, VII, 108.  
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discoveries of one age improving upon another.”365 Writing to Irish antiquarian Charles 
O’Connor, Johnson urges him to write a history “of the Irish nation, from its conversion 
to Christianity to the invasion from England.” Johnson writes, “[D]o what you can easily 
do without anxious exactness. Lay the foundation, and leave the superstructure to 
posterity.”366  
Johnson does not always come across as open to rebuttal, of course. In the 
etymology for to quaff, for instance, Johnson rejects the conjectures of Junius and the 
proposed corruption of Skinner, offering his own alternative, which seems to foreclose 
further debate.  
To QUAFF.v.a. [of this word the derivation is uncertain: Junius, with his usual 
idleness of conjecture, derives it from the Greek, χυαϕιζειν in the Eolick dialect 
used for νυαϑιζειν.367  Skinner from go off, as go off, guoff, quoff, quaff. It comes 
from coeffer, Fr. to be drunk.] To drink; to swallow in large draughts. <several 
quotes> 
 
Yet Johnson’s confident declaration that quaff “comes from coeffer” does not cancel out, 
even though it seems to belie, his declaration at the beginning of the note that the 
derivation of quaff is uncertain. In the etymology for hist, Johnson declares ignorance 
then immediately declares what the “original” of hist “probably…may be,” writing, “Of 
this word I know not the original: probably it may be a corruption of hush, hush it, husht, 
hist.].” Having declared his ignorance, Johnson then follows with the alternately 
confident and tentative phrase “probably it may be.” Ignorance, confidence, and 
                                                 
365 Rambler 108 (30 March 1751), in Yale Works, IV, 213.  
366 Letters (19 May 1777), III, 24. O’Connor (1710-91) was a member of the Royal Irish Academy and 
author of Dissertations on the Ancient History of Ireland (1753); see Letters, I, 151 n.1.  
367 I do not indicate breathings or accent marks.  
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qualification coexist in one of the Dictionary entry’s metatextual zones—between the 
etymological brackets.  
Johnson does not generally hesitate to offer his opinion in this particular 
metatextual zone, but his frequent use of qualitative hedges in his etymologies shows that 
he is well aware of their tentative nature. He would not have needed to point out that fact 
in every etymology as he does for to peep. In his Preface, Johnson qualifies his 
pretensions to authority as an etymologist, and indicates that some of the information 
between the etymological brackets is not even intended to determine the word’s etymon, 
but is included, rather, to provide information useful toward determining an etymology, 
especially as it pertains to meaning or usage. For example, Johnson sometimes places 
“Dutch and German substitutes” between the etymological brackets, “which I consider 
not as radical, but parallel, not as the parents, but sisters of the English.” These words are 
purported to be “related by descent or cognation. . . . It is sufficient, in etymological 
enquiries, if the senses of kindred words be found such as may easily pass into each 
other, or such as may both be referred to one general idea.”368 The entry for to strew, 
including its revision, shows how Johnson employs these lexical relations “by descent or 
cognation” are offered to readers who can consider them when evaluating Johnson’s 
tentative advice on the orthographic choice between strew and strow:  
1st edition:  
To STREW. v.a. [The orthography of this word is doubtful: it is generally written 
strew, and I have followed custom; but Skinner likewise proposes strow, and 
Junius writes straw. Their reasons will appear in the word from which it may be 
derived. Strawan, Gothick; stroyen, Dutch; streawian, Sax. strawen, German; 
                                                 
368 Preface, paras. 26, 27.  
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strôer, Danish. Perhaps strow is best, being that which reconciles etymology with 
pronunciation.]  
 
4th edition:  
To STREW. v.a.  [The orthography of this word is doubtful: it is sometimes 
written strew, and sometimes strow, I have taken both: Skinner proposes strow, 
and Junius writes straw. Their reasons will appear in the word from which it may 
be derived. Strawan, Gothick; stroyen, Dutch; streawian369, Sax. strawen, 
German; strôer, Danish.  Perhaps strow is best, being that which reconciles 
etymology with pronunciation. See STROW.] 
 
Here Johnson’s advice on usage depends on an unresolved etymology, and his judgment 
on usage is offered as a reasoned proposal, not an edict.  
* * * * * * 
Johnson’s comments on etymology can glide imperceptibly, at times, into 
comments on usage, and it is crucial to understand this in our readings of Johnson’s notes 
on “corruption,” because at times they function as etymologies, at times they function as 
usage notes, and at times their function and effect lie somewhere amid the three points of 
what we might call Johnson’s hermeneutic triangle: etymology, usage, and meaning. In 
determining meaning and advising usage, Johnson often turns to etymology; but 
Johnson’s etymologies themselves may be confirmed by meaning as it is found in actual 
usage, as is seen in Johnson’s definition of the intransitive sense of to atone: 
To ATO'NE.v.n.[from at one, as the etymologists remark, to be at one, is the 
same as to be in concord. This derivation is much confirmed by the following 
passage of Shakespeare, and appears to be the sense still retained in Scotland.] 1. 
To agree; to accord.  
     He and Ausidus can no more atone, 
Than violentest contrariety. Shakesp. Coriolanus. 
 
                                                 
369 In both versions of to strew I have changed a “winn” to “w.” 
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Because Johnson’s definitions often arise from the usage of older authors, such as 
Shakespeare and Spenser, he often will use the evidence of contemporary oral language 
in areas retaining usage that is scarce or obsolete in the English of southeastern England 
that was taken to be standard English. So in the entry for atone, Johnson’s etymology and 
definition are supported by a Shakespeare passage and Scottish usage. The interplay 
between usage, meaning, and etymology in this entry reveals the kind of overlap among 
Johnson’s interpretive strategies that one often finds in his metatextual commentary, and 
the valence of Johnson’s term “corruption” can shift, be bivalent, or be multivalent when 
used in Johnson’s metatextual commentary.  Johnson’s commentary on bestraught 
functions simultaneously as a comment on usage, etymology, and meaning.  
BESTRA'UGHT.particip. [Of this participle I have not found the verb; by analogy 
we may derive it from bestract; perhaps it is corrupted from distraught.] 
Distracted; mad; out of one’s senses; out of one’s wits.  
Ask Marian, the fat alewife, if she knew me not. What! 
I am not bestraught.   Shakespeare. Tam. the Shrew.  
 
While Johnson defines this word, his note raises questions about the very status of the 
word, which may merely be “corrupted from distraught”—corrupted by Shakespeare or 
by one of the many textual intermediaries (printers, actors) between Shakespeare and 
reader to whom Johnson ascribes textual corruptions. Johnson may even suspect that the 
“corruption,” if it is a “corruption,” was an intentional malapropism employed by 
Shakespeare to characterize Christopher Sly, the drunk tinker who speaks these lines.370 
By questioning the status of the word, Johnson’s comment on “corruption” is a kind of 
                                                 
370 In a “General Observation” note added in 1773 to Johnson’s edition of The Merry Wives of Windsor, 
Johnson comments not on malapropisms, but an analogous “mode of forming ridiculous characters” 
whereby they use “language distorted and depraved by provincial or foreign pronunciation.” See Arthur 
Sherbo, “1773: The Year of Revision,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 7 (1973): 36.  
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caveat lector, a warning to the reader that this word may be a textual misprint or mistake 
that should not be repeated. At the same time, the connection for Johnson between 
bestraught and distraught seems the primary basis for Johnson’s definition, and alongside 
his etymology—“by analogy we may derive it from bestract”—the use of “corruption” 
serves as an alternate etymology to Johnson’s conjecture that bestract/bestraught may 
have once existed alongside distract/distraught.371  
Trying to determine to which side of the prescriptive/descriptive divide Johnson’s 
use of “corruption” falls can be difficult, and is not neatly resolved by judging that 
“corruption” is descriptive when used in etymologies and prescriptive when used in usage 
notes. At times, Johnson’s observation on corruption may serve both as etymology and as 
at least an implicit usage note. In the etymology for meslin, Johnson’s comment on 
corruption, again, serves as the basis for an alternative etymology.  
ME'SLIN. n.s. [from mesler, French, to mix; or rather corruptly pronounced for 
mescellane <listed as miscellane in 1755>. See MASLIN.] Mixed corn: as, wheat 
and rie. Hooker < meslin>; Tusser <mestlin>.  
 
The 1755  edition, lacking an entry for maslin, does contain one for mastlin, very close to 
entry for meslin.  
MA'STLIN. n.s. [from mesler, French, to mingle; or rather corrupted from 
miscellane.] Mixed corn; as, wheat and rye. Tusser's Husb.  
 
Johnson’s comment on corruption is yet another conjecture about the word’s origin, but 
by the time Johnson arrives at the entry for mislen he drops the possible French etymon, 
perhaps more confident in his own analysis of corruption from miscellane.  
                                                 
371 Johnson lists “destraught” as the old form of the participle for distract: “To DISTRA'CT. part. pass. 
distracted; anciently distraught; and sometimes distract. [distractus, Lat.].” 
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 MI'SLEN. n.s. [corrupted from miscellane.] Mixed corn: as, wheat and rie.  
They commonly sow those lands with wheat, mislen, and barley. 
Mortimer’s Husbandry. 
 
 By the time Johnson decides to drop mesler as a possible etymon for mislen, he has 
already considered this question three times, in the entries for mastlin, meslin, as well as 
the entry for miscellane.  
MISCELLA'NE. n.s. [miscellaneus, Lat. This is corrupted into mastlin or 
mestlin.] Mixed corn: as, wheat and rye.  
It is thought to be of use to make some miscellane in corn; as if you sow a 
few beans with wheat, your wheat will be the better. Bacon’s Nat. Hist. 
No. 670. 
 
When Johnson later revises the Dictionary, he adds an entry for maslin, and again drops 
mesler as a possible etymon.  
MA'SLIN. adj. [corrupted from miscellane.] Composed of various kinds; as, 
maslin bread, made of wheat and rye. <no quote> 
 
In all of these cases Johnson’s comment on corruption serves as his best explanation of a 
word’s derivation. This alone does not suggest a preference for miscellane—a form 
which, with respect to the forms maslin or mastlin, preserves more traces of its 
etymology—but for those readers who subcribe to Johnson’s expressed view in the 
Preface that “I have always considered” the “true orthography” of words as “depending 
on their derivation,” the other forms, mastlin, meslin, and mislen, become less attractive 
and perhaps implicitly stigmatized if miscellaneus is the etymon.372 Moreover, miscellane 
may carry more weight because it is attested by Bacon in his Natural History. Johnson’s 
                                                 
372 The Dictionary, however, does not resolve the spelling questions it raises about these forms because 
meslin, if one takes the French mesler as its etymon, preserves more traces of its etymology than a form 
like mastlen. For Johnson the etymon that matters most is not the one that is historically most prior, but the 
one responsible for introducing the word to English. Thus “I write enchant, enchantment, enchanter, after 
the French, and incantation after the Latin; thus entire is chosen rather than intire, because it passed to us 
not from the Latin integer, but from the French entier.” See Preface, para. 11.  
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judgment that a word is derived by means of corruption does not necessarily proscribe 
that word, as the examples of gun and stocking attest. But by listing miscellane as an 
entry word alongside such “corrupted” forms as maslin, mastlin, meslin, and mislin 
Johnson’s etymologies of those words may implicitly mark them as less preferable to 
miscellane. If so, those etymologies function as implicit usage notes.  At the same time, 
Johnson’s interpretation of those forms as corruptions of miscellane performs a 
philological function, providing an etymological basis, however inaccurate, for the 
meaning of maslin and its orthographic counterparts, as found in the texts of Tusser, 
Mortimer, or common parlance. In any case, Johnson leaves room for future scholars to 
correct his etymologies and for readers to dispute his spelling preferences. As he notes in 
the Preface, his work “is yet capable of many improvements.” The “orthography which I 
recommend is still controvertible, the etymology which I adopt is uncertain, and perhaps 
frequently erroneous.”373
As suggested in the previous chapter, the structure of Johnson’s entries—with 
etymologies generally occurring within brackets and usage notes at the end of an entry—
belies the fact that usage notes may appear within the brackets and etymological 
speculations may occur at the end of an entry within or without the brackets. Thus we 
should be prepared to read both of these spaces within an entry as containing metatextual 
commentaries that reflect on or complement one another, rather than operating in 
isolation. The location of the term “corruption,” in itself, does not determine in any 
simple way the import of the term. The signification of “corruption” can vary along a 
                                                 
373 Preface, para. 69.  
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spectrum from descriptive to prescriptive, sometimes signifying both at the same time, 
whether it appears within the etymological brackets or at the end of a definition, in a 
space usually reserved for usage notes. The context of the term “corruption,” both within 
the entry, and alongside closely related entries, is important for interpreting its 
signification.  
 These caveats aside, it is possible to suggest some seeming tendencies in 
Johnson’s uses of “corruption.” First, the term “corruption,” which is often interpreted 
simply as a usage note, occurs more often than not between the etymological brackets, 
and often carries some etymological significance. In the etymology for belfry, Johnson’s 
language suggests his disapproval of the process of corruption, but his discussion of 
corruption serves as a conjectural etymology.  
BE'LFRY. n.s. [Beffroy, in French, is a tower; which was perhaps the true word, 
till those, who knew not its original, corrupted it to belfry, because bells were in 
it.] The place where the bells are rung.  
Fetch the leathern bucket that hangs in the belfry; that is curiously painted 
before, and will make a figure. Gay’s What d’ ye call it. 
 
As is the case with many other examples we have seen, there is no indication that 
Johnson is urging readers to use beffroy, “which was perhaps the true word,” or even a 
spelling more true to the presumed etymon. Johnson’s qualifier, “perhaps,” indicates that 
Johnson is not even sure that beffroy is the etymon or the “true word.” Even if the 
discussion of belfry is one of those inquiries into the “true orthography” of words, which, 
as Johnson declares in the Preface, “I have always considered as depending on their 
derivation,” it is not clear that the inquiry also functions as a proscription of belfry. The 
normative effect of this etymology is that it reinforces the idea that ignorance of 
    241
 
etymology corrupts the language, and that such ignorance is regrettable and should be 
avoided, even if it is too late to do anything about belfry, whose corruption may stand as 
one of those things “tolerated among the imperfections of human things, and which 
require only to be registered, that they may not be increased, and ascertained, that they 
may not be confounded.”374  
When the noun and participle forms, “corruption” and “corrupted,” appear in an 
entry they do not necessarily denote prescription except when accompanied by a modifier 
indicates a clearly prescriptive message or intent. For example, under the entry for lesser 
Johnson calls it “a barbarous corruption of less, formed by the vulgar from the habit of 
terminating comparatives in er; afterwards adopted by poets, and then by writers of 
prose.” The fact Johnson has to call it a “barbarous” corruption suggests that simply to 
call it a “corruption” would not suffice to indicate Johnson’s disapproval of this form. 
Johnson’s account of how a lexical corruption is transmitted from person to person reads 
like a morality tale in miniature. It shows how corruption tends to spread and reminds the 
reader that the spread of such corruptions might be avoided by a kind of verbal 
abstinence. Such words spread both by the “habit” and adoption of speakers and writers 
who embrace them. Not content with saying this much, Johnson adds another point to 
underscore the moral, even as that point seems simultaneously to indicate Johnson’s 
recalcitrant resignation to the “authority” of “custom”:  
LE'SSER. adj. A barbarous corruption of less, formed by the vulgar from the 
habit of terminating comparatives in er; afterwards adopted by poets, and then by 
writers of prose, till it has all the authority which a mode originally erroneous can 
derive from custom.  
                                                 
374 Preface, para. 6.  
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In this entry, the context of Johnson’s comment on “corruption” seems to underscore a 
prescriptive intent that the term on its own, used alternately for prescriptive and 
descriptive purposes, does not necessarily convey. Here Johnson’s comments on 
corruption seem calculated not to address philological questions, but to operate as a 
salutary reminder of how corruption spreads, even among those who presumably should 
know better. Both  lesser and its relative worser, in fact, were listed by Johnson in his 
original “Scheme” for the Dictionary as examples of the “[b]arbarous and impure Words” 
he would brand “with some note of infamy,” adding that “they are carefully to be 
eradicated wherever they are found, and they may be discovered too frequently in the 
best authors.”375  
Johnson certainly discourages corruption, but the tendencies he derides under the 
umbrella term “corruption” form the basis of his understanding of how languages and 
texts change. The morally loaded sense of “corruption” is never simply extricable from 
Johnson’s use of the word, but there are times when Johnson’s use of the term shifts from 
the field of moral philosophy to that of natural philosophy, when Johnson uses the term to 
explain or analyze, not just to deride or prescribe. Unlike Johnson’s eighteenth-century 
readers, we are less likely to be sensitive to this kind of semantic slippage in the term 
“corruption,” made possible by its simultaneous use in the eighteenth century as a term of 
both moral and natural philosophy. Thus Johnson’s observations on corruption are not 
                                                 
375 Samuel Johnson, “A Short Scheme for compiling a new Dictionary of the English Language.” The 
manuscript for the “Scheme” is reproduced in facsimile in The R. B. Adam Library Relating to Dr. Samuel 
Johnson and His Era, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), pages unnumbered. This citation 
can be found on page 17 of the manuscript, which is numbered as such in Johnson’s hand. Johnson includes 
this same passage, only slightly revised, in the Plan, para. 66.  
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merely the prescriptions of a persnickety lexicographer; they constitute Johnson’s 
conjectures and assumptions about how language changes. 
Herein lies the cause of aporia, or at least ambiguity, in Johnson’s use of 
corruption: he uses the same term, “corruption,” both as a prescriptive usage label and as 
a term of inquiry and analysis. In some cases, its prescriptive force is apparent in entries 
like clouted, thenceforth, uncomeatable, and to powder: 
CLO'UTED. participial adj. Congealed; coagulated: corruptly used for clotted.  
       I’ve seen her skim the clouted cream, 
And press from spongy curds the milky stream.Gay’s Past. 
 
THE'NCEFORTH. adv. [thence and forth.] 2. From thenceforth is a barbarous 
corruption, though it has crept into books where it ought not to be found. Milton.; 
Locke.376  
 
UNCO'MEATABLE. adj.  Inaccessible; unattainable. A low, corrupt word. <sic> 
 
To PO'WDER. v.n. To come tumultuously and violently. A low corrupt word.  
   Whilst two companions were disputing it at sword’s point, down comes a kite 
powdering upon them, and gobbets up both. L’Estrange. 
 
Johnson’s use of the term in the default location for usage notes and his use of modifiers 
“low” and “barbarous” reinforce the status here of “corrupt” as a prescriptive term. So 
does the use of the adverb and adjective “corruptly” and “corrupt.” A word described as 
“corruptly used” for another word would seem to demonstrate poor usage. Likewise, the 
phrase a “corrupt word,” like the phrases “bad word” or a “low word,” seems to suggest 
something about the word’s status. The emphasis in these adjectival and adverbial uses 
(e.g., “PARMA'CITTY. n.s. Corruptedly for sperma ceti”) seems to be placed not on how 
the word is derived or formed, but on how it is used. The use of the adverb “corruptedly” 
                                                 
376 1755: From thenceforth is a barbarous corruption crept into later books.  
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or “corruptly” suggests that the entry word in question is used in a reprehensible or 
incorrect way, and use of the adjective “corrupt” suggests that corruption is a core 
attribute of the word and effectively brands the word as one to be avoided.377 This use of 
“corruption” is well known enough, but some entries straddle the line between the 
descriptive and prescriptive functions of the term “corruption.”  In the entry for glum, 
Johnson’s comment on corruption serves as an etymology for the word, but the 
etymology is joined with a usage note designating the word with two cautionary labels, 
“low” and “cant”: 
GLUM. adj. [A low cant word formed by corrupting gloom.] Sullen; stubbornly 
grave.  
Some, when they hear a story, look glum, and cry, Well, what then? 
Guardian. 
 
In the entry for for compatible, the term “corrupted” both serves as the etymology and the 
basis for Johnson’s judgment that competible “ought always to be used”: 
COMPA'TIBLE. adj. [corrupted, by an unskilful compliance with pronunciation, 
from competible, from competo, Latin, to suit, to agree.  Competible is found in 
good writers, and ought always to be used.]  
1. Suitable to; fit for; consistent with; not incongruous to.  
   The object of the will is such a good as is compatible to an intellectual 
nature.  Hale’s Origin of Mankind. 
2. Consistent; agreeable.  
   Our poets have joined together such qualities as are by nature the most 
compatible; valour with anger, meekness with piety, and prudence with 
dissimulation.  Broome.  
 
While the mention of corruption in one of Johnson’s etymologies, as we have seen, does 
not in itself amount to a recommendation on usage, its proximity in this entry to an 
                                                 
377 Yet when writing of “low terms,” Johnson points out in Rambler 168 that words are not innately “low;” 
such values are “arbitrarily and capriciously established.” “No word is naturally or intrinsically meaner 
than another; our opinion therefore of words, as of other things arbitrarily and capriciously established, 
depends wholly upon accident and custom.” Yale Works, V, 126.  
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unequivocal usage note gives it more prescriptive force. So does the language of the entry 
for competible, wherein compatible is described as the result of “corrupt orthography”:  
COMPE'TIBLE. adj. [from competo, Latin. For this word a corrupt orthography 
has introduced compatible.] Suitable to; consistent with. <quotes follow>  
 
Yet the fact that Johnson has to add, “Competible . . .ought always to be used,” suggests 
that to include the term “corrupted,” on its own, was perhaps not sufficient to indicate a 
preference for competible. In the entry for to hend, Johnson’s note on corruption is a 
conjectural emendation of a Shakespeare line. Johnson registers his opinion, yet the note, 
in sum, is as much a note of inquiry as it is a corrective note: 
To HEND. v.a. [hendan, Saxon, from hendo, low Latin, which seems borrowed 
from hand or hond, Teutonick.]  
1. To seize; to lay hold on. Fairfax, b. ii.
2. To croud378; to surround. Perhaps the following passage is corrupt, and should 
be read hemmed; or it may mean to take possession.  
  The generous and gravest citizens 
Have hent the gates, and very near upon 
The duke is entering.  Shakespeare. Meas. for Measure. 
 
If “corruption” is, for Johnson, a hortatory usage term, it is just as often a heuristic term 
in Johnson’s vocabulary of philological inquiry, rather than an expression of abuse.  
III. Types of Corruption, “Kindred” Letters, and William Holder’s Elements of 
Speech 
 
While modern readers tend to read Johnson’s use of the term “corruption” in the 
Dictionary exclusively as a prescriptive usage note, our readings of the way Johnson uses 
“corruption” in the Dictionary, including parallels to Johnson’s derivation of jour, show 
that it frequently operates for Johnson as a descriptively focused analytical concept that is 
crucial to Johnson’s developing understanding of language change. Johnson often uses 
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the term “corruption” to describe changes of linguistic form—the change from d to g to 
j—in addition to the changes of meaning explained by Lockean associations of ideas. 
Johnson’s descriptive terms of language change, which include “coalition,” 
“composition,” and “contraction,” are just as important to Johnson’s theory of language 
as are its more widely discussed Lockean foundations.  Johnson’s general intention of 
ordering within an entry the senses of a word—from its “primitive signification” to “the 
remoter or metaphorical signification”—showed him how simple and complex ideas 
could be separated, reassociated, and recombined in ways that eluded rational ordering 
schemes.379 But in addition to semantic changes, Johnson encountered copious evidence 
of sound change as he and his amanuenses sifted and sorted words, their various forms, 
and their lexical parents and cousins. Under the entry for mellow, Johnson offers an 
alternative to Skinner’s etymology, but admits that Skinner’s conjecture assumes a 
process that is common in speech: “ME'LLOW.adj. [mearwa,380 soft, Saxon, Skinner: 
more nearly from mollis, molle, mollow, mellow; though r is indeed easily changed into l 
in common speech.].” His continual encounters with spelling variants, his use of cross-
references, observed changes from etymon to head-word, differences among cognates, 
different pronunciations of the same word in different dialects, and the numerous 
“corruptions” Johnson notes, presented Johnson with the effects of sound changes, whose 
processes differed from the ways words changed in meaning.  
James Sledd and Gwin Kolb, the only scholars to address Johnson’s treatment of 
such changes in form, do so only briefly. They argue that Johnson, in his etymologies, 
                                                 
379 Plan, paras. 41, 47.  
380 I have changed a “winn’’ to a “w.” 
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draws on one of the “main foundations of eighteenth-century etymologizing,” the 
“elaborately tabulated ‘mutations of the letters,’ which can be traced ultimately to the 
classical grammarians.” “As for the mutations of the letters,” they write, “the chief 
conclusion to be drawn from them is that any letter, and presumably any sound, could 
become any other, without regard to time, place, or linguistic relationship.”381 Yet 
evidence from the Dictionary suggests that Johnson’s understanding of sound changes, 
which he would describe as changes in “letters,” were not so unconstrained.  
In conjecturing about corruptions, Johnson draws on his own developing 
assumptions about likely sound changes and about common processes of language 
change. As the entries for gun, to drivel, and huggermugger suggest, the assumptions 
underlying some of Johnson’s etymologies are clearer when we look at those etymologies 
in the context of other, related entries, including some of the Dictionary’s generally 
overlooked entries for individual letters. Johnson, in an informal way, began to draw on 
observations in one entry to make judgments in another. As Johnson worked more and 
more with spelling variants, cognates, and etymological deductions, he began to develop 
intuitions about what kinds of language changes were common and therefore plausible. 
These intuitions make their way into Johnson’s often incorrect etymologies, but those 
etymologies are not completely ad hoc, as is usually assumed. They often draw on 
loosely principled assumptions about what letters are “kindred” letters in Johnson’s 
terms, on assumptions about what kinds of processes are “usual” or common in language 
change. In making linguistic judgments about corruptions, Johnson may also have been 
                                                 
381 Sledd and Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 38-39.  
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inspired by the detailed and quite sound, by modern standards, phonetic work of 
seventeenth-century phonetician William Holder.   
* * * * * * 
 Johnson occasionally points out, or allows his illustrative quotations to point out, 
that certain language changes are “usual” or “common.” As we have already seen, 
Johnson includes some of William Camden’s observations on “usual” processes that 
affect particular letters, such as the “melting of g.” In addition, an entry whose text is 
lifted from “Gibson’s Camden” notes the loss of o “in after times,” in certain contexts. 
PRES. Pres, prest, seem to be derived from the Saxon, preost, a priest; it being 
usual in after times to drop the letter o in like cases. Gibson’s Camden. 
 
Johnson himself notes that the tendency for a certain letter to be “changed into” another. 
Under guise, Johnson writes that it is the “same with wise; guise, French; wisa, Saxon, 
the w382 or w being changed as is common into g.” And in Johnson’s proposition that 
drivel was “corrupted’ from dripple by means of dribble he applies assumptions about 
what letters are often confounded with one another to fashion etymological conjectures, 
which are conjectures about language change.  Johnson’s etymology of drivel depends on 
assumptions about likely language changes, assumptions reinforced by his own 
observations of English as he worked on the Dictionary. P and B, as the entries for those 
letters inform us, are often “confounded” with one another by the Germans and the 
Welsh; B and V are often confounded, or used “indifferently’ by “the Gascons” and the 
Spaniards.  
                                                 
382 The three preceding “w”s are “winns” in the Dictionary.  
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In addition to specific changes from one letter to another, Johnson notes that 
certain general processes of change are “common” or “usual.” Among the terms Johnson 
uses for these processes are words widely recognized by linguists today—metathesis, 
contraction, reduplication—as well as terms for processes not common in modern 
professional linguistic jargon, such as the dropping of “harsh” consonants. Starting with 
the last example first, Johnson suggests in his etymology for bag that “harsh” consonants 
are usually dropped.  
BAG.n.s. [belge, Sax. from whence perhaps by dropping, as is usual, the harsh 
consonant, came bege, bage, bag.]  
 
Johnson’s comment about a process that “is usual,” along with another of his conjectural 
gradual corruptions, together help explain his etymology, by which he proposes one way 
to connect the given data points in his etymology: bag and belge. Johnson notes 
metathesis in the entry for scruff, writing that this word is the “same, I suppose, with 
scurf, by a metathesis usual in pronunciation,” a note that was likely informed by his 
observation of metathesis in other entries. “Gibson’s Camden” provides an example of 
metathetic variation, by which letters in a word are transposed: “BRUN, BRAN, 
BROWN, BOURN, BURN, are all derived from the Saxon, born, bourn, brunna, burna; 
all signifying a river or brook. Gibson’s Camden.” Under the entry for crud Johnson 
writes that it is “commonly written curd.” He also observes that the verb to girn “[s]eems 
to be a corruption of grin,” and in his etymology for bird, Johnson derives it from “bird, 
or brid, a chicken, Saxon.” Johnson notes a common contraction in the entry for pence, 
which is the “plural of penny; formed from pennies, by a contraction usual in the rapidity 
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of colloquial speech.” Johnson’s etymology of pickapack identifies it as an instance of a 
“reduplication very common in our language”:  
PI'CKAPACK.adv. [from pack, by a reduplication very common in our 
language.] In manner of a pack.  
In a hurry she whips up her darling under her arms, and carries the other a 
pickapack upon her shoulders. L’Estr.  
 
In addition to these common processes of change, Johnson notes assimilatory processes 
in his entries for the particles en, il, and im:  
EN. An inseparable particle borrowed by us from the French, and by the French 
formed from the Latin in. Many words are uncertainly written with en or in. In 
many words en is changed into em for more easy pronunciation.  
 
IL, before words beginning with l, stands for in.383
 
IM is used commonly, in composition, for in before mute letters.384
     What is im in Latin, when it is not negative, is often em in French; and our 
writers, as the Latin or French occurs to their minds, use im or em: formerly im 
was more common, and now em seems to prevail.  
 
What is interesting about Johnson’s comments on “usual” processes is that they refer, and 
in the case of assimilation allude, not merely to processes of language change that operate 
on a particular word or particle, but rather to linguistic changes that operate on particular 
categories (“harsh” consonants) and in particular contexts (“before mute letters”). 
Contraction, and reduplication refer to linguistic changes that operate even more 
generally in the language. In other words, these comments on language change show 
Johnson trying to discern a kind of order in the ways that words change. As he acquires 
more experience with the lexicon, noting how individual words change over time and 
space, Johnson views certain language changes with enough frequency that he begins to 
                                                 
383 This entry follows the entry for ill adv. and immediately precedes the entry for illachrymable.  
384 This entry precedes the entry for image.  
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consider them “common.” Once Johnson determines a type of language change to be 
common, he can use it to explain how or why a word changed.   
Metathesis, contraction, reduplication, and even “corruption,” constitute elements 
of Johnson’s vocabulary of linguistic description. Johnson uses these concepts, even 
when he does not name them explicitly, to identify patterns in language change that he 
then uses to conjecture how a word might have changed when he lacks conclusive data. 
In the revised entry for to gird, Johnson adds an etymology, in which he employs the 
notion of metathesis, or “transposition,” for lack of evidence.  
To GIRD.v.n.[Of this word in this sense I know not the original; it may be formed 
by a very customary transposition from gride or cut.] To break a scornful jest; to 
gibe; to sneer. Drayton.;  Shakespeare’s Henry IV, p. ii. 
 
Johnson’s seeming purpose in discussing this “very customary transposition” is 
interpretive rather than prescriptive. Johnson’s conjectural etymology proposes an origin 
that is semantically closer to the sense of Johnson’s definition of the word, which seems 
semantically unrelated to the definitions for the transitive verb to gird, which generally 
pertain to binding, surrounding, encircling, investing (with clothes or equipment).385 
When read in the context of these comments on metathesis, Johnson’s observation that 
the verb to girn “[s]eems to be a corruption of grin,” even if it serves as a proscription 
against to girn, also serves as a conjectural etymology that reveals the way Johnson 
observed what he saw as the lamentable processes of language change and then made use 
                                                 
385 The senses for this verb generally pertain to binding, surrounding, encircling, investing (with clothes or 
equipment). Johnson’s 9th signification for to gird v.a. in 1773 is “To reproach; to gibe,” a definition 
moved to the end of the list from its position as the 7th definition out of 9 in 1755. The move to the end of 
the list may signal that, of all the senses listed in that entry, the last one is the farthest afield from the 
etymon. For details of this kind of practice, as Johnson planned to employ it, see Johnson’s Plan. Johnson’s 
entries do not always bear out this plan.  
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of those kinds of observations, which were reinforced by his cumulative experiences with 
the lexicon, as principles (even when they are unstated explicitly) when he made the case 
for a certain etymology.  
  In a passage Johnson abbreviates under his entry for “corruption,” Edward 
Brerewood attributes the changes in Greek from its classical state to “four kindes of 
corruption” that “are very common in their language.” He writes that the “greatest part of 
the corruption” of Greek  
proceeded from no other cause, then [sic] their owne negligence, or affectation. 
As First, . . . by mutilation of some words. . . . Secondly, by compaction of 
seuerall words into one. . . . Thirdly, by confusion of sounde, as making no 
difference in the pronouncing of  [certain] vowels. . . and dipthongues. . . . 
Fourthly, by translation of accents, from the syllables to which in ancient 
pronouncing they belonged, to others. And all those foure kindes of corruption, 
are very common in their language.386   
 
While Johnson does not rely on Brerewood’s terms of corruption in the Dictionary, three 
kinds of corruption Brerewood describes—“mutilation,” “compaction,” and “confusion” 
of sound—are analogous to processes Johnson assumes to be highly productive 
mechanisms of language change, mechanisms he describes as contraction, coalition and 
compounding (or composition), and the “confounding” of letters. If language change is 
corruption, then these latter terms are those terms of corruption rarely discussed in 
treatments of Johnson, language change, and the Dictionary. These terms and the 
philological uses to which Johnson employs them were, of course, by no means original 
to Johnson. They were part of the vocabulary he inherited from the same philological 
discourses that inform his use of “corruption.” These terms are important because when 
                                                 
386 Edward Brerewood, Enquiries touching the diuersity of languages, and religions through the chiefe 
parts of the world (London, 1614), 11. 
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Johnson makes conjectures about language change, he seems to assume the operation of 
these processes, sometimes working in tandem, even when he does not invoke them 
explicitly.  
 “Contraction” and “compound” were terms used “in grammar,” and the 
Dictionary defines their grammatical senses, respectively, as “To form one word from 
two or more words” and “The reduction of two vowels or syllables to one.” We have 
already seen Johnson’s treatment of “contraction” in the introduction to this study. In the 
Preface Johnson writes that “composition” as “one of the chief characteristics of 
language,” so he inserts “great numbers of compounded words” in order that the “frame 
of our language and modes of our combination” might be “amply discovered.”387 
Because he sees “composition” as such a productive process in language change, Johnson 
invokes it in his conjectural etymologies, as in the etymologies for oftentimes and wicked: 
OFTENTI'MES.adv. [often and times. From the composition of this word it is 
reasonable to believe, that oft was once an adjective, of which often was the 
plural; which seems retained in the phrase thine often infirmities. See OFTEN.]  
 
WI'CKED.adj. [Of this common word the etymology is very obscure: wicca, is an 
enchanter; wæccan, is to oppress; wirian, to curse; wiced, is crooked: all these 
however Skinner rejects for vitiatus, Latin. Perhaps it is a compound of wic, vile, 
bad, and head, malum caput.] 
 
Johnson’s conjectures often lead him astray, but they provide a revealing glimpse of his 
assumptions about linguistic processes of change because they show his linguistic 
reasoning in action, when he is put on the spot by a philological puzzle.  
Johnson defines “coalition” as “[u]nion in one mass or body; conjunction of 
separate parts in one whole.” He uses the term “coalition,” for instance, to describe the 
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interjection begone (“only a coalition of the words be gone.”) and the preposition instead 
in the entry for instead of (“A word formed by the coalition of in and stead, place.”). He 
also uses it to define diphthong (“A coalition of two vowels to form one sound; as vain, 
leaf, Caesar.”). Unlike the terms “contraction,” “compound,” and “composition,” 
“coalition” is a word Johnson hardly uses as an explicit heuristic term, but the fact that he 
does use it at times, suggests that he was free to employ the notion of “coalition” as a 
concept even when he did not use the term explicitly.388 Thus, Johnson describes begone 
as a “coalition” between the etymology brackets for wobegone we only find “[wo and 
begone.].”  
Johnson often seems to view these processes as co-conspirators in language 
change, and at times the processes seem hard to distinguish from one another. Johnson 
writes that the obsolete negative particle ne “was formerly of very frequent use, both 
singly and by contraction in compound words, as nill for ne will or will not; nis for ne is 
or is not.”  He describes since as “formed by contraction from sithence, or sith thence, 
                                                 
388 Johnson uses the term “coalition” explicitly in the Plan and in the Dictionary. Johnson uses “coalition,” 
along with “contraction,” in the Plan to describe “metrical licenses.” “It may be likewise proper to remark 
metrical licenses, such as contractions, generous, gen’rous, reverend, rev’rend; and coalitions, as region, 
question.” See Plan, para. 21. Aside from the examples in entries for begone, diphthong, and instead of, I 
have only found four examples in the Dictionary of “coalition” used as a descriptive linguistic term: under 
the entries for abandon (“Pasquier thinks it a coalition of a ban donner, to give up a proscription”), albeit 
(“a coalition of the words all be it so. Skinner.”), triphthong (“A coalition of three vowels to form one 
sound: as, eau, eye.”), and once in the Dictionary’s prefatory “GRAMMAR.” Johnson’s use of “coalesce” 
in the “GRAMMAR” suggests he uses it as a verb corresponding to the noun “coalition.” Johnson writes, 
“O coalesces into a diphthong with a, as moan, groan, approach.” After noting that O is joined “[w]ith i, as 
oil, soil, moil, noisome,” Johnson adds, “This coalition of letters seems to unite the sounds of the two letters 
as far as two sounds can be united without being destroyed, and therefore approaches more nearly than any 
combination in our tongue to the notion of a diphthong.” Johnson also notes that U “coalesces with a, e, i, 
o; but has rather in these combinations the force of w, as quaff, quest, quit, quite, languish; sometimes in ui 
the i loses its sound, as in juice.” I have found no other similar examples of “coalesce” in the Dictionary.  
    255
 
from sithe, Saxon.”389 He lists Habnab is listed as deriving from “hap ne hap, or nap; as 
would ne would, will ne will; that is, let it happen or not.” Ne, by that “contraction in 
compound words” Johnson describes, combines with hap to form nap, which then 
coalesces with the preceding hap. Likewise, Johnson writes that the adjective dich 
“seems corrupted from dit for do it. Howd’ye is “[c]ontracted from how do ye.” Grovel, 
Johnson opines, “may perhaps come by gradual corruption from ground fell.”390  
In addition to these types of corruption, Johnson phonetic “confusion,” or the act 
of “confounding” letters, as a significant mechanism of language change. This 
“confusion” takes place, not only because of negligence or ignorance, but because certain 
letters are “kindred” letters. Just as Johnson posits in his derivation of jour that “Diu is, 
by inaccurate ears, or inaccurate pronunciation, easily confounded with giu,” he observes 
analogous examples of phonetic confusion among “kindred” letters, letters having “a near 
affinity” with one another based on their articulatory properties. So in the Dictionary 
entry for B, as we have seen in the introduction, we find that B “has a near affinity with 
the other labial letters, and is confounded by the Germans with P, and by the Gascons 
with V.” Likewise, the entry for V notes that “V, the consonant, has a sound nearly 
approaching to those of b and f. With b it is by the Spaniards and Gascons always 
confounded, and in the Runick alphabet is expressed by the same character with f, 
distinguished only by a diacritical point.” Johnson notes under the entry for F that its 
“kindred letter is V, which, in the Islandick alphabet, is only distinguished from it by a 
point in the body of the letter.” Under the entry for dad/daddy Johnson finds it 
                                                 
389 The “th” in sithe is an “eth” (ð) in the Dictionary.  
390 1755 has “feel” 
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“remarkable, that, in all parts of the world, the word for father, as first taught to children, 
is compounded of a and t, or the kindred letter d differently placed; as tad, Welsh; . . . 
391Greek; atta, Gothick; tata, Latin.”392 Johnson’s observations on the “child’s way of 
expressing father” reveal his lack of comparative evidence, and we might like to know 
more about precisely why he finds it worthy of remark, but for our present purposes what 
is interesting is the attention Johnson gives here and in other entries to “kindred” letters 
and letters having a “near affinity” with one another, such as f and v, p and b, t and d. 
Throughout the Dictionary Johnson records the evidence for such affinities, even he does 
not comment on them, as when he records various cognates for the verb to have: “[haban, 
Gothick; habban, Saxon; hebben, Dutch; avoir, French; avere, Ital.]”  
For Johnson, these affinities are a matter of linguistic record, since one can find 
evidence of them within languages (German and Spanish) and cross-linguistically (in the 
various equivalents to daddy and the cognates of have). Moreover, these affinities or 
phonetic relationships are describable in terms of articulatory properties, since kindred 
letters are articulated at the same place in the mouth. Johnson often seems to assume the 
plausibility of such affinities when he makes conjectures about language change. Thus to 
grabble is “probably corrupted from grapple,” and fitch is “a colloquial corruption of 
vetch.” The proposed relationships between these words depend, of course, not just on 
sound correspondences but semantic connections. Yet Johnson’s seeming assumptions 
“kindred” letters and articulatory affinities suggest that his notions about letter 
                                                 
391 The Greek letters here are difficult to discern.  
392 Johnson either forgot, or was unfamiliar with, the fact that abba is Aramaic for something akin to papa, 
another form he seems to overlook.   
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“mutations” were an important aspect of his understanding of “linguistic corruption,” and 
that these notions were not as unconstrained as Sledd and Kolb suggest. In fact, the 
phonetic work of William Holder provided Johnson a principled model by which to 
understand these phonetic affinities.  
* * * * * * 
 Johnson’s ideas about language are usually described as Lockean, but as much as 
Locke’s theories about the association of ideas informed Johnson’s views on language, 
our examination of his use of corruption, and his derivation of the word jour—from 
diurnus to giorno to jour—reveals that a number of Johnson’s linguistic judgments in the 
Dictionary owe little to Locke. As several studies have now shown, Locke’s ideas about 
language and the way words represent ideas and their various combinations informed 
Johnson’s defining practices and his notions of semantics in important ways, but 
Johnson’s comments on corruption and his working assumptions about recurring 
processes of language change are not adequately accounted for by referring to Locke’s 
ideas. Johnson’s observations on metathesis, contraction, reduplication, and corruption 
draw on his familiarity with the critical traditions and vocabularies of etymologists, 
textual critics, antiquarians, grammarians and rhetoricians, all of which were components 
of the broad field known as philology; they also draw on the early modern English 
phonetic tradition of John Wallis and, more importantly, William Holder.  
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Robert DeMaria, Jr., in his comprehensive study of the Dictionary’s illustrative 
quotations, calls Holder the “linguistics expert” of the Dictionary.393 But in an essay on 
Johnson’s “theory of language,” DeMaria falsely labels Holder as Lockean in his 
approach to language. Relying on the notion that “Johnson’s practice as a lexicographer 
embodies the theory that it expresses in its illustrative quotations,” DeMaria argues that 
“Johnson’s illustrative quotations contain an exposition of the Lockean theory of 
language in excerpts from Locke, Isaac Watts, William Holder, Robert South, Henry 
Felton, and others.”394 The main problem with labeling Holder a Lockean is that his 
Elements of Speech, based on work in the early 1660s, was published in 1669, over 
twenty years before Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690). Holder’s 
Elements of Speech: An Essay of Inquiry into the Natural Production of Letters, 
described by one modern editor as “a landmark in the history of English phonetics,” 
shows no influence of Locke’s ideas.395 More significantly for our purposes, to list 
Holder as just one of many proponents of “the Lockean theory” of language is to 
overlook the very expertise he brings as a linguist both to the Dictionary and to Johnson’s 
own linguistic interpretations.  
In a survey of linguistics in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, Pierre 
Swiggers cites Holder’s Elements and John Wallis’s Grammatica linguae Anglicanae 
                                                 
393 Robert DeMaria, Jr., Johnson’s Dictionary and the Language of Learning, 162. DeMaria also calls 
Holder a “spelling reformer” on 167.  
394 Robert DeMaria, Jr., “The Theory of Language in Johnson’s Dictionary,” in Johnson after Two Hundred 
Years, Paul J. Korshin, ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 160. 
395 This comes from an unpaginated, unattributed note prefacing the Scolar Press reprint of Holder’s 
Elements, which adds, “The Elements of Speech has a two-fold importance—as an attempt to describe 
scientifically the sounds of English, and as a manual of practical phonetics.” William Holder, Elements of 
Speech (1669). A Scolar Press Facsimile. (Menston, England: Scolar Press, 1967).  
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(1653) as examples—the only English examples—of the “important empirical work in 
phonetics” done during this period.396 In A Short History of Linguistics R. H. Robins calls 
Holder “perhaps the most successful” among those in a tradition belatedly called the 
“English school of phonetics.” Holder, writes Robins, “came nearer than any other 
western scholar, before contact was made with Indian phonetic work, to a correct 
articulatory diagnosis of the voice-voiceless distinction in consonants.”397 Holder’s 
emphasis on the physiology of speech grew out of a “Worthy Designe of giving Relief to 
a Deaf and Dumb Person. . . recommended to my Care.”398 Holder was a fellow of the 
Royal Society and later tutor to his young brother-in-law Christopher Wren, who wrote 
that Holder was “famed for his wonderful art, in making a young gentleman named 
Alexander Popham, who was born deaf and dumb, to speak.”399 After Popham lost his 
ability to speak again, John Wallis helped restore his speech, which led to a longstanding 
dispute print between Holder and Wallis over who could claim credit for Popham’s 
success.400  In Holder’s treatise, “the Original” of letters “is found in Viva voce, in spoken 
                                                 
396 Pierre Swiggers, “History of Linguistics: Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe,” in 
International Encyclopedia of Linguistics, Vol. 3, ed. William Bright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 155.  
397 R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1990), 131-2. The term “the 
English school of phonetics,” quoted here in Robins, comes from the title of a 1946 article by J. R. Firth. 
Robins notes that “the term phonetics is first recorded in the nineteenth century,” and that from “the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth century work was carried on around phonetic questions under the titles of 
orthography and orthoepy.” Ibid., 131.  
398 William Holder, “The Preface,” in Elements of Speech: An Essay of Inquiry into the Natural Production 
of Letter: with an Appendix concerning Persons Deaf & Dumb (London, 1669); reprinted in  Elements of 
Speech and Discourse concerning Time. (New York: AMS Press, 1975).  
399 R. W. Rieber and Jeffrey L. Wollock, “William Holder on Phonetics and Deafness: An Introduction to 
the New Edition of Elements of Speech,” in Elements of Speech and Discourse concerning Time, op. cit., v.   
400 For brief accounts of the dispute, see Rieber and Wollock, “William Holder on Phonetics and 
Deafness,” i-iii, and J. A. Kemp’s Introduction to Wallis’s Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae and Tractatus 
De Loquela. John Wallis, Grammar of the English Language with an introductory grammatico-physical; 
Treatise on Speech (or on the formation of all speech sounds), trans. J. A. Kemp. (London: Longman, 1972 
[1653]), 12-13. Kemp’s edition includes a facsimile of Wallis’s Latin text.  
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Language, and therefore tis Speech we now chiefly consider.”401 And after outlining the 
organs of speech, “the Motions of the Mouth…by which the voice is discriminated,” and 
“the  Articulations of the Breath or Voice in their passage from the Larynx through the 
Mouth or Nose,” Holder describes how he taught his student using creative teaching 
props, showing his student the “posture” of the tongue in different articulatory positions 
by means of a “Palat with the upper jaw, of Plaster, and the shape of a Tong of stuffed 
Leather.”402 While scholars have pointed out the influence of Wallis on Johnson, 
especially on the “GRAMMAR” preceding the Dictionary, it is Holder’s Elements of 
Speech, written in English, rather than Wallis’s Latin Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae, 
that is cited throughout the Dictionary.403  
 In some ways, quotations from William Holder in the Dictionary demonstrate 
DeMaria’s argument that “Johnson’s practice as a lexicographer embodies the theory that 
it expresses in its illustrative quotations.” As I argue in the previous chapter, DeMaria 
underestimates the extent to which passages are quoted to illustrate usage rather than 
serve a polemic or express a theory, but Johnson’s frequent use of Holder in definitions 
relating to matters of language, especially the physical properties of consonants as they 
are articulated, when examined alongside Johnson’s handling of linguistic corruptions in 
                                                 
401 Holder, Elements of Speech, 9.  
402 Holder, Elements of Speech, 10-11, 136-37.  
403 Sledd and Kolb write that Wallis’s contribution “to Johnson’s section [in the ‘GRAMMAR’] on 
‘etymology’ is so large that modern readers would be happier if acknowledgments more adequate by 
modern standards had been made.” Sledd and Kolb, Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, 17. Sledd and Kolb later 
point out Johnson’s independence of Wallis, writing that he “had the common sense to correct, in his 
grammar, the etymological extravagance of Wallis.” Ibid., 40. For more information on what they call 
“Johnson’s rather puzzling relationship to Wallis,” they refer readers to a chapter on Johnson in H. G. 
Baker’s unpublished dissertation, “The Contribution of John Wallis to the Methods and Materials of 
English Grammarians” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1937), which I have not yet consulted; see 
Sledd and Kolb, op. cit., 18.  
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his metatextual commentary, suggests that Holder’s framework for describing the 
physiological properties of consonants and their articulation exerted some influence on 
Johnson’s estimation of what types of letters were “kindred” and consequently his 
estimation of what kinds of “corruptions” were likely or not.  
Aside from quotations under the entries for words like language, vowel, 
consonant, speech, and communication, Johnson quotes Holder under a variety of words 
of no particular linguistic import, as is the case with inclusively: 
All articulation is made within the mouth, from the throat to the lips inclusively; 
and is differenced partly by the organs used in it, and partly by the manner and 
degree of articulating. Holder's Elements of Speech. 
 
As this quote shows, Holder is concerned with the organs, manner, and degree of 
articulating, and other entries supported with quotations from Holder in the Dictionary 
reveal how different Holder’s ‘theory of language’ is from Locke’s. Johnson includes 
several words from Holder’s vocabulary of linguistic articulation and illustrates them 
with quotes from Holder.  
APPU'LSE.n.s. [appulsus, Lat.] The act of striking against any thing. <quote by 
Harvey on Consumptions> 
     In vowels, the passage of the mouth is open and free, without any 
appulse of an organ of speech to another: but, in all consonants, there is an 
appulse of the organs.           Holder.  
 
DE'NTAL.adj. [dentalis, Latin.]. . .  2. [In grammar.] Pronounced principally by 
the agency of the teeth.  
     The Hebrews have assigned which letters are labial, which  dental, and 
which guttural.                                        Bacon’s Natural History, No. 198.
     The dental consonants are easy, therefore let them be next; first the 
labio-dentals, as also the lingua-dentals.       Holder’s Elem. 
 
GI'NGIVAL.adj. [gingiva, Latin.] Belonging to the gums.  
     Whilst the Italians strive to cut a thread in their pronunciation between 
D and T, so to sweeten it, they make the occluse appulse, especially the 
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gingival, softer than we do, giving a little of perviousness.        Holder’s 
Elements of Speech. 
 
LA'BIAL.adj. [labialis, Latin.] Uttered by the lips.  
     The Hebrews have assigned which letters are labial, which dental, and 
which guttural.     Bacon’s Natural History. 
     Some particular affection of sound in its passage to the lips, will seem 
to make some composition in any vowel which is labial. Holder’s 
Elements of Speech. 
 
LA'BIODENTAL.adj. [labium and dentalis.] Formed or pronounced by the co-
operation of the lips and teeth.  
The dental consonants are very easy; and first the labiodentals f, v, also 
the linguadentals, th, dh.Holder Elm. of Sp.  
 
MUTE.n.s. 2. A letter which without a vowel can make no sound. 
     Grammarians note the easy pronunciation of a mute before a liquid, which doth 
not therefore necessarily make the preceding vowel long. Holder’s Elements of 
Speech. 
 
PA'LATICK.adj. [from palate.] Belonging to the palate; or roof of the mouth.  
     The three labials, P. B. M. are parallel to the three gingival T. D. N. 
and to the three palatic K.G. L.404           Holder.  
 
SPI'RITALLY.adv. [from spiritus, Lat.] By means of the breath.  
     Conceive one of each pronounced spiritally, the other vocally.Holder’s 
Elements of Speech. 
 
VOCA'LITY.n.s. [vocalitas, Lat. from vocal.] Power of utterance; quality of 
being utterable by the voice.  
     L and R being in extremes, one of roughness, the other of smoothness 
and freeness of vocality, are not easy in tract of vocal speech to be 
pronounced spiritally. Holder.  
 
As the quote from Bacon’s Natural History used both in labial and dental makes plain, 
Holder is not the first, nor the only, writer to use such terms.405 John Wallis, John Wilkins 
                                                 
404 The transcription of the quote from Holder seems to correct an error and produce an error. L is not a 
“palatic” in Holder’s framework. The L seems to be a misprint for Nĝ  (representing the “ng” sound in sing, 
or the velar nasal, in modern linguist’s parlance), assuming that Johnson is quoting the following passage 
from p. 38 of Holder’s Elements: “the 3 Labial B. P. M. are Parallel to the 3 Gingival T. D. N., and to the 3 
Palatick K. G. Nĝ.” Given Holder’s descriptions of consonants (see below), it makes more sense to list the 
labials as “P. B. M.,” since P, T, and K are all “mutes” and “spiritals” in Holder’s framework; B, D, and G 
are all “murmure-mute” and “vocal.”  
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and others used similar vocabularies to describe English sounds, but in the Dictionary 
this vocabulary is associated more with Holder than anyone else.   
 The most interesting potential influence of Holder’s work on Johnson’s linguistic 
interpretations lies in his framework for describing the place and manner of articulation 
for consonants. This framework provides Johnson with access to a detailed, clearly laid 
out exposition of English consonants and their properties. With access to a scientifically 
described account of English sounds, Johnson would have principled reasons for 
estimating certain sound changes as likelier than others. Johnson could refer, even if just 
mentally and imperfectly, to Holder’s account of English sounds when making his own 
conjectures about “gradual corruptions” that relied on assumptions, as in the case of the 
jour derivation, about what letters might be “easily confounded” for one another. An 
account such as Holder’s would supplement Johnson’s own observations about sound 
changes and about sound correspondences as he examined variations in spellings over 
time and space, changes from etymon to reflex, cognates in related languages, as well as 
“rustick” dialects and Scots. In the end, there is of course no way to determine the extent 
or the occasion of Holder’s influence on Johnson’s linguistic judgments, which were also 
influenced, I argue, by Johnson’s own observations of sound correspondences in the data 
he encountered. In any case, Holder and the phonetic tradition he himself draws on are 
important contexts for Johnson’s linguistic judgments, yet the role of this phonetic 
tradition has been ignored thus far in studies of the Dictionary and studies of Johnson’s 
interpretation of language.  
                                                                                                                                                 
405 However, the OED (online) lists Holder as providing the first attribution of gingival, labiodental, palatic 
(in the original spelling), and spiritally.   
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Johnson makes no mention of Holder in his etymologies, and there is no 
indication that Johnson used Holder methodically or rigorously,406 but it is not unlikely 
that when Johnson postulated certain corruptions he recalled the phonetic work of Holder 
or other members of the phonetic tradition that Holder represents, especially regarding 
consonants. As Johnson writes in the Preface, vowels are “so capriciously pronounced, 
and so differently modified, by accident or affectation, not only in every province, but in 
every mouth, that to them, as is well known to etymologists, little regard is to be shewn in 
the deduction of one language from another.”407 Consonants, on the other hand, are 
carefully compared, classified and tabulated in Holder’s Elements.408 In Holder’s 
framework, consonants are described in terms of three qualities: the degree of oral cavity 
closure, the “organs of speech” used, and whether the consonants were voiceless (like p, 
                                                 
406 For instance, Johnson does not generally use Holder’s terminology for describing letters in his entry for 
the letter n, for which Holder uses the terms Naso-vocal and gingival. Johnson calls it a “semivowel,” a 
term used (in Latin, i.e. “semi-vocalis”) by Wallis, for instance, in his Grammar of English. Johnson may 
have been reluctant to tie his own terms to closely to any individual system. In his prefatory “GRAMMAR” 
Johnson refers to the different traditions from which he draws his own eclectic vocabulary: “ In treating on 
the letters [in this “GRAMMAR”], I shall not, like some other grammarians, enquire into the original form 
as an antiquarian: nor into their formation and prolation by the organs of speech, as a mechanick, 
anatomist, or physiologist; nor into the properties and gradation of sounds, or the elegance or harshness of 
particular combinations, as a writer of universal and transcendental grammar. I consider the English 
alphabet only as it is English; and even in this narrow disquisition I follow the example of former 
grammarians, perhaps with more reverence than judgment.” The mention of the “mechanick anatomist, or 
physiologist” who enquires into the formation and prolation of letters” may be a reference to Holder and 
John Wallis. Here I read Johnson as not rejecting these methods out of hand, but determining them as 
inappropriate to his purposes, given his audience. Such a qualifier allows Johnson not to be bound by any 
particular terminology, and may be intended to prevent being taken to task for inconsistencies in, or 
problems with, his terms to describe letters.  
407 Preface, para. 10.  
408 On the difference in describing consonants and vowels, Holder writes, “The Articulations, that is, the 
Motions and Postures of the Organs in framing the Vowels, are more difficultly discerned, than those of 
Consonants; because in the Consonants, the Appulse is more manifest to the sense of Touching, but in the 
Vowels it is so hard to discern the Figures made by the Motions of the Tongue, (inclining onely toward the 
Palat, and not touching it) especially about the more inward Bosse or convex of it, that it is rendred no less 
difficult to define the Articulations of the Vowels; and he that can describe them accurately, erit mihi 
magnus Apollo.” Holder goes on with his own highly qualified attempt at explaining vowels, noting, 
“Onely he who shall adventure has this advantage, that it is easier to affirm, than to disprove.” Elements of 
Speech, 82-83.  
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t, k, f) or voiced (like b, d, g, v). First, consonants are “occluse” or “pervious.” “Occluse” 
consonants are those made by “close appulse,” whereby “all passage of Breath or voice 
through the mouth” was precluded, whereas consonants made by “pervious appulse” 
consonants gave breath and voice “some passage out of the mouth.”409 Second, Holder 
differentiates consonants on the basis of what “organs of speech” (tongue, palate, 
“goums,” jaw, teeth, lips) are used in articulation.410 Third, Holder distinguishes 
consonants by “sound;” consonants varied in terms of the “Articulation of Breath” and 
the “Articulation of Voice,” depending on whether or not the the larynx was activated in 
producing a letter (as in the voiced or “vocal” consonants b, d, g, rather than the voiceless 
or “spirital’ consonants  p, t, and k), and whether or not the voice “hath a free passage 
through the Nose” (as in the case of nasals or “naso-vocals” n, m, and ng).411 Holder 
describes how appulse, organ, and sound can distinguish consonants from one another 
and reveal their similarities at the same time:  
If a close Appulse be made by the Lips, viz. by the Under-Lip, to the Upper-Lip, 
then is framed P, or B, or M; if it be made by the end of the Tongue to the Goums, 
T. or. D. or N. If by the Bosse of the Tongue to the Palate, near the Throat, then 
K. or G. or Nĝ. So there are 9 Consonants made by close Appulse, and they 
evidently answer one another in their Properties; whether you compare them in 
respect of the Organs, the 3 Labial P. B. M. are Parallel to the Gingival T. D. N, 
and to the 3 Palatick K. G. Nĝ; or whether in respect of Sound; P. T. K. are 
Articulations of Breath; B. D. G. (if you compare B to P; D to T; and G to K;) are 
made with the very same Appulse and Motion of the Organ; and are differenced 
onely by being Articulations of Voice, or Breath vocalized: which is easily 
discerned, if you strive to pronounce P. abstracted without a Vowel, then it will be 
wholly Mute, because it is nothing but Breath stopt: but if you in the same manner 
go to pronounce B, there will be a murmuring sound of the Voice, formed in the 
Larynx, and passing till it be stopt by the Appulse of the Lips.412
                                                 
409 Holder, Elements of Speech, 36.  
410 Holder, Elements of Speech, 25.  
411 Holder, Elements of Speech, 32.  
412 Holder, Elements of Speech, 37-39.  
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Holder summarizes these and other distinctions in a table of the consonants. Holder has 
two columns for sound—“Sound” and “Sound or MATTER.”  
        SOUND  ORGAN  Or thus more properly by  
     Sound or MATTER 
P.    Mute  Labial  p. Spirital. 
 B.    Murmure-mute Labial  b. Vocal or Murmurant. 
 M.   Naso-vocal  Labial  m. Naso-vocal. 
  Close  T.    Mute  Gingival   t. Spirital. 
Appulse   D.   Murm-mute  Gingival  d. Vocal.  
 N.   Naso-vocal  Gingival  n. Naso-vocal. 
 K.   Mute  Palatic  k. Spirital. 
 G.   Murm-mute  Palatic  g. Vocal 
 Ng. Naso-vocal  Palatic  y.413 Naso-vocal. 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 F.    Blæse   Labiodental f. Spirital. 
 V.   Murm-Blæse  Labiodental v. Vocal. 
 Th.  Blæse  Lingua-dental θ Spirital. 
Pervious Dh. Murmur- Blæse Lingua-dental ϑ Vocal. 
Appulse  S.    Sibilant.   Gingival  s. Spirital. 
Z.    Murm-Sibilant Gingival  z. Vocal. 
Sh.  Sibilant  Palatic  sh. Spirital. 
Zh.  Murm-Sibilant Palatic  j.zh. Vocal. 
 L.    Semi-voc.smooth  Gingival  l. Vocal-lateral. 
 R     Semi-voc.jarring Gingival  r. Vocal-jarring. 
 
FIG. 1. Modified from William Holder, Elements of Speech, p. 53, sig. E3r. 
 
Holder also includes another chart, or “Scheme,” that makes apparent the differences and 
affinities of the various “letters,” and rejects letters deemed to hard to pronounce easily : 
Articulations   Spirital Vocal Naso-Spirital Naso-vocal 
_____________________________________________________ 
Close   Labial   P B †M  M 
(Occluse)     Gingival   T D †N  N 
Appulse  Palatick   K G †Ng  Ng 
  ___________________________________________________ 
Labiadental  F V †F  †V 
Linguadental  Th Dh †Th  †Dh 
Pervious  Gingival-Sibilant  S Z †S  †Z 
Appulse   Palatick- Sibilant  Sh Zh †Sh  †Zh 
Gingival-Free  †L L †L  †L 
Gingival-jarring  †R R †R  †R 
                                                 
413 The ERRATA listed at the beginning of the text notes that there “was intended a Character for Ng, viz. n 
with a tail like that of g. which must be understood where the Printer has imitated it by n or y.” 
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FIGURE 2. Adapted from William Holder, Elements of Speech, p. 62, sig. E7v.414  
 
Given Johnson’s probable knowledge of these tables and Holder’s general framework, it  
is possible to say that his comments on language changes, particularly of corruptions, are 
informed, at least loosely, by Holder’s strikingly modern account of English “letters” and 
his own cumulative observations of variation in English and among cognate words.  
Johnson adds a comment on corruption to the revised entry for cockloft, 
reanalyzing both the etymology and the rationale for it.  
CO'CKLOFT. n.s. [cock and loft.] The room over the garret, in which fowls are 
supposed to roost, unless it be rather corrupted from coploft, the cop or top of the 
house.  
   If the lowest floors already burn, 
Cocklofts and garrets soon will take their turn.  Dryd. Juv. 
   My garrets, or rather my cocklofts indeed, are very indifferently 
furnished; but they are rooms to lay lumber in.  Swift. 
 
                                                 
414 Holder’s daggers, or obelisks, lie on their sides in his text, but I display them vertically here. For Holder 
the obelisks are “intended for marks of rejection of those Letters, to which they are prefixed”; Holder, 
Elements of Speech, 60-61. Holder rejects “Naso-vocals” because they “are not easie or graceful to 
pronounce.” Holder rejects “Naso-Spiritals”  “for the same reason. . . . [B]eing found harsh and 
troublesome, they are more generally disused, whilst most Nations rather study to sweeten and soften their 
Pronunciation, and to that end are more ready to change or leave out in their Compositions of words, and 
Conjugations, and words, borrowed from other Languages, such Letters, as less suit with ease of 
Pronunciation.” Holder also rejects “spirital” L and R because “in attempting to pronounce these two 
Consonants, as likewise the Nasals, and some of the vowels Spiritally, the Throat is brought to labour, and 
it makes that which we call a Guttural pronunciation.”  The ostensibly normative tone of Holder’s 
rejections here is partly defensive, since his scheme would be theoretically neater without all of the blank 
spaces in his table brought about by his rejections. Holder adds of the consonants that survive his obelisks, 
“And if they do not all go in equal and parallel Combinations you see the Reason of it. . . .And I, not being 
able to know the distinct usages in all Languages, do not hold my self obliged by the design of this Essay, 
to accomodate an Alphabet to [all languages]. . . ; “leaving it to every ones pleasure, upon their experience 
of forrein usages, to select out of this common stock more Letters than I do, and remove the Obelisks,” 
Elements of Speech, 56-60.  Holder does not include in either of these tables h; nor does he include what 
modern linguists would call affricates, the “ch” and “j” sounds in “cheer” and “jeer” respectively. 
Regarding h, Holder writes, “I have hitherto had no occasion to speak of H, since that H is onely a Guttural 
Aspiration, i.e. a more forcible impulse of Breath from the Lungs, applyed when we please, before or after 
other Letters” (67). Holder considers the “ch” and “j consonant” sounds not to be “simple” letters but rather 
“compounds” respectively of “T. and Sh. or at least T. and :Y.” and of “D and Zh, or D and Y. In WHAT, 
WHICH, and the like, H is pronounced before W” (72). Holder also calls Y and W “vowel consonants” on 
141-42.  
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Johnson’s earlier etymology, analyzing cockloft as a fairly transparent compound, leads 
Johnson to explain its presumptively primitive meaning, ‘the loft where the cocks roost,’ 
presumably the more primitive literal meaning which came later to mean “the room over 
the garret.” Johnson later proposes that the word is a compound, but one whose origin is 
obscured by processes of corruption, the change from p to ck. This comment is more 
comprehensible, and seems less arbitrary, when one reads across entries, in this case by 
consulting his definitions for cop. When we do, we find that cop is defined as “the top of 
anything,” and that Johnson judges cock a “vulgar” or “common” variation of cop. 
COP.n.s. [kop, Dut. cop, Sax.] The head; the top of any thing; any thing rising to a 
head. As a cop, vulgarly cock of hay; a cob-castle, properly cop-castle, a small 
castle or house on a hill. A cob of cherrystones for cop, a pile of stones one laid 
upon another; a tuft on the head of birds.  
 
In addition, the tenth sense of the noun cock is listed as a variant of the preferred cop 
when one means a “small heap of hay.” Johnson’s reanalysis of the etymology for 
cockloft, then, seems based on Johnson’s observation that (or assumption that) ck, or at 
least the sound it makes is substituted for p when cock means a “heap of hay.” Thus 
Johnson’s observations on what is “vulgarly” or “improperly” done to cop (cock is used 
for cop, which draws the word away from the form of its presumed etymon, Saxon cop) 
provides the evidentiary basis for Johnson’s conjectural corruption in the entry for 
cockloft. If p becomes ck to produce “cock of hay” p may have been corrupted ck in 
cockloft. Johnson also conjectures a variation between ck and p in the entry for mop:  
MOP. n.s. 2.[Perhaps corrupted from mock.] A wry mouth made in contempt.  
     Each one, tripping on his toe, 
Will be here with mop and mow. Shakesp. Tempest. 
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Johnson’s conjectural derivation here of course relies in part on his interpretation of the 
text and its context. But the variation between ck and p has precedent in Johnson’s 
observations of language changes and is understandable even from the view of Holder’s 
framework. P and K are both voiceless stops, or in Holder’s terms spirital and occluse. P, 
T, and K, as spirital occluse consonants are described as a unit “parallel” to B, D, and G, 
and M, N, and Ng (see above) in Holder’s terms. P, a labial, and K, a palatick, differ only 
in place of articulation. Johnson adds another note to the revised edition, assuming a 
corruption from p to k (here spelled c) in the entries for clump and plump: 
CLUMP.n.s. [formed from lump.] 1. A shapeless piece of wood, or other matter, 
nearly equal in its dimensions.  
2. A cluster of trees; a tuft of trees or shrubs: anciently a plump.  
 
PLUMP. n.s. [from the adjective.] A knot; a tuft; a cluster; a number joined in one 
mass. I believe it is now corrupted to clump.  
   England, Scotland, Ireland lie all in a plump together, not accessible but 
by sea.  Bacon.  
   Warwick having espied certain plumps of Scottish horsemen ranging the 
field, returned towards the arriere to prevent danger.           
 Hayward. 
   We rested under a plump of trees.    Sandys.  
   Spread upon a lake, with upward eye 
A plump of fowl behold their foe on high; 
They close their trembling troop, and all attend 
On whom the sowsing eagle will descend.    Dryden.  
 
Johnson’s belated assumption that plump and clump are related forms, again, is supported 
by their presumed semantic similarities, but also by the assumption that p and the sound 
represented variously as k, ck, or c can reasonably be related. Holder’s framework 
provides principled reasons for conjecturing such a relation. Just as importantly, the 
evidence Johnson encounters in various entries supports such a connection.  
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If we look at other corruptions in the Dictionary involving corruptions from p or k 
into other forms, the corrupted forms are often consistent with Holder’s framework. 
Johnson describes corruptions from p to b (occluse labials differed only by voice) in the 
entries for cob, to grabble, and pickback and from b to p in peacock, to plump v.n., and 
plump adv.:   
COB. A word often used in the composition of low terms; corrupted from cop, 
Sax. kopf, Germ. the head or top.  
 
To GRA'BBLE. v.n. [probably corrupted from grapple.]To grope; . . . 
<Arbuthnot. . . > 
 
PI'CKBACK. adj. [corrupted perhaps from pickpack.] On the back. 
   As our modern wits behold, 
Mounted a pickback on the old, 
Much farther off.  Hudibras. 
 
PEA'COCK. n.s. [pawa, Saxon, pavo, Lat.] Of this word the etymology is not 
known: perhaps it is peak cock, from the tuft of feathers on its head; the peak of 
women being an ancient ornament: if it be not rather a corruption of beaucoq, Fr. 
from the more striking lustre of its spangled train.]  A fowl eminent for the beauty 
of his feathers, and particularly of his tail. <4 quotes> 
 
To PLUMP.v.n. [from the adverb.] 1. To fall like a stone into the water. A word 
formed from the sound, or rather corrupted from plumb.   
2. [From the adjective.] To be swollen. Ainsworth.415
PLUMP. adv. [Probably corrupted from plumb, or perhaps formed from the sound 
of a stone falling on the water.] With a sudden fall.  
  I would fain now see ’em rowl’d 
Down a hill, or from a bridge 
Head-long cast, to break their ridge; 
Or to some river take ’em 
Plump, and see if that would wake ’em.   Ben. Johnson.  
   Fluttering his pennons vain plump down he drops.  Milt.  
 
Johnson describes corruptions from p to t (occluse spiritals) in gantlet and potgun and t to 
p in to sprain:  
                                                 
415 These two significations are listed in reverse order in 1755.  
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GA'NTLET. n.s. [gantlet is only corrupted from gantelope, gant, all; and loopen, 
to run, Dutch.] A military punishment, in which the criminal running between the 
ranks receives a lash from each man. Dryden’s Juv.; Locke.  
 
PO'TGUN. n.s. [by mistake or corruption used for popgun.] A gun which makes a 
small smart noise.  
   An author, thus who pants for fame, 
Begins the world with fear and shame, 
When first in print, you see him dread 
Each potgun levell’d at his head.   Swift’s Miscel.  
 
To SPRAIN. v.a. [Corrupted from strain.] To stretch the ligaments of a joint 
without dislocation of the bone. Gay.  
 
Johnson notes corruptions from k to g (both occluse palaticks) in gun and huggermugger 
(as we have already seen), as well as to haggle and muggy/muggish: 
To HA'GGLE. v.a. [corrupted from hackle or hack.] To cut; to chop; to mangle: 
always in a bad sense.  
  Suffolk first died, and York all haggled o’er 
Comes to him where in gore he lay insteep’d. Shakespeare. H. V. 
 
MU'GGY/MU'GGISH. n.s. <1755:> [A cant word.] <1773:> [corrupted from 
mucky, for damp.]  Moist; damp; mouldy. 
Cover with stones, or muggy straw, to keep it moist. Mortimer’s 
Husbandry. 
 
SHOG. n.s. [from shock.] Violent concussion. Dryden; Bentley.  
Johnson notes a “supposed” corruption from k to t (both occluse spiritals) in the entry for 
to smatter: 
To SMA'TTER. v.n. [It is supposed to be corrupted from smack or taste.] 1. To 
have a slight taste; to have a slight, superficial, and imperfect knowledge. Watts.; 
Bentley. 2. To talk superficially or ignorantly. Hudibras.; Swift. 
 
These observations on corruptions do not by necessity rely on Holder’s framework—
grammarians had observed, for instance, the close kinship between p and b for centuries. 
Yet the changes from p to b, p to k, p to t, k to g, k to t, and vice versa are all changes 
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between letters that are all occluse appulse consonants, and the change only requires an 
alteration in voicing (e.g., from spirital to vocal) or an alteration in the place of 
articulation (e.g., gingival to palatal), and such posited changes are consistent with 
Holder’s framework.  
Articulations  Spirital Vocal  
Close   Labial  P B  
(Occluse) Gingival  T   
Appulse   Palatick  K G  
  FIG. 3. Adapted from Holder, Elements of Speech, 62. 
Johnson also notes corruptions from k to the “tch” sound (i.e. the voiceless affricate 
sound in rich, and stitch) in the entries for reechy, smatch, and wretchless and from “tch” 
to k in nick:  
REE'CHY. adj. [from reech, corruptly formed from reek.] Smoky; sooty; tanned.  
   Let him, for a pair of reechy kisses, 
Make you to ravel all this matter out.  Shakesp. Hamlet. 
   The kitchen malkin pins 
Her richest lockram ’bout her reechy neck.    Shakesp. 
SMATCH. n.s. [corrupted from smack.] 1. Taste; tincture; twang.  
   Thou art a fellow of a good respect; 
Thy life hath had some smatch of honour in’t. Shakespeare.  
   Some nations have a peculiar guttural or nasal smatch in their language. 
Holder’s Elements of Speech. 
   These salts have somewhat of a nitrons taste, but mixt with a smatch of a 
vitriolick. Grew.  
2. [Cœruleo, Latin.]  A bird. <no quote> 
 
WRE'TCHLESS. adj. [This is, by I know not whose corruption, written for 
reckless.] Careless; mindless; heedless.  
   For any man to put off his present repentance, on contemplation of a 
possibility that his latter repentance may serve the turn, is the most 
wretchless presumption, and hath no promise of mercy annexed to it.  
Hammond.  
   If persons of so circumspect a piety have been thus overtaken, what 
security can there be for our wretchless oscitancy?    Government of the 
Tongue. 
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NICK. n.s. [nicke, Teutonick, the twinkling of an eye.] . . .  
2. A notch cut in any thing. [Corrupted from nock or notch.]416  
 
 While Holder leaves the “tch” sound out of his tables and his scheme, he does so because 
that scheme only includes what he considers to be “simple” letters, the irreducible 
“elements” of speech. Holder considers “Ch (as we pronounce it)” to be a compound of 
k’s kindred letter t and “Sh. or at least” a compound of  t and y.417 Whether or not 
Johnson had Holder in mind when noting these last corruptions, Holder’s framework, and 
the physical relations among letters therein, would have only supplemented evidence for 
a correspondence between k and “tch” as he considers lexical data throughout the 
Dictionary. The entry for arch shows Johnson noting an alternation between these two 
sounds depending on what consonant follows:  
ARCH, in composition, signifies chief, or of the first class, . . .as, archangel, 
archbishop. It is pronounced variously with regard to the ch, which before a 
consonant sound as in cheese, as archdeacon; before a vowel like k, as archangel.  
 
Johnson’s observations of such variations in language, in the end, are not fully 
attributable to, or reliant on, any single scheme. Johnson’s understanding of language 
change and his application of that understanding in his comments on “corruptions” rely 
on a variety of variety of linguistic and philological traditions, including Locke’s 
psychology of mind, early modern textual studies and lexicography, and Holder’s 
phonetics.  Johnson’s developing ideas on language change are also attributable to his 
tendency to synthesize the vocabularies of these different traditions and to synthesize his 
accumulated observations on language change as he progressed through the alphabet. He 
                                                 
416 No quote illustrates this signification. Two more significations follow the second one.  
417 Holder, The Elements of Speech, 72.  
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never fully synthesized these observations in any single, comprehensive statement, but in 
his various comments on corruption throughout the Dictionary we see instantiations of 











































 The subtitle of this work, “Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary in Its Contexts,” 
suggests a comprehensive or complete treatment of the Dictionary’s contexts, but of 
course this study has not exhausted the contexts within which it is possible or desirable to 
understand the Dictionary. Yet it does examine, more explicitly than any other study, the 
grounds for our understanding of Johnson as a linguistic thinker. Johnson was no linguist, 
but he applied his own best understanding of language and its processes of change to the 
interpretive tasks of lexicography and textual criticism. So even if Johnson was not so 
much a linguist as he was a philologer, his presumed attitudes toward language have long 
helped shape the modern linguist’s understanding of, and approach to, language by 
exemplifying naïve, outmoded, even pre-modern attitudes toward language.  
Johnson died just two years before William Jones delivered his famous paper to 
the Royal Asiatic Society, declaring that Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, “Gothic,” and “Celtic,” 
must have “sprung from some common source, which, perhaps, no longer exists.”418 
Jones’s paper has long been considered at least the symbolic origin of a type of historical 
and comparativist linguistic study that postdates Johnson—a kind of language-study that 
is rigorous and theoretically principled. While Johnson is generally considered as pre-
linguistic, this study argues that Johnson is a linguist in his own right, however 
constrained he is by his own times.   
* * * * * * 
                                                 
418 Quoted in R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1990), p. 149. 
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 Many misreadings of the Dictionary occur because scholars often consult the 
Preface alone. But even once we consult the Dictionary, we are apt to misread it because 
the text is only readable in chunks, and because the reading conventions we bring to the 
Dictionary prepare us to read it in ways that obscure Johnson’s methods and his aims.  
Thus another significant consequence of this study is that it points out the flexible 
structure and often integral nature of Johnson’s entries, offering a new way to them; 
moreover, it provides evidence to show that, when analyzing language, Johnson draws on 
the kinds of cross-entry connections he encourages his readers to make, “examining all 
the words of the same race” in “any case of doubt or difficulty,” and considering data 
from various entries, since “all [words] will be better understood, as they are considered 
in greater variety of structure and relations” (Preface, para. 53).   
In showing how what I have called the metatextual and textual components of 
Johnson’s entries interrelate, this study provides replicable interpretive strategies for 
future students of the Dictionary, and offers a novel, substantive reconstruction of 
Johnson’s philological methods and logic. Moreover, it points out how plucking portions 
of Johnson’s metatext from his entries can and does detract from studies of the 
Dictionary. In her recent study, The Grammar of Empire in Eighteenth-Century British 
Writing, Janet Sorenson writes in her chapter on Johnson that he attempts “to stop 
illegitimate reproduction and circulation [of words], drawing on Johnson’s use of 
metaphors of childbirth and the language of legitimacy in the Plan (“low terms” are “the 
spawn of folly or affectation, …and of which therefore no legitimate derivation can be 
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shewn”)419 For Sorenson, Johnson’s comments on “low” words, “cant,” “Scots usage,” 
“corruption,” and his frequent comment on the fact that a word has an “uncertain 
etymology” are all disparaging labels, “meant to limit or curtail the usage of these suspect 
words and prevent their further reproduction.” Thus  
Johnson disparagingly labels words such as “budge” and “cajole” as “low” and 
“cant.” In addition, the Dictionary warns that “bamboozle” is “a cant word not 
used in pure or grave writings” and that “agog” is “a word of uncertain 
etymology.” Johnson also writes of “bandog” (a mastiff) “the original of this 
word is very doubtful.” He writes of the word “bantling” (a young child) “if it has 
any etymology, it is corrupted from the old word ‘bairn,’ a little child, a low 
word,” and, we might add, a Scots word.420
 
In Sorenson’s reading, the phrase “a word of uncertain etymology,” juxtaposed with the 
terms “cant” and “low” becomes a warning label, as do the comments on corruption and 
Scots. Yet a look at the full entry for agog, or even a look at the full etymology in itself, 
does not support Sorenson’s reading of the comment on “uncertain etymology” as a 
warning label. It shows, rather, Johnson using the comment to qualify the evidence he 
lays out along with his own conjectural etymology. Moreover, Johnson provides readers 
with details about how agog is used (it “has the particles on, or for, before the object of 
desire”) in ways that seem to facilitate rather than discourage the use of agog:  
AGO'G. adv.[a word of uncertain etymology; the French have the term à gogo, in 
low language; as, ils vivent à gogo, they live to their wish: from this phrase our 
word may be, perhaps, derived.] 1. In a state of desire; in a state of warm 
imagination; heated with the notion of some enjoyment; longing; strongly excited.  
     As for the sense and reason of it, that has little or nothing to do here; 
only let it sound full and round, and chime right to the humour, which is at 
present agog, (just as a big, long, rattling name is said to command even 
adoration from a Spaniard) and, no doubt, with this powerful, senseless 
                                                 
419 Plan, para. 29.  
420 Janet Sorenson, The Grammar of Empire in Eighteenth-Century British Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 79. 
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engine, the rabble-driver, shall be able to carry all before him.   
     South’s Sermons. 
2. It is used with the verbs to be, or to set; as, he is agog, or you may set him 
agog.  
     The gawdy gossip, when she’s set agog, 
In jewels drest, and at each ear a bob, 
Goes slaunting out, and, in her trim of pride, 
Thinks all she says or does, is justify’d.   Dryd. Juv. Sat. 6. 
     This maggot has no sooner set him agog, but he gets him a ship, 
freights her, builds castles in the air, and conceits both the Indies in his 
coffers.       L’Estrange.  
3. It has the particles on, or for, before the object of desire.  
     On which the saints are all agog, 
And all this for a bear and dog.    Hudibras, cant. ii. 
     Gypsies generally straggle into these parts, and set the heads of our 
servant-maids so agog for husbands, that we do not expect to have any 
business done as it should be, whilst they are in the country.   
       Addison. Spectator. 
 
Sorenson’s reading does not account for the possibility that by describing agog as “a 
word of uncertain etymology” Johnson is merely admitting what must be admitted: the 
etymology is, in fact, uncertain.  
For Sorenson, this term is instead a “label,” a term which itself suggests that 
Johnson is branding the word rather than admitting ignorance. But the term “of uncertain 
etymology,” in itself, is no condemnation of a word. Johnson says the same thing of 
several other words. For instance, the word anger is “of no certain etymology”; bachelor 
is “a word of very uncertain etymology, it not being well known what was its original 
sense”; the etymology of baron is “very uncertain”; to struggle is “of uncertain 
etymology.” Stubborn is also a word “of which no obvious etymology appears,” yet 
Johnson, after offering possible derivations from Minshew, Junius, and Edward Lye, lists 
five senses of the word illustrated by ten quotations from authors of no mean reputation: 
Shakespeare, Spenser, and Dryden. Again, nothing in the entry suggests that Johnson is 
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trying to discourage the use of “stubborn” because its etymology is unclear. There is 
apparently even a right and wrong way, or at least a common and uncommon way, to use 
stubborn. Having written in the first edition that stubborn, in “all its uses it commonly 
implies something of a bad quality,” Johnson adds in the fourth edition, “though Locke 
has catachrestically used it in a sense of praise.”421 It would seem unusual for Johnson to 
warn readers against using a word like struggle while noting his impressions of its proper 
use.  
It is true that Johnson determines that presumed French etymon, “the term à 
gogo,” occurs “in low language.” But even a word with presumably low origins can rise 
above the fortunes of its pedigree in the Dictionary. Gratitude, for instance, comes from 
“low Latin,” along with several other words Johnson describes as perhaps having a “low 
Latin” pedigree: commission, destructive, fee, homage, manor, map, marriage, moat, to 
preserve, secretary, soldier, and temporal. It is also true that two of the authors used to 
illustrate agog, Samuel Butler (by means of his satire Hudibras) and Sir Roger 
L’Estrange (especially by means of his translation of Aesop’s Fables), are relatively 
frequent suppliers to the Dictionary of terms Johnson labels as low.  Hudibras is quoted 
in two other entries marked, as Sorenson points out, as “low” terms: cajole and budge; is 
quoted along with Shakespeare under to budge; Hudibras and L’Estrange provide the 
                                                 
421 Johnson includes the following definitions for catachresis and catachrestical; the passage from “Smith’s 
Rhetorick” serves as the definition for catachresis:  
CATACHRE'SIS.n.s. . .  ;It is, in rhetorick, the abuse of a trope, when the words are too far wrested from 
their native signification, or when one word is abusively put for another, for want of the proper word; as, a 
voice beautiful to the ear. Smith’s Rhetorick.  
CATACHRE'STICAL. adj. [from catachresis.] Contrary to proper use; forced; far fetched. A 
catachrestical and far derived similitude it holds with men, that is, in a bifurcation. Brown’s Vulgar 
Errours. 
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only illustrations for the verb to cajole until he adds a quote from Rymer in the fourth 
edition. In addition, Hudibras and L’Estrange both illustrate, along with Shakespeare, 
usage of the verb to fadge, which is “a mean word not now used, unless perhaps in 
ludicrous and low compositions.” Johnson illustrates the noun squelch, a “low and 
ludicrous” word meaning “a heavy fall,” with quotes from Hudibras and L’Estrange 
alone. The verb to imbrangle (“to intangle”) is illustrated by Hudibras alone; the adverb 
squab (“with a heavy sudden fall; plump and fat”) with L’Estrange alone. Hudibras, 
L’Estrange’s Fables, and other works, such as John Arbuthnot’s History of John Bull 
(which provides the illustrative quote for that “cant word not used in pure or grave 
writings,” bamboozle) are quoted throughout the Dictionary, and these informal, often 
“ludicrous” (i.e. as Johnson defines it, “burlesque; merry; sportive; exciting laughter”) 
works are not “grave” or “pure,” thus they often contain words more commonly used in 
informal, “low” contexts. Sorenson seems to read Johnson’s phrase “not used” as “not to 
be used” or “not now used, nor ought it ever be used,” taking Johnson’s estimation of the 
contexts within which bamboozle is actually used and reading it as an injunction meant to 
“limit or curtail the usage of these suspect words and prevent their further 
reproduction.”422   
Yet however one reads Johnson’s “labels” (a slightly loaded term itself), they 
always operate, and should be read, in the larger context of the entry. It is easy to imagine 
that readers might not want to use bamboozle, once an authoritative dictionary like 
Johnson’s seems to exclude its use from “pure or grave writings.” But Sorenson is not 
                                                 
422 Sorenson, The Grammar of Empire, 79.  
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merely referring to the various ways that readers might respond to, or interpret, Johnson’s 
comments on words—a kind of variety that is enabled by Johnson’s wording—she is 
characterizing Johnson’s aims and intentions. Every one of Sorenson’s “labels” (“of 
uncertain etymology,” “low,” “cant,” “Scots,” “corrupted”), as this dissertation has 
shown, make room for other readings, and other assumptions about Johnson’s intentions, 
than the one she provides. My own contextualized reading in Chapter 2 of Johnson’s 
comments on Scots, for instance, radically departs from Sorenson’s (and James Basker’s) 
reading of them, regardless of their context, as “warning labels.”423  
Other words mentioned by Sorenson among those words of uncertain etymology, 
bandog and bantling, illustrate the way Johnson’s entries may be read fruitfully in the 
context of other entries. Johnson does write that the “original of this word is very 
doubtful,” but as I point out in Chapter 2, Johnson uses the metatextual space, set off by 
brackets, in the entry to construct his own notions of the word’s etymology in order to 
support his own estimation that bandog means “a kind of large dog.”  
[from ban or band, and dog. The original of this word is very doubtful. Caius, De 
Canibus Britannicis,424 derives it from band, that is, a dog chained up. Skinner 
inclines to deduce it from bana, a murderer. May it not come from ban a curse, as 
we say a curst cur; or rather from baund, swelled or large, a Danish word; from 
whence, in some counties they call a great nut a ban-nut.] 
 
If the etymology is uncertain, Johnson does his best to derive one, and his methods here, 
as I hope this dissertation suggests, demonstrate the ways in which his philological 
                                                 
423 “Johnson did include some Scots words in his Dictionary. . . . Any Scots words which he did include 
receive ‘warning labels’ such as ‘confined to Scotland’ or ‘still retained in Scotland.’ . . . . By labeling 
Scots words with derogatory phrases, eliminating his assistants’ information regarding Scottish usage, and 
banning most Scots terms, Johnson both exoticizes and represses Scots.” Sorenson, Grammar of Empire, 
91. For my own interpretation of such phrases, see Chapter 2. 
424 1755: Caius, de canibus Britannicis 
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observations in one entry are informed by observations made in other entries (the entries 
for ban, to ban, band, to band, bane (the lexical descendant of bana), as well as his 
observations made in cognate languages (“a Danish word”), observations made on 
analogous uses in oral language (“as we say a curst cur”), and in the language of the 
“counties” not otherwise included or defined in the Dictionary (ban-nut: “in some 
counties they call a great nut a ban-nut”)425 As I argue in Chapter 3, Johnson often lays 
out for the reader competing etymologies of a word, with the evidence for each. 
Johnson’s conjecture that Danish baund is a source for, or at least cognate of, the word 
provides the best etymological fit with his definition, “a kind of large dog.”  Even if the 
comment on bandog’s “original” were intended as a kind of disparaging label, reading 
that comment out of context skews the passage and misses its potential relevance for 
understanding Johnson’s philological methods.  
As I argue in Chapter 2, Johnson invites readers in the Preface to “examine words 
of the same race” in “any case of doubt or difficulty” (para. 53). And in the doubtful case 
of bandog’s etymology Johnson makes his own tentative conclusions based on evidence 
from words that he considers to be related (ban as “curse,” the Danish word baund, the 
use of ban in the compound “ban-nut”) and places that evidence alongside the evidence 
of Caius and Skinner. If we are ready to see how the various elements of Johnson’s 
entries work together, and if we are prepared to read Johnson’s entries not as discrete and 
isolated members of a discourse colony (as McDermott and Walsh suggest) Johnson’s 
philological methods and logic will be more clear. In the case of bandog, that would 
                                                 
425 Johnson neither includes an entry for ban-nut nor includes any signification under ban semantically 
related to the notions “swelled,” “large,” or “great.”  
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involve treating the etymology as a kind of hypertext that invites readers to consult the 
entries for words Johnson describes as being related to bandog. Often these related words 
can serve as hypertextual links to other entries, and are made conspicuous by their 
orthographic similarity to the headword, not to mention their italicized font, as is the case 
with ban and band. A little more ingenuity, but not much effort, is required to locate the 
implied link, bane, via its “Saxon” parent “bana, murderer”: ban appears on the left-hand 
side of the book, bane on the right-hand.   
The reader who wishes to follow links among entries can do so easily enough, 
whether consulting an original edition of the folio or the CD-ROM version. Other links, 
for instance the one Johnson makes to Danish baund, are extra-textual, and would require 
reference to texts other than the Dictionary for confirmation or comparison, but many of 
the links are intra-textual (like ban, band, and bane) and provide substantial evidence, on 
their own, for the kinds of connections that inform Johnson’s philological judgments. 
This kind of cross-entry reading is partly the cost of Johnson’s choice to order the entries 
alphabetically, instead of the method used by the French Academy, which found it 
“agreeable & instructif de dispose le Dictionnaire par Racines” (agreeable and instructive 
to arrange the Dictionary according to Roots). In Johnson’s alphabetically organized text, 
one must trace these connections by pursuing the links suggested by Johnson’s 
metatextual commentary.  
A little more effort is required to follow the links in the metatext for the “low 
word” bantling, in which Johnson offers another one of his conjectural etymologies 
involving corruption: 
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BA'NTLING.n.s. [if it has any etymology, it is perhaps corrupted from the old 
word bairn, bairnling, a little child.] A little child: a low word.  
If the object of their love 
Chance by Lucina’s aid to prove, 
They seldom let the bantling roar, 
In basket, at a neighbour’s door.  Prior.  
 
We do not find an entry for bairn, but there is an entry for ling, a “termination” that often 
signifies “diminution”:  
LING. The termination notes commonly diminution; as, kitling, and is derived 
from klein, German, little; sometimes a quality; as, firstling, in which sense 
Skinner deduces it from langen, old Teutonick, to belong. 
 
Johnson’s proposed etymology, then, involves analyzing bantling as a compound of the 
unknown commodity, bant, with the known commodity ling, which operates as a 
termination in other entries (though there is no entry for kitling, for some reason): 
duckling, firstling, fondling, foundling, nursling, weakling, and even dumpling:  
DU'MPLING.n.s. [from dump, heaviness.] A sort of pudding.  
You prate too long, like a book-learn’d sot, 
’Till pudding and dumpling burn to pot. Dryden.  
 
In Johnson’s entry for bantling it is easy to read contempt into Johnson’s phrase “if it has 
any etymology,” and bantling—with its confluence of presumed lowness, doubtful 
etymology, potential origins in the “corruptions of oral utterance” (Preface, para. 16), and 
its Scottish associations—displays several features traditionally regarded as Johnsonian-
induced stigmata. Certainly, given all of those factors, and the widespread presumption 
that Johnson hated Scots, no reader could be faulted for presuming that Johnson advises 
them to use bantling with caution, if at all.  
But Johnson is not just stigmatizing this word; he is offering a conjectural 
etymology as he often does when he lacks textual evidence, by presuming a corruption 
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and by drawing on oral language “old” language or Scots to make his philological 
judgments. With ling accounted for, Johnson tries to account for bant, presuming that it 
contains meaning in itself. Yet he lacks of any attestable meaning for bant. Banter, whose 
orthography might suggest a relation, is semantically unrelated and reveals no 
etymological evidence that would clarify the meaning of bant; it is a “barbarous word, 
without etymology, unless it be derived from badiner, Fr.” Pant, though not far removed 
phonetically, is far removed semantically.  Resorting to conjecture about corruptions, 
Johnson looks for words semantically related to bant from which bant might plausibly be 
derived. Bairn is semantically related to bantling, Given the meaning of bantling, as 
derived from the context of the quote from Prior, possibly along with Johnson’s own 
awarness the word’s use in other writings or even oral speech, bairn is semantically 
related. Johnson then presumes three changes: a vowel change, the loss of r, and the 
insertion of a t between the n and l. As is well known, Johnson and etymologists before 
him played freely with vowels. The other two conjectured changes are not unique to the 
entry for bantling. Johnson notes r-dropping in other conjectural corruptions in the 
entries for bully, moky, as well as nousel, nustle, and nuzzle:  
BU'LLY. n.s. [Skinner derives this word from burly, as a corruption in the 
pronunciation; which is very probably right. . . . <even though Johnson offers 
other possibilities>] 
MO'KY. adj. Dark: as, moky weather. Ains.  It seems a corruption of murky. In 
some places they call it muggy. Dusky; cloudy. <no quote; 1755: “It seems a 
corruption of murky: and in some places they call it muggy, dusky.”> 
To NOU'SEL. v.a. [The same I believe with nuzzel, and both in their original 
import, corrupted from nursle.] To nurse up. . . .  
To NU'STLE. v.a. To fondle; to cherish. Corrupted from nursle. See NUZZLE. 
Ains. To NU'ZZLE. v.a. [This word, in its original signification, seems corrupted 
from nursle; but when its original meaning was forgotten, writers supposed it to 
come from nozzle or nose, and in that sense used it.]  
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1. To nurse; to foster. . . .  
 
In other entries, Johnson notes the insertion of both consonants within words, which 
modern linguists term epenthesis, a term Johnson includes in the Dictionary:   
EPE'NTHESIS.n.s. . . . [In grammar.] The addition of a vowel or consonant in the 
middle of a word. Harris.  
 
In his comments on corruptions, Johnson conjectures various corruptions that might be 
termed epenthetic: alarum from alarm; callipers from clippers; clink from click; trinket 
from tricket; tenant-saw from tenon-saw, and nustle from nursle (see above), which 
presumably underwent both r-loss and epenthesis.  
ALA'RUM. n.s. [corrupted, as it seems, from alarm.] 426. . . .  
CA'LLIPERS. n.s. [Of this word I know not the etymology, nor does any thing 
more probable occur, than that, perhaps, the word is corrupted from clippers, 
instruments with which any thing is clipped, inclosed or embraced.] Compasses 
with bowed shanks. Moxon’s Mechanical Exercises.  
To CLINK. v.a. [perhaps softened from clank, or corrupted from click.] To strike 
so as to make a small sharp noise.  Shakesp. 
TE'NANT-SAW. n.s. [corrupted, I suppose, from tenon-saw.] See TENON. <sic> 
TRI'NKET. n.s. [This Skinner derives somewhat harshly from trinquet, Fr. 
trinchetto, Ital. a topsail. I rather imagine it corrupted from tricket, some petty 
finery or decoration.]  
1. Toys; ornaments of dress; superfluities of decoration. Sidney, b. ii.; Shakesp.; 
Shakesp. Winter’s Tale.; Dryden’s Juv.; Arbuthnot’s Hist. of John Bull.; Swift.  
2. Things of no great value; tackle; tools. Tuss.; L’Estr.  
 
When we place Johnson’s comments on bantling in the context of other, clearly related 
entries (the entry for ling and its manifestations in other entries, entries wherein 
Johnson’s uses “corruption” as an analytical term) we get a different picture than the one 
Sorenson provides of what Johnson is up to in the entry for bantling.  
                                                 
426 This end bracket is new to the fourth edition.  
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The passage “perhaps corrupted from the old word bairn, bairnling, a little child” 
partly demonstrates the way a corruption might have happened, as Johnson does in 
several other entries:  
BAG.n.s. [belge, Sax. from whence perhaps by dropping, as is usual, the harsh 
consonant, came bege, bage, bag.] 
BUMBA'ILIFF.n.s. [This is a corruption of bound bailiff, pronounced by gradual 
corruption, boun, bun, bum bailiff.] . . .427  
To CLA'MBER.v.n. [probably corrupted from climb; as climber, clamber.] . . . .  
CLU'MSY.adj. [This word, omitted in the other etymologists, is rightly derived 
by Bailey from lompsch, Dutch, stupid. In English, lump, clump, lumpish, 
clumpish, clumpishly, clumsily, clumsy.] . . . . 
To CRI'MPLE.v.a. [from rumple, crumple, crimple.] . . . . 
To DRI'BBLE.v.n. [This word seems to have come from drop by successive 
alterations, such as are usual in living languages. Drop, drip, dripple, dribble, 
from thence drivel and driveler. Drip may indeed be the original word, from the 
Danish drypp.] . . . 
To DRI'VEL.v.n. [from drip, dripple, dribble, drivel.] . . .  
To HO'BBLE.v.n. [to hop, to hopple, to hobble.] . . . . 
SKA'DDLE.n.s. [sceathnisse,428 Saxon; scath is harm; thence scathle, scaddle.] 
Hurt; damage. Dict.  
To SLOP.v.a. [from lap, lop, slop.] To drink grossly and greedily.429  
SMI'CKET.n.s. [Diminutive of smock, smocket, smicket.] The under garment of a 
woman.430  
 
As these examples show, Johnson sometimes makes his presumed corruptions more 
explicit than he does under bantling, and sometimes he does not even call them 
corruptions. It is possible to read “bairn, bairnling” as another of Johnson’s illustrations 
of gradual corruption: Smock, smocket, smicket; hop, hopple, hobble; bairn, bairnling, 
bantling. Thus Johnson’s “bairn, bairnling,” may be a shorthand way for Johnson to 
                                                 
427 This is the revised 1773 version.  
428 “Th” here is, in the original, an “eth” (ð). 
429 This entry includes no illustrative quotation.  
430 This entry is not included in the 1755 edition; this entry includes no illustrative quotation.  
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clarify for readers how he gets from bairn to bantling; a process which, on the model of 
the above examples might be elaborated thus:  
bairn > bairnling > bainling or barnling >  banling > bantling. 
This reconstruction of Johnson’s is just that, a reconstruction, but one that accounts for 
evidence of Johnson’s practices in the Dictionary that is largely ignored, overlooked, or 
misinterpreted.  
For various reasons, I regard Sorenson’s reading of Johnson’s “labels” as a 
misreading, not simply an alternative to my own. In assuming that phrases like 
“corrupted,” “of certain etymology,” and “still retained in Scotland” are all disparaging 
warning labels meant to “limit or curtail the usage of these suspect words and prevent 
their further reproduction,” Sorenson must assume that all of these “labels” function in 
the same unitary way—as derogatory labels—regardless of their context within an 
entry.431 Yet as this dissertation demonstrates, Johnson’s use of the term “corruption” is 
not univocal but multivalent, and its resonance and function depend largely on the 
context of use within the entry. If we always read Johnson’s comments on corruption as 
warning labels, then we must assume that Johnson meant to curtail and limit the use of 
chicken, corporal, elder, gun, modern, platoon, and stocking. Likewise, Johnson’s 
comment that a word has an “doubtful etymology” is more often than not a hedge or a 
qualifier preceding his own conjecture, or a confession of ignorance that must be 
admitted or passed over with an act of silent omission, since Johnson’s default entry 
structure leads readers to expect, generally, an etymology, or at least a gesture toward 
                                                 
431 Sorenson, Grammar of Empire, 79, 91.  
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one, in each entry.  Johnson’s comment on uncertain etymology, rather than being an act 
of regulation or prescription opens the space between the brackets to conjecture and 
emendation. By artificially narrowing the function and meaning of Johnson’s terms of 
metatextual commentary, we read the Dictionary with artificial blinders, often finding the 
authoritarian Doctor we already expected to see. By providing accounts of the rhetoric of 
the Preface, the integral nature of the structure of the entry, the hypertextual nature of the 
Dictionary, and the polysemy of “corruption” I hope to raise critical awareness about the 
ways we often unwittingly accept these artificial blinders, whose effect is compounded 
by the limits already placed on readers by the size and structure of the dictionary. 
Becoming one of Johnson’s “Corrupted” Readers: Rabinowitz’s “Authorial 
Reading” and the Dictionary 
 
Peter Rabinowitz, in Before Reading, is not the first critic to talk about the reading 
conventions we bring to the texts we read, but his account of “authorial reading” loosely 
approximates what I have tried to do in this study. For Rabinowitz, “authorial reading” 
involves reading a text as what he calls the “authorial audience.” The “authorial 
audience” does not comprise the “flesh-and-blood people who read a book,” but rather a 
hypothetical audience whose presence influences the author’s particular choices. Authors, 
Rabinowitz writes, “cannot begin to fill up a blank page without making assumptions 
about the readers’ beliefs, knowledge, and familiarity with conventions. As a result 
authors are forced to guess; they design their books rhetorically for some more or less 
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specific hypothetical audience, which I call the authorial audience.”432 As Rabinowitz 
explains, the  
notion of authorial audience is clearly tied to authorial intention, but it gets around 
some of the problems that have traditionally hampered the discussion of intention 
by treating it as a matter of social convention rather than of individual 
psychology. In other words, my perspective allows us to treat the reader’s attempt 
to read as the author intended, not as a search for the author’s private psyche, but 
rather as the joining of a particular social/interpretive community; that is, the 
acceptance of the author’s invitation to read in a particular socially constituted 
way that is shared by the author and his or her expected readers. . . . By thinking 
in terms of the authorial audience rather than private intention, furthermore, we 
are reminded of the constraints within which writers write. . . . [A]uthors can put 
down whatever marks they wish on the page; readers can construe them however 
they wish. But once authors and readers accept the communal nature of writing 
and reading, they give up some of that freedom.433
 
As Rabinowitz points out, authorial reading involves neither Northrop Frye’s notion of 
“disinterested response” nor Stanley Fish’s “automaton who approaches each new 
sentence with the same anesthetized mind,” nor Gerald Prince’s “degree-zero naratee” 
who has “no personality or social characteristics” and is thus “capabale of reading a text 
without distorting presuppositions.”434 Authorial reading  
does not escape “distorting presuppositions.” Rather, it recognizes that distorting 
presuppositions lie at the heart of the reading process. . . . To join the authorial 
audience, then, you should not ask what a pure reading of a given text would be. 
Rather, you need to ask what sort of corrupted reader this particular author wrote 
for: what were the reader’s beliefs, engagements, commitments, prejudices, and 
stampedings of pity and terror.435
 
In my own reading of the Preface, reconstructing such a “corrupted reader” also involves 
asking questions about the material circumstances that could be expected to obtain such 
                                                 
432 Peter Rabinowitz, “From Before Reading,” in The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary 
Trends, 2nd ed. David H. Richter, ed. (Boston: Bedford/St.Martin’s, 1998), 999.  
433 Rabinowitz, “From Before Reading,” 1000.  
434 Rabinowitz, “From Before Reading,” 1001-02.  
435 Rabinowitz, “From Before Reading,” 1002.  
    291
 
that the reader and text came into contact. Thus, we are not only concerned about how 
lexicographers were often described (as men of industry, not genius), how it was 
awkward for Johnson to put himself forward in the Preface, how the audience expected a 
work of national significance and pride; we are also concerned about the ways that 
nascent book reviewing practices in popular magazines played a role in constructing the 
authorial audience for the Preface. In “the case of successful authorial reading, the author 
and readers are members of the same community, so while the reader does in fact engage 
in an act of production, he or she makes what the author intended to be found. Of course, 
. . . not all attempts at authorial reading are successful.”436  
Like Rabinowitz, I agree that authorial reading is not the only or necessarily the 
best way to read; yet it is “more than just another among a large set of equally valid and 
equally important ways of approaching a text” (1004) for two reasons: “many readers try 
to engage in it” (1005) and  
many types of reading depend for their power on a prior understanding of the 
authorial meaning. The manifest/latent distinction of certain Freudian studies, for 
instance, collapses if we don’t have a manifest meaning to begin with. . . . [W]e 
see the same dependence on authorial intention in much feminist criticism. Judith 
Fetterley’s ‘resisting reader’ can come into being only if there is something to 
resist. (1004-05)  
 
Almost any discussion of Johnson’s Dictionary takes some position on Johnson’s 
intentions and a critics’ assumptions about those intentions strongly influence their 
readings of Johnson’s entries. Even though the Preface is generally considered a retreat 
from the more prescriptive Plan, Johnson leaves speaks out of both sides of his mouth in 
the Preface, noting, on the one hand, I “do not form, but register the language” (para. 75), 
                                                 
436 Rabinowitz, “From Before Reading,” 1003.  
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and on the other, it “remains that we retard what we cannot repel” (para. 91). Referring to 
the great amount of ink spilled “about whether Johnson hoped to fix English or merely to 
record it,” Sorenson suggests that we avoid discussing Johnson’s intentions altogether. 
“Despite Johnson’s own anti-prescriptivist attitude, it is important to note that before 
communicating anything else, the Dictionary communicates a conception of language as 
ordered and unitary. We would do well to consider the Dictionary not in terms of 
Johnson’s intentions, but in terms of the symbolic market in which it participates.”437 
Despite this statement, relegated to a footnote, Sorenson’s reading of Johnson’s “labels” 
clearly relies on assumptions about his intentions. I do not pretend to know Johnson’s 
intentions, but I do know that by taking Johnson’s intentions as expressed in the Plan or 
the Preface too literally without considering either the rhetorical circumstances of those 
documents or the context of Johnson’s metatextual comments, we ignore the very 
evidence that would make it possible to produce even more nuanced, better substantiated 
arguments about Johnson’s ideas about language as well as their epistemological and 
ideological foundations.  
Thus, in arguing for the importance of reading as authorial audience, I am not 
suggesting that it is either the final reading or the most important. . . . I would be 
disappointed in a student who could produce an authorial reading but who could 
not, in Terry Eagleton’s phrase, “show the text as it cannot know itself”—that is, 
move beyond that reading to look at the work critically from some perspective 
other than the one called for by the author. But while authorial reading without 
further critique is often incomplete, so is a critical reading without an 
understanding of the authorial audience as its base. (1005) 
 
Despite the deliberately provocative title of this dissertation’s second chapter, I recognize 
that there is no single way to read the Dictionary. Yet I do agree with Rabinowitz that 
                                                 
437 Sorenson, Grammar of Empire, 64, 245 (continuation of n. 7). 
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authorial reading provides an important point of orientation from which other readings 
can depart.  
 [A]uthorial reading has a special status against which other readings can be 
measured (although not necessarily negatively); it is a kind of norm (although not 
necessarily a positive value), in that it serves as a point of orientation (although 
not necessarily as an ultimate destination). In short, authorial reading—in the 
sense of understanding the values of the authorial audience—has its own kind of 
validity, even if, in the end, actual readers share neither the experiences nor the 
values presumed by the author. (1007) 
 
In trying to function as an authorial reader, I fully appreciate the need for ‘resisting 
readers,’ and do not believe that the point of orientation this study serves as an ultimate 
destination. But I argue, as Rabinowitz does, that the approaches of resisting readers and 
authorial readers alike will stand on firmer ground and will be more valuable given such 
a point of orientation. We will be more equipped to argue about what Johnson elides, for 
instance, when we stop eliding from our representations of his text those parts that are 
inconvenient or seem uninteresting.  
The authorial readings this dissertation provides are necessary because they draw 
attention to the ways in which our sources for understanding Johnson as a linguistic 
thinker open themselves up to misreadings, a term which I, like Rabinowitz use here “to 
refer not to readings that simply skirt the authorial audience, but rather to readings that 
attempt to incorporate the strategies of the authorial audience, but fail to do so” (1010).    
These misreadings occur, however, not just because of a critic’s ideological predilections 
or methodological and theoretical commitments, but because Johnson’s own Plan and 
Preface both contain statements that allow us to emphasize the prescriptivist or the 
descriptivist, depending on which statements we quote. We also tend to read the Plan and 
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Preface as straightforward guides to the contents of the Dictionary, often disregarding the 
function of those paratexts as historically and rhetorically situated documents of self-
fashioning. Moreover, these misreadings occur, as I have argued, because the interpretive 
conventions we bring to the task of reading (or consulting, as the case may be) the 
Dictionary are different from those of the authorial audience. Not only do we 
compartmentalize the various elements of the Dictionary (and often ignore the 
etymologies because their longstanding reputation as foolish renders them presumably 
irrelevant to the modern reader), but we also tend to miss the multifunctional nature of 
Johnson’s metatextual commentaries, and the polysemy of Johnson’s metatextual 
vocabulary (especially “corruption”) that allows the authorial audience to recognize those 
various functions, even when they operate simultaneously, in comparison to most of 
today’s actual audiences. In addition, by reading the Dictionary as a polemic (Reddick), 
or as a text with themes (DeMaria), or as a discourse colony composed of unrelated 
textual islands (McDermott and Walsh), some of the most important studies of the 
Dictionary depart from authorial reading even when they presume to engage in it: thus, 
the Dictionary is Anglican polemic for Reddick, a didactic encyclopedia for DeMaria.  
The authorial readings that this study provides are also important because we 
simply cannot know the text of the Dictionary in the way we can know the text of Tom 
Jones or other novels. For example, those who study the Dictionary must deal with the 
fact that they will likely not read the Dictionary from cover to cover, at least not in this 
decade. Thus I, like critics before me, have had to come with my own ways to meet the 
hermeneutic challenges posed by the Dictionary, sampling the text with an increasing 
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understanding of the ways in which the text is, as James Sledd, Gwin Kolb, and Robert 
DeMaria, Jr. have pointed out, a redaction of previous practices and even of previous 
content; and the ways in which, as Allen Reddick has demonstrated, it is a “text in 
flux.”438   
If I promote an authorial reading of the Dictionary I do not do so under the spell 
of a post-Romantic notion of authorship. As Sledd, Kolb, DeMaria, Reddick and others 
have made clear, Johnson’s Dictionary, like all dictionaries, is quite literally intertextual,  
since lexicographers have always incorporated the content of earlier dictionaries. Johnson 
often acknowledges such borrowings, but not always. Moreover, the “precise extent and 
nature” of the amanuenses’ “responsibilities remain largely unclear” (Reddick, 218 n. 
12).439  Yet the longstanding notion that the Dictionary was in some simple way the 
product of Johnson’s intellect and genius is not the product of post-Romantic fancy; it 
was a notion that Johnson actively encouraged in his dramatic portrayal of lexicographic 
travail in the Preface, a document suffused with the first person. As a text whose value 
relied in part on its ability to claim authoritativeness, the Dictionary needed to display its 
credentials and obscure factors that might mitigate or undermine its claims to authority. 
As much as Johnson underscores the obstacles he faced in struggling with the language, 
he never tries to deflect blame for faults by mentioning his amanuenses. The heroic ethos 
of moral and intellectual struggle in the Preface depends largely on the notion that the 
work was “written” (not compiled) with “little assistance of the learned, and without any 
patronage of the great; not in the soft obscurities of retirement, or under the shelter of 
                                                 
438 Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 8.  
439 Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 218 n. 12.  
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academick bowers, but amid inconvenience and distraction, in sickness and sorrow.”440 In 
presenting the Dictionary to the public, Johnson is willing to take credit and blame for the 
contents: “[I]f our language is not here fully displayed, I have only failed in an attempt 
which no human powers have hitherto completed.”441 The success or the failure, for 
Johnson’s authorial audience, would be attributed to him. Without being able to know 
exactly how, or the extent to which, the amanuenses contributed to the entries, we can say 
that Johnson generally acted (wrote) as if the contents were largely of his own making. 
Johnson took responsibility for the contents of the Dictionary, and given that Allen 
Reddick has shown that Johnson, in fact, did oversee the work of his amanuenses in the 
fourth edition, it is reasonable to agree with Reddick’s assessment that the contributions 
of amanuenses to the text were subject to Johnson’s approval.  
 For these reasons I have allowed myself in this study to act and write as if all 
metatextual commentary in the Dictionary originates with, and represents both the 
linguistic thinking and interpretive methods of, Johnson, but some of the metatextual 
commentary may have actually been penned by Johnson’s amanuenses, especially the 
comments on usage “still retained in Scotland,” given the fact five of Johnson’s 
amanuenses were Scotsmen. There is little reason to expect that without the help of these 
amanuenses, or the testimony of other Scots speakers or writers, Johnson would have 
been able to attest to what was retained in Scotland. “Macbean,” the only amanuensis 
mentioned by name in the Dictionary, is given credit for metatextual commentary and 
definitions in the entries for three entries in the Dictionary, loord, to mounch/to maunch, 
                                                 
440 Preface, para. 94.  
441 Preface, para. 94.  
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and sorn.442 The metatextual commentaries for loord and sorn are longer than is usual in 
the Dictionary, but the commentary on mounch/maunch is consistent with the 
commentary we have examined in this study. Testimony from the Ainsworth’s Latin-
English dictionary, contemporary Scots usage, and the presumed etymological ties to 
French manger are all presented to gloss a passage from Shakespeare’s ‘Scottish play’:  
To MOUNCH / To MAUNCH. v.a. [mouch, to eat much. Ains. This word is 
retained in Scotland, and denotes the obtunded action of toothless gums on a hard 
crust, or any thing eatable: it seems to be a corruption of the French word manger. 
Macbean.]  
A sailor’s wife had chesnuts in her lap, 
And mouncht, and mouncht, and mouncht.     Shakesp. Macbeth.  
 
This entry, presented as it appears, is unusual in that the only definition is placed within, 
rather than after, the brackets. But it is typical in the way Macbean’s commentary circuits 
what I have called Johnson’s lexicographic-hermeneutic triangle: etymology, usage, and 
meaning. In its use of Scots both to gloss passages of older English texts and to justify a 
proposed definition, in its use of corruption to conjecture an etymology, this entry 
employs the same complementary interpretive strategies that we see throughout the 
Dictionary.  
 It is impossible to know whether or not every unattributed metatextual 
commentary can be ascribed definitively to Johnson, but the presence of Macbean’s 
attribution, along with similar attributions to living correspondents, suggests that Johnson 
is willing to acknowledge those who provide etymological information. Johnson 
                                                 
442 A CD-ROM search of the Dictionary for names of the amanuenses found only “Macbean.” Aside from 
the metatextual commentary in the entries listed above, four lines of verse used in the 1755 edition to 
illustrate scale are attributed to “Macbean”; see scale n.s. 7; these lines are absent in the 1773 edition. Two 
Macbeans worked on the Dictionary: Alexander Macbean, a former amanuensis for Ephraim Chambers’s 
Cyclopædia described by Johnson as “a man of great learning,” and Alexander’s brother William. For more 
on the Macbeans, see Reddick, The Making of Johnson’s Dictionary, 62.  
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acknowledges the help of his friend, the Scottish philosopher James Beattie, who helped 
him revise the entry for fren and the etymology for humblebee: 
FREN.n.s. A worthless woman. A stranger. An old word wholly forgotten here; 
but retained in Scotland. Beattie.  
     But now from me his madding mind is start, 
And wooes the widow’s daughter of the glen; 
And now fair Rosalind hath bred his smart, 
So now his friend is changed for a fren. Spenser’s Past. 
 
HU'MBLEBEE.n.s. [hum and bee. What may be the true etymology of this word, 
I am in doubt. The humblebee is known to have no sting. The Scotch call a cow 
without horns an humble cow; so that the word seems to signify inermis, wanting 
the natural weapons. Dr. Beattie.] A buzzing wild bee.  
     The honeybags steal from the humblebees, 
And for night tapers crop their waxen thighs. Shakespeare.  
     This puts us in mind once again of the humblebees and the tinderboxes.  
Atterbury. 
 
Johnson similarly credits other contemporaries with etymological information: Edward 
Lye (“Mr. Lye” in several etymologies), as well as “Dr. Lawrence,” perhaps Johnson’s 
friend, Dr. Thomas Lawrence (1711-83), (under bachelor), “Mr. Dier” (under ugly), 
George Steevens, Johnson’s collaborator on his Shakespeare edition (“Mr. Steevens” 
under beef-eater and bombast), and Francis Wise, the Oxford librarian who helped 
Johnson secure his honorary M.A. from Oxford (“Mr. Wise” under warlock/warluck). 
The relative rarity of these types of attributions also suggests that Johnson only 
infrequently felt the need to make them.  
 These qualifications aside, I assume with Anne McDermott and Marcus Walsh 
that the Dictionary contains “[e]vidence of Johnson’s shaping intelligence.”443 Even 
when amanuenses or friends such as Francis Wise supplied information to be used in 
                                                 
443 Anne McDermott and Marcus Walsh, “Editing Johnson’s Dictionary,” 45. 
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Johnson’s metatext (“This etymology was communicated by Mr. Wise.”), the decision to 
include it, and the decision about how to present it (with or without qualification or 
objection), the rationale for including it, and the method for integrating it within the 
entry—all rest with Johnson. Robert DeMaria, Jr. and Gwin J. Kolb, who make the most 
vigorous recent case for viewing the Dictionary as an act of redaction rather than an act 
of creation, conclude that the “part of the Dictionary that is truly Johnson’s . . . is in his 
commentary on the work that he presents, rather than in the body of the work itself.”444 
My own interpretation of Johnson as a linguist in the Dictionary requires that I unify 
various comments in the metatext and present them as material shaped and manipulated 
by Johnson’s “shaping intelligence,” but if I propose a kind of unity to the text of the 
Dictionary, it is not the kind of unity proposed by DeMaria—a unity of theme and 
didactic intention—but a unity of method and terminology. The Dictionary as presented 
in this dissertation is not a New Critical organic whole, but nonetheless a text unified in 
the ways I describe in Chapters 2 and 3—by the hypertextual connections within the text 
and the consistent function and voice of the metatext within the entry. Yet if the 
metatextual commentary in the Dictionary shows signs of “Johnson’s shaping 
intelligence” his interpretive methods and vocabulary draw on precedents in 
lexicography, etymology, textual criticism, phonetics, antiquarian research—the eclectic 
constellation of methods constituting eighteenth-century philology. It is this eclectic and 
interrelated set of interpretive practices that, I argue, Johnson draws on when loosely 
forming or considering his authorial audience, and this study brings attention to this 
                                                 
444 Robert DeMaria, Jr. and Gwin J. Kolb, “Johnson’s Dictionary and Dictionary Johnson,” 26.  
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interrelated set of interpretive practices. I hope with this study to provide a firmer basis 
than has yet existed for an authorial reading of the Dictionary, since its special status as a 
nationalistic icon, as a repository of nostalgia, reverence, and contempt, will continue to 
draw at least the passing attention of literary critics, cultural critics, linguists, as well as 
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